draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-11.txt   draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-12.txt 
Security Events Working Group A. Backman, Ed. Security Events Working Group A. Backman, Ed.
Internet-Draft Amazon Internet-Draft Amazon
Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones, Ed. Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones, Ed.
Expires: December 17, 2020 Microsoft Expires: December 26, 2020 Microsoft
M. Scurtescu M. Scurtescu
Coinbase Coinbase
M. Ansari M. Ansari
Cisco Cisco
A. Nadalin A. Nadalin
Microsoft Microsoft
June 15, 2020 June 24, 2020
Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP
draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-11 draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-12
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines how a series of Security Event Tokens This specification defines how a series of Security Event Tokens
(SETs) can be delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over (SETs) can be delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over
TLS initiated as a poll by the recipient. The specification also TLS initiated as a poll by the recipient. The specification also
defines how delivery can be assured, subject to the SET Recipient's defines how delivery can be assured, subject to the SET Recipient's
need for assurance. need for assurance.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 17, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 26, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. SET Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. SET Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Polling Delivery using HTTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Polling Delivery using HTTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Polling HTTP Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Polling HTTP Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Polling HTTP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3. Polling HTTP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4. Poll Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.4. Poll Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4.1. Poll Only Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.4.1. Poll-Only Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4.2. Acknowledge Only Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.4.2. Acknowledge-Only Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4.3. Poll with Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.4.3. Poll with Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4.4. Poll with Acknowledgement and Errors . . . . . . . . 9 2.4.4. Poll with Acknowledgement and Errors . . . . . . . . 10
2.5. Poll Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.5. Poll Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.5.1. Poll Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.5.1. Poll Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.6. Error Response Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.6. Error Response Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3. Authentication and Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3. Authentication and Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2. HTTP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.2. HTTP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3. Confidentiality of SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.3. Confidentiality of SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.4. Access Token Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.4. Access Token Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.4.1. Bearer Token Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.4.1. Bearer Token Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. Unencrypted Transport Considerations . . . . . . . . 16 Appendix A. Unencrypted Transport Considerations . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Appendix B. Other Streaming Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix C. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Appendix C. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Appendix D. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction and Overview 1. Introduction and Overview
This specification defines how a stream of Security Event Tokens This specification defines how a stream of Security Event Tokens
(SETs) [RFC8417] can be transmitted to an intended SET Recipient (SETs) [RFC8417] can be transmitted to an intended SET Recipient
using HTTP [RFC7231] over TLS. The specification defines a method to using HTTP [RFC7231] over TLS. The specification defines a method to
poll for SETs using HTTP POST. This is an alternative SET delivery poll for SETs using HTTP POST. This is an alternative SET delivery
method to the one defined in [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]. method to the one defined in [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push].
Poll-based SET delivery is intended for scenarios where all of the
following apply:
o The recipient of the SET is capable of making outbound HTTP
requests.
o The transmitter is capable of hosting a TLS-enabled HTTP endpoint
that is accessible to the recipient.
o The transmitter and recipient are willing to exchange data with
one another.
In some scenarios, either push-based or poll-based delivery could be
used, and in others, only one of them would be applicable.
A mechanism for exchanging configuration metadata such as endpoint A mechanism for exchanging configuration metadata such as endpoint
URLs and cryptographic keys between the transmitter and recipient is URLs, cryptographic keys, and possible implementation constraints
out of scope for this specification. How SETs are defined and the such as buffer size limitations between the transmitter and recipient
is out of scope for this specification. How SETs are defined and the
process by which security events are identified for SET Recipients process by which security events are identified for SET Recipients
are specified in [RFC8417]. are specified in [RFC8417].
1.1. Notational Conventions 1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
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After successful (acknowledged) SET delivery, SET Transmitters are After successful (acknowledged) SET delivery, SET Transmitters are
not required to retain or record SETs for retransmission. Once a SET not required to retain or record SETs for retransmission. Once a SET
is acknowledged, the SET Recipient SHALL be responsible for is acknowledged, the SET Recipient SHALL be responsible for
retention, if needed. Transmitters may also discard undelivered SETs retention, if needed. Transmitters may also discard undelivered SETs
under deployment-specific conditions, such as if they have not been under deployment-specific conditions, such as if they have not been
polled for over too long a period of time or if an excessive amount polled for over too long a period of time or if an excessive amount
of storage is needed to retain them. of storage is needed to retain them.
