draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-10.txt   draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-11.txt 
Security Events Working Group A. Backman, Ed. Security Events Working Group A. Backman, Ed.
Internet-Draft Amazon Internet-Draft Amazon
Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones, Ed. Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones, Ed.
Expires: December 6, 2020 Microsoft Expires: December 17, 2020 Microsoft
M. Scurtescu M. Scurtescu
Coinbase Coinbase
M. Ansari M. Ansari
Cisco Cisco
A. Nadalin A. Nadalin
Microsoft Microsoft
June 4, 2020 June 15, 2020
Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP
draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-10 draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-11
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines how a series of Security Event Tokens This specification defines how a series of Security Event Tokens
(SETs) may be delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over (SETs) can be delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over
TLS initiated as a poll by the recipient. The specification also TLS initiated as a poll by the recipient. The specification also
defines how delivery can be assured, subject to the SET Recipient's defines how delivery can be assured, subject to the SET Recipient's
need for assurance. need for assurance.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 6, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 17, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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4.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. HTTP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.2. HTTP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3. Confidentiality of SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.3. Confidentiality of SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.4. Access Token Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.4. Access Token Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.4.1. Bearer Token Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.4.1. Bearer Token Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Appendix A. Unencrypted Transport Considerations . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix C. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction and Overview 1. Introduction and Overview
This specification defines how a stream of Security Event Tokens This specification defines how a stream of Security Event Tokens
(SETs) [RFC8417] can be transmitted to an intended SET Recipient (SETs) [RFC8417] can be transmitted to an intended SET Recipient
using HTTP [RFC7231] over TLS. The specification defines a method to using HTTP [RFC7231] over TLS. The specification defines a method to
poll for SETs using HTTP POST. This is an alternative SET delivery poll for SETs using HTTP POST. This is an alternative SET delivery
method to the one defined in [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]. method to the one defined in [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push].
skipping to change at page 3, line 33 skipping to change at page 3, line 35
This specification utilizes terminology defined in [RFC8417] and This specification utilizes terminology defined in [RFC8417] and
[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]. [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push].
2. SET Delivery 2. SET Delivery
When a SET is available for a SET Recipient, the SET Transmitter When a SET is available for a SET Recipient, the SET Transmitter
queues the SET in a buffer so that a SET Recipient can poll for SETs queues the SET in a buffer so that a SET Recipient can poll for SETs
using HTTP POST. using HTTP POST.
In Poll-Based SET Delivery Using HTTP, zero or more SETs are In poll-based SET delivery using HTTP over TLS, zero or more SETs are
delivered in a JSON [RFC8259] document to a SET Recipient in response delivered in a JSON [RFC8259] document to a SET Recipient in response
to an HTTP POST request to the SET Transmitter. Then in a following to an HTTP POST request to the SET Transmitter. Then in a following
request, the SET Recipient acknowledges received SETs and can poll request, the SET Recipient acknowledges received SETs and can poll
for more. All requests and responses are JSON documents and use a for more. All requests and responses are JSON documents and use a
"Content-Type" of "application/json", as described in Section 2.1. "Content-Type" of "application/json", as described in Section 2.1.
After successful (acknowledged) SET delivery, SET Transmitters are After successful (acknowledged) SET delivery, SET Transmitters are
not required to retain or record SETs for retransmission. Once a SET not required to retain or record SETs for retransmission. Once a SET
is acknowledged, the SET Recipient SHALL be responsible for is acknowledged, the SET Recipient SHALL be responsible for
retention, if needed. Transmitters may also discard undelivered SETs retention, if needed. Transmitters may also discard undelivered SETs
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request to the SET Transmitter, it must also include in the request a request to the SET Transmitter, it must also include in the request a
"Content-Language" header whose value indicates the language of the "Content-Language" header whose value indicates the language of the
error descriptions included in the request. The method of language error descriptions included in the request. The method of language
selection in the case when the SET Recipient can provide error selection in the case when the SET Recipient can provide error
messages in multiple languages is out of scope for this messages in multiple languages is out of scope for this
specification. specification.
3. Authentication and Authorization 3. Authentication and Authorization
The SET delivery method described in this specification is based upon The SET delivery method described in this specification is based upon
HTTP and HTTP over TLS [RFC2818] and/or standard HTTP authentication HTTP over TLS [RFC2818] and standard HTTP authentication and
and authorization schemes, as per [RFC7235]. The TLS server authorization schemes, as per [RFC7235]. The TLS server certificate
certificate MUST be validated, per [RFC6125]. As per Section 4.1 of MUST be validated, per [RFC6125]. As per Section 4.1 of [RFC7235], a
[RFC7235], a SET delivery endpoint SHALL indicate supported HTTP SET delivery endpoint SHALL indicate supported HTTP authentication
authentication schemes via the "WWW-Authenticate" header when using schemes via the "WWW-Authenticate" header when using HTTP
HTTP authentication. authentication.
