Security Events Working Group                            A. Backman, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                    Amazon
Intended status: Standards Track                           M. Jones, Ed.
Expires: April 4, 2019                                         Microsoft
                                                            M. Scurtescu
                                                               M. Ansari
                                                              A. Nadalin
                                                         October 1, 2018

                Push-Based SET Token Delivery Using HTTP


   This specification defines how a series of security event tokens
   (SETs) Security Event Token (SET) may be
   delivered to a previously registered receiver an intended recipient using HTTP POST.  The SET is
   transmitted in the body of an HTTP POST over TLS initiated as a push reqest to an endpoint
   operated by the recipient, and the recipient indicates successful or
   failed transmission via the receiver. HTTP response.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 4, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   ( in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Notational Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Event  SET Delivery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Event Delivery Process  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Transmitting a SET  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  Handling a SET Transmission Request . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Success Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  Failure Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.3.3. . .   6
     2.4.  Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes . . . . . . . .   6
       2.3.4.  Error Responses
   3.  Authentication and Authorization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  Delivery Reliability  . . . . . .   7
   3.  Authentication and Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.1.   8
     5.1.  Authentication Using Signed SETs  . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.2.   8
     5.2.  TLS Support Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.3.   8
     5.3.  Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.4.  Authenticating Persisted SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.   9
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.1.   9
     7.1.  Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes . . . . . . . .   8
       6.1.1.   9
       7.1.1.  Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       6.1.2.   9
       7.1.2.  Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  10
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.1.  13
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.2.  13
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14  15
   Appendix A.  Other Streaming Specifications . . . . . . . . . . .  15  16
   Appendix B.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16  17
   Appendix C.  Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17  18
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18  19

1.  Introduction and Overview

   This specification defines how SETs (see [RFC8417]) can be
   transmitted to a previously registered mechanism by which a holder of a
   Security Event Token (SET) [RFC8417] may deliver the SET Receiver using to an
   intended recipient via HTTP
   [RFC7231] POST [RFC7231].

   Push-Based SET Delivery over TLS. HTTP POST is intended for scenarios
   where all of the following apply:

   o  The specification defines a method to push SETs
   via holder of the SET is capable of making outbound HTTP POST. requests.

   o  The recipient is capable of hosting an HTTP endpoint that is
      accessible to the transmitter.

   o  The transmitter and recipient are known to one another.

   o  The transmitter and recipient have an out-of-band mechanism for
      exchanging configuration metadata such as endpoint URLs and
      security key parameters.

1.1.  Notational Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   Throughout this documents all figures may contain spaces and extra
   line-wrapping for readability and space limitations.

1.2.  Definitions

   This specification assumes utilizes terminology defined in the Security Event
   Token specification[RFC8417], [RFC8417], as well
   as the terms defined below:

   SET Transmitter
      A service provider
      An entity that delivers SETs in its possession to other providers known as one or more SET

   SET Receiver
      A service provider
      An entity that registers to receive SETs from a SET
      Transmitter and provides operates an endpoint where it expects to receive
      SETs via HTTP
      POST. from one or more SET Transmitters.

2.  Event Delivery

2.1.  Event Delivery Process

   In Push-Based  SET Delivery Using HTTP, SETs are delivered one at

   To deliver a
   time using HTTP POST requests by SET to a given SET Receiver, the SET Transmitter to makes a
   SET Transmission Request to the SET Receiver,
   as described below in Section 2.2.  Upon receipt, with the SET itself
   contained within the request.  The SET Receiver
   acknowledges receipt replies to this
   request with a response either acknowledging successful transmission
   of the SET, or indicates indicating that an error via occurred while receiving,
   parsing, and/or validating the HTTP response, SET.

   Upon receipt of a SET, the SET Receiver SHALL validate that all of
   the following are true:

   o  The SET Receiver can parse the SET.

   o  The SET is authentic (i.e. it was issued by the issuer specified
      within the SET).

   o  The SET Receiver is identified as
   described below the intended audience of the

   The mechanisms by which the SET Receiver performs this validation are
   out-of-scope for this document.  SET parsing and issuer and audience
   identification are defined in Section 2.3.

