draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-12.txt   rfc8936.txt 
Security Events Working Group A. Backman, Ed. Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) A. Backman, Ed.
Internet-Draft Amazon Request for Comments: 8936 Amazon
Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones, Ed. Category: Standards Track M. Jones, Ed.
Expires: December 26, 2020 Microsoft ISSN: 2070-1721 Microsoft
M. Scurtescu M. Scurtescu
Coinbase Coinbase
M. Ansari M. Ansari
Cisco
A. Nadalin A. Nadalin
Microsoft Independent
June 24, 2020 November 2020
Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP
draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-12
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines how a series of Security Event Tokens This specification defines how a series of Security Event Tokens
(SETs) can be delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over (SETs) can be delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over
TLS initiated as a poll by the recipient. The specification also TLS initiated as a poll by the recipient. The specification also
defines how delivery can be assured, subject to the SET Recipient's defines how delivery can be assured, subject to the SET Recipient's
need for assurance. need for assurance.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 26, 2020. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8936.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction and Overview
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Notational Conventions
1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Definitions
2. SET Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. SET Delivery
2.1. Polling Delivery using HTTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Polling Delivery using HTTP
2.2. Polling HTTP Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2. Polling HTTP Request
2.3. Polling HTTP Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3. Polling HTTP Response
2.4. Poll Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.4. Poll Request
2.4.1. Poll-Only Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.4.1. Poll-Only Request
2.4.2. Acknowledge-Only Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.4.2. Acknowledge-Only Request
2.4.3. Poll with Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.4.3. Poll with Acknowledgement
2.4.4. Poll with Acknowledgement and Errors . . . . . . . . 10 2.4.4. Poll with Acknowledgement and Errors
2.5. Poll Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.5. Poll Response
2.5.1. Poll Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.5.1. Poll Error Response
2.6. Error Response Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.6. Error Response Handling
3. Authentication and Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3. Authentication and Authorization
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4. Security Considerations
4.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs
4.2. HTTP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.2. HTTP Considerations
4.3. Confidentiality of SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.3. Confidentiality of SETs
4.4. Access Token Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.4. Access Token Considerations
4.4.1. Bearer Token Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.4.1. Bearer Token Considerations
5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5. Privacy Considerations
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6. IANA Considerations
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7. References
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7.1. Normative References
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7.2. Informative References
Appendix A. Unencrypted Transport Considerations . . . . . . . . 18 Appendix A. Unencrypted Transport Considerations
Appendix B. Other Streaming Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Acknowledgments
Appendix C. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Authors' Addresses
Appendix D. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction and Overview 1. Introduction and Overview
This specification defines how a stream of Security Event Tokens This specification defines how a stream of Security Event Tokens
(SETs) [RFC8417] can be transmitted to an intended SET Recipient (SETs) [RFC8417] can be transmitted to an intended SET Recipient
using HTTP [RFC7231] over TLS. The specification defines a method to using HTTP [RFC7231] over TLS. The specification defines a method to
poll for SETs using HTTP POST. This is an alternative SET delivery poll for SETs using HTTP POST. This is an alternative SET delivery
method to the one defined in [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]. method to the one defined in [RFC8935].
Poll-based SET delivery is intended for scenarios where all of the Poll-based SET delivery is intended for scenarios where all of the
following apply: following apply:
o The recipient of the SET is capable of making outbound HTTP * The recipient of the SET is capable of making outbound HTTP
requests. requests.
o The transmitter is capable of hosting a TLS-enabled HTTP endpoint * The transmitter is capable of hosting a TLS-enabled HTTP endpoint
that is accessible to the recipient. that is accessible to the recipient.
o The transmitter and recipient are willing to exchange data with * The transmitter and recipient are willing to exchange data with
one another. one another.
In some scenarios, either push-based or poll-based delivery could be In some scenarios, either push-based or poll-based delivery could be
used, and in others, only one of them would be applicable. used, and in others, only one of them would be applicable.
A mechanism for exchanging configuration metadata such as endpoint A mechanism for exchanging configuration metadata such as endpoint
URLs, cryptographic keys, and possible implementation constraints URLs, cryptographic keys, and possible implementation constraints
such as buffer size limitations between the transmitter and recipient such as buffer size limitations between the transmitter and recipient
is out of scope for this specification. How SETs are defined and the is out of scope for this specification. How SETs are defined and the
process by which security events are identified for SET Recipients process by which security events are identified for SET Recipients
are specified in [RFC8417]. are specified in [RFC8417].
1.1. Notational Conventions 1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
Throughout this document, all figures may contain spaces and extra Throughout this document, all figures may contain spaces and extra
line wrapping for readability and due to space limitations. line wrapping for readability and due to space limitations.
1.2. Definitions 1.2. Definitions
This specification utilizes terminology defined in [RFC8417] and This specification utilizes terminology defined in [RFC8417] and
[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]. [RFC8935].
2. SET Delivery 2. SET Delivery
When a SET is available for a SET Recipient, the SET Transmitter When a SET is available for a SET Recipient, the SET Transmitter
queues the SET in a buffer so that a SET Recipient can poll for SETs queues the SET in a buffer so that a SET Recipient can poll for SETs
using HTTP POST. using HTTP POST.
In poll-based SET delivery using HTTP over TLS, zero or more SETs are In poll-based SET delivery using HTTP over TLS, zero or more SETs are
delivered in a JSON [RFC8259] document to a SET Recipient in response delivered in a JSON [RFC8259] document to a SET Recipient in response
to an HTTP POST request to the SET Transmitter. Then in a following to an HTTP POST request to the SET Transmitter. Then in a following
request, the SET Recipient acknowledges received SETs and can poll request, the SET Recipient acknowledges received SETs and can poll
for more. All requests and responses are JSON documents and use a for more. All requests and responses are JSON documents and use a
"Content-Type" of "application/json", as described in Section 2.1. "Content-Type" of "application/json", as described in Section 2.2.
