draft-ietf-secevent-http-push-01.txt   draft-ietf-secevent-http-push-02.txt 
skipping to change at page 1, line 16 skipping to change at page 1, line 16
Expires: April 4, 2019 Microsoft Expires: April 4, 2019 Microsoft
M. Scurtescu M. Scurtescu
Google Google
M. Ansari M. Ansari
Cisco Cisco
A. Nadalin A. Nadalin
Microsoft Microsoft
October 1, 2018 October 1, 2018
Push-Based SET Token Delivery Using HTTP Push-Based SET Token Delivery Using HTTP
draft-ietf-secevent-http-push-01 draft-ietf-secevent-http-push-02
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines how a series of security event tokens This specification defines how a Security Event Token (SET) may be
(SETs) may be delivered to a previously registered receiver using delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST. The SET is
HTTP POST over TLS initiated as a push to the receiver. transmitted in the body of an HTTP POST reqest to an endpoint
operated by the recipient, and the recipient indicates successful or
failed transmission via the HTTP response.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
skipping to change at page 2, line 15 skipping to change at page 2, line 17
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Event Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. SET Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Event Delivery Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Transmitting a SET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Transmitting a SET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Success Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Handling a SET Transmission Request . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3. Failure Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3.1. Success Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.4. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes . . . . . . . . 6
2.3.2. Failure Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3.3. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes . . . . . . 6
2.3.4. Error Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Authentication and Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3. Authentication and Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Delivery Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. TLS Support Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.2. TLS Support Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.3. Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.4. Authenticating Persisted SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes . . . . . . . . 8 6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.1. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes . . . . . . . . 9
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix A. Other Streaming Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix C. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Appendix A. Other Streaming Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix C. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction and Overview 1. Introduction and Overview
This specification defines how SETs (see [RFC8417]) can be This specification defines a mechanism by which a holder of a
transmitted to a previously registered SET Receiver using HTTP Security Event Token (SET) [RFC8417] may deliver the SET to an
[RFC7231] over TLS. The specification defines a method to push SETs intended recipient via HTTP POST [RFC7231].
via HTTP POST.
Push-Based SET Delivery over HTTP POST is intended for scenarios
where all of the following apply:
o The holder of the SET is capable of making outbound HTTP requests.
o The recipient is capable of hosting an HTTP endpoint that is
accessible to the transmitter.
o The transmitter and recipient are known to one another.
o The transmitter and recipient have an out-of-band mechanism for
exchanging configuration metadata such as endpoint URLs and
security key parameters.
1.1. Notational Conventions 1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
Throughout this documents all figures may contain spaces and extra Throughout this documents all figures may contain spaces and extra
line-wrapping for readability and space limitations. line-wrapping for readability and space limitations.
1.2. Definitions 1.2. Definitions
This specification assumes terminology defined in the Security Event This specification utilizes terminology defined in [RFC8417], as well
Token specification[RFC8417], as well as the terms defined below: as the terms defined below:
SET Transmitter SET Transmitter
A service provider that delivers SETs to other providers known as An entity that delivers SETs in its possession to one or more SET
SET Receivers. Receivers.
SET Receiver SET Receiver
A service provider that registers to receive SETs from a SET An entity that operates an endpoint where it expects to receive
Transmitter and provides an endpoint to receive SETs via HTTP SETs from one or more SET Transmitters.
POST.
2. Event Delivery 2. SET Delivery
2.1. Event Delivery Process To deliver a SET to a given SET Receiver, the SET Transmitter makes a
SET Transmission Request to the SET Receiver, with the SET itself
contained within the request. The SET Receiver replies to this
request with a response either acknowledging successful transmission
of the SET, or indicating that an error occurred while receiving,
parsing, and/or validating the SET.
In Push-Based SET Delivery Using HTTP, SETs are delivered one at a Upon receipt of a SET, the SET Receiver SHALL validate that all of
time using HTTP POST requests by a SET Transmitter to a SET Receiver, the following are true:
as described below in Section 2.2. Upon receipt, the SET Receiver
acknowledges receipt or indicates an error via the HTTP response, as
described below in Section 2.3.
After successful (acknowledged) SET delivery, SET Transmitters SHOULD o The SET Receiver can parse the SET.
NOT be required to maintain or record SETs for recovery. Once a SET
is acknowledged, the SET Receiver SHALL be responsible for retention
and recovery.