Authorization for the eligibility to provide actionable SETs can be Authorization for the eligibility to provide actionable SETs can be
determined by using the identity of the SET Issuer, validating the determined by using the identity of the SET Issuer, validating the
polling endpoint URL, perhaps using TLS, or via other employed polling endpoint URL, perhaps using mutual TLS, or via other employed
authentication methods. Because SETs are not commands, SET authentication methods. Because SETs are not commands, SET
Recipients are free to ignore SETs that are not of interest after Recipients are free to ignore SETs that are not of interest after
acknowledging their receipt. acknowledging their receipt.
4. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
4.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs 4.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs
JWS signed SETs can be used (see [RFC7515] and Section 5 of JWS signed SETs can be used (see [RFC7515] and Section 5 of
[RFC8417]) to enable the SET Recipient to validate that the SET [RFC8417]) to enable the SET Recipient to validate that the SET
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4.2. HTTP Considerations 4.2. HTTP Considerations
SET delivery depends on the use of Hypertext Transfer Protocol and is SET delivery depends on the use of Hypertext Transfer Protocol and is
thus subject to the security considerations of HTTP Section 9 of thus subject to the security considerations of HTTP Section 9 of
[RFC7230] and its related specifications. [RFC7230] and its related specifications.
4.3. Confidentiality of SETs 4.3. Confidentiality of SETs
SETs may contain sensitive information that is considered Personally SETs may contain sensitive information that is considered Personally
Identifiable Information (PII). In such cases, SET Transmitters and Identifiable Information (PII). In such cases, SET Transmitters and
SET Recipients MUST protect the confidentiality of the SET contents SET Recipients MUST protect the confidentiality of the SET contents.
by encrypting the SET as described in JWE [RFC7516], using a In some use cases, using TLS to secure the transmitted SETs will be
transport-layer security mechanism such as TLS, or both. If an Event sufficient. In other use cases, encrypting the SET as described in
delivery endpoint supports TLS, it MUST support at least TLS version JWE [RFC7516] will also be required. The Event delivery endpoint
1.2 [RFC5246] and SHOULD support the newest version of TLS that meets MUST support at least TLS version 1.2 [RFC5246] and SHOULD support
its security requirements, which as of the time of this publication the newest version of TLS that meets its security requirements, which
is TLS 1.3 [RFC8446]. When using TLS, the client MUST perform a TLS/ as of the time of this publication is TLS 1.3 [RFC8446]. The client
SSL server certificate check using DNS-ID [RFC6125]. How a SET MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check using DNS-ID
Recipient determines the expected service identity to match the SET [RFC6125]. How a SET Recipient determines the expected service
Transmitter's server certificate against is out of scope for this identity to match the SET Transmitter's server certificate against is
document. Implementation security considerations for TLS can be out of scope for this document. Implementation security
found in "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525]. considerations for TLS can be found in "Recommendations for Secure
Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525].
4.4. Access Token Considerations 4.4. Access Token Considerations
If HTTP Authentication is performed using OAuth access tokens If HTTP Authentication is performed using OAuth access tokens
[RFC6749], implementers MUST take into account the threats and [RFC6749], implementers MUST take into account the threats and
countermeasures documented in Section 8 of [RFC7521]. countermeasures documented in Section 8 of [RFC7521].
4.4.1. Bearer Token Considerations 4.4.1. Bearer Token Considerations
Due to the possibility of interception, Bearer tokens [RFC6750] MUST Transmitting Bearer tokens [RFC6750] using TLS helps prevent their
be exchanged using TLS. interception.
Bearer tokens SHOULD have a limited lifetime that can be determined Bearer tokens SHOULD have a limited lifetime that can be determined
directly or indirectly (e.g., by checking with a validation service) directly or indirectly (e.g., by checking with a validation service)
by the service provider. By expiring tokens, clients are forced to by the service provider. By expiring tokens, clients are forced to
obtain a new token (which usually involves re-authentication) for obtain a new token (which usually involves re-authentication) for
continued authorized access. For example, in OAuth 2.0, a client MAY continued authorized access. For example, in OAuth 2.0, a client MAY
use an OAuth refresh token to obtain a new bearer token after use an OAuth refresh token to obtain a new bearer token after
authenticating to an authorization server, per Section 6 of authenticating to an authorization server, per Section 6 of
[RFC6749]. [RFC6749].
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5. Privacy Considerations 5. Privacy Considerations
SET Transmitters SHOULD attempt to deliver SETs that are targeted to SET Transmitters SHOULD attempt to deliver SETs that are targeted to
the specific business and protocol needs of subscribers. the specific business and protocol needs of subscribers.
When sharing personally identifiable information or information that When sharing personally identifiable information or information that
is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET
Transmitters and Recipients MUST have the appropriate legal Transmitters and Recipients MUST have the appropriate legal
agreements and user consent or terms of service in place. agreements and user consent or terms of service in place.
Furthermore, data that needs confidentiality protection MUST be Furthermore, data that needs confidentiality protection MUST be
encrypted, either via TLS or using JSON Web Encryption (JWE) encrypted, at least with TLS and sometimes also using JSON Web
[RFC7516], or both. Encryption (JWE) [RFC7516].