After successful (acknowledged) SET delivery, SET Transmitters are After successful (acknowledged) SET delivery, SET Transmitters are
not required to retain or record SETs for retransmission. Once a SET not required to retain or record SETs for retransmission. Once a SET
is acknowledged, the SET Recipient SHALL be responsible for is acknowledged, the SET Recipient SHALL be responsible for
retention, if needed. Transmitters may also discard undelivered SETs retention, if needed. Transmitters may also discard undelivered SETs
under deployment-specific conditions, such as if they have not been under deployment-specific conditions, such as if they have not been
polled for over too long a period of time or if an excessive amount polled for over too long a period of time or if an excessive amount
of storage is needed to retain them. of storage is needed to retain them.
Upon receiving a SET, the SET Recipient reads the SET and validates Upon receiving a SET, the SET Recipient reads the SET and validates
it in the manner described in Section 2 of it in the manner described in Section 2 of [RFC8935]. The SET
[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]. The SET Recipient MUST acknowledge Recipient MUST acknowledge receipt to the SET Transmitter, and SHOULD
receipt to the SET Transmitter, and SHOULD do so in a timely fashion, do so in a timely fashion, as described in Section 2.4. The SET
as described in Section 2.4. The SET Recipient SHALL NOT use the Recipient SHALL NOT use the event acknowledgement mechanism to report
event acknowledgement mechanism to report event errors other than event errors other than those relating to the parsing and validation
those relating to the parsing and validation of the SET. of the SET.
2.1. Polling Delivery using HTTP 2.1. Polling Delivery using HTTP
This method allows a SET Recipient to use HTTP POST (Section 4.3.3 of This method allows a SET Recipient to use HTTP POST (Section 4.3.3 of
[RFC7231]) to acknowledge SETs and to check for and receive zero or [RFC7231]) to acknowledge SETs and to check for and receive zero or
more SETs. Requests MAY be made at a periodic interval (short more SETs. Requests MAY be made at a periodic interval (short
polling) or requests MAY wait, pending availability of new SETs using polling) or requests MAY wait, pending availability of new SETs using
long polling, per Section 2 of [RFC6202]. Note that short polling long polling, per Section 2 of [RFC6202]. Note that short polling
will result in retrieving zero or more SETs whereas long polling will will result in retrieving zero or more SETs whereas long polling will
typically result in retrieving one or more SETs unless a timeout typically result in retrieving one or more SETs unless a timeout
occurs. occurs.
The delivery of SETs in this method is facilitated by HTTP POST The delivery of SETs in this method is facilitated by HTTP POST
requests initiated by the SET Recipient in which: requests initiated by the SET Recipient in which:
o The SET Recipient makes a request for available SETs using an HTTP * The SET Recipient makes a request for available SETs using an HTTP
POST to a pre-arranged endpoint provided by the SET Transmitter POST to a pre-arranged endpoint provided by the SET Transmitter,
or, or
o after validating previously received SETs, the SET Recipient * after validating previously received SETs, the SET Recipient
initiates another poll request using HTTP POST that includes initiates another poll request using HTTP POST that includes
acknowledgement of previous SETs and requests the next batch of acknowledgement of previous SETs and requests the next batch of
SETs. SETs.
The purpose of the acknowledgement is to inform the SET Transmitter The purpose of the acknowledgement is to inform the SET Transmitter
that delivery has succeeded and redelivery is no longer required. that delivery has succeeded and redelivery is no longer required.
Before acknowledgement, SET Recipients validate the received SETs and Before acknowledgement, SET Recipients validate the received SETs and
retain them in a manner appropriate to the recipient's requirements. retain them in a manner appropriate to the recipient's requirements.
The level and method of retention of SETs by SET Recipients is out of The level and method of retention of SETs by SET Recipients is out of
scope of this specification. scope of this specification.
2.2. Polling HTTP Request 2.2. Polling HTTP Request
When initiating a poll request, the SET Recipient constructs a JSON When initiating a poll request, the SET Recipient constructs a JSON
document that consists of polling request parameters and SET document that consists of polling request parameters and SET
acknowledgement parameters in the form of JSON objects. acknowledgement parameters in the form of JSON objects.
skipping to change at page 5, line 22 skipping to change at line 202
When initiating a poll request, the SET Recipient constructs a JSON When initiating a poll request, the SET Recipient constructs a JSON
document that consists of polling request parameters and SET document that consists of polling request parameters and SET
acknowledgement parameters in the form of JSON objects. acknowledgement parameters in the form of JSON objects.
When making a request, the HTTP "Content-Type" header field is set to When making a request, the HTTP "Content-Type" header field is set to
"application/json". "application/json".