Transmitted SETs SHOULD be self-validating (e.g. signed) if there is o The SET is authentic (i.e. it was issued by the issuer specified
a requirement to verify they were issued by the SET Transmitter at a within the SET).
later date when de-coupled from the original delivery where
authenticity could be checked via the HTTP or TLS mutual
authentication.
Upon receiving a SET, the SET Receiver reads the SET and validates o The SET Receiver is identified as the intended audience of the
it. The SET Receiver MUST acknowledge receipt to the SET SET.
Transmitter, using the defined acknowledgement or error method.
The SET Receiver SHALL NOT use the Event acknowledgement mechanism to The mechanisms by which the SET Receiver performs this validation are
report Event errors other than relating to the parsing and validation out-of-scope for this document. SET parsing and issuer and audience
of the SET. identification are defined in [RFC8417]. The mechanism for
validating the authenticity of a SET is implementation specific, and
may vary depending on the authentication mechanisms in use, and
whether the SET is signed and/or encrypted (See Section 3).
2.2. Transmitting a SET The SET Receiver SHOULD ensure that the SET is persisted in a way
that is sufficient to meet the SET Receiver's own reliability
requirements, and MUST NOT expect or depend on a SET Transmitter to
re-transmit or otherwise make available to the SET Receiver a SET
once the SET Receiver acknowledges that it was received successfully.
This method allows a SET Transmitter to use HTTP POST (Section 4.3.3 Once the SET has been validated and persisted, the SET Receiver
[RFC7231]) to deliver SETs to a previously registered web callback SHOULD immediately return a response indicating that the SET was
URI supplied by the SET Receiver as part of a configuration process successfully delivered. The SET Receiver SHOULD NOT perform
(not defined by this document). extensive business logic that processes the event expressed by the
SET prior to sending this response. Such logic SHOULD be executed
asynchronously from delivery, in order to minimize the expense and
impact of SET delivery on the SET Transmitter.
The SET to be delivered MAY be signed and/or encrypted as defined in The SET Transmitter SHOULD NOT re-transmit a SET, unless the response
[RFC8417]. from the SET Receiver in previous transmissions indicated a
potentially recoverable error (such as server unavailability that may
be transient, or a decryption failure that may be due to
misconfigured keys on the SET Receiver's side). In the latter case,
the SET Transmitter MAY re-transmit a SET, after an appropriate delay
to avoid overwhelming the SET Receiver (see Section 4).
The HTTP Content-Type (see Section 3.1.1.5 [RFC7231]) for the HTTP The SET Transmitter MAY provide an out-of-band mechanism by which a
POST is "application/secevent+jwt" and the request body SHALL consist SET Receiver may be notified of delivery failures, and MAY retain
of a single SET (see [RFC8417]). As per Section 5.3.2 [RFC7231], the SETs that it failed to deliver and make them available to the SET
value of the "Accept" header is "application/json". Receiver via other means.
The following is a non-normative example of a SET transmission HTTP 2.1. Transmitting a SET
POST request:
POST /Events HTTP/1.1 To transmit a SET to a SET Receiver, the SET Transmitter makes an
HTTP POST request to an HTTP endpoint provided by the SET Receiver.
The "Content-Type" header of this request MUST be "application/
secevent+jwt" as defined in Sections 2.2 and 6.2 of RFC8417
[RFC8417], and the "Accept" header MUST be "application/json". The
request body MUST consist of the SET itself, represented as a JWT
[RFC7519].
The mechanisms by which the SET Transmitter determines the HTTP
endpoint to use when transmitting a SET to a given SET Receiver are
not defined by this specification and may be implementation-specific.
The following is a non-normative example of a SET transmission
request:
POST /Events HTTP/1.1
Host: notify.examplerp.com Host: notify.examplerp.com
Accept: application/json Accept: application/json
Content-Type: application/secevent+jwt Content-Type: application/secevent+jwt
eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0 eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0
. .
