draft-ietf-secevent-http-push-11.txt   draft-ietf-secevent-http-push-12.txt 
Security Events Working Group A. Backman, Ed. Security Events Working Group A. Backman, Ed.
Internet-Draft Amazon Internet-Draft Amazon
Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones, Ed. Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones, Ed.
Expires: December 6, 2020 Microsoft Expires: December 17, 2020 Microsoft
M. Scurtescu M. Scurtescu
Coinbase Coinbase
M. Ansari M. Ansari
Cisco Cisco
A. Nadalin A. Nadalin
Microsoft Microsoft
June 4, 2020 June 15, 2020
Push-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP Push-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP
draft-ietf-secevent-http-push-11 draft-ietf-secevent-http-push-12
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines how a Security Event Token (SET) may be This specification defines how a Security Event Token (SET) can be
delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST. The SET is delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over TLS. The SET
transmitted in the body of an HTTP POST request to an endpoint is transmitted in the body of an HTTP POST request to an endpoint
operated by the recipient, and the recipient indicates successful or operated by the recipient, and the recipient indicates successful or
failed transmission via the HTTP response. failed transmission via the HTTP response.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 6, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 17, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 19 skipping to change at page 2, line 19
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. SET Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. SET Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Transmitting a SET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1. Transmitting a SET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Success Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2. Success Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. Failure Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3. Failure Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes . . . . . . . . 8 2.4. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes . . . . . . . . 8
3. Authentication and Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3. Authentication and Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Delivery Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4. Delivery Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. HTTP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.2. HTTP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.3. Confidentiality of SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.3. Confidentiality of SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.4. Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.4. Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.5. Authenticating Persisted SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.5. Authenticating Persisted SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.1. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes . . . . . . . . 11 7.1. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes . . . . . . . . 11
7.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. Other Streaming Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Appendix A. Unencrypted Transport Considerations . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Appendix B. Other Streaming Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix C. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Appendix C. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix D. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction and Overview 1. Introduction and Overview
This specification defines a mechanism by which a transmitter of a This specification defines a mechanism by which a transmitter of a
Security Event Token (SET) [RFC8417] may deliver the SET to an Security Event Token (SET) [RFC8417] can deliver the SET to an
intended recipient via HTTP POST [RFC7231]. intended SET Recipient via HTTP POST [RFC7231] over TLS. This is an
alternative SET delivery method to the one defined in
[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-poll].
Push-Based SET Delivery over HTTP POST is intended for scenarios Push-based SET delivery over HTTP POST is intended for scenarios
where all of the following apply: where all of the following apply:
o The transmitter of the SET is capable of making outbound HTTP o The transmitter of the SET is capable of making outbound HTTP
requests. requests.
o The recipient is capable of hosting an HTTP endpoint that is o The recipient is capable of hosting an HTTP endpoint using TLS
accessible to the transmitter. that is accessible to the transmitter.
o The transmitter and recipient are known to one another. o The transmitter and recipient are known to one another.
A mechanism for exchanging configuration metadata such as endpoint A mechanism for exchanging configuration metadata such as endpoint
URLs and cryptographic keys between the transmitter and recipient is URLs and cryptographic keys between the transmitter and recipient is
out of scope for this specification. How SETs are defined and the out of scope for this specification. How SETs are defined and the
process by which security events are identified for SET Recipients process by which security events are identified for SET Recipients
are specified in [RFC8417]. are specified in [RFC8417].
1.1. Notational Conventions 1.1. Notational Conventions
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The SET Transmitter MAY re-transmit a SET if the responses from The SET Transmitter MAY re-transmit a SET if the responses from
previous transmissions timed out or indicated potentially recoverable previous transmissions timed out or indicated potentially recoverable
error (such as server unavailability that may be transient). In all error (such as server unavailability that may be transient). In all
other cases, the SET Transmitter SHOULD NOT re-transmit a SET. The other cases, the SET Transmitter SHOULD NOT re-transmit a SET. The
SET Transmitter SHOULD delay retransmission for an appropriate amount SET Transmitter SHOULD delay retransmission for an appropriate amount
of time to avoid overwhelming the SET Recipient (see Section 4). of time to avoid overwhelming the SET Recipient (see Section 4).
