draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-06.txt   draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-07.txt 
Network Working Group A. Backman, Ed. Security Events Working Group A. Backman, Ed.
Internet-Draft Amazon Internet-Draft Amazon
Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones, Ed. Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones, Ed.
Expires: May 22, 2020 Microsoft Expires: August 8, 2020 Microsoft
M. Scurtescu M. Scurtescu
Coinbase Coinbase
M. Ansari M. Ansari
Cisco Cisco
A. Nadalin A. Nadalin
Microsoft Microsoft
November 19, 2019 February 5, 2020
Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP
draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-06 draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-07
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines how a series of Security Event Tokens This specification defines how a series of Security Event Tokens
(SETs) may be delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over (SETs) may be delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over
TLS initiated as a poll by the recipient. The specification also TLS initiated as a poll by the recipient. The specification also
defines how delivery can be assured, subject to the SET Recipient's defines how delivery can be assured, subject to the SET Recipient's
need for assurance. need for assurance.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 22, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 8, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. SET Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. SET Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Polling Delivery using HTTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Polling Delivery using HTTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Polling HTTP Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Polling HTTP Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Polling HTTP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3. Polling HTTP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4. Poll Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.4. Poll Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4.1. Poll Only Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.4.1. Poll Only Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4.2. Acknowledge Only Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.4.2. Acknowledge Only Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4.3. Poll with Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.4.3. Poll with Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4.4. Poll with Acknowledgement and Errors . . . . . . . . 9 2.4.4. Poll with Acknowledgement and Errors . . . . . . . . 9
2.5. Poll Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.5. Poll Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.5.1. Poll Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.5.1. Poll Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6. Error Response Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.6. Error Response Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. Authentication and Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3. Authentication and Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2. HTTP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.2. HTTP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3. Confidentiality of SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.3. Confidentiality of SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.4. Access Token Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.4. Access Token Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.4.1. Bearer Token Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.4.1. Bearer Token Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction and Overview 1. Introduction and Overview
This specification defines how a stream of Security Event Tokens This specification defines how a stream of Security Event Tokens
(SETs) [RFC8417] can be transmitted to an intended SET Recipient (SETs) [RFC8417] can be transmitted to an intended SET Recipient
using HTTP [RFC7231] over TLS. The specification defines a method to using HTTP [RFC7231] over TLS. The specification defines a method to
poll for SETs using HTTP POST. This is an alternative SET delivery poll for SETs using HTTP POST. This is an alternative SET delivery
method to the one defined in [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]. method to the one defined in [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push].
A mechanism for exchanging configuration metadata such as endpoint A mechanism for exchanging configuration metadata such as endpoint
URLs and cryptographic key parameters between the transmitter and URLs and cryptographic keys between the transmitter and recipient is
recipient is out of scope for this specification. How SETs are out of scope for this specification. How SETs are defined and the
defined and the process by which security events are identified for process by which security events are identified for SET Recipients
SET Recipients are specified in [RFC8417]. are specified in [RFC8417].
1.1. Notational Conventions 1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
Throughout this document, all figures MAY contain spaces and extra Throughout this document, all figures may contain spaces and extra
line wrapping for readability and due to space limitations. line wrapping for readability and due to space limitations.
1.2. Definitions 1.2. Definitions
This specification utilizes terminology defined in [RFC8417] and This specification utilizes terminology defined in [RFC8417] and
[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]. [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push].
2. SET Delivery 2. SET Delivery
When a SET is available for a SET Recipient, the SET Transmitter When a SET is available for a SET Recipient, the SET Transmitter
attempts to deliver the SET by queueing the SET in a buffer so that a queues the SET in a buffer so that a SET Recipient can poll for SETs
SET Recipient can poll for SETs using HTTP/1.1 POST. using HTTP/1.1 POST.
