draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-09.txt   draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-10.txt 
Security Events Working Group A. Backman, Ed. Security Events Working Group A. Backman, Ed.
Internet-Draft Amazon Internet-Draft Amazon
Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones, Ed. Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones, Ed.
Expires: October 31, 2020 Microsoft Expires: December 6, 2020 Microsoft
M. Scurtescu M. Scurtescu
Coinbase Coinbase
M. Ansari M. Ansari
Cisco Cisco
A. Nadalin A. Nadalin
Microsoft Microsoft
April 29, 2020 June 4, 2020
Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP
draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-09 draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-10
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines how a series of Security Event Tokens This specification defines how a series of Security Event Tokens
(SETs) may be delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over (SETs) may be delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over
TLS initiated as a poll by the recipient. The specification also TLS initiated as a poll by the recipient. The specification also
defines how delivery can be assured, subject to the SET Recipient's defines how delivery can be assured, subject to the SET Recipient's
need for assurance. need for assurance.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 31, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 6, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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1.2. Definitions 1.2. Definitions
This specification utilizes terminology defined in [RFC8417] and This specification utilizes terminology defined in [RFC8417] and
[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]. [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push].
2. SET Delivery 2. SET Delivery
When a SET is available for a SET Recipient, the SET Transmitter When a SET is available for a SET Recipient, the SET Transmitter
queues the SET in a buffer so that a SET Recipient can poll for SETs queues the SET in a buffer so that a SET Recipient can poll for SETs
using HTTP/1.1 POST. using HTTP POST.
In Poll-Based SET Delivery Using HTTP, zero or more SETs are In Poll-Based SET Delivery Using HTTP, zero or more SETs are
delivered in a JSON [RFC8259] document to a SET Recipient in response delivered in a JSON [RFC8259] document to a SET Recipient in response
to an HTTP POST request to the SET Transmitter. Then in a following to an HTTP POST request to the SET Transmitter. Then in a following
request, the SET Recipient acknowledges received SETs and can poll request, the SET Recipient acknowledges received SETs and can poll
for more. All requests and responses are JSON documents and use a for more. All requests and responses are JSON documents and use a
"Content-Type" of "application/json", as described in Section 2.1. "Content-Type" of "application/json", as described in Section 2.1.
After successful (acknowledged) SET delivery, SET Transmitters are After successful (acknowledged) SET delivery, SET Transmitters are
not required to retain or record SETs for retransmission. Once a SET not required to retain or record SETs for retransmission. Once a SET
is acknowledged, the SET Recipient SHALL be responsible for is acknowledged, the SET Recipient SHALL be responsible for
retention, if needed. retention, if needed. Transmitters may also discard undelivered SETs
under deployment-specific conditions, such as if they have not been
polled for over too long a period of time or if an excessive amount
of storage is needed to retain them.
Upon receiving a SET, the SET Recipient reads the SET and validates Upon receiving a SET, the SET Recipient reads the SET and validates
it in the manner described in Section 2 of it in the manner described in Section 2 of
[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]. The SET Recipient MUST acknowledge [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]. The SET Recipient MUST acknowledge
receipt to the SET Transmitter, and SHOULD do in a timely fashion, as receipt to the SET Transmitter, and SHOULD do in a timely fashion, as
described in Section 2.4. The SET Recipient SHALL NOT use the event described in Section 2.4. The SET Recipient SHALL NOT use the event
acknowledgement mechanism to report event errors other than those acknowledgement mechanism to report event errors other than those
relating to the parsing and validation of the SET. relating to the parsing and validation of the SET.
2.1. Polling Delivery using HTTP 2.1. Polling Delivery using HTTP
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determined by using the identity of the SET Issuer, validating the determined by using the identity of the SET Issuer, validating the
polling endpoint URL, perhaps using TLS, or via other employed polling endpoint URL, perhaps using TLS, or via other employed
authentication methods. Because SETs are not commands, SET authentication methods. Because SETs are not commands, SET
Recipients are free to ignore SETs that are not of interest after Recipients are free to ignore SETs that are not of interest after
acknowledging their receipt. acknowledging their receipt.
4. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
4.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs 4.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs
In scenarios where HTTP authorization or TLS mutual authentication JWS signed SETs can be used (see [RFC7515] and Section 5 of
are not used or are considered weak, JWS signed SETs SHOULD be used [RFC8417]) to enable the SET Recipient to validate that the SET
(see [RFC7515] and Section 5 of [RFC8417]). This enables the SET Issuer is authorized to provide actionable SETs.
Recipient to validate that the SET Issuer is authorized to provide
actionable SETs.
4.2. HTTP Considerations 4.2. HTTP Considerations
SET delivery depends on the use of Hypertext Transfer Protocol and is SET delivery depends on the use of Hypertext Transfer Protocol and is
thus subject to the security considerations of HTTP Section 9 of thus subject to the security considerations of HTTP Section 9 of
[RFC7230] and its related specifications. [RFC7230] and its related specifications.