The following JSON object members are used in a polling request: The following JSON object members are used in a polling request:
Request Processing Parameters Request Processing Parameters
maxEvents maxEvents
An OPTIONAL integer value indicating the maximum number of An OPTIONAL integer value indicating the maximum number of
unacknowledged SETs to be returned. The SET Transmitter SHOULD unacknowledged SETs to be returned. The SET Transmitter SHOULD
NOT send more SETs than the specified maximum. If more than NOT send more SETs than the specified maximum. If more than
the maximum number of SETs are available, the SET Transmitter the maximum number of SETs are available, the SET Transmitter
determines which to return first; the oldest SETs available MAY determines which to return first; the oldest SETs available MAY
returned first, or another selection algorithm MAY be used, be returned first, or another selection algorithm MAY be used,
such as prioritizing SETs in some manner that makes sense for such as prioritizing SETs in some manner that makes sense for
the use case. first. A value of "0" MAY be used by SET the use case. A value of "0" MAY be used by SET Recipients
Recipients that would like to perform an acknowledge-only that would like to perform an acknowledge-only request. This
request. This enables the Recipient to use separate HTTP enables the Recipient to use separate HTTP requests for
requests for acknowledgement and reception of SETs. If this acknowledgement and reception of SETs. If this parameter is
parameter is omitted, no limit is placed on the number of SETs omitted, no limit is placed on the number of SETs to be
to be returned. returned.
returnImmediately returnImmediately
An OPTIONAL JSON boolean value that indicates the SET An OPTIONAL JSON boolean value that indicates the SET
Transmitter SHOULD return an immediate response even if no Transmitter SHOULD return an immediate response even if no
results are available (short polling). The default value is results are available (short polling). The default value is
"false", which indicates the request is to be treated as an "false", which indicates the request is to be treated as an
HTTP Long Poll, per Section 2 of [RFC6202]. The timeout for HTTP long poll, per Section 2 of [RFC6202]. The timeout for
the request is part of the configuration between the the request is part of the configuration between the
participants, which is out of scope of this specification. participants, which is out of scope of this specification.
SET Acknowledgment Parameters SET Acknowledgment Parameters
ack ack
A JSON array of strings whose values are the "jti" [RFC7519] A JSON array of strings whose values are the "jti" [RFC7519]
values of successfully received SETs that are being values of successfully received SETs that are being
acknowledged. If there are no outstanding SETs to acknowledge, acknowledged. If there are no outstanding SETs to acknowledge,
this member is omitted or contains an empty array. Once a SET this member is omitted or contains an empty array. Once a SET
has been acknowledged, the SET Transmitter is released from any has been acknowledged, the SET Transmitter is released from any
obligation to retain the SET. obligation to retain the SET.
setErrs setErrs
A JSON object with one or more members whose keys are the "jti" A JSON object with one or more members whose keys are the "jti"
skipping to change at page 6, line 25 skipping to change at line 252
object. object.
2.3. Polling HTTP Response 2.3. Polling HTTP Response
In response to a poll request, the SET Transmitter checks for In response to a poll request, the SET Transmitter checks for
available SETs and responds with a JSON document containing the available SETs and responds with a JSON document containing the
following JSON object members: following JSON object members:
sets sets
A JSON object containing zero or more SETs being returned. Each A JSON object containing zero or more SETs being returned. Each
member name is the "jti" of a SET to be delivered and its value is member name is the "jti" of a SET to be delivered, and its value
a JSON string representing the corresponding SET. If there are no is a JSON string representing the corresponding SET. If there are
outstanding SETs to be transmitted, the JSON object SHALL be no outstanding SETs to be transmitted, the JSON object SHALL be
empty. Note that both SETs being transmitted for the first time empty. Note that both SETs being transmitted for the first time
and SETs that are being re-transmitted after not having been and SETs that are being retransmitted after not having been
acknowledged are communicated here. acknowledged are communicated here.
moreAvailable moreAvailable
A JSON boolean value that indicates if more unacknowledged SETs A JSON boolean value that indicates if more unacknowledged SETs
are available to be returned. This member MAY be omitted, with are available to be returned. This member MAY be omitted, with
the meaning being the same as including it with the boolean value the meaning being the same as including it with the boolean value
"false". "false".
When making a response, the HTTP "Content-Type" header field is set When making a response, the HTTP "Content-Type" header field is set
to "application/json". to "application/json".
skipping to change at page 7, line 17 skipping to change at line 292
If the SET Recipient has received SETs from the SET Transmitter, the If the SET Recipient has received SETs from the SET Transmitter, the
SET Recipient parses and validates that received SETs meet its own SET Recipient parses and validates that received SETs meet its own
requirements and SHOULD acknowledge receipt in a timely fashion requirements and SHOULD acknowledge receipt in a timely fashion
(e.g., seconds or minutes) so that the SET Transmitter can mark the (e.g., seconds or minutes) so that the SET Transmitter can mark the
SETs as received. SET Recipients SHOULD acknowledge receipt before SETs as received. SET Recipients SHOULD acknowledge receipt before
taking any local actions based on the SETs to avoid unnecessary delay taking any local actions based on the SETs to avoid unnecessary delay
in acknowledgement, where possible. in acknowledgement, where possible.
Poll requests have three variations: Poll requests have three variations:
Poll-Only
In this scenario, a SET Recipient asks for the next set of
events where no previous SET deliveries are acknowledged (such
as in the initial poll request).
Poll-Only Acknowledge-Only
In which a SET Recipient asks for the next set of events where no In this scenario, a SET Recipient sets the "maxEvents" value to
previous SET deliveries are acknowledged (such as in the initial "0" along with "ack" and "setErrs" members indicating the SET
poll request). Recipient is acknowledging previously received SETs and does
not want to receive any new SETs in response to the request.
Acknowledge-Only
In which a SET Recipient sets the "maxEvents" value to "0" along
with "ack" and "setErrs" members indicating the SET Recipient is
acknowledging previously received SETs and does not want to
receive any new SETs in response to the request.
Combined Acknowledge and Poll Combined Acknowledge and Poll
In which a SET Recipient is both acknowledging previously received In this scenario, a SET Recipient is both acknowledging
SETs using the "ack" and "setErrs" members and will wait for the previously received SETs using the "ack" and "setErrs" members
next group of SETs in the SET Transmitters response. and will wait for the next group of SETs in the SET
Transmitters response.