In Poll-Based SET Delivery Using HTTP, zero or more SETs are In Poll-Based SET Delivery Using HTTP, zero or more SETs are
delivered in a JSON [RFC8259] document to a SET Recipient in response delivered in a JSON [RFC8259] document to a SET Recipient in response
to an HTTP POST request to the SET Transmitter. Then in a following to an HTTP POST request to the SET Transmitter. Then in a following
request, the SET Recipient acknowledges received SETs and can poll request, the SET Recipient acknowledges received SETs and can poll
for more. All requests and responses are JSON documents and use a for more. All requests and responses are JSON documents and use a
"Content-Type" of "application/json", as described in Section 2.1. "Content-Type" of "application/json", as described in Section 2.1.
After successful (acknowledged) SET delivery, SET Transmitters are After successful (acknowledged) SET delivery, SET Transmitters are
not required to retain or record SETs for retransmission. Once a SET not required to retain or record SETs for retransmission. Once a SET
is acknowledged, the SET Recipient SHALL be responsible for is acknowledged, the SET Recipient SHALL be responsible for
retention, if needed. retention, if needed.
Upon receiving a SET, the SET Recipient reads the SET and validates Upon receiving a SET, the SET Recipient reads the SET and validates
it in the manner described in Section 2 of it in the manner described in Section 2 of
[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]. The SET Recipient MUST acknowledge [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]. The SET Recipient MUST acknowledge
receipt to the SET Transmitter. The SET Recipient SHALL NOT use the receipt to the SET Transmitter, and SHOULD do in a timely fashion, as
event acknowledgement mechanism to report event errors other than described in Section 2.4. The SET Recipient SHALL NOT use the event
those relating to the parsing and validation of the SET. acknowledgement mechanism to report event errors other than those
relating to the parsing and validation of the SET.
2.1. Polling Delivery using HTTP 2.1. Polling Delivery using HTTP
This method allows a SET Recipient to use HTTP POST (Section 4.3.3 of This method allows a SET Recipient to use HTTP POST (Section 4.3.3 of
[RFC7231]) to acknowledge SETs and to check for and receive zero or [RFC7231]) to acknowledge SETs and to check for and receive zero or
more SETs. Requests MAY be made at a periodic interval (short more SETs. Requests MAY be made at a periodic interval (short
polling) or requests MAY wait, pending availability of new SETs using polling) or requests MAY wait, pending availability of new SETs using
long polling, per Section 2 of [RFC6202]. long polling, per Section 2 of [RFC6202]. Note that short polling
will result in retrieving zero or more SETs whereas long polling will
typically result in retrieving one or more SETs unless a timeout
occurs.
The delivery of SETs in this method is facilitated by HTTP POST The delivery of SETs in this method is facilitated by HTTP POST
requests initiated by the SET Recipient in which: requests initiated by the SET Recipient in which:
o The SET Recipient makes a request for available SETs using an HTTP o The SET Recipient makes a request for available SETs using an HTTP
POST to a pre-arranged endpoint provided by the SET Transmitter POST to a pre-arranged endpoint provided by the SET Transmitter
or, or,
o after validating previously received SETs, the SET Recipient o after validating previously received SETs, the SET Recipient
initiates another poll request using HTTP POST that includes initiates another poll request using HTTP POST that includes
acknowledgement of previous SETs and waits for the next batch of acknowledgement of previous SETs and requests the next batch of
SETs. SETs.
The purpose of the acknowledgement is to inform the SET Transmitter The purpose of the acknowledgement is to inform the SET Transmitter
that delivery has succeeded and redelivery is no longer required. that delivery has succeeded and redelivery is no longer required.
Before acknowledgement, SET Recipients SHOULD ensure that received Before acknowledgement, SET Recipients SHOULD ensure that received
SETs have been validated and retained in a manner appropriate to the SETs have been validated and retained in a manner appropriate to the
recipient's requirements. The level and method of retention of SETs recipient's requirements. The level and method of retention of SETs
by SET Recipients is out of scope of this specification. by SET Recipients is out of scope of this specification.