2.1. Transmitting a SET 2.1. Transmitting a SET
To transmit a SET to a SET Recipient, the SET Transmitter makes an To transmit a SET to a SET Recipient, the SET Transmitter makes an
HTTP POST request to an HTTP endpoint provided by the SET Recipient. HTTP POST request to an HTTP endpoint using TLS provided by the SET
The "Content-Type" header of this request MUST be "application/ Recipient. The "Content-Type" header of this request MUST be
secevent+jwt" as defined in Sections 2.3 and 7.2 of [RFC8417], and "application/secevent+jwt" as defined in Sections 2.3 and 7.2 of
the "Accept" header MUST be "application/json". The request body [RFC8417], and the "Accept" header MUST be "application/json". The
MUST consist of the SET itself, represented as a JWT [RFC7519]. request body MUST consist of the SET itself, represented as a JWT
[RFC7519].
The SET Transmitter MAY include in the request an "Accept-Language" The SET Transmitter MAY include in the request an "Accept-Language"
header to indicate to the SET Recipient the preferred language(s) in header to indicate to the SET Recipient the preferred language(s) in
which to receive error messages. which to receive error messages.
The mechanisms by which the SET Transmitter determines the HTTP The mechanisms by which the SET Transmitter determines the HTTP
endpoint to use when transmitting a SET to a given SET Recipient are endpoint to use when transmitting a SET to a given SET Recipient are
not defined by this specification and are deployment specific. not defined by this specification and are deployment specific.
The following is a non-normative example of a SET transmission The following is a non-normative example of a SET transmission
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"err": "authentication_failed", "err": "authentication_failed",
"description": "Access token has expired." "description": "Access token has expired."
} }
Figure 4: Example Error Response (authentication_failed) Figure 4: Example Error Response (authentication_failed)
The following is an example non-normative error response indicating The following is an example non-normative error response indicating
that the SET Receiver is not willing to accept SETs issued by the that the SET Receiver is not willing to accept SETs issued by the
specified issuer from this particular SET Transmitter. specified issuer from this particular SET Transmitter.
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
{ {
"err": "access_denied", "err": "access_denied",
"description": "Not authorized for issuer http://iss.example.com/." "description": "Not authorized for issuer https://iss.example.com/."
} }
Figure 5: Example Error Response (access_denied) Figure 5: Example Error Response (access_denied)
2.4. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes 2.4. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes
Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes are strings that identify a Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes are strings that identify a
specific category of error that may occur when parsing or validating specific category of error that may occur when parsing or validating
a SET. Every Security Event Token Delivery Error Code MUST have a a SET. Every Security Event Token Delivery Error Code MUST have a
unique name registered in the IANA "Security Event Token Delivery unique name registered in the IANA "Security Event Token Delivery
Error Codes" registry established by Section 7.1. Error Codes" registry established by Section 7.1.
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Table 1: SET Delivery Error Codes Table 1: SET Delivery Error Codes
Implementations SHOULD expect that other Error Codes may also be Implementations SHOULD expect that other Error Codes may also be
received, as the set of Error Codes is extensible via the IANA received, as the set of Error Codes is extensible via the IANA
"Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes" registry established in "Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes" registry established in
Section 7.1. Section 7.1.
3. Authentication and Authorization 3. Authentication and Authorization
The SET delivery method described in this specification is based upon The SET delivery method described in this specification is based upon
HTTP and HTTP over TLS [RFC2818] and/or standard HTTP authentication HTTP over TLS [RFC2818] and standard HTTP authentication and
and authorization schemes, as per [RFC7235]. The TLS server authorization schemes, as per [RFC7235]. The TLS server certificate
certificate MUST be validated, per [RFC6125]. MUST be validated, per [RFC6125].