   After successful (acknowledged) [RFC8417].  The mechanism for
   validating the authenticity of a SET delivery, is implementation specific, and
   may vary depending on the authentication mechanisms in use, and
   whether the SET Transmitters is signed and/or encrypted (See Section 3).

   The SET Receiver SHOULD ensure that the SET is persisted in a way
   that is sufficient to meet the SET Receiver's own reliability
   requirements, and MUST NOT be required expect or depend on a SET Transmitter to maintain
   re-transmit or record SETs for recovery.  Once otherwise make available to the SET Receiver a SET
   is acknowledged,
   once the SET Receiver SHALL be responsible for retention acknowledges that it was received successfully.

   Once the SET has been validated and recovery.

   Transmitted SETs persisted, the SET Receiver
   SHOULD be self-validating (e.g. signed) if there is immediately return a requirement to verify they were issued response indicating that the SET was
   successfully delivered.  The SET Receiver SHOULD NOT perform
   extensive business logic that processes the event expressed by the
   SET prior to sending this response.  Such logic SHOULD be executed
   asynchronously from delivery, in order to minimize the expense and
   impact of SET delivery on the SET Transmitter.

   The SET Transmitter at SHOULD NOT re-transmit a
   later date when de-coupled SET, unless the response
   from the original delivery where
   authenticity could SET Receiver in previous transmissions indicated a
   potentially recoverable error (such as server unavailability that may
   be checked via the HTTP transient, or TLS mutual

   Upon receiving a decryption failure that may be due to
   misconfigured keys on the SET Receiver's side).  In the latter case,
   the SET Transmitter MAY re-transmit a SET, after an appropriate delay
   to avoid overwhelming the SET Receiver reads the SET (see Section 4).

   The SET Transmitter MAY provide an out-of-band mechanism by which a
   SET Receiver may be notified of delivery failures, and validates
   it.  The SET Receiver MUST acknowledge receipt MAY retain
   SETs that it failed to deliver and make them available to the SET
   Transmitter, using the defined acknowledgement or error method.

   The SET
   Receiver SHALL NOT use the Event acknowledgement mechanism to
   report Event errors via other than relating to the parsing and validation
   of the SET.

2.2. means.

2.1.  Transmitting a SET

   This method allows

   To transmit a SET Transmitter to use a SET Receiver, the SET Transmitter makes an
   HTTP POST (Section 4.3.3
   [RFC7231]) to deliver SETs request to a previously registered web callback
   URI supplied an HTTP endpoint provided by the SET Receiver as part Receiver.
   The "Content-Type" header of a configuration process
   (not defined by this document).

   The SET to be delivered MAY request MUST be signed and/or encrypted "application/
   secevent+jwt" as defined in

   The HTTP Content-Type (see Section [RFC7231]) for the HTTP
   POST is "application/secevent+jwt" Sections 2.2 and 6.2 of RFC8417
   [RFC8417], and the "Accept" header MUST be "application/json".  The
   request body SHALL MUST consist of a single the SET (see [RFC8417]).  As per Section 5.3.2 [RFC7231], itself, represented as a JWT

   The mechanisms by which the
   value of SET Transmitter determines the "Accept" header is "application/json". HTTP
   endpoint to use when transmitting a SET to a given SET Receiver are
   not defined by this specification and may be implementation-specific.

   The following is a non-normative example of a SET transmission HTTP

   POST /Events  HTTP/1.1
   Accept: application/json
   Content-Type: application/secevent+jwt


                Figure 1: Example SET Transmission Request

2.3.  Handling a SET Transmission Request

   Upon receipt of the request, the SET Receiver SHALL validate the JWT
   structure of the SET as defined in Section 7.2 [RFC7519].  The SET
   Receiver SHALL also validate the SET information as described in
   Section 2 [RFC8417].


2.2.  Success Response

   If the SET is determined to be valid, the SET Receiver SHALL
   "acknowledge" successful submission by responding with HTTP Status
   202 as "Accepted" (see Section 6.3.3 [RFC7231]).