Upon receiving a SET, the SET Recipient reads the SET and validates Upon receiving a SET, the SET Recipient reads the SET and validates
it in the manner described in Section 2 of it in the manner described in Section 2 of
[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]. The SET Recipient MUST acknowledge [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]. The SET Recipient MUST acknowledge
receipt to the SET Transmitter, and SHOULD do in a timely fashion, as receipt to the SET Transmitter, and SHOULD do so in a timely fashion,
described in Section 2.4. The SET Recipient SHALL NOT use the event as described in Section 2.4. The SET Recipient SHALL NOT use the
acknowledgement mechanism to report event errors other than those event acknowledgement mechanism to report event errors other than
relating to the parsing and validation of the SET. those relating to the parsing and validation of the SET.
2.1. Polling Delivery using HTTP 2.1. Polling Delivery using HTTP
This method allows a SET Recipient to use HTTP POST (Section 4.3.3 of This method allows a SET Recipient to use HTTP POST (Section 4.3.3 of
[RFC7231]) to acknowledge SETs and to check for and receive zero or [RFC7231]) to acknowledge SETs and to check for and receive zero or
more SETs. Requests MAY be made at a periodic interval (short more SETs. Requests MAY be made at a periodic interval (short
polling) or requests MAY wait, pending availability of new SETs using polling) or requests MAY wait, pending availability of new SETs using
long polling, per Section 2 of [RFC6202]. Note that short polling long polling, per Section 2 of [RFC6202]. Note that short polling
will result in retrieving zero or more SETs whereas long polling will will result in retrieving zero or more SETs whereas long polling will
typically result in retrieving one or more SETs unless a timeout typically result in retrieving one or more SETs unless a timeout
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POST to a pre-arranged endpoint provided by the SET Transmitter POST to a pre-arranged endpoint provided by the SET Transmitter
or, or,
o after validating previously received SETs, the SET Recipient o after validating previously received SETs, the SET Recipient
initiates another poll request using HTTP POST that includes initiates another poll request using HTTP POST that includes
acknowledgement of previous SETs and requests the next batch of acknowledgement of previous SETs and requests the next batch of
SETs. SETs.
The purpose of the acknowledgement is to inform the SET Transmitter The purpose of the acknowledgement is to inform the SET Transmitter
that delivery has succeeded and redelivery is no longer required. that delivery has succeeded and redelivery is no longer required.
Before acknowledgement, SET Recipients SHOULD ensure that received
SETs have been validated and retained in a manner appropriate to the Before acknowledgement, SET Recipients validate the received SETs and
recipient's requirements. The level and method of retention of SETs retain them in a manner appropriate to the recipient's requirements.
by SET Recipients is out of scope of this specification. The level and method of retention of SETs by SET Recipients is out of
scope of this specification.
2.2. Polling HTTP Request 2.2. Polling HTTP Request
When initiating a poll request, the SET Recipient constructs a JSON When initiating a poll request, the SET Recipient constructs a JSON
document that consists of polling request parameters and SET document that consists of polling request parameters and SET
acknowledgement parameters in the form of JSON objects. acknowledgement parameters in the form of JSON objects.
When making a request, the HTTP header "Content-Type" is set to When making a request, the HTTP "Content-Type" header field is set to
"application/json". "application/json".
The following JSON object members are used in a polling request: The following JSON object members are used in a polling request:
Request Processing Parameters Request Processing Parameters
maxEvents maxEvents
An OPTIONAL JSON integer value indicating the maximum number of An OPTIONAL integer value indicating the maximum number of
unacknowledged SETs that SHOULD be returned. If more than the unacknowledged SETs to be returned. The SET Transmitter SHOULD
maximum number of SETs are available, the oldest SETs available NOT send more SETs than the specified maximum. If more than
SHOULD be returned first. A value of "0" MAY be used by SET the maximum number of SETs are available, the SET Transmitter
Recipients that would like to perform an acknowledge only determines which to return first; the oldest SETs available MAY
returned first, or another selection algorithm MAY be used,
such as prioritizing SETs in some manner that makes sense for
the use case. first. A value of "0" MAY be used by SET
Recipients that would like to perform an acknowledge-only
request. This enables the Recipient to use separate HTTP request. This enables the Recipient to use separate HTTP
requests for acknowledgement and reception of SETs. If this requests for acknowledgement and reception of SETs. If this
parameter is omitted, no limit is placed on the number of SETs parameter is omitted, no limit is placed on the number of SETs
to be returned. to be returned.
returnImmediately returnImmediately
An OPTIONAL JSON boolean value that indicates the SET An OPTIONAL JSON boolean value that indicates the SET
Transmitter SHOULD return an immediate response even if no Transmitter SHOULD return an immediate response even if no
results are available (short polling). The default value is results are available (short polling). The default value is
"false", which indicates the request is to be treated as an "false", which indicates the request is to be treated as an
HTTP Long Poll, per Section 2 of [RFC6202]. The timeout for HTTP Long Poll, per Section 2 of [RFC6202]. The timeout for
the request is part of the configuration between the the request is part of the configuration between the
participants, which is out of scope of this specification. participants, which is out of scope of this specification.