2.2. Polling HTTP Request 2.2. Polling HTTP Request
When initiating a poll request, the SET Recipient constructs a JSON When initiating a poll request, the SET Recipient constructs a JSON
document that consists of polling request parameters and SET document that consists of polling request parameters and SET
acknowledgement parameters in the form of JSON objects. The request acknowledgement parameters in the form of JSON objects.
payloads are delivered in a JSON document, as described in
Section 2.4 and Section 2.5.
When making a request, the HTTP header "Content-Type" is set to When making a request, the HTTP header "Content-Type" is set to
"application/json". "application/json".
The following JSON object members are used in a polling request: The following JSON object members are used in a polling request:
Request Processing Parameters Request Processing Parameters
maxEvents maxEvents
An OPTIONAL JSON integer value indicating the maximum number of An OPTIONAL JSON integer value indicating the maximum number of
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HTTP Long Poll, per Section 2 of [RFC6202]. The timeout for HTTP Long Poll, per Section 2 of [RFC6202]. The timeout for
the request is part of the configuration between the the request is part of the configuration between the
participants, which is out of scope of this specification. participants, which is out of scope of this specification.
SET Acknowledgment Parameters SET Acknowledgment Parameters
ack ack
A JSON array of strings whose values are the "jti" values of A JSON array of strings whose values are the "jti" values of
successfully received SETs that are being acknowledged. If successfully received SETs that are being acknowledged. If
there are no outstanding SETs to acknowledge, this member is there are no outstanding SETs to acknowledge, this member is
omitted. When acknowledging a SET, the SET Transmitter is omitted. Once a SET has been acknowledged, the SET Transmitter
released from any obligation to retain the SET. is released from any obligation to retain the SET.
setErrs setErrs
A JSON object with one or more members whose keys are the "jti" A JSON object with one or more members whose keys are the "jti"
values of invalid SETs received. The values of these objects values of invalid SETs received. The values of these objects
are themselves JSON objects that describe the errors detected are themselves JSON objects that describe the errors detected
using the "err" and "description" values specified in using the "err" and "description" values specified in
Section 2.6. If there are no outstanding SETs with errors to Section 2.6. If there are no outstanding SETs with errors to
return, this member is omitted. report, this member is omitted.
2.3. Polling HTTP Response 2.3. Polling HTTP Response
In response to a poll request, the SET Transmitter checks for In response to a poll request, the SET Transmitter checks for
available SETs and responds with a JSON document containing the available SETs and responds with a JSON document containing the
following JSON object members: following JSON object members:
sets sets
A JSON object that contains zero or more nested JSON objects. A JSON object containing zero or more SETs being returned. Each
Each nested JSON object's key corresponds to the "jti" of a SET to member name is the "jti" of a SET to be delivered and its value is
be delivered, and its value is a JSON string containing the value a JSON string representing the corresponding SET. If there are no
of the encoded corresponding SET. If there are no outstanding outstanding SETs to be transmitted, the JSON object SHALL be
SETs to be transmitted, the JSON object SHALL be empty. empty.
moreAvailable moreAvailable
A JSON boolean value that indicates if more unacknowledged SETs A JSON boolean value that indicates if more unacknowledged SETs
are available to be returned. are available to be returned. This member MAY be omitted, with
the meaning being the same as including it with the boolean value
"false".
When making a response, the HTTP header "Content-Type" is set to When making a response, the HTTP header "Content-Type" is set to
"application/json". "application/json".
2.4. Poll Request 2.4. Poll Request
The SET Recipient performs an HTTP POST (see Section 4.3.4 of The SET Recipient performs an HTTP POST (see Section 4.3.4 of
[RFC7231]) to a pre-arranged polling endpoint URI to check for SETs [RFC7231]) to a pre-arranged polling endpoint URI to check for SETs
that are available. Because the SET Recipient has no prior SETs to that are available. Because the SET Recipient has no prior SETs to
acknowledge, the "ack" and "setErrs" request parameters are omitted. acknowledge, the "ack" and "setErrs" request parameters are omitted.