   In order to maintain compatibility with other methods of
   transmission, the SET Receiver SHOULD NOT include an HTTP response
   body representation of the submitted SET or what the SET's pending
   status is when acknowledging success.  In the case of an error (e.g. valid, the SET Receiver SHALL
   "acknowledge" successful transmission by responding with HTTP
   Response Status 400), the purpose Code 202 (see Section 6.3.3 of RFC7231 [RFC7231]).
   The body of the HTTP response body is to
   indicate any SET parsing, validation, or cryptographic errors. MUST be empty.

   The following is a non-normative example of a successful receipt of a

   HTTP/1.1 202 Accepted

              Figure 2: Example Successful Delivery Response

   Note that the purpose of the "acknowledgement" response is to let the
   SET Transmitter know that a SET has been delivered and the
   information no longer needs to be retained by the SET Transmitter.
   Before acknowledgement, SET Receivers SHOULD ensure they have
   validated received SETs and retained them in a manner appropriate to
   information retention requirements appropriate to the SET event types
   signaled.  The level and method of retention of SETs by SET Receivers
   is out-of-scope of this specification.


2.3.  Failure Response

   In the Event event of a general HTTP error condition, the SET Receiver MAY
   respond with an appropriate HTTP Status code Code as defined in Section 6
   of RFC7231 [RFC7231].

   When the SET Receiver detects an error parsing or validating a
   received SET (as defined by [RFC8417]),
   transmitted in a SET Transmission Request, the SET Receiver SHALL
   respond with an HTTP Response Status 400 error with an error Code of 400.  The "Content-Type"
   header of this response as described
   in MUST be "application/json", and the body MUST
   be a JSON object containing the following name/value pairs:

   err  A Security Event Token Error Code (see Section 2.3.4. 2.4).

   description  Human-readable text that describes the error and MAY
      contain additional diagnostic information.

   The following is an example non-normative error response.

   HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
   Content-Type: application/json

   "description":"SET already received. Ignored."


                     Figure 3: Example Error Response


2.4.  Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes

   Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes are strings that identify a
   specific type of error that may occur when parsing or validating a
   SET.  Every Security Event Token Delivery Error Code MUST have a
   unique name registered in the IANA "Security Event Token Delivery
   Error Codes" registry established by Section 6.1. 7.1.

   The following table presents the initial set of Error Codes that are
   registered in the IANA "Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes"

   | Error     | Description                                           |
   | Code      |                                                       |
   | json      | Invalid JSON object.                                  |
   | jwtParse  | Invalid or unparsable JWT or JSON structure.          |
   | jwtHdr    | In invalid JWT header was detected.                   |
   | jwtCrypto | Unable to parse due to unsupported algorithm.         |
   | jws       | Signature was not validated.                          |
   | jwe       | Unable to decrypt JWE encoded data.                   |
   | jwtAud    | Invalid audience value.                               |
   | jwtIss    | Issuer not recognized.                                |
   | setType   | An unexpected Event type was received.                |
   | setParse  | Invalid structure was encountered such as an          |
   |           | inability to parse or an incomplete set of Event      |
   |           | claims.                                               |
   | setData   | SET event claims incomplete or invalid.               |
   | dup       | A duplicate SET was received and has been ignored.    |

                     Table 1: SET Delivery Error Codes

2.3.4.  Error Responses

   An error response SHALL include a JSON object which provides details
   about the error.  The JSON object includes the JSON attributes:

      A value which is a keyword that describes the error (see Table 1).

      A human-readable text that provides additional diagnostic

   When included as part of an HTTP Status 400 response, the above JSON
   is the HTTP response body (see Figure 3).

3.  Authentication and Authorization

   The SET delivery method described in this specification is based upon
   HTTP and depends on the use of TLS and/or standard HTTP
   authentication and authorization schemes as per [RFC7235].

   Because SET Delivery describes Delivery describes a simple function, authorization for
   the ability to pick-up or deliver SETs can be derived by considering
   the identity of the SET issuer, or via other employed authentication
   methods.  Because SETs are not commands (see ), SET Receivers are
   free to ignore SETs that are not of interest.