SET Acknowledgment Parameters SET Acknowledgment Parameters
ack ack
A JSON array of strings whose values are the "jti" values of A JSON array of strings whose values are the "jti" [RFC7519]
successfully received SETs that are being acknowledged. If values of successfully received SETs that are being
there are no outstanding SETs to acknowledge, this member is acknowledged. If there are no outstanding SETs to acknowledge,
omitted. Once a SET has been acknowledged, the SET Transmitter this member is omitted or contains an empty array. Once a SET
is released from any obligation to retain the SET. has been acknowledged, the SET Transmitter is released from any
obligation to retain the SET.
setErrs setErrs
A JSON object with one or more members whose keys are the "jti" A JSON object with one or more members whose keys are the "jti"
values of invalid SETs received. The values of these objects values of invalid SETs received. The values of these objects
are themselves JSON objects that describe the errors detected are themselves JSON objects that describe the errors detected
using the "err" and "description" values specified in using the "err" and "description" values specified in
Section 2.6. If there are no outstanding SETs with errors to Section 2.6. If there are no outstanding SETs with errors to
report, this member is omitted. report, this member is omitted or contains an empty JSON
object.
2.3. Polling HTTP Response 2.3. Polling HTTP Response
In response to a poll request, the SET Transmitter checks for In response to a poll request, the SET Transmitter checks for
available SETs and responds with a JSON document containing the available SETs and responds with a JSON document containing the
following JSON object members: following JSON object members:
sets sets
A JSON object containing zero or more SETs being returned. Each A JSON object containing zero or more SETs being returned. Each
member name is the "jti" of a SET to be delivered and its value is member name is the "jti" of a SET to be delivered and its value is
a JSON string representing the corresponding SET. If there are no a JSON string representing the corresponding SET. If there are no
outstanding SETs to be transmitted, the JSON object SHALL be outstanding SETs to be transmitted, the JSON object SHALL be
empty. empty. Note that both SETs being transmitted for the first time
and SETs that are being re-transmitted after not having been
acknowledged are communicated here.
moreAvailable moreAvailable
A JSON boolean value that indicates if more unacknowledged SETs A JSON boolean value that indicates if more unacknowledged SETs
are available to be returned. This member MAY be omitted, with are available to be returned. This member MAY be omitted, with
the meaning being the same as including it with the boolean value the meaning being the same as including it with the boolean value
"false". "false".
When making a response, the HTTP header "Content-Type" is set to When making a response, the HTTP "Content-Type" header field is set
"application/json". to "application/json".
2.4. Poll Request 2.4. Poll Request
The SET Recipient performs an HTTP POST (see Section 4.3.4 of The SET Recipient performs an HTTP POST (see Section 4.3.4 of
[RFC7231]) to a pre-arranged polling endpoint URI to check for SETs [RFC7231]) to a pre-arranged polling endpoint URI to check for SETs
that are available. Because the SET Recipient has no prior SETs to that are available. Because the SET Recipient has no prior SETs to
acknowledge, the "ack" and "setErrs" request parameters are omitted. acknowledge, the "ack" and "setErrs" request parameters are omitted.
After a period of time configured between the SET Transmitter and After a period of time configured in an out-of-band manner between
Recipient, a SET Transmitter MAY redeliver SETs it has previously the SET Transmitter and Recipient, a SET Transmitter MAY redeliver
delivered. The SET Recipient SHOULD accept repeat SETs and SETs it has previously delivered. The SET Recipient SHOULD accept
acknowledge the SETs regardless of whether the Recipient believes it repeat SETs and acknowledge the SETs regardless of whether the
has already acknowledged the SETs previously. A SET Transmitter MAY Recipient believes it has already acknowledged the SETs previously.
limit the number of times it attempts to deliver a SET. A SET Transmitter MAY limit the number of times it attempts to
deliver a SET.
If the SET Recipient has received SETs from the SET Transmitter, the If the SET Recipient has received SETs from the SET Transmitter, the
SET Recipient SHOULD parse and validate received SETs to meet its own SET Recipient parses and validates that received SETs meet its own
requirements and SHOULD acknowledge receipt in a timely fashion requirements and SHOULD acknowledge receipt in a timely fashion
(e.g., seconds or minutes) so that the SET Transmitter can mark the (e.g., seconds or minutes) so that the SET Transmitter can mark the
SETs as received. SET Recipients SHOULD acknowledge receipt before SETs as received. SET Recipients SHOULD acknowledge receipt before
taking any local actions based on the SETs to avoid unnecessary delay taking any local actions based on the SETs to avoid unnecessary delay
in acknowledgement, where possible. in acknowledgement, where possible.