eyJwdWJsaXNoZXJVcmkiOiJodHRwczovL3NjaW0uZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iLCJmZWV eyJwdWJsaXNoZXJVcmkiOiJodHRwczovL3NjaW0uZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iLCJmZWV
kVXJpcyI6WyJodHRwczovL2podWIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vRmVlZHMvOThkNTI0Nj kVXJpcyI6WyJodHRwczovL2podWIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vRmVlZHMvOThkNTI0Nj
FmYTViYmM4Nzk1OTNiNzc1NCIsImh0dHBzOi8vamh1Yi5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9GZ FmYTViYmM4Nzk1OTNiNzc1NCIsImh0dHBzOi8vamh1Yi5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9GZ
WVkcy81ZDc2MDQ1MTZiMWQwODY0MWQ3Njc2ZWU3Il0sInJlc291cmNlVXJpcyI6 WVkcy81ZDc2MDQ1MTZiMWQwODY0MWQ3Njc2ZWU3Il0sInJlc291cmNlVXJpcyI6
skipping to change at page 5, line 5 skipping to change at page 5, line 36
hYjYxZTc1MjFkOSJdLCJldmVudFR5cGVzIjpbIkNSRUFURSJdLCJhdHRyaWJ1dG hYjYxZTc1MjFkOSJdLCJldmVudFR5cGVzIjpbIkNSRUFURSJdLCJhdHRyaWJ1dG
VzIjpbImlkIiwibmFtZSIsInVzZXJOYW1lIiwicGFzc3dvcmQiLCJlbWFpbHMiX VzIjpbImlkIiwibmFtZSIsInVzZXJOYW1lIiwicGFzc3dvcmQiLCJlbWFpbHMiX
SwidmFsdWVzIjp7ImVtYWlscyI6W3sidHlwZSI6IndvcmsiLCJ2YWx1ZSI6Impk SwidmFsdWVzIjp7ImVtYWlscyI6W3sidHlwZSI6IndvcmsiLCJ2YWx1ZSI6Impk
b2VAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20ifV0sInBhc3N3b3JkIjoibm90NHUybm8iLCJ1c2VyTmF b2VAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20ifV0sInBhc3N3b3JkIjoibm90NHUybm8iLCJ1c2VyTmF
tZSI6Impkb2UiLCJpZCI6IjQ0ZjYxNDJkZjk2YmQ2YWI2MWU3NTIxZDkiLCJuYW tZSI6Impkb2UiLCJpZCI6IjQ0ZjYxNDJkZjk2YmQ2YWI2MWU3NTIxZDkiLCJuYW
1lIjp7ImdpdmVuTmFtZSI6IkpvaG4iLCJmYW1pbHlOYW1lIjoiRG9lIn19fQ 1lIjp7ImdpdmVuTmFtZSI6IkpvaG4iLCJmYW1pbHlOYW1lIjoiRG9lIn19fQ
. .
Figure 1: Example SET Transmission Request Figure 1: Example SET Transmission Request
2.3. Handling a SET Transmission Request 2.2. Success Response
Upon receipt of the request, the SET Receiver SHALL validate the JWT
structure of the SET as defined in Section 7.2 [RFC7519]. The SET
Receiver SHALL also validate the SET information as described in
Section 2 [RFC8417].
2.3.1. Success Response
If the SET is determined to be valid, the SET Receiver SHALL If the SET is determined to be valid, the SET Receiver SHALL
"acknowledge" successful submission by responding with HTTP Status "acknowledge" successful transmission by responding with HTTP
202 as "Accepted" (see Section 6.3.3 [RFC7231]). Response Status Code 202 (see Section 6.3.3 of RFC7231 [RFC7231]).
The body of the response MUST be empty.
In order to maintain compatibility with other methods of
transmission, the SET Receiver SHOULD NOT include an HTTP response
body representation of the submitted SET or what the SET's pending
status is when acknowledging success. In the case of an error (e.g.
HTTP Status 400), the purpose of the HTTP response body is to
indicate any SET parsing, validation, or cryptographic errors.
The following is a non-normative example of a successful receipt of a The following is a non-normative example of a successful receipt of a
SET. SET.
HTTP/1.1 202 Accepted HTTP/1.1 202 Accepted
Figure 2: Example Successful Delivery Response Figure 2: Example Successful Delivery Response
Note that the purpose of the "acknowledgement" response is to let the Note that the purpose of the "acknowledgement" response is to let the
SET Transmitter know that a SET has been delivered and the SET Transmitter know that a SET has been delivered and the
information no longer needs to be retained by the SET Transmitter. information no longer needs to be retained by the SET Transmitter.