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POST /Events HTTP/1.1 POST /Events HTTP/1.1
Host: notify.idp.example.com Host: notify.idp.example.com
Content-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
{ {
"ack": ["3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30"], "ack": ["3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30"],
"setErrs": { "setErrs": {
"4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8": { "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8": {
"err": "jwtAud", "err": "authentication_failed",
"description": "The audience value was invalid." "description": "The SET could not be authenticated"
} }
}, },
"returnImmediately": true "returnImmediately": true
} }
Figure 5: Example Poll Acknowledgement with Error Figure 5: Example Poll Acknowledgement with Error
2.5. Poll Response 2.5. Poll Response
In response to a valid poll request, the service provider MAY respond In response to a valid poll request, the service provider MAY respond
immediately if SETs are available to be delivered. If no SETs are immediately if SETs are available to be delivered. If no SETs are
available at the time of the request, the SET Transmitter SHALL delay available at the time of the request, the SET Transmitter SHALL delay
responding until a SET is available or the timeout interval has responding until a SET is available or the timeout interval has
elapsed unless the poll request parameter "returnImmediately" is elapsed unless the poll request parameter "returnImmediately" is
"true". present with the value "true".
As described in Section 2.3, a JSON document is returned containing a As described in Section 2.3, a JSON document is returned containing
number of members including "sets", which SHALL contain zero or more members including "sets", which SHALL contain zero or more SETs.
SETs.
The following is a non-normative example response to the request The following is a non-normative example response to the request
shown in Section 2.4. This example shows two SETs being returned: shown in Section 2.4. This example shows two SETs being returned:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
{ {
"sets": { "sets": {
"4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8": "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8":
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} }
} }
Figure 6: Example Poll Response Figure 6: Example Poll Response
In the above example, two SETs whose "jti" values are In the above example, two SETs whose "jti" values are
"4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8" and "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8" and
"3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30" are delivered. "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30" are delivered.
The following is a non-normative example response to the request The following is a non-normative example response to the request
shown in Section 2.4, which indicates that no new SETs or shown in Section 2.4.1, which indicates that no new SETs or
unacknowledged SETs are available: unacknowledged SETs are available:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
{ {
"sets": {} "sets": {}
} }
Figure 7: Example No SETs Poll Response Figure 7: Example No SETs Poll Response
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[RFC7231]. [RFC7231].
Service providers MAY respond to any invalid poll request with an Service providers MAY respond to any invalid poll request with an
HTTP Response Status Code of 400 (Bad Request) even when a more HTTP Response Status Code of 400 (Bad Request) even when a more
specific code might apply, for example if the service provider deemed specific code might apply, for example if the service provider deemed
that a more specific code presented an information disclosure risk. that a more specific code presented an information disclosure risk.
When no more specific code might apply, the service provider SHALL When no more specific code might apply, the service provider SHALL
respond to an invalid poll request with an HTTP Status Code of 400. respond to an invalid poll request with an HTTP Status Code of 400.
The response body for responses to invalid poll requests is left The response body for responses to invalid poll requests is left
undefined. undefined, and its contents SHOULD be ignored.
The following is a non-normative example of a response to an invalid The following is a non-normative example of a response to an invalid
poll request: poll request:
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Example Poll Error Response Example Poll Error Response
2.6. Error Response Handling 2.6. Error Response Handling
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err err
A value from the IANA "Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes" A value from the IANA "Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes"
registry that identifies the error. registry that identifies the error.
description description
A human-readable string that provides additional diagnostic A human-readable string that provides additional diagnostic
information. information.
When included as part of a batch of SETs, the above JSON is included When included as part of a batch of SETs, the above JSON is included
as part of the "setErrs" member, as defined in Section 2.3 and as part of the "setErrs" member, as defined in Section 2.2 and
Section 2.4.4. Section 2.4.4.