Poll requests have three variations: Poll requests have three variations:
Poll Only Poll-Only
In which a SET Recipient asks for the next set of events where no In which a SET Recipient asks for the next set of events where no
previous SET deliveries are acknowledged (such as in the initial previous SET deliveries are acknowledged (such as in the initial
poll request). poll request).
Acknowledge Only Acknowledge-Only
In which a SET Recipient sets the "maxEvents" value to "0" along In which a SET Recipient sets the "maxEvents" value to "0" along
with "ack" and "setErrs" members indicating the SET Recipient is with "ack" and "setErrs" members indicating the SET Recipient is
acknowledging previously received SETs and does not want to acknowledging previously received SETs and does not want to
receive any new SETs in response to the request. receive any new SETs in response to the request.
Combined Acknowledge and Poll Combined Acknowledge and Poll
In which a SET Recipient is both acknowledging previously received In which a SET Recipient is both acknowledging previously received
SETs using the "ack" and "setErrs" members and will wait for the SETs using the "ack" and "setErrs" members and will wait for the
next group of SETs in the SET Transmitters response. next group of SETs in the SET Transmitters response.
2.4.1. Poll Only Request 2.4.1. Poll-Only Request
In the case where no SETs were received in a previous poll (see In the case where no SETs were received in a previous poll (see
Figure 7), the SET Recipient simply polls without acknowledgement Figure 7), the SET Recipient simply polls without acknowledgement
parameters ("ack" and "setErrs"). parameters ("ack" and "setErrs").
The following is an example request made by a SET Recipient that has The following is a non-normative example request made by a SET
no outstanding SETs to acknowledge and is polling for available SETs Recipient that has no outstanding SETs to acknowledge and is polling
at the endpoint "https://notify.idp.example.com/Events": for available SETs at the endpoint "https://notify.idp.example.com/
Events":
POST /Events HTTP/1.1 POST /Events HTTP/1.1
Host: notify.idp.example.com Host: notify.idp.example.com
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
{ {
"returnImmediately": true "returnImmediately": true
} }
Figure 1: Example Initial Poll Request Figure 1: Example Initial Poll Request
A SET Recipient can poll using default parameter values by passing an A SET Recipient can poll using default parameter values by passing an
empty JSON object. empty JSON object.
The following is a non-normative example default poll request to the The following is a non-normative example default poll request to the
endpoint "https://notify.idp.example.com/Events": endpoint "https://notify.idp.example.com/Events":
POST /Events HTTP/1.1 POST /Events HTTP/1.1
Host: notify.idp.example.com Host: notify.idp.example.com
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
{} {}
Figure 2: Example Default Poll Request Figure 2: Example Default Poll Request
2.4.2. Acknowledge Only Request 2.4.2. Acknowledge-Only Request
In this variation, the SET Recipient acknowledges previously received In this variation, the SET Recipient acknowledges previously received
SETs and indicates it does not want to receive SETs in response by SETs and indicates it does not want to receive SETs in response by
setting the "maxEvents" value to "0". setting the "maxEvents" value to "0". This variation might be used,
for instance, when a SET Recipient needs to acknowledge received SETs
independently (e.g., on separate threads) from the process of
receiving SETs.
This variation might be used, for instance, when a SET Recipient If the poll needs to return immediately, then "returnImmediately"
needs to acknowledge received SETs independently (e.g., on separate MUST also be present with the value "true". If it is "false", then a
threads) from the process of receiving SETs. long poll will still occur until an event is ready to be returned,
even though no events will be returned.
The following is a non-normative example poll request with The following is a non-normative example poll request with
acknowledgement of SETs received (for example as shown in Figure 6): acknowledgement of SETs received (for example as shown in Figure 6):
POST /Events HTTP/1.1 POST /Events HTTP/1.1
Host: notify.idp.example.com Host: notify.idp.example.com
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
{ {
"ack": [ "ack": [
"4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8", "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8",
"3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30" "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30"
], ],
"maxEvents": 0, "maxEvents": 0,
"returnImmediately": true "returnImmediately": true
} }
Figure 3: Example Acknowledge Only Request Figure 3: Example Acknowledge-Only Request
2.4.3. Poll with Acknowledgement 2.4.3. Poll with Acknowledgement
This variation allows a recipient thread to simultaneously This variation allows a recipient thread to simultaneously
acknowledge previously received SETs and wait for the next group of acknowledge previously received SETs and wait for the next group of
SETs in a single request. SETs in a single request.