4.  Delivery Reliability

   Delivery reliability requirements may vary from implementation to
   implementation.  This specification defines the response from the SET
   Receiver in such a way as to provide the SET Transmitter with the
   information necessary to determine what further action is required,
   if any, in order to meet their requirements.  SET Transmitters with
   high reliability requirements may be tempted to always retry failed
   transmissions, however it should be noted that for many types of SET
   delivery errors, a simple function, authorization for
   the ability retry is extremely unlikely to pick-up or deliver SETs can be derived by considering successful.  For
   example, "json", "jwtParse", and "setParse" all indicate structural
   errors in the identity content of the SET issuer, or via other employed authentication
   methods.  Because SETs are not commands (see ), SET Receivers are
   free to ignore SETs that are likely to remain when re-
   transmitting the same SET.  Others such as "jws" or "jwe" may be
   transient, for example if cryptographic material has not been
   properly distributed to the SET Receiver's systems.

   Implementers SHOULD evaluate their reliability requirements and the
   impact of interest.

4. various retry mechanisms on the performance of their
   systems to determine the correct strategy for various error

5.  Security Considerations


5.1.  Authentication Using Signed SETs

   In scenarios where HTTP authorization or TLS mutual authentication
   are not used or are considered weak, JWS signed SETs SHOULD be used
   (see [RFC7515] and Security Considerations [RFC8417]).  This enables
   the SET Receiver to validate that the SET issuer is authorized to
   deliver SETs.


5.2.  TLS Support Considerations

   SETs contain sensitive information that is considered PII (e.g.
   subject claims).  Therefore, SET Transmitters and SET Receivers MUST
   require the use of a transport-layer security mechanism.  Event
   delivery endpoints MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and MAY support
   additional transport-layer mechanisms meeting its security
   requirements.  When using TLS, the client MUST perform a TLS/SSL
   server certificate check, per [RFC6125].  Implementation security
   considerations for TLS can be found in "Recommendations for Secure
   Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525].


5.3.  Denial of Service

   The SET Receiver may be vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack
   where a malicious party makes a high volume of requests containing
   invalid SETs, causing the endpoint to expend significant resources on
   cryptographic operations that are bound to fail.  This may be
   mitigated by authenticating SET Transmitters with a mechanism with
   low runtime overhead, such as mutual TLS or statically assigned
   bearer tokens.


5.4.  Authenticating Persisted SETs

   At the time of receipt, the SET Receiver can rely upon transport
   layer mechanisms, HTTP authentication methods, and/or other context
   from the transmission request to authenticate the SET Transmitter and
   validate the authenticity of the SET.  However, this context is
   typically unavailable to systems that the SET Receiver forwards the
   SET onto, or to systems that retrieve the SET from storage.  If the
   SET Receiver requires the ability to validate SET authenticity
   outside of the context of the transmission request, then the SET
   Transmitter SHOULD sign the SET in accordance with [RFC7515], or
   encrypt it using an authenticated encryption scheme in accordance
   with [RFC7516].

6.  Privacy Considerations

   If a SET needs to be retained for audit purposes, JWS MAY be used to
   provide verification of its authenticity.

   When sharing personally identifiable information or information that
   is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET
   Transmitters and Receivers MUST have the appropriate legal agreements
   and user consent or terms of service in place.

   The propagation of subject identifiers can be perceived as personally
   identifiable information.  Where possible, SET Transmitters and
   Receivers SHOULD devise approaches that prevent propagation -- for
   example, the passing of a hash value that requires the subscriber to
   already know the subject.


7.  IANA Considerations


7.1.  Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes

   This document defines Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes, for
   which IANA is asked to create and maintain a new registry titled
   "Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes".  Initial values for the
   Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes registry are given in
   Table 1.  Future assignments are to be made through the Expert Review
   registration policy ([RFC8126]) and shall follow the template
   presented in Section 6.1.1.

6.1.1. 7.1.1.

7.1.1.  Registration Template

   Error Code
      The name of the Security Event Token Delivery Error Code, as
      described in Section 2.3.3. 2.4.  The name MUST be a case-sensitive ASCII
      string consisting only of upper-case letters ("A" - "Z"),
      lower-case lower-
      case letters ("a" - "z"), and digits ("0" - "9").

      A brief human-readable description of the Security Event Token
      Delivery Error Code.

   Change Controller
      For error codes registered by the IETF or its working groups, list
      "IETF Secevent Working Group".  For all other error codes, list
      the name of the party responsible for the registration.  Contact
      information such as mailing address, email address, or phone
      number may also be provided.