Before acknowledgement, SET Receivers SHOULD ensure they have Before acknowledgement, SET Receivers SHOULD ensure they have
validated received SETs and retained them in a manner appropriate to validated received SETs and retained them in a manner appropriate to
information retention requirements appropriate to the SET event types information retention requirements appropriate to the SET event types
signaled. The level and method of retention of SETs by SET Receivers signaled. The level and method of retention of SETs by SET Receivers
is out-of-scope of this specification. is out-of-scope of this specification.
2.3.2. Failure Response 2.3. Failure Response
In the Event of a general HTTP error condition, the SET Receiver MAY In the event of a general HTTP error condition, the SET Receiver MAY
respond with an appropriate HTTP Status code as defined in Section 6 respond with an appropriate HTTP Status Code as defined in Section 6
[RFC7231]. of RFC7231 [RFC7231].
When the SET Receiver detects an error parsing or validating a When the SET Receiver detects an error parsing or validating a SET
received SET (as defined by [RFC8417]), the SET Receiver SHALL transmitted in a SET Transmission Request, the SET Receiver SHALL
indicate an HTTP Status 400 error with an error response as described respond with an HTTP Response Status Code of 400. The "Content-Type"
in Section 2.3.4. header of this response MUST be "application/json", and the body MUST
be a JSON object containing the following name/value pairs:
err A Security Event Token Error Code (see Section 2.4).
description Human-readable text that describes the error and MAY
contain additional diagnostic information.
The following is an example non-normative error response. The following is an example non-normative error response.
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
{ {
"err":"dup", "err":"dup",
"description":"SET already received. Ignored." "description":"SET already received. Ignored."
} }
Figure 3: Example Error Response Figure 3: Example Error Response
2.3.3. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes 2.4. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes
Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes are strings that identify a Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes are strings that identify a
specific type of error that may occur when parsing or validating a specific type of error that may occur when parsing or validating a
SET. Every Security Event Token Delivery Error Code MUST have a SET. Every Security Event Token Delivery Error Code MUST have a
unique name registered in the IANA "Security Event Token Delivery unique name registered in the IANA "Security Event Token Delivery
Error Codes" registry established by Section 6.1. Error Codes" registry established by Section 7.1.
The following table presents the initial set of Error Codes that are The following table presents the initial set of Error Codes that are
registered in the IANA "Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes" registered in the IANA "Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes"
registry: registry:
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+ +-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| Error | Description | | Error | Description |
| Code | | | Code | |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+ +-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| json | Invalid JSON object. | | json | Invalid JSON object. |
skipping to change at page 7, line 5 skipping to change at page 7, line 27
| setType | An unexpected Event type was received. | | setType | An unexpected Event type was received. |
| setParse | Invalid structure was encountered such as an | | setParse | Invalid structure was encountered such as an |
| | inability to parse or an incomplete set of Event | | | inability to parse or an incomplete set of Event |
| | claims. | | | claims. |
| setData | SET event claims incomplete or invalid. | | setData | SET event claims incomplete or invalid. |
| dup | A duplicate SET was received and has been ignored. | | dup | A duplicate SET was received and has been ignored. |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+ +-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
Table 1: SET Delivery Error Codes Table 1: SET Delivery Error Codes
2.3.4. Error Responses
An error response SHALL include a JSON object which provides details
about the error. The JSON object includes the JSON attributes:
err
A value which is a keyword that describes the error (see Table 1).
description
A human-readable text that provides additional diagnostic
information.
When included as part of an HTTP Status 400 response, the above JSON
is the HTTP response body (see Figure 3).
3. Authentication and Authorization 3. Authentication and Authorization
The SET delivery method described in this specification is based upon The SET delivery method described in this specification is based upon
HTTP and depends on the use of TLS and/or standard HTTP HTTP and depends on the use of TLS and/or standard HTTP
authentication and authorization schemes as per [RFC7235]. authentication and authorization schemes as per [RFC7235].
Because SET Delivery describes a simple function, authorization for Because SET Delivery describes a simple function, authorization for
the ability to pick-up or deliver SETs can be derived by considering the ability to pick-up or deliver SETs can be derived by considering
the identity of the SET issuer, or via other employed authentication the identity of the SET issuer, or via other employed authentication
methods. Because SETs are not commands (see ), SET Receivers are methods. Because SETs are not commands (see ), SET Receivers are
free to ignore SETs that are not of interest. free to ignore SETs that are not of interest.