The following is a non-normative example poll with acknowledgement of The following is a non-normative example poll with acknowledgement of
the SETs received in Figure 6: the SETs received in Figure 6:
POST /Events HTTP/1.1 POST /Events HTTP/1.1
Host: notify.idp.example.com Host: notify.idp.example.com
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
{ {
"ack": [ "ack": [
"4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8", "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8",
"3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30" "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30"
], ],
"returnImmediately": false "returnImmediately": false
} }
Figure 4: Example Poll with Acknowledgement and No Errors Figure 4: Example Poll with Acknowledgement and No Errors
In the above acknowledgement, the SET Recipient has acknowledged In the above acknowledgement, the SET Recipient has acknowledged
receipt of two SETs and has indicated it wants to wait until the next receipt of two SETs and has indicated it wants to wait until the next
SET is available. SET is available.
2.4.4. Poll with Acknowledgement and Errors 2.4.4. Poll with Acknowledgement and Errors
In the case where errors were detected in previously delivered SETs, In the case where errors were detected in previously delivered SETs,
the SET Recipient MAY use the "setErrs" member to communicate the the SET Recipient MAY use the "setErrs" member to communicate the
errors in the following poll request. errors in the following poll request.
The following is a non-normative example of a response acknowledging The following is a non-normative example of a response acknowledging
one successfully received SET and one SET with an error from the two one successfully received SET and one SET with an error from the two
SETs received in Figure 6: SETs received in Figure 6:
POST /Events HTTP/1.1 POST /Events HTTP/1.1
Host: notify.idp.example.com Host: notify.idp.example.com
Content-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
{ {
"ack": ["3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30"], "ack": ["3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30"],
"setErrs": { "setErrs": {
"4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8": { "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8": {
"err": "authentication_failed", "err": "authentication_failed",
"description": "The SET could not be authenticated" "description": "The SET could not be authenticated"
} }
}, },
"returnImmediately": true "returnImmediately": true
} }
Figure 5: Example Poll Acknowledgement with Error Figure 5: Example Poll Acknowledgement with Error
2.5. Poll Response 2.5. Poll Response
In response to a valid poll request, the service provider MAY respond In response to a valid poll request, the service provider MAY respond
immediately if SETs are available to be delivered. If no SETs are immediately if SETs are available to be delivered. If no SETs are
available at the time of the request, the SET Transmitter SHALL delay available at the time of the request, the SET Transmitter SHALL delay
responding until a SET is available or the timeout interval has responding until a SET is available or the timeout interval has
elapsed unless the poll request parameter "returnImmediately" is elapsed unless the poll request parameter "returnImmediately" is
skipping to change at page 11, line 9 skipping to change at page 12, line 9
Figure 6: Example Poll Response Figure 6: Example Poll Response
In the above example, two SETs whose "jti" values are In the above example, two SETs whose "jti" values are
"4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8" and "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8" and
"3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30" are delivered. "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30" are delivered.
The following is a non-normative example response to the request The following is a non-normative example response to the request
shown in Section 2.4.1, which indicates that no new SETs or shown in Section 2.4.1, which indicates that no new SETs or
unacknowledged SETs are available: unacknowledged SETs are available:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
{ {
"sets": {} "sets": {}
} }
Figure 7: Example No SETs Poll Response Figure 7: Example No SETs Poll Response
Upon receiving the JSON document (e.g., as shown in Figure 6), the Upon receiving the JSON document (e.g., as shown in Figure 6), the
SET Recipient parses and verifies the received SETs and notifies the SET Recipient parses and verifies the received SETs and notifies the
SET Transmitter of successfully received SETs and SETs with errors SET Transmitter of successfully received SETs and SETs with errors
via the next poll request to the SET Transmitter, as described in via the next poll request to the SET Transmitter, as described in
Section 2.4.3 or Section 2.4.4. Section 2.4.3 or Section 2.4.4.
2.5.1. Poll Error Response 2.5.1. Poll Error Response
In the event of a general HTTP error condition in the context of In the event of a general HTTP error condition in the context of
processing a poll request, the service provider SHOULD respond with processing a poll request, the service provider responds with the
an appropriate HTTP Response Status Code as defined in Section 6 of applicable HTTP Response Status Code, as defined in Section 6 of
[RFC7231]. [RFC7231].
Service providers MAY respond to any invalid poll request with an Service providers MAY respond to any invalid poll request with an
HTTP Response Status Code of 400 (Bad Request) even when a more HTTP Response Status Code of 400 (Bad Request) even when a more
specific code might apply, for example if the service provider deemed specific code might apply, for example if the service provider deemed
that a more specific code presented an information disclosure risk. that a more specific code presented an information disclosure risk.