2.4.1. Poll-Only Request 2.4.1. Poll-Only Request
In the case where no SETs were received in a previous poll (see In the case where no SETs were received in a previous poll (see
Figure 7), the SET Recipient simply polls without acknowledgement Figure 7), the SET Recipient simply polls without acknowledgement
parameters ("ack" and "setErrs"). parameters ("ack" and "setErrs").
The following is a non-normative example request made by a SET The following is a non-normative example request made by a SET
Recipient that has no outstanding SETs to acknowledge and is polling Recipient that has no outstanding SETs to acknowledge and is polling
for available SETs at the endpoint "https://notify.idp.example.com/ for available SETs at the endpoint "https://notify.idp.example.com/
Events": Events":
POST /Events HTTP/1.1 POST /Events HTTP/1.1
Host: notify.idp.example.com Host: notify.idp.example.com
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
{ {
"returnImmediately": true "returnImmediately": true
} }
Figure 1: Example Initial Poll Request Figure 1: Example Initial Poll Request
A SET Recipient can poll using default parameter values by passing an A SET Recipient can poll using default parameter values by passing an
empty JSON object. empty JSON object.
The following is a non-normative example default poll request to the The following is a non-normative example default poll request to the
endpoint "https://notify.idp.example.com/Events": endpoint "https://notify.idp.example.com/Events":
POST /Events HTTP/1.1 POST /Events HTTP/1.1
Host: notify.idp.example.com Host: notify.idp.example.com
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
{} {}
Figure 2: Example Default Poll Request Figure 2: Example Default Poll Request
2.4.2. Acknowledge-Only Request 2.4.2. Acknowledge-Only Request
In this variation, the SET Recipient acknowledges previously received In this variation, the SET Recipient acknowledges previously received
SETs and indicates it does not want to receive SETs in response by SETs and indicates it does not want to receive SETs in response by
setting the "maxEvents" value to "0". This variation might be used, setting the "maxEvents" value to "0". This variation might be used,
for instance, when a SET Recipient needs to acknowledge received SETs for instance, when a SET Recipient needs to acknowledge received SETs
independently (e.g., on separate threads) from the process of independently (e.g., on separate threads) from the process of
receiving SETs. receiving SETs.
If the poll needs to return immediately, then "returnImmediately" If the poll needs to return immediately, then "returnImmediately"
MUST also be present with the value "true". If it is "false", then a MUST also be present with the value "true". If it is "false", then a
long poll will still occur until an event is ready to be returned, long poll will still occur until an event is ready to be returned,
even though no events will be returned. even though no events will be returned.
The following is a non-normative example poll request with The following is a non-normative example poll request with
acknowledgement of SETs received (for example as shown in Figure 6): acknowledgement of SETs received (for example, as shown in Figure 6):
POST /Events HTTP/1.1 POST /Events HTTP/1.1
Host: notify.idp.example.com Host: notify.idp.example.com
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
{ {
"ack": [ "ack": [
"4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8", "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8",
"3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30" "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30"
], ],
"maxEvents": 0, "maxEvents": 0,
"returnImmediately": true "returnImmediately": true
} }
Figure 3: Example Acknowledge-Only Request Figure 3: Example Acknowledge-Only Request
2.4.3. Poll with Acknowledgement 2.4.3. Poll with Acknowledgement
This variation allows a recipient thread to simultaneously This variation allows a recipient thread to simultaneously
acknowledge previously received SETs and wait for the next group of acknowledge previously received SETs and wait for the next group of
SETs in a single request. SETs in a single request.
The following is a non-normative example poll with acknowledgement of The following is a non-normative example poll with acknowledgement of
the SETs received in Figure 6: the SETs received in Figure 6:
skipping to change at page 11, line 8 skipping to change at line 446
responding until a SET is available or the timeout interval has responding until a SET is available or the timeout interval has
elapsed unless the poll request parameter "returnImmediately" is elapsed unless the poll request parameter "returnImmediately" is
present with the value "true". present with the value "true".
As described in Section 2.3, a JSON document is returned containing As described in Section 2.3, a JSON document is returned containing
members including "sets", which SHALL contain zero or more SETs. members including "sets", which SHALL contain zero or more SETs.
The following is a non-normative example response to the request The following is a non-normative example response to the request
shown in Section 2.4. This example shows two SETs being returned: shown in Section 2.4. This example shows two SETs being returned:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
{ {
"sets": { "sets":
"4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8": {
"eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0. "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8":
eyJqdGkiOiI0ZDM1NTllYzY3NTA0YWFiYTY1ZDQwYjAzNjNmYWFkOCIsImlhdCI6MTQ "eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0.
1ODQ5NjQwNCwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwiYXVkIjpbIm eyJqdGkiOiI0ZDM1NTllYzY3NTA0YWFiYTY1ZDQwYjAzNjNmYWFkOCIsImlhdC
h0dHBzOi8vc2NpbS5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9GZWVkcy85OGQ1MjQ2MWZhNWJiYzg3OTU5M I6MTQ1ODQ5NjQwNCwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwi
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W1lIiwidXNlck5hbWUiLCJwYXNzd29yZCIsImVtYWlscyJdfX19.", L3NjaW0uZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vVXNlcnMvNDRmNjE0MmRmOTZiZDZhYjYxZTc1Mj
"3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30": FkOSIsImF0dHJpYnV0ZXMiOlsiaWQiLCJuYW1lIiwidXNlck5hbWUiLCJwYXNz
"eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0. d29yZCIsImVtYWlscyJdfX19.",
eyJqdGkiOiIzZDBjM2NmNzk3NTg0YmQxOTNiZDBmYjFiZDRlN2QzMCIsImlhdCI6MTQ "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30":
1ODQ5NjAyNSwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwiYXVkIjpbIm "eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0.