4. Security Considerations 4. Delivery Reliability
4.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs Delivery reliability requirements may vary from implementation to
implementation. This specification defines the response from the SET
Receiver in such a way as to provide the SET Transmitter with the
information necessary to determine what further action is required,
if any, in order to meet their requirements. SET Transmitters with
high reliability requirements may be tempted to always retry failed
transmissions, however it should be noted that for many types of SET
delivery errors, a retry is extremely unlikely to be successful. For
example, "json", "jwtParse", and "setParse" all indicate structural
errors in the content of the SET that are likely to remain when re-
transmitting the same SET. Others such as "jws" or "jwe" may be
transient, for example if cryptographic material has not been
properly distributed to the SET Receiver's systems.
Implementers SHOULD evaluate their reliability requirements and the
impact of various retry mechanisms on the performance of their
systems to determine the correct strategy for various error
conditions.
5. Security Considerations
5.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs
In scenarios where HTTP authorization or TLS mutual authentication In scenarios where HTTP authorization or TLS mutual authentication
are not used or are considered weak, JWS signed SETs SHOULD be used are not used or are considered weak, JWS signed SETs SHOULD be used
(see [RFC7515] and Security Considerations [RFC8417]). This enables (see [RFC7515] and Security Considerations [RFC8417]). This enables
the SET Receiver to validate that the SET issuer is authorized to the SET Receiver to validate that the SET issuer is authorized to
deliver SETs. deliver SETs.
4.2. TLS Support Considerations 5.2. TLS Support Considerations
SETs contain sensitive information that is considered PII (e.g. SETs contain sensitive information that is considered PII (e.g.
subject claims). Therefore, SET Transmitters and SET Receivers MUST subject claims). Therefore, SET Transmitters and SET Receivers MUST
require the use of a transport-layer security mechanism. Event require the use of a transport-layer security mechanism. Event
delivery endpoints MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and MAY support delivery endpoints MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and MAY support
additional transport-layer mechanisms meeting its security additional transport-layer mechanisms meeting its security
requirements. When using TLS, the client MUST perform a TLS/SSL requirements. When using TLS, the client MUST perform a TLS/SSL
server certificate check, per [RFC6125]. Implementation security server certificate check, per [RFC6125]. Implementation security
considerations for TLS can be found in "Recommendations for Secure considerations for TLS can be found in "Recommendations for Secure
Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525]. Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525].
4.3. Denial of Service 5.3. Denial of Service
The SET Receiver may be vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack The SET Receiver may be vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack
where a malicious party makes a high volume of requests containing where a malicious party makes a high volume of requests containing
invalid SETs, causing the endpoint to expend significant resources on invalid SETs, causing the endpoint to expend significant resources on
cryptographic operations that are bound to fail. This may be cryptographic operations that are bound to fail. This may be
mitigated by authenticating SET Transmitters with a mechanism with mitigated by authenticating SET Transmitters with a mechanism with
low runtime overhead, such as mutual TLS or statically assigned low runtime overhead, such as mutual TLS or statically assigned
bearer tokens. bearer tokens.
5. Privacy Considerations 5.4. Authenticating Persisted SETs
At the time of receipt, the SET Receiver can rely upon transport
layer mechanisms, HTTP authentication methods, and/or other context
from the transmission request to authenticate the SET Transmitter and
validate the authenticity of the SET. However, this context is
typically unavailable to systems that the SET Receiver forwards the
SET onto, or to systems that retrieve the SET from storage. If the
SET Receiver requires the ability to validate SET authenticity
outside of the context of the transmission request, then the SET
Transmitter SHOULD sign the SET in accordance with [RFC7515], or
encrypt it using an authenticated encryption scheme in accordance
with [RFC7516].
6. Privacy Considerations
If a SET needs to be retained for audit purposes, JWS MAY be used to If a SET needs to be retained for audit purposes, JWS MAY be used to
provide verification of its authenticity. provide verification of its authenticity.
When sharing personally identifiable information or information that When sharing personally identifiable information or information that
is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET
Transmitters and Receivers MUST have the appropriate legal agreements Transmitters and Receivers MUST have the appropriate legal agreements
and user consent or terms of service in place. and user consent or terms of service in place.
The propagation of subject identifiers can be perceived as personally The propagation of subject identifiers can be perceived as personally
identifiable information. Where possible, SET Transmitters and identifiable information. Where possible, SET Transmitters and
Receivers SHOULD devise approaches that prevent propagation -- for Receivers SHOULD devise approaches that prevent propagation -- for
example, the passing of a hash value that requires the subscriber to example, the passing of a hash value that requires the subscriber to
already know the subject. already know the subject.
6. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
6.1. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes 7.1. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes
This document defines Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes, for This document defines Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes, for
which IANA is asked to create and maintain a new registry titled which IANA is asked to create and maintain a new registry titled
"Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes". Initial values for the "Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes". Initial values for the
Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes registry are given in Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes registry are given in
Table 1. Future assignments are to be made through the Expert Review Table 1. Future assignments are to be made through the Expert Review
registration policy ([RFC8126]) and shall follow the template registration policy ([RFC8126]) and shall follow the template
presented in Section 6.1.1. presented in Section 7.1.1.
6.1.1. Registration Template 7.1.1. Registration Template
Error Code Error Code
The name of the Security Event Token Delivery Error Code, as The name of the Security Event Token Delivery Error Code, as
described in Section 2.3.3. The name MUST be a case-sensitive described in Section 2.4. The name MUST be a case-sensitive ASCII
ASCII string consisting only of upper-case letters ("A" - "Z"), string consisting only of upper-case letters ("A" - "Z"), lower-
lower-case letters ("a" - "z"), and digits ("0" - "9"). case letters ("a" - "z"), and digits ("0" - "9").
Description Description
A brief human-readable description of the Security Event Token A brief human-readable description of the Security Event Token
Delivery Error Code. Delivery Error Code.
Change Controller Change Controller
For error codes registered by the IETF or its working groups, list For error codes registered by the IETF or its working groups, list
"IETF Secevent Working Group". For all other error codes, list "IETF Secevent Working Group". For all other error codes, list
the name of the party responsible for the registration. Contact the name of the party responsible for the registration. Contact
information such as mailing address, email address, or phone information such as mailing address, email address, or phone
number may also be provided. number may also be provided.
Defining Document(s) Defining Document(s)
A reference to the document or documents that define the Security A reference to the document or documents that define the Security
Event Token Delivery Error Code. The definition MUST specify the Event Token Delivery Error Code. The definition MUST specify the
name and description of the error code, and explain under what name and description of the error code, and explain under what
circumstances the error code may be used. URIs that can be used circumstances the error code may be used. URIs that can be used
to retrieve copies of each document at no cost SHOULD be included. to retrieve copies of each document at no cost SHOULD be included.
6.1.2. Initial Registry Contents 7.1.2. Initial Registry Contents
o o
Error Code Error Code
json json
Description Description
Invalid JSON object. Invalid JSON object.
Change Controller Change Controller
IETF Secevent Working Group IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s) Defining Document(s)
Section 2.3.3 of this document. Section 2.4 of this document.
o o
Error Code Error Code
jwtParse jwtParse
Description Description
Invalid or unparsable JWT or JSON structure. Invalid or unparsable JWT or JSON structure.
Change Controller Change Controller
IETF Secevent Working Group IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s) Defining Document(s)
Section 2.3.3 of this document. Section 2.4 of this document.
o o
Error Code Error Code
jwtHdr jwtHdr
Description Description
An invalid JWT header was detected. An invalid JWT header was detected.
Change Controller Change Controller
IETF Secevent Working Group IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s) Defining Document(s)
skipping to change at page 10, line 14 skipping to change at page 11, line 12
Error Code Error Code
jwtHdr jwtHdr
Description Description
An invalid JWT header was detected. An invalid JWT header was detected.
Change Controller Change Controller
IETF Secevent Working Group IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s) Defining Document(s)
Section 2.3.3 of this document. Section 2.4 of this document.
o o
Error Code Error Code
jwtCrypto jwtCrypto
Description Description
Unable to parse due to unsupported algorithm. Unable to parse due to unsupported algorithm.
Change Controller Change Controller
IETF Secevent Working Group IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s) Defining Document(s)
Section 2.3.3 of this document. Section 2.4 of this document.
o o
Error Code Error Code
jws jws
Description Description
Signature was not validated. Signature was not validated.
Change Controller Change Controller
IETF Secevent Working Group IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s) Defining Document(s)
Section 2.3.3 of this document. Section 2.4 of this document.
o o
Error Code Error Code
jwe jwe
Description Description
Unable to decrypt JWE encoded data. Unable to decrypt JWE encoded data.