When no more specific code might apply, the service provider SHALL When no more specific code might apply, the service provider SHALL
respond to an invalid poll request with an HTTP Status Code of 400. respond to an invalid poll request with an HTTP Status Code of 400.
The response body for responses to invalid poll requests is left The response body for responses to invalid poll requests is left
undefined, and its contents SHOULD be ignored. undefined, and its contents SHOULD be ignored.
The following is a non-normative example of a response to an invalid The following is a non-normative example of a response to an invalid
poll request: poll request:
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Example Poll Error Response Example Poll Error Response
2.6. Error Response Handling 2.6. Error Response Handling
If a SET is invalid, error codes from the IANA "Security Event Token If a SET is invalid, error codes from the IANA "Security Event Token
Delivery Error Codes" registry established by Delivery Error Codes" registry established by
[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push] are used in error responses. As [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push] are used in error responses. As
described in Section 2.3 of [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push], an error described in Section 2.3 of [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push], an error
response is a JSON object providing details about the error that response is a JSON object providing details about the error that
skipping to change at page 12, line 22 skipping to change at page 13, line 22
description description
A human-readable string that provides additional diagnostic A human-readable string that provides additional diagnostic
information. information.
When included as part of a batch of SETs, the above JSON is included When included as part of a batch of SETs, the above JSON is included
as part of the "setErrs" member, as defined in Section 2.2 and as part of the "setErrs" member, as defined in Section 2.2 and
Section 2.4.4. Section 2.4.4.
When the SET Recipient includes one or more error responses in a When the SET Recipient includes one or more error responses in a
request to the SET Transmitter, it must also include in the request a request to the SET Transmitter, it must also include in the request a
"Content-Language" header whose value indicates the language of the "Content-Language" header field whose value indicates the language of
error descriptions included in the request. The method of language the error descriptions included in the request. The method of
selection in the case when the SET Recipient can provide error language selection in the case when the SET Recipient can provide
messages in multiple languages is out of scope for this error messages in multiple languages is out of scope for this
specification. specification.
3. Authentication and Authorization 3. Authentication and Authorization
The SET delivery method described in this specification is based upon The SET delivery method described in this specification is based upon
HTTP over TLS [RFC2818] and standard HTTP authentication and HTTP over TLS [RFC2818] and standard HTTP authentication and
authorization schemes, as per [RFC7235]. The TLS server certificate authorization schemes, as per [RFC7235]. The TLS server certificate
MUST be validated, per [RFC6125]. As per Section 4.1 of [RFC7235], a MUST be validated using DNS-ID [RFC6125] and/or DANE [RFC6698]. As
SET delivery endpoint SHALL indicate supported HTTP authentication per Section 4.1 of [RFC7235], a SET delivery endpoint SHALL indicate
schemes via the "WWW-Authenticate" header when using HTTP supported HTTP authentication schemes via the "WWW-Authenticate"
authentication. header field when using HTTP authentication.
Authorization for the eligibility to provide actionable SETs can be Authorization for the eligibility to provide actionable SETs can be
determined by using the identity of the SET Issuer, validating the determined by using the identity of the SET Issuer, validating the
polling endpoint URL, perhaps using mutual TLS, or via other employed identity of the SET Transmitter, or via other employed authentication
authentication methods. Because SETs are not commands, SET methods. Likewise, the SET Transmitter may choose to validate the
Recipients are free to ignore SETs that are not of interest after identity of the SET Recipient, perhaps using mutual TLS. Because
acknowledging their receipt. SETs are not commands, SET Recipients are free to ignore SETs that
are not of interest after acknowledging their receipt.
4. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
4.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs 4.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs
JWS signed SETs can be used (see [RFC7515] and Section 5 of JWS signed SETs can be used (see [RFC7515] and Section 5 of
[RFC8417]) to enable the SET Recipient to validate that the SET [RFC8417]) to enable the SET Recipient to validate that the SET
Issuer is authorized to provide actionable SETs. Issuer is authorized to provide actionable SETs.
4.2. HTTP Considerations 4.2. HTTP Considerations
SET delivery depends on the use of Hypertext Transfer Protocol and is SET delivery depends on the use of Hypertext Transfer Protocol and is
thus subject to the security considerations of HTTP Section 9 of thus subject to the security considerations of HTTP Section 9 of
skipping to change at page 13, line 13 skipping to change at page 14, line 18
Issuer is authorized to provide actionable SETs. Issuer is authorized to provide actionable SETs.
4.2. HTTP Considerations 4.2. HTTP Considerations
SET delivery depends on the use of Hypertext Transfer Protocol and is SET delivery depends on the use of Hypertext Transfer Protocol and is
thus subject to the security considerations of HTTP Section 9 of thus subject to the security considerations of HTTP Section 9 of
[RFC7230] and its related specifications. [RFC7230] and its related specifications.