h0dHBzOi8vamh1Yi5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9GZWVkcy85OGQ1MjQ2MWZhNWJiYzg3OTU5M eyJqdGkiOiIzZDBjM2NmNzk3NTg0YmQxOTNiZDBmYjFiZDRlN2QzMCIsImlhdC
2I3NzU0IiwiaHR0cHM6Ly9qaHViLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL0ZlZWRzLzVkNzYwNDUxNmIx I6MTQ1ODQ5NjAyNSwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwi
ZDA4NjQxZDc2NzZlZTciXSwic3ViIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL1V YXVkIjpbImh0dHBzOi8vamh1Yi5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9GZWVkcy85OGQ1MjQ2MW
zZXJzLzQ0ZjYxNDJkZjk2YmQ2YWI2MWU3NTIxZDkiLCJldmVudHMiOnsidXJuOmlldG ZhNWJiYzg3OTU5M2I3NzU0IiwiaHR0cHM6Ly9qaHViLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL0Zl
Y6cGFyYW1zOnNjaW06ZXZlbnQ6cGFzc3dvcmRSZXNldCI6eyJpZCI6IjQ0ZjYxNDJkZ ZWRzLzVkNzYwNDUxNmIxZDA4NjQxZDc2NzZlZTciXSwic3ViIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly
jk2YmQ2YWI2MWU3NTIxZDkifSwiaHR0cHM6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9zY2ltL2V2ZW50 9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL1VzZXJzLzQ0ZjYxNDJkZjk2YmQ2YWI2MWU3NTIx
L3Bhc3N3b3JkUmVzZXRFeHQiOnsicmVzZXRBdHRlbXB0cyI6NX19fQ." ZDkiLCJldmVudHMiOnsidXJuOmlldGY6cGFyYW1zOnNjaW06ZXZlbnQ6cGFzc3
dvcmRSZXNldCI6eyJpZCI6IjQ0ZjYxNDJkZjk2YmQ2YWI2MWU3NTIxZDkifSwi
aHR0cHM6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9zY2ltL2V2ZW50L3Bhc3N3b3JkUmVzZXRFeH
QiOnsicmVzZXRBdHRlbXB0cyI6NX19fQ."
}
} }
}
Figure 6: Example Poll Response Figure 6: Example Poll Response
In the above example, two SETs whose "jti" values are In the above example, two SETs whose "jti" values are
"4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8" and "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8" and
"3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30" are delivered. "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30" are delivered.
The following is a non-normative example response to the request The following is a non-normative example response to the request
shown in Section 2.4.1, which indicates that no new SETs or shown in Section 2.4.1, which indicates that no new SETs or
unacknowledged SETs are available: unacknowledged SETs are available:
skipping to change at page 12, line 22 skipping to change at line 501
{ {
"sets": {} "sets": {}
} }
Figure 7: Example No SETs Poll Response Figure 7: Example No SETs Poll Response
Upon receiving the JSON document (e.g., as shown in Figure 6), the Upon receiving the JSON document (e.g., as shown in Figure 6), the
SET Recipient parses and verifies the received SETs and notifies the SET Recipient parses and verifies the received SETs and notifies the
SET Transmitter of successfully received SETs and SETs with errors SET Transmitter of successfully received SETs and SETs with errors
via the next poll request to the SET Transmitter, as described in via the next poll request to the SET Transmitter, as described in
Section 2.4.3 or Section 2.4.4. Sections 2.4.3 and 2.4.4.
2.5.1. Poll Error Response 2.5.1. Poll Error Response
In the event of a general HTTP error condition in the context of In the event of a general HTTP error condition in the context of
processing a poll request, the service provider responds with the processing a poll request, the service provider responds with the
applicable HTTP Response Status Code, as defined in Section 6 of applicable HTTP response status code, as defined in Section 6 of
[RFC7231]. [RFC7231].
Service providers MAY respond to any invalid poll request with an Service providers MAY respond to any invalid poll request with an
HTTP Response Status Code of 400 (Bad Request) even when a more HTTP response status code of 400 (Bad Request) even when a more
specific code might apply, for example if the service provider deemed specific code might apply, for example, if the service provider
that a more specific code presented an information disclosure risk. deemed that a more specific code presented an information disclosure
When no more specific code might apply, the service provider SHALL risk. When no more specific code might apply, the service provider
respond to an invalid poll request with an HTTP Status Code of 400. SHALL respond to an invalid poll request with an HTTP status code of
400.
The response body for responses to invalid poll requests is left The response body for responses to invalid poll requests is left
undefined, and its contents SHOULD be ignored. undefined, and its contents SHOULD be ignored.
The following is a non-normative example of a response to an invalid The following is a non-normative example of a response to an invalid
poll request: poll request:
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Example Poll Error Response Figure 8: Example Poll Error Response
2.6. Error Response Handling 2.6. Error Response Handling
If a SET is invalid, error codes from the IANA "Security Event Token If a SET is invalid, error codes from the IANA "Security Event Token
Delivery Error Codes" registry established by Error Codes" registry established by [RFC8935] are used in error
[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push] are used in error responses. As responses. As described in Section 2.3 of [RFC8935], an error
described in Section 2.3 of [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push], an error
response is a JSON object providing details about the error that response is a JSON object providing details about the error that
includes the following name/value pairs: includes the following name/value pairs:
err err: A value from the IANA "Security Event Token Error Codes"
A value from the IANA "Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes"
registry that identifies the error. registry that identifies the error.
description description: A human-readable string that provides additional
A human-readable string that provides additional diagnostic diagnostic information.
information.