Change Controller Change Controller
IETF Secevent Working Group IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s) Defining Document(s)
Section 2.3.3 of this document. Section 2.4 of this document.
o o
Error Code Error Code
jwtAud jwtAud
Description Description
Invalid audience value. Invalid audience value.
Change Controller Change Controller
IETF Secevent Working Group IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s) Defining Document(s)
Section 2.3.3 of this document. Section 2.4 of this document.
o o
Error Code Error Code
jwtIss jwtIss
Description Description
Issuer not recognized. Issuer not recognized.
Change Controller Change Controller
Defining Document(s) Defining Document(s)
Section 2.3.3 of this document. Section 2.4 of this document.
o o
Error Code Error Code
setType setType
Description Description
An unexpected Event type was received. An unexpected Event type was received.
Change Controller Change Controller
IETF Secevent Working Group IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s) Defining Document(s)
Section 2.3.3 of this document. Section 2.4 of this document.
o o
Error Code Error Code
setParse setParse
Description Description
Invalid structure was encountered such as an inability to parse Invalid structure was encountered such as an inability to parse
or an incomplete set of Event claims. or an incomplete set of Event claims.
Change Controller Change Controller
IETF Secevent Working Group IETF Secevent Working Group
skipping to change at page 12, line 15 skipping to change at page 13, line 13
setParse setParse
Description Description
Invalid structure was encountered such as an inability to parse Invalid structure was encountered such as an inability to parse
or an incomplete set of Event claims. or an incomplete set of Event claims.
Change Controller Change Controller
IETF Secevent Working Group IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s) Defining Document(s)
Section 2.3.3 of this document. Section 2.4 of this document.
o o
Error Code Error Code
setData setData
Description Description
SET event claims incomplete or invalid. SET event claims incomplete or invalid.
Change Controller Change Controller
IETF Secevent Working Group IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s) Defining Document(s)
Section 2.3.3 of this document. Section 2.4 of this document.
o o
Error Code Error Code
dup dup
Description Description
A duplicate SET was received and has been ignored. A duplicate SET was received and has been ignored.
Change Controller Change Controller
IETF Secevent Working Group IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s) Defining Document(s)
Section 2.3.3 of this document. Section 2.4 of this document.
7. References 8. References
7.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
skipping to change at page 14, line 19 skipping to change at page 15, line 14
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8417] Hunt, P., Ed., Jones, M., Denniss, W., and M. Ansari, [RFC8417] Hunt, P., Ed., Jones, M., Denniss, W., and M. Ansari,
"Security Event Token (SET)", RFC 8417, "Security Event Token (SET)", RFC 8417,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8417, July 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8417, July 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8417>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8417>.
7.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[openid-connect-core] [openid-connect-core]
NRI, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", Nov 2014. NRI, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", Nov 2014.
[RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: [RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002, Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
skipping to change at page 18, line 14 skipping to change at page 19, line 12
o Removed text about SET creation and handling. o Removed text about SET creation and handling.
o Removed duplication in protocol description. o Removed duplication in protocol description.
o Added "non-normative example" text to example transmission o Added "non-normative example" text to example transmission
request. request.
o Fixed inconsistencies in use of Error Code term. o Fixed inconsistencies in use of Error Code term.
Draft 02 - AB:
o Rewrote abstract and introduction.
o Rewrote definitions for SET Transmitter, SET Receiver.
o Renamed Event Delivery section to SET Delivery.
o Readability edits to Success Response and Failure Response
sections.
o Consolidated definition of error response under Failure Response
section.
o Removed Event Delivery Process section and moved its content to
parent section.
o Readability edits to SET Delivery section and its subsections.
o Added callout that SET Receiver HTTP endpoint configuration is
out-of-scope.
o Added callout that SET verification mechanisms are out-of-scope.
o Added retry guidance, notes regarding delivery reliability
requirements.
o Added guidance around using JWS and/or JWE to authenticate
persisted SETs.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Annabelle Backman (editor) Annabelle Backman (editor)
Amazon Amazon
Email: richanna@amazon.com Email: richanna@amazon.com
Michael B. Jones (editor) Michael B. Jones (editor)
Microsoft Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com Email: mbj@microsoft.com
URI: http://self-issued.info/ URI: http://self-issued.info/
Marius Scurtescu Marius Scurtescu
Google Google
Email: mscurtescu@google.com Email: mscurtescu@google.com
 End of changes. 61 change blocks. 
148 lines changed or deleted 228 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.47. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/