   Defining Document(s)
      A reference to the document or documents that define the Security
      Event Token Delivery Error Code.  The definition MUST specify the
      name and description of the error code, and explain under what
      circumstances the error code may be used.  URIs that can be used
      to retrieve copies of each document at no cost SHOULD be included.


7.1.2.  Initial Registry Contents


      Error Code

         Invalid JSON object.

      Change Controller
         IETF Secevent Working Group

      Defining Document(s)
         Section 2.3.3 2.4 of this document.


      Error Code

         Invalid or unparsable JWT or JSON structure.

      Change Controller
         IETF Secevent Working Group

      Defining Document(s)
         Section 2.3.3 2.4 of this document.


      Error Code

         An invalid JWT header was detected.

      Change Controller
         IETF Secevent Working Group

      Defining Document(s)
         Section 2.3.3 2.4 of this document.


      Error Code

         Unable to parse due to unsupported algorithm.

      Change Controller
         IETF Secevent Working Group

      Defining Document(s)
         Section 2.3.3 2.4 of this document.


      Error Code

         Signature was not validated.

      Change Controller
         IETF Secevent Working Group

      Defining Document(s)
         Section 2.3.3 2.4 of this document.


      Error Code

         Unable to decrypt JWE encoded data.

      Change Controller
         IETF Secevent Working Group

      Defining Document(s)
         Section 2.3.3 2.4 of this document.


      Error Code

         Invalid audience value.

      Change Controller
         IETF Secevent Working Group

      Defining Document(s)
         Section 2.3.3 2.4 of this document.


      Error Code

         Issuer not recognized.

      Change Controller

      Defining Document(s)
         Section 2.3.3 2.4 of this document.


      Error Code

         An unexpected Event type was received.

      Change Controller
         IETF Secevent Working Group

      Defining Document(s)
         Section 2.3.3 2.4 of this document.


      Error Code

         Invalid structure was encountered such as an inability to parse
         or an incomplete set of Event claims.

      Change Controller
         IETF Secevent Working Group

      Defining Document(s)
         Section 2.3.3 2.4 of this document.


      Error Code

         SET event claims incomplete or invalid.

      Change Controller
         IETF Secevent Working Group

      Defining Document(s)
         Section 2.3.3 2.4 of this document.


      Error Code

         A duplicate SET was received and has been ignored.

      Change Controller
         IETF Secevent Working Group

      Defining Document(s)
         Section 2.3.3 2.4 of this document.


8.  References


8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,

   [RFC5988]  Nottingham, M., "Web Linking", RFC 5988,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5988, October 2010,

   [RFC6125]  Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
              Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
              within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
              (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
              2011, <>.

   [RFC7159]  Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
              2014, <>.

   [RFC7231]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,

   [RFC7517]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,

   [RFC7525]  Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
              "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
              (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
              2015, <>.

   [RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
              RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <>.

   [RFC8417]  Hunt, P., Ed., Jones, M., Denniss, W., and M. Ansari,
              "Security Event Token (SET)", RFC 8417,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8417, July 2018,


8.2.  Informative References

              NRI, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", Nov 2014.

   [RFC3339]  Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
              Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,

   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
              RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,

   [RFC6750]  Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
              Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,

   [RFC7230]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
              RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,

   [RFC7235]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014,

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015, <>.

   [RFC7516]  Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
              RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,

   [RFC7521]  Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M., and Y. Goland,
              "Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication
              and Authorization Grants", RFC 7521, DOI 10.17487/RFC7521,
              May 2015, <>.

   [RFC7617]  Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme",
              RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015,

              Internet2, "Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS
              Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", March

Appendix A.  Other Streaming Specifications

   [[EDITORS NOTE: This section to be removed prior to publication]]

   The following pub/sub, queuing, streaming systems were reviewed as
   possible solutions or as input to the current draft:

   XMPP Events

   The WG considered the XMPP events ands its ability to provide a
   single messaging solution without the need for both polling and push
   modes.  The feeling was the size and methodology of XMPP was to far
   apart from the current capabilities of the SECEVENTs community which
   focuses in on HTTP based service delivery and authorization.