4.3. Confidentiality of SETs 4.3. Confidentiality of SETs
SETs may contain sensitive information that is considered Personally SETs may contain sensitive information, including Personally
Identifiable Information (PII). In such cases, SET Transmitters and Identifiable Information (PII), or be distributed through third
SET Recipients MUST protect the confidentiality of the SET contents. parties. In such cases, SET Transmitters and SET Recipients MUST
In some use cases, using TLS to secure the transmitted SETs will be protect the confidentiality of the SET contents. In some use cases,
sufficient. In other use cases, encrypting the SET as described in using TLS to secure the transmitted SETs will be sufficient. In
JWE [RFC7516] will also be required. The Event delivery endpoint other use cases, encrypting the SET as described in JWE [RFC7516]
MUST support at least TLS version 1.2 [RFC5246] and SHOULD support will also be required. The Event delivery endpoint MUST support at
the newest version of TLS that meets its security requirements, which least TLS version 1.2 [RFC5246] and SHOULD support the newest version
as of the time of this publication is TLS 1.3 [RFC8446]. The client of TLS that meets its security requirements, which as of the time of
MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check using DNS-ID this publication is TLS 1.3 [RFC8446]. The client MUST perform a
[RFC6125]. How a SET Recipient determines the expected service TLS/SSL server certificate check using DNS-ID [RFC6125] and/or DANE
[RFC6698]. How a SET Recipient determines the expected service
identity to match the SET Transmitter's server certificate against is identity to match the SET Transmitter's server certificate against is
out of scope for this document. Implementation security out of scope for this document. The implementation security
considerations for TLS can be found in "Recommendations for Secure considerations for TLS in "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and
Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525]. DTLS" [RFC7525] MUST be followed.
4.4. Access Token Considerations 4.4. Access Token Considerations
If HTTP Authentication is performed using OAuth access tokens If HTTP Authentication is performed using OAuth access tokens
[RFC6749], implementers MUST take into account the threats and [RFC6749], implementers MUST take into account the threats and
countermeasures documented in Section 8 of [RFC7521]. countermeasures documented in Section 8 of [RFC7521].
4.4.1. Bearer Token Considerations 4.4.1. Bearer Token Considerations
Transmitting Bearer tokens [RFC6750] using TLS helps prevent their Transmitting Bearer tokens [RFC6750] using TLS helps prevent their
skipping to change at page 14, line 11 skipping to change at page 15, line 18
security considerations of this authorization method [RFC7521]. security considerations of this authorization method [RFC7521].
Since security is only as good as the weakest link, implementers also Since security is only as good as the weakest link, implementers also
need to consider authentication choices coupled with OAuth bearer need to consider authentication choices coupled with OAuth bearer
tokens. The security considerations of the default authentication tokens. The security considerations of the default authentication
method for OAuth bearer tokens, HTTP Basic, are well documented in method for OAuth bearer tokens, HTTP Basic, are well documented in
[RFC7617], therefore implementers are encouraged to prefer stronger [RFC7617], therefore implementers are encouraged to prefer stronger
authentication methods. authentication methods.
5. Privacy Considerations 5. Privacy Considerations
SET Transmitters SHOULD attempt to deliver SETs that are targeted to SET Transmitters should attempt to deliver SETs that are targeted to
the specific business and protocol needs of subscribers. the specific business and protocol needs of subscribers.
When sharing personally identifiable information or information that When sharing personally identifiable information or information that
is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET
Transmitters and Recipients MUST have the appropriate legal Transmitters and Recipients MUST have the appropriate legal
agreements and user consent or terms of service in place. agreements and user consent or terms of service in place.
Furthermore, data that needs confidentiality protection MUST be Furthermore, data that needs confidentiality protection MUST be
encrypted, at least with TLS and sometimes also using JSON Web encrypted, at least with TLS and sometimes also using JSON Web
Encryption (JWE) [RFC7516]. Encryption (JWE) [RFC7516].
In some cases, subject identifiers themselves may be considered In some cases, subject identifiers themselves may be considered
sensitive information, such that their inclusion within a SET may be sensitive information, such that their inclusion within a SET may be
considered a violation of privacy. SET Issuers should consider the considered a violation of privacy. SET Issuers and SET Transmitters
ramifications of sharing a particular subject identifier with a SET should consider the ramifications of sharing a particular subject
Recipient (e.g., whether doing so could enable correlation and/or de- identifier with a SET Recipient (e.g., whether doing so could enable
anonymization of data) and choose appropriate subject identifiers for correlation and/or de-anonymization of data) and choose appropriate
their use cases. subject identifiers for their use cases.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This specification requires no IANA actions. This specification requires no IANA actions.