In some cases, subject identifiers themselves may be considered In some cases, subject identifiers themselves may be considered
sensitive information, such that their inclusion within a SET may be sensitive information, such that their inclusion within a SET may be
considered a violation of privacy. SET Issuers should consider the considered a violation of privacy. SET Issuers should consider the
ramifications of sharing a particular subject identifier with a SET ramifications of sharing a particular subject identifier with a SET
Recipient (e.g., whether doing so could enable correlation and/or de- Recipient (e.g., whether doing so could enable correlation and/or de-
anonymization of data) and choose appropriate subject identifiers for anonymization of data) and choose appropriate subject identifiers for
their use cases. their use cases.
If SETs are transmitted over unencrypted channels, some privacy-
sensitive information about them might leak, even though the SETs
themselves are encrypted. For instance, an attacker may be able to
determine whether or not a SET was accepted and the reason for its
rejection or may be able to derive information from being able to
observe the size of the encrypted SET.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This specification requires no IANA actions. This specification requires no IANA actions.
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push] [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]
Backman, A., Jones, M., Scurtescu, M., Ansari, M., and A. Backman, A., Jones, M., Scurtescu, M., Ansari, M., and A.
Nadalin, "Push-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Nadalin, "Push-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery
Using HTTP", draft-ietf-secevent-http-push-08 (work in Using HTTP", draft-ietf-secevent-http-push-11 (work in
progress), February 2020. progress), June 2020.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000, DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
skipping to change at page 17, line 5 skipping to change at page 16, line 45
[RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer [RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235, Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>.
[RFC7617] Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme", [RFC7617] Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme",
RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015, RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments Appendix A. Unencrypted Transport Considerations
Earlier versions of this specification made the use of TLS optional
and described security and privacy considerations resulting from use
of unencrypted HTTP as the underlying transport. When the working
group decided to mandate usage HTTP over TLS, it also decided to
preserve the description of these considerations in a non-normative
manner.
The considerations for using unencrypted HTTP with this protocol are
the same as those described in Appendix A of
[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push], and are therefore not repeated here.
Appendix B. Acknowledgments
The editors would like to thank the members of the SCIM working The editors would like to thank the members of the SCIM working
group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with
draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 in 2015. We would like to thank Phil Hunt draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 in 2015. We would like to thank Phil Hunt
and the other the authors of draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02, upon and the other the authors of draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02, upon
which this specification is based. We would like to thank the which this specification is based. We would like to thank the
participants in the SecEvents working group for their contributions participants in the SecEvents working group for their contributions
to this specification. to this specification.
Additionally, we would like to thank the following individuals for Additionally, we would like to thank the following individuals for
their reviews of the specification: Benjamin Kaduk, Mark Nottingham, their reviews of the specification: Benjamin Kaduk, Mark Nottingham,
Yaron Sheffer, Valery Smyslov, and Robert Sparks. Yaron Sheffer, Valery Smyslov, and Robert Sparks.
Appendix B. Change Log Appendix C. Change Log
[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]] [[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
Draft 00 - AB - Based on draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02 with the Draft 00 - AB - Based on draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02 with the
following additions: following additions:
o Renamed to "Poll-Based SET Token Delivery Using HTTP" o Renamed to "Poll-Based SET Token Delivery Using HTTP"
o Removed references to the HTTP Push delivery method. o Removed references to the HTTP Push delivery method.
skipping to change at page 19, line 32 skipping to change at page 19, line 36
Draft 10 - mbj Draft 10 - mbj
o Addressed SecDir review comments by Valery Smyslov on draft-ietf- o Addressed SecDir review comments by Valery Smyslov on draft-ietf-
secevent-http-push-10 that also applied here. secevent-http-push-10 that also applied here.
o Addressed IETF last call comments by Mark Nottingham. o Addressed IETF last call comments by Mark Nottingham.
o Addressed GenArt review comments by Robert Sparks. o Addressed GenArt review comments by Robert Sparks.
Draft 11 - mbj
o Revised to unambiguously require the use of TLS, while preserving
descriptions of precautions needed for non-TLS use in an appendix.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Annabelle Backman (editor) Annabelle Backman (editor)
Amazon Amazon
Email: richanna@amazon.com Email: richanna@amazon.com
Michael B. Jones (editor) Michael B. Jones (editor)
Microsoft Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com Email: mbj@microsoft.com
URI: http://self-issued.info/ URI: https://self-issued.info/
Marius Scurtescu Marius Scurtescu
Coinbase Coinbase
Email: marius.scurtescu@coinbase.com Email: marius.scurtescu@coinbase.com
Morteza Ansari Morteza Ansari
Cisco Cisco
Email: morteza.ansari@cisco.com Email: morteza.ansari@cisco.com
Anthony Nadalin Anthony Nadalin
Microsoft Microsoft
Email: tonynad@microsoft.com Email: tonynad@microsoft.com
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