When included as part of a batch of SETs, the above JSON is included When included as part of a batch of SETs, the above JSON is included
as part of the "setErrs" member, as defined in Section 2.2 and as part of the "setErrs" member, as defined in Sections 2.2 and
Section 2.4.4. 2.4.4.
When the SET Recipient includes one or more error responses in a When the SET Recipient includes one or more error responses in a
request to the SET Transmitter, it must also include in the request a request to the SET Transmitter, it must also include in the request a
"Content-Language" header field whose value indicates the language of "Content-Language" header field whose value indicates the language of
the error descriptions included in the request. The method of the error descriptions included in the request. The method of
language selection in the case when the SET Recipient can provide language selection in the case when the SET Recipient can provide
error messages in multiple languages is out of scope for this error messages in multiple languages is out of scope for this
specification. specification.
3. Authentication and Authorization 3. Authentication and Authorization
The SET delivery method described in this specification is based upon The SET delivery method described in this specification is based upon
HTTP over TLS [RFC2818] and standard HTTP authentication and HTTP over TLS [RFC2818] and standard HTTP authentication and
authorization schemes, as per [RFC7235]. The TLS server certificate authorization schemes, as per [RFC7235]. The TLS server certificate
MUST be validated using DNS-ID [RFC6125] and/or DANE [RFC6698]. As MUST be validated using DNS-ID [RFC6125] and/or DNS-Based
per Section 4.1 of [RFC7235], a SET delivery endpoint SHALL indicate Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) [RFC6698]. As per
Section 4.1 of [RFC7235], a SET delivery endpoint SHALL indicate
supported HTTP authentication schemes via the "WWW-Authenticate" supported HTTP authentication schemes via the "WWW-Authenticate"
header field when using HTTP authentication. header field when using HTTP authentication.
Authorization for the eligibility to provide actionable SETs can be Authorization for the eligibility to provide actionable SETs can be
determined by using the identity of the SET Issuer, validating the determined by using the identity of the SET Issuer, validating the
identity of the SET Transmitter, or via other employed authentication identity of the SET Transmitter, or via other employed authentication
methods. Likewise, the SET Transmitter may choose to validate the methods. Likewise, the SET Transmitter may choose to validate the
identity of the SET Recipient, perhaps using mutual TLS. Because identity of the SET Recipient, perhaps using mutual TLS. Because
SETs are not commands, SET Recipients are free to ignore SETs that SETs are not commands, SET Recipients are free to ignore SETs that
are not of interest after acknowledging their receipt. are not of interest after acknowledging their receipt.
skipping to change at page 14, line 4 skipping to change at line 574
Authorization for the eligibility to provide actionable SETs can be Authorization for the eligibility to provide actionable SETs can be
determined by using the identity of the SET Issuer, validating the determined by using the identity of the SET Issuer, validating the
identity of the SET Transmitter, or via other employed authentication identity of the SET Transmitter, or via other employed authentication
methods. Likewise, the SET Transmitter may choose to validate the methods. Likewise, the SET Transmitter may choose to validate the
identity of the SET Recipient, perhaps using mutual TLS. Because identity of the SET Recipient, perhaps using mutual TLS. Because
SETs are not commands, SET Recipients are free to ignore SETs that SETs are not commands, SET Recipients are free to ignore SETs that
are not of interest after acknowledging their receipt. are not of interest after acknowledging their receipt.
4. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
4.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs 4.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs
JWS signed SETs can be used (see [RFC7515] and Section 5 of JWS signed SETs can be used (see [RFC7515] and Section 5 of
[RFC8417]) to enable the SET Recipient to validate that the SET [RFC8417]) to enable the SET Recipient to validate that the SET
Issuer is authorized to provide actionable SETs. Issuer is authorized to provide actionable SETs.
4.2. HTTP Considerations 4.2. HTTP Considerations
SET delivery depends on the use of Hypertext Transfer Protocol and is SET delivery depends on the use of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol
thus subject to the security considerations of HTTP Section 9 of and is thus subject to the security considerations of HTTP (Section 9
[RFC7230] and its related specifications. of [RFC7230]) and its related specifications.
4.3. Confidentiality of SETs 4.3. Confidentiality of SETs
SETs may contain sensitive information, including Personally SETs may contain sensitive information, including Personally
Identifiable Information (PII), or be distributed through third Identifiable Information (PII), or be distributed through third
parties. In such cases, SET Transmitters and SET Recipients MUST parties. In such cases, SET Transmitters and SET Recipients MUST
protect the confidentiality of the SET contents. In some use cases, protect the confidentiality of the SET contents. In some use cases,
using TLS to secure the transmitted SETs will be sufficient. In using TLS to secure the transmitted SETs will be sufficient. In
other use cases, encrypting the SET as described in JWE [RFC7516] other use cases, encrypting the SET as described in JSON Web
will also be required. The Event delivery endpoint MUST support at Encryption (JWE) [RFC7516] will also be required. The Event delivery
least TLS version 1.2 [RFC5246] and SHOULD support the newest version endpoint MUST support at least TLS version 1.2 [RFC5246] and SHOULD
of TLS that meets its security requirements, which as of the time of support the newest version of TLS that meets its security
this publication is TLS 1.3 [RFC8446]. The client MUST perform a requirements, which as of the time of this publication is TLS 1.3
TLS/SSL server certificate check using DNS-ID [RFC6125] and/or DANE [RFC8446]. The client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate
[RFC6698]. How a SET Recipient determines the expected service check using DNS-ID [RFC6125] and/or DANE [RFC6698]. How a SET
identity to match the SET Transmitter's server certificate against is Recipient determines the expected service identity to match the SET
out of scope for this document. The implementation security Transmitter's server certificate against is out of scope for this
considerations for TLS in "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and document. The implementation security considerations for TLS in
DTLS" [RFC7525] MUST be followed. "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)" [RFC7525] MUST be followed.