As stated in Section 2.7.1 of [RFC7230], an HTTP requestor MUST NOT
generate the "userinfo" (i.e., username and password) component (and
its "@" delimiter) when an "http" URI reference is generated with a
message, as they are now disallowed in HTTP.
4.3. Confidentiality of SETs 4.3. Confidentiality of SETs
SETs may contain sensitive information that is considered Personally SETs may contain sensitive information that is considered Personally
Identifiable Information (PII). In such cases, SET Transmitters and Identifiable Information (PII). In such cases, SET Transmitters and
SET Recipients MUST protect the confidentiality of the SET contents SET Recipients MUST protect the confidentiality of the SET contents
by encrypting the SET as described in JWE [RFC7516], using a by encrypting the SET as described in JWE [RFC7516], using a
transport-layer security mechanism such as TLS, or both. If an Event transport-layer security mechanism such as TLS, or both. If an Event
delivery endpoint supports TLS, it MUST support at least TLS version delivery endpoint supports TLS, it MUST support at least TLS version
1.2 [RFC5246] and SHOULD support the newest version of TLS that meets 1.2 [RFC5246] and SHOULD support the newest version of TLS that meets
its security requirements, which as of the time of this publication its security requirements, which as of the time of this publication
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When sharing personally identifiable information or information that When sharing personally identifiable information or information that
is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET
Transmitters and Recipients MUST have the appropriate legal Transmitters and Recipients MUST have the appropriate legal
agreements and user consent or terms of service in place. agreements and user consent or terms of service in place.
Furthermore, data that needs confidentiality protection MUST be Furthermore, data that needs confidentiality protection MUST be
encrypted, either via TLS or using JSON Web Encryption (JWE) encrypted, either via TLS or using JSON Web Encryption (JWE)
[RFC7516], or both. [RFC7516], or both.
In some cases, subject identifiers themselves may be considered In some cases, subject identifiers themselves may be considered
sensitive information, such that their inclusion within a SET may be sensitive information, such that their inclusion within a SET may be
considered a violation of privacy. SET Transmitters should consider considered a violation of privacy. SET Issuers should consider the
the ramifications of sharing a particular subject identifier with a ramifications of sharing a particular subject identifier with a SET
SET Recipient (e.g., whether doing so could enable correlation and/or Recipient (e.g., whether doing so could enable correlation and/or de-
de-anonymization of data) and choose appropriate subject identifiers anonymization of data) and choose appropriate subject identifiers for
for their use cases. their use cases.
If SETs are transmitted over unencrypted channels, some privacy-
sensitive information about them might leak, even though the SETs
themselves are encrypted. For instance, an attacker may be able to
determine whether or not a SET was accepted and the reason for its
rejection or may be able to derive information from being able to
observe the size of the encrypted SET.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This specification requires no IANA actions. This specification requires no IANA actions.
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push] [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]
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<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>.
[RFC7617] Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme", [RFC7617] Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme",
RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015, RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments Appendix A. Acknowledgments
The editors would like to thank the members of the SCIM working The editors would like to thank the members of the SCIM working
group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with
draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 in 2015. draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 in 2015. We would like to thank Phil Hunt
and the other the authors of draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02, upon
The editors would like to thank Phil Hunt and the other the authors which this specification is based. We would like to thank the
of draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02, on which this specification is participants in the SecEvents working group for their contributions
based. to this specification.
The editors would like to thank the participants in the SecEvents Additionally, we would like to thank the following individuals for
working group for their contributions to this specification. their reviews of the specification: Benjamin Kaduk, Mark Nottingham,
Yaron Sheffer, Valery Smyslov, and Robert Sparks.
Appendix B. Change Log Appendix B. Change Log
[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]] [[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
Draft 00 - AB - Based on draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02 with the Draft 00 - AB - Based on draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02 with the
following additions: following additions:
o Renamed to "Poll-Based SET Token Delivery Using HTTP" o Renamed to "Poll-Based SET Token Delivery Using HTTP"
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Draft 07 - mbj Draft 07 - mbj
o Addressed area director review comments by Benjamin Kaduk. o Addressed area director review comments by Benjamin Kaduk.
Draft 08 - mbj + AB Draft 08 - mbj + AB
o Corrected editorial nits. o Corrected editorial nits.
Draft 09 - AB Draft 09 - AB
o Addressed area director review comments by Benamin Kaduk: o Addressed area director review comments by Benjamin Kaduk:
* Added text clarifying that determining the SET Recipient's * Added text clarifying that determining the SET Recipient's
service identity is out of scope. service identity is out of scope.
* Removed unelaborated reference to use of authentication to * Removed unelaborated reference to use of authentication to
prevent DoS attacks. prevent DoS attacks.
Draft 10 - mbj
o Addressed SecDir review comments by Valery Smyslov on draft-ietf-
secevent-http-push-10 that also applied here.
o Addressed IETF last call comments by Mark Nottingham.
o Addressed GenArt review comments by Robert Sparks.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Annabelle Backman (editor) Annabelle Backman (editor)
Amazon Amazon
Email: richanna@amazon.com Email: richanna@amazon.com
Michael B. Jones (editor) Michael B. Jones (editor)
Microsoft Microsoft
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