   Amazon Simple Notification Service

   Simple Notification Service, is a pub/sub messaging product from AWS.
   SNS supports a variety of subscriber types: HTTP/HTTPS endpoints, AWS
   Lambda functions, email addresses (as JSON or plain text), phone
   numbers (via SMS), and AWS SQS standard queues.  It doesn't directly
   support pull, but subscribers can get the pull model by creating an
   SQS queue and subscribing it to the topic.  Note that this puts the
   cost of pull support back onto the subscriber, just as it is in the
   push model.  It is not clear that one way is strictly better than the
   other; larger, sophisticated developers may be happy to own message
   persistence so they can have their own internal delivery guarantees.
   The long tail of OIDC clients may not care about that, or may fail to
   get it right.  Regardless, I think we can learn something from the
   Delivery Policies supported by SNS, as well as the delivery controls
   that SQS offers (e.g.  Visibility Timeout, Dead-Letter Queues).  I'm
   not suggesting that we need all of these things in the spec, but they
   give an idea of what features people have found useful.

   Other information:

   o  API Reference:

   o  Visibility Timeouts:

   Apache Kafka

   Apache Kafka is an Apache open source project based upon TCP for
   distributed streaming.  It prescribes some interesting general
   purpose features that seem to extend far beyond the simpler streaming
   model SECEVENTs is after.  A comment from MS has been that Kafka does
   an acknowledge with poll combination event which seems to be a
   performance advantage.  See:

   Google Pub/Sub

   Google Pub Sub system favours a model whereby polling and
   acknowledgement of events is done as separate endpoints as separate


   o  Cloud Overview -

   o  Subscriber Overview -

   o  Subscriber Pull(poll) -

Appendix B.  Acknowledgments

   The editors would like to thanks the members of the SCIM WG which
   began discussions of provisioning events starting with: draft-hunt-
   scim-notify-00 in 2015.

   The editors would like to thank Phil Hunt and the other authors of
   draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02, on which this draft is based.

   The editor would like to thank the participants in the the SECEVENTS
   working group for their support of this specification.

Appendix C.  Change Log

   Draft 00 - AB - Based on draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02 with the
   following changes:

   o  Renamed to "Push-Based SET Token Delivery Using HTTP"

   o  Removed references to the HTTP Polling delivery method.

   o  Removed informative reference to RFC6202.

   Draft 01 - AB:

   o  Fixed area and workgroup to match secevent.

   o  Removed unused definitions and definitions already covered by SET.

   o  Renamed Event Transmitter and Event Receiver to SET Transmitter
      and SET Receiver, respectively.

   o  Added IANA registry for SET Delivery Error Codes.

   o  Removed enumeration of HTTP authentication methods.

   o  Removed generally applicable guidance for HTTP, authorization
      tokens, and bearer tokens.

   o  Moved guidance for using authentication methods as DoS protection
      to Security Considerations.

   o  Removed redundant instruction to use WWW-Authenticate header.

   o  Removed further generally applicable guidance for authorization

   o  Removed bearer token from example delivery request, and text
      referencing it.

   o  Broke delivery method description into separate request/response

   o  Added missing empty line between headers and body in example

   o  Removed unapplicable notes about example formatting.

   o  Removed text about SET creation and handling.

   o  Removed duplication in protocol description.

   o  Added "non-normative example" text to example transmission

   o  Fixed inconsistencies in use of Error Code term.

   Draft 02 - AB:

   o  Rewrote abstract and introduction.

   o  Rewrote definitions for SET Transmitter, SET Receiver.

   o  Renamed Event Delivery section to SET Delivery.

   o  Readability edits to Success Response and Failure Response

   o  Consolidated definition of error response under Failure Response

   o  Removed Event Delivery Process section and moved its content to
      parent section.

   o  Readability edits to SET Delivery section and its subsections.

   o  Added callout that SET Receiver HTTP endpoint configuration is

   o  Added callout that SET verification mechanisms are out-of-scope.

   o  Added retry guidance, notes regarding delivery reliability

   o  Added guidance around using JWS and/or JWE to authenticate
      persisted SETs.

Authors' Addresses

   Annabelle Backman (editor)

   Michael B. Jones (editor)


   Marius Scurtescu


   Morteza Ansari


   Anthony Nadalin