4.4. Access Token Considerations 4.4. Access Token Considerations
If HTTP Authentication is performed using OAuth access tokens If HTTP Authentication is performed using OAuth access tokens
[RFC6749], implementers MUST take into account the threats and [RFC6749], implementers MUST take into account the threats and
countermeasures documented in Section 8 of [RFC7521]. countermeasures documented in Section 8 of [RFC7521].
4.4.1. Bearer Token Considerations 4.4.1. Bearer Token Considerations
Transmitting Bearer tokens [RFC6750] using TLS helps prevent their Transmitting bearer tokens [RFC6750] using TLS helps prevent their
interception. interception.
Bearer tokens SHOULD have a limited lifetime that can be determined Bearer tokens SHOULD have a limited lifetime that can be determined
directly or indirectly (e.g., by checking with a validation service) directly or indirectly (e.g., by checking with a validation service)
by the service provider. By expiring tokens, clients are forced to by the service provider. By expiring tokens, clients are forced to
obtain a new token (which usually involves re-authentication) for obtain a new token (which usually involves re-authentication) for
continued authorized access. For example, in OAuth 2.0, a client MAY continued authorized access. For example, in OAuth 2.0, a client MAY
use an OAuth refresh token to obtain a new bearer token after use an OAuth refresh token to obtain a new bearer token after
authenticating to an authorization server, per Section 6 of authenticating to an authorization server, per Section 6 of
[RFC6749]. [RFC6749].
Implementations supporting OAuth bearer tokens need to factor in Implementations supporting OAuth bearer tokens need to factor in
security considerations of this authorization method [RFC7521]. security considerations of this authorization method [RFC7521].
Since security is only as good as the weakest link, implementers also Since security is only as good as the weakest link, implementers also
need to consider authentication choices coupled with OAuth bearer need to consider authentication choices coupled with OAuth bearer
tokens. The security considerations of the default authentication tokens. The security considerations of the default authentication
method for OAuth bearer tokens, HTTP Basic, are well documented in method for OAuth bearer tokens, HTTP Basic, are well documented in
[RFC7617], therefore implementers are encouraged to prefer stronger [RFC7617]; therefore, implementers are encouraged to prefer stronger
authentication methods. authentication methods.
5. Privacy Considerations 5. Privacy Considerations
SET Transmitters should attempt to deliver SETs that are targeted to SET Transmitters should attempt to deliver SETs that are targeted to
the specific business and protocol needs of subscribers. the specific business and protocol needs of subscribers.
When sharing personally identifiable information or information that When sharing personally identifiable information or information that
is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET
Transmitters and Recipients MUST have the appropriate legal Transmitters and Recipients MUST have the appropriate legal
skipping to change at page 15, line 39 skipping to change at line 659
In some cases, subject identifiers themselves may be considered In some cases, subject identifiers themselves may be considered
sensitive information, such that their inclusion within a SET may be sensitive information, such that their inclusion within a SET may be
considered a violation of privacy. SET Issuers and SET Transmitters considered a violation of privacy. SET Issuers and SET Transmitters
should consider the ramifications of sharing a particular subject should consider the ramifications of sharing a particular subject
identifier with a SET Recipient (e.g., whether doing so could enable identifier with a SET Recipient (e.g., whether doing so could enable
correlation and/or de-anonymization of data) and choose appropriate correlation and/or de-anonymization of data) and choose appropriate
subject identifiers for their use cases. subject identifiers for their use cases.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This specification requires no IANA actions. This document has no IANA actions.
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push]
Backman, A., Jones, M., Scurtescu, M., Ansari, M., and A.
Nadalin, "Push-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery
Using HTTP", draft-ietf-secevent-http-push-12 (work in
progress), June 2020.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000, DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
skipping to change at page 17, line 29 skipping to change at line 737
[RFC8417] Hunt, P., Ed., Jones, M., Denniss, W., and M. Ansari, [RFC8417] Hunt, P., Ed., Jones, M., Denniss, W., and M. Ansari,
"Security Event Token (SET)", RFC 8417, "Security Event Token (SET)", RFC 8417,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8417, July 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8417, July 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8417>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8417>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC8935] Backman, A., Ed., Jones, M., Ed., Scurtescu, M., Ansari,
M., and A. Nadalin, "Push-Based Security Event Token (SET)
Delivery Using HTTP", RFC 8935, DOI 10.17487/RFC8935,
November 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8935>.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[RFC6202] Loreto, S., Saint-Andre, P., Salsano, S., and G. Wilkins, [RFC6202] Loreto, S., Saint-Andre, P., Salsano, S., and G. Wilkins,
"Known Issues and Best Practices for the Use of Long "Known Issues and Best Practices for the Use of Long
Polling and Streaming in Bidirectional HTTP", RFC 6202, Polling and Streaming in Bidirectional HTTP", RFC 6202,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6202, April 2011, DOI 10.17487/RFC6202, April 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6202>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6202>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
skipping to change at page 18, line 19 skipping to change at line 778
[RFC7617] Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme", [RFC7617] Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme",
RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015, RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617>.
Appendix A. Unencrypted Transport Considerations Appendix A. Unencrypted Transport Considerations
Earlier versions of this specification made the use of TLS optional Earlier versions of this specification made the use of TLS optional
and described security and privacy considerations resulting from use and described security and privacy considerations resulting from use
of unencrypted HTTP as the underlying transport. When the working of unencrypted HTTP as the underlying transport. When the working
group decided to mandate usage HTTP over TLS, it also decided to group decided to mandate usage of HTTP over TLS, it also decided to
preserve the description of these considerations in a non-normative preserve the description of these considerations in a non-normative
manner. manner.