When the SET Recipient includes one or more error responses in a When the SET Recipient includes one or more error responses in a
request to the SET Transmitter, it must also include in the request a request to the SET Transmitter, it must also include in the request a
"Content-Language" header whose value indicates the language of the "Content-Language" header whose value indicates the language of the
error descriptions included in the request. The method of language error descriptions included in the request. The method of language
selection in the case when the SET Recipient can provide error selection in the case when the SET Recipient can provide error
messages in multiple languages is out of scope for this messages in multiple languages is out of scope for this
specification. specification.
3. Authentication and Authorization 3. Authentication and Authorization
The SET delivery method described in this specification is based upon The SET delivery method described in this specification is based upon
HTTP and depends on the use of TLS and/or standard HTTP HTTP and and HTTP over TLS [RFC2818] and/or standard HTTP
authentication and authorization schemes, as per [RFC7235]. authentication and authorization schemes, as per [RFC7235]. The TLS
server certificate MUST be validated, per [RFC6125]. As per
As per Section 4.1 of [RFC7235], a SET delivery endpoint SHALL Section 4.1 of [RFC7235], a SET delivery endpoint SHALL indicate
indicate supported HTTP authentication schemes via the "WWW- supported HTTP authentication schemes via the "WWW-Authenticate"
Authenticate" header. header when using HTTP authentication.
Authorization for the ability to pick-up or deliver SETs can be Authorization for the eligibility to provide actionable SETs can be
determined by using the identity of the SET issuer, or via other determined by using the identity of the SET Issuer, validating the
employed authentication methods. Among other benefits, polling endpoint URL, perhaps using TLS, or via other employed
authentication can help prevent denial-of-service attacks. Because authentication methods. Among other benefits, authentication can
SETs are not commands, SET Recipients are free to ignore SETs that help prevent denial-of-service attacks. Because SETs are not
are not of interest after acknowledging their receipt. commands, SET Recipients are free to ignore SETs that are not of
interest after acknowledging their receipt.
4. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
4.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs 4.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs
In scenarios where HTTP authorization or TLS mutual authentication In scenarios where HTTP authorization or TLS mutual authentication
are not used or are considered weak, JWS signed SETs SHOULD be used are not used or are considered weak, JWS signed SETs SHOULD be used
(see [RFC7515] and Section 5 of [RFC8417]). This enables the SET (see [RFC7515] and Section 5 of [RFC8417]). This enables the SET
Recipient to validate that the SET issuer is authorized to deliver Recipient to validate that the SET Issuer is authorized to provide
the SET. actionable SETs.
4.2. HTTP Considerations 4.2. HTTP Considerations
SET delivery depends on the use of Hypertext Transfer Protocol and is SET delivery depends on the use of Hypertext Transfer Protocol and is
thus subject to the security considerations of HTTP Section 9 of thus subject to the security considerations of HTTP Section 9 of
[RFC7230] and its related specifications. [RFC7230] and its related specifications.
As stated in Section 2.7.1 of [RFC7230], an HTTP requestor MUST NOT As stated in Section 2.7.1 of [RFC7230], an HTTP requestor MUST NOT
generate the "userinfo" (i.e., username and password) component (and generate the "userinfo" (i.e., username and password) component (and
its "@" delimiter) when an "http" URI reference is generated with a its "@" delimiter) when an "http" URI reference is generated with a
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4.3. Confidentiality of SETs 4.3. Confidentiality of SETs
SETs may contain sensitive information that is considered Personally SETs may contain sensitive information that is considered Personally
Identifiable Information (PII). In such cases, SET Transmitters and Identifiable Information (PII). In such cases, SET Transmitters and
SET Recipients MUST protect the confidentiality of the SET contents SET Recipients MUST protect the confidentiality of the SET contents
by encrypting the SET as described in JWE [RFC7516], using a by encrypting the SET as described in JWE [RFC7516], using a
transport-layer security mechanism such as TLS, or both. If an Event transport-layer security mechanism such as TLS, or both. If an Event
delivery endpoint supports TLS, it MUST support at least TLS version delivery endpoint supports TLS, it MUST support at least TLS version
1.2 [RFC5246] and SHOULD support the newest version of TLS that meets 1.2 [RFC5246] and SHOULD support the newest version of TLS that meets
its security requirements. When using TLS, the client MUST perform a its security requirements, which as of the time of this publication
TLS/SSL server certificate check, per [RFC6125]. Implementation is TLS 1.3 [RFC8446]. When using TLS, the client MUST perform a TLS/
SSL server certificate check using DNS-ID [RFC6125]. Implementation
security considerations for TLS can be found in "Recommendations for security considerations for TLS can be found in "Recommendations for
Secure Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525]. Secure Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525].