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push] [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]
Backman, A., Jones, M., Scurtescu, M., Ansari, M., and A. Backman, A., Jones, M., Scurtescu, M., Ansari, M., and A.
Nadalin, "Push-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Nadalin, "Push-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery
Using HTTP", draft-ietf-secevent-http-push-11 (work in Using HTTP", draft-ietf-secevent-http-push-12 (work in
progress), June 2020. progress), June 2020.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000, DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
skipping to change at page 15, line 17 skipping to change at page 16, line 26
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>. 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August
2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698>.
[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer [RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>. 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", [RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015, RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7521] Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M., and Y. Goland, [RFC7521] Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M., and Y. Goland,
"Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication "Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication
and Authorization Grants", RFC 7521, DOI 10.17487/RFC7521, and Authorization Grants", RFC 7521, DOI 10.17487/RFC7521,
May 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7521>. May 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7521>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>. 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
skipping to change at page 17, line 9 skipping to change at page 18, line 27
and described security and privacy considerations resulting from use and described security and privacy considerations resulting from use
of unencrypted HTTP as the underlying transport. When the working of unencrypted HTTP as the underlying transport. When the working
group decided to mandate usage HTTP over TLS, it also decided to group decided to mandate usage HTTP over TLS, it also decided to
preserve the description of these considerations in a non-normative preserve the description of these considerations in a non-normative
manner. manner.
The considerations for using unencrypted HTTP with this protocol are The considerations for using unencrypted HTTP with this protocol are
the same as those described in Appendix A of the same as those described in Appendix A of
[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push], and are therefore not repeated here. [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push], and are therefore not repeated here.
Appendix B. Acknowledgments Appendix B. Other Streaming Specifications
[[ NOTE TO THE RFC EDITOR: This section to be removed prior to
publication ]]
A number of pub/sub, queuing, and streaming systems were reviewed as
possible solutions or as input to the current draft. These are
listed in Appendix B of [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push], and are
therefore not repeated here.
Appendix C. Acknowledgments
The editors would like to thank the members of the SCIM working The editors would like to thank the members of the SCIM working
group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with
draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 in 2015. We would like to thank Phil Hunt draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 in 2015. We would like to thank Phil Hunt
and the other the authors of draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02, upon and the other the authors of draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02, upon
which this specification is based. We would like to thank the which this specification is based. We would like to thank the
participants in the SecEvents working group for their contributions participants in the SecEvents working group for their contributions
to this specification. to this specification.
Additionally, we would like to thank the following individuals for Additionally, we would like to thank the following individuals for
their reviews of the specification: Benjamin Kaduk, Mark Nottingham, their reviews of the specification: Roman Danyliw, Martin Duke,
Yaron Sheffer, Valery Smyslov, and Robert Sparks. Benjamin Kaduk, Erik Kline, Murray Kucherawy, Warren Kumari, Barry
Leiba, Mark Nottingham, Alvaro Retana, Yaron Sheffer, Valery Smyslov,
Robert Sparks, Eric Vyncke, and Robert Wilton.
Appendix C. Change Log Appendix D. Change Log
[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]] [[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
Draft 00 - AB - Based on draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02 with the Draft 00 - AB - Based on draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02 with the
following additions: following additions:
o Renamed to "Poll-Based SET Token Delivery Using HTTP" o Renamed to "Poll-Based SET Token Delivery Using HTTP"
o Removed references to the HTTP Push delivery method. o Removed references to the HTTP Push delivery method.
skipping to change at page 19, line 41 skipping to change at page 21, line 22
o Addressed IETF last call comments by Mark Nottingham. o Addressed IETF last call comments by Mark Nottingham.
o Addressed GenArt review comments by Robert Sparks. o Addressed GenArt review comments by Robert Sparks.
Draft 11 - mbj Draft 11 - mbj
o Revised to unambiguously require the use of TLS, while preserving o Revised to unambiguously require the use of TLS, while preserving
descriptions of precautions needed for non-TLS use in an appendix. descriptions of precautions needed for non-TLS use in an appendix.
Draft 12 - mbj
o Addressed IESG comments.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Annabelle Backman (editor) Annabelle Backman (editor)
Amazon Amazon
Email: richanna@amazon.com Email: richanna@amazon.com
Michael B. Jones (editor) Michael B. Jones (editor)
Microsoft Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com Email: mbj@microsoft.com
URI: https://self-issued.info/ URI: https://self-issued.info/
Marius Scurtescu Marius Scurtescu
Coinbase Coinbase
Email: marius.scurtescu@coinbase.com Email: marius.scurtescu@coinbase.com
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