The considerations for using unencrypted HTTP with this protocol are The considerations for using unencrypted HTTP with this protocol are
the same as those described in Appendix A of the same as those described in Appendix A of [RFC8935], and are
[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push], and are therefore not repeated here.
Appendix B. Other Streaming Specifications
[[ NOTE TO THE RFC EDITOR: This section to be removed prior to
publication ]]
A number of pub/sub, queuing, and streaming systems were reviewed as
possible solutions or as input to the current draft. These are
listed in Appendix B of [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push], and are
therefore not repeated here. therefore not repeated here.
Appendix C. Acknowledgments Acknowledgments
The editors would like to thank the members of the SCIM working The editors would like to thank the members of the SCIM Working
group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with Group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with
draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 in 2015. We would like to thank Phil Hunt draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 in 2015. We would like to thank Phil Hunt
and the other the authors of draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02, upon and the other authors of draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02, upon which
which this specification is based. We would like to thank the this specification is based. We would like to thank the participants
participants in the SecEvents working group for their contributions in the SecEvents Working Group for their contributions to this
to this specification. specification.
Additionally, we would like to thank the following individuals for Additionally, we would like to thank the following individuals for
their reviews of the specification: Roman Danyliw, Martin Duke, their reviews of this specification: Roman Danyliw, Martin Duke,
Benjamin Kaduk, Erik Kline, Murray Kucherawy, Warren Kumari, Barry Benjamin Kaduk, Erik Kline, Murray Kucherawy, Warren Kumari, Barry
Leiba, Mark Nottingham, Alvaro Retana, Yaron Sheffer, Valery Smyslov, Leiba, Mark Nottingham, Alvaro Retana, Yaron Sheffer, Valery Smyslov,
Robert Sparks, Eric Vyncke, and Robert Wilton. Robert Sparks, √Čric Vyncke, and Robert Wilton.
Appendix D. Change Log
[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
Draft 00 - AB - Based on draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02 with the
following additions:
o Renamed to "Poll-Based SET Token Delivery Using HTTP"
o Removed references to the HTTP Push delivery method.
Draft 01 - mbj:
o Addressed problems identified in my 18-Jul-18 review message
titled "Issues for both the Push and Poll Specs".
o Changes to align terminology with RFC 8417, for instance, by using
the already defined term SET Recipient rather than SET Receiver.
o Applied editorial and minor normative corrections.
o Updated Marius' contact information.
o Begun eliminating redundancies between this specification and
"Push-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP"
[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-push], referencing, rather that
duplicating common normative text.
Draft 02 - mbj:
o Removed vestigial language remaining from when the push and poll
delivery methods were defined in a common specification.
o Replaced remaining uses of the terms Event Transmitter and Event
Recipient with the correct terms SET Transmitter and SET
Recipient.
o Removed uses of the unnecessary term "Event Stream".
o Removed dependencies between the semantics of "maxEvents" and
"returnImmediately".
o Said that PII in SETs is to be encrypted with TLS, JWE, or both.
o Corrected grammar and spelling errors.
Draft 03 - mbj:
o Corrected uses of "attribute" to "member" when describing JSON
objects.
o Further alignment with the push draft.
Draft 04 - AB + mbj
o Referenced SET Transmitter definition in http-push.
o Removed incorrect normative text regarding SET construction.
o Consolidated general out-of-scope items under Introduction.
o Removed unnecessary HTTP headers in examples and added Content-
Type.
o Added Content-Language requirement for error descriptions,
aligning with http-push.
o Stated that bearer tokens SHOULD have a limited lifetime.
o Minor editorial fixes.
Draft 05 - AB + mbj
o Added normative text defining how to respond to invalid poll
requests.
o Addressed shepherd comments by Yaron Sheffer.
Draft 06 - mbj
o Addressed nits identified by the idnits tool.
Draft 07 - mbj
o Addressed area director review comments by Benjamin Kaduk.
Draft 08 - mbj + AB
o Corrected editorial nits.
Draft 09 - AB
o Addressed area director review comments by Benjamin Kaduk:
* Added text clarifying that determining the SET Recipient's
service identity is out of scope.
* Removed unelaborated reference to use of authentication to
prevent DoS attacks.
Draft 10 - mbj
o Addressed SecDir review comments by Valery Smyslov on draft-ietf-
secevent-http-push-10 that also applied here.
o Addressed IETF last call comments by Mark Nottingham.
o Addressed GenArt review comments by Robert Sparks.
Draft 11 - mbj
o Revised to unambiguously require the use of TLS, while preserving
descriptions of precautions needed for non-TLS use in an appendix.
Draft 12 - mbj
o Addressed IESG comments.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Annabelle Backman (editor) Annabelle Backman (editor)
Amazon Amazon
Email: richanna@amazon.com Email: richanna@amazon.com
Michael B. Jones (editor) Michael B. Jones (editor)
Microsoft Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com Email: mbj@microsoft.com
URI: https://self-issued.info/ URI: https://self-issued.info/
Marius Scurtescu Marius Scurtescu
Coinbase Coinbase
Email: marius.scurtescu@coinbase.com Email: marius.scurtescu@coinbase.com
Morteza Ansari Morteza Ansari
Cisco Independent
Email: morteza@sharppics.com
Email: morteza.ansari@cisco.com
Anthony Nadalin Anthony Nadalin
Microsoft Independent
Email: tonynad@microsoft.com Email: nadalin@prodigy.net
 End of changes. 64 change blocks. 
314 lines changed or deleted 180 lines changed or added

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