4.4. Access Token Considerations 4.4. Access Token Considerations
When using access tokens, such as those issued by OAuth 2.0 If HTTP Authentication is performed using OAuth access tokens
[RFC6749], implementers MUST take into account threats and [RFC6749], implementers MUST take into account the threats and
countermeasures documented in Section 8 of [RFC7521]. countermeasures documented in Section 8 of [RFC7521].
4.4.1. Bearer Token Considerations 4.4.1. Bearer Token Considerations
Due to the possibility of interception, Bearer tokens MUST be Due to the possibility of interception, Bearer tokens [RFC6750] MUST
exchanged using TLS. be exchanged using TLS.
Bearer tokens SHOULD have a limited lifetime that can be determined Bearer tokens SHOULD have a limited lifetime that can be determined
directly or indirectly (e.g., by checking with a validation service) directly or indirectly (e.g., by checking with a validation service)
by the service provider. By expiring tokens, clients are forced to by the service provider. By expiring tokens, clients are forced to
obtain a new token (which usually involves re-authentication) for obtain a new token (which usually involves re-authentication) for
continued authorized access. For example, in OAuth 2.0, a client MAY continued authorized access. For example, in OAuth 2.0, a client MAY
use an OAuth refresh token to obtain a new bearer token after use an OAuth refresh token to obtain a new bearer token after
authenticating to an authorization server, per Section 6 of authenticating to an authorization server, per Section 6 of
[RFC6749]. [RFC6749].
Implementations supporting OAuth bearer tokens need to factor in Implementations supporting OAuth bearer tokens need to factor in
security considerations of this authorization method [RFC7521]. security considerations of this authorization method [RFC7521].
Since security is only as good as the weakest link, implementers also Since security is only as good as the weakest link, implementers also
need to consider authentication choices coupled with OAuth bearer need to consider authentication choices coupled with OAuth bearer
tokens. The security considerations of the default authentication tokens. The security considerations of the default authentication
method for OAuth bearer tokens, HTTP Basic, are well documented in method for OAuth bearer tokens, HTTP Basic, are well documented in
[RFC7617], therefore implementers are encouraged to prefer stronger [RFC7617], therefore implementers are encouraged to prefer stronger
authentication methods. Designating the specific methods of authentication methods.
authentication and authorization are out of scope for the delivery of
SETs, however this information is provided as a resource to
implementers.
5. Privacy Considerations 5. Privacy Considerations
If a SET needs to be retained for audit purposes, a JWS signature MAY
be used to provide verification of its authenticity.
SET Transmitters SHOULD attempt to deliver SETs that are targeted to SET Transmitters SHOULD attempt to deliver SETs that are targeted to
the specific business and protocol needs of subscribers. the specific business and protocol needs of subscribers.
When sharing personally identifiable information or information that When sharing personally identifiable information or information that
is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET
Transmitters and Recipients MUST have the appropriate legal Transmitters and Recipients MUST have the appropriate legal
agreements and user consent or terms of service in place. agreements and user consent or terms of service in place.
Furthermore, data that needs confidentiality protection MUST be
encrypted, either via TLS or using JSON Web Encryption (JWE)
[RFC7516], or both.
The propagation of subject identifiers can be perceived as personally In some cases, subject identifiers themselves may be considered
identifiable information. Where possible, SET Transmitters and sensitive information, such that their inclusion within a SET may be
Recipients SHOULD devise approaches that prevent propagation, for considered a violation of privacy. SET Transmitters should consider
example, the passing of a hash value that requires the subscriber to the ramifications of sharing a particular subject identifier with a
already know the subject. SET Recipient (e.g., whether doing so could enable correlation and/or
de-anonymization of data), and choose appropriate subject identifiers
for their use cases.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This specification requires no IANA actions. This specification requires no IANA actions.
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push] [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]
Backman, A., Jones, M., Scurtescu, M., Ansari, M., and A. Backman, A., Jones, M., Scurtescu, M., Ansari, M., and A.
Nadalin, "Push-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Nadalin, "Push-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery
Using HTTP", draft-ietf-secevent-http-push-07 (work in Using HTTP", draft-ietf-secevent-http-push-07 (work in
progress), July 2019. progress), July 2019.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
skipping to change at page 15, line 35 skipping to change at page 15, line 45
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>. 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", [RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015, RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
[RFC7521] Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M., and Y. Goland,
"Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication
and Authorization Grants", RFC 7521, DOI 10.17487/RFC7521,
May 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7521>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>. 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data [RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
[RFC8417] Hunt, P., Ed., Jones, M., Denniss, W., and M. Ansari, [RFC8417] Hunt, P., Ed., Jones, M., Denniss, W., and M. Ansari,
"Security Event Token (SET)", RFC 8417, "Security Event Token (SET)", RFC 8417,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8417, July 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8417, July 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8417>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8417>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[RFC6202] Loreto, S., Saint-Andre, P., Salsano, S., and G. Wilkins, [RFC6202] Loreto, S., Saint-Andre, P., Salsano, S., and G. Wilkins,
"Known Issues and Best Practices for the Use of Long "Known Issues and Best Practices for the Use of Long
Polling and Streaming in Bidirectional HTTP", RFC 6202, Polling and Streaming in Bidirectional HTTP", RFC 6202,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6202, April 2011, DOI 10.17487/RFC6202, April 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6202>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6202>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.
[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer [RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing", Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014, RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer [RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235, Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>.
[RFC7521] Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M., and Y. Goland,
"Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication
and Authorization Grants", RFC 7521, DOI 10.17487/RFC7521,
May 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7521>.
[RFC7617] Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme", [RFC7617] Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme",
RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015, RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments Appendix A. Acknowledgments
The editors would like to thank the members of the SCIM working The editors would like to thank the members of the SCIM working
group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with
draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 in 2015. draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 in 2015.
skipping to change at page 18, line 29 skipping to change at page 19, line 4
Type. Type.
o Added Content-Language requirement for error descriptions, o Added Content-Language requirement for error descriptions,
aligning with http-push. aligning with http-push.
o Stated that bearer tokens SHOULD have a limited lifetime. o Stated that bearer tokens SHOULD have a limited lifetime.
o Minor editorial fixes. o Minor editorial fixes.
Draft 05 - AB + mbj Draft 05 - AB + mbj
o Added normative text defining how to respond to invalid poll o Added normative text defining how to respond to invalid poll
requests. requests.
o Addressed shepherd comments by Yaron Sheffer. o Addressed shepherd comments by Yaron Sheffer.
Draft 06 - mbj Draft 06 - mbj
o Addressed nits identified by the idnits tool. o Addressed nits identified by the idnits tool.
Draft 07 - mbj
o Addressed area director review comments by Benjamin Kaduk.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Annabelle Backman (editor) Annabelle Backman (editor)
Amazon Amazon
Email: richanna@amazon.com Email: richanna@amazon.com
Michael B. Jones (editor) Michael B. Jones (editor)
Microsoft Microsoft
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