Authorization for the eligibility to provide actionable SETs can be Authorization for the eligibility to provide actionable SETs can be
determined by using the identity of the SET Issuer, the identity of determined by using the identity of the SET Issuer, the identity of
the SET Transmitter, perhaps using mutual TLS, or via other employed the SET Transmitter, perhaps using mutual TLS, or via other employed
authentication methods. Because SETs are not commands, SET authentication methods. Because SETs are not commands, SET
Recipients are free to ignore SETs that are not of interest. Recipients are free to ignore SETs that are not of interest.
4. Delivery Reliability 4. Delivery Reliability
Delivery reliability requirements may vary depending upon the use Delivery reliability requirements may vary depending upon the use
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5.2. HTTP Considerations 5.2. HTTP Considerations
SET delivery depends on the use of Hypertext Transfer Protocol and is SET delivery depends on the use of Hypertext Transfer Protocol and is
thus subject to the security considerations of HTTP Section 9 of thus subject to the security considerations of HTTP Section 9 of
[RFC7230] and its related specifications. [RFC7230] and its related specifications.
5.3. Confidentiality of SETs 5.3. Confidentiality of SETs
SETs may contain sensitive information that is considered Personally SETs may contain sensitive information that is considered Personally
Identifiable Information (PII). In such cases, SET Transmitters and Identifiable Information (PII). In such cases, SET Transmitters and
SET Recipients MUST protect the confidentiality of the SET contents SET Recipients MUST protect the confidentiality of the SET contents.
by encrypting the SET as described in JWE [RFC7516], using a In some use cases, using TLS to secure the transmitted SETs will be
transport-layer security mechanism such as TLS, or both. If an Event sufficient. In other use cases, encrypting the SET as described in
delivery endpoint supports TLS, it MUST support at least TLS version JWE [RFC7516] will also be required. The Event delivery endpoint
1.2 [RFC5246] and SHOULD support the newest version of TLS that meets MUST support at least TLS version 1.2 [RFC5246] and SHOULD support
its security requirements, which as of the time of this publication the newest version of TLS that meets its security requirements, which
is TLS 1.3 [RFC8446]. When using TLS, the client MUST perform a TLS/ as of the time of this publication is TLS 1.3 [RFC8446]. The client
SSL server certificate check using DNS-ID [RFC6125]. How a SET MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check using DNS-ID
Transmitter determines the expected service identity to match the SET [RFC6125]. How a SET Transmitter determines the expected service
Recipient's server certificate against is out of scope for this identity to match the SET Recipient's server certificate against is
document. Implementation security considerations for TLS can be out of scope for this document. Implementation security
found in "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525]. considerations for TLS can be found in "Recommendations for Secure
Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525].
5.4. Denial of Service 5.4. Denial of Service
The SET Recipient may be vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack The SET Recipient may be vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack
where a malicious party makes a high volume of requests containing where a malicious party makes a high volume of requests containing
invalid SETs, causing the endpoint to expend significant resources on invalid SETs, causing the endpoint to expend significant resources on
cryptographic operations that are bound to fail. This may be cryptographic operations that are bound to fail. This may be
mitigated by authenticating SET Transmitters with a mechanism such as mitigated by authenticating SET Transmitters with a mechanism such as
mutual TLS. mutual TLS.
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6. Privacy Considerations 6. Privacy Considerations
SET Transmitters SHOULD attempt to deliver SETs that are targeted to SET Transmitters SHOULD attempt to deliver SETs that are targeted to
the specific business and protocol needs of subscribers. the specific business and protocol needs of subscribers.
When sharing personally identifiable information or information that When sharing personally identifiable information or information that
is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET
Transmitters and Recipients MUST have the appropriate legal Transmitters and Recipients MUST have the appropriate legal
agreements and user consent or terms of service in place. agreements and user consent or terms of service in place.
Furthermore, data that needs confidentiality protection MUST be Furthermore, data that needs confidentiality protection MUST be
encrypted, either via TLS or using JSON Web Encryption (JWE) encrypted, at least with TLS and sometimes also using JSON Web
[RFC7516], or both. Encryption (JWE) [RFC7516].
In some cases, subject identifiers themselves may be considered In some cases, subject identifiers themselves may be considered
sensitive information, such that their inclusion within a SET may be sensitive information, such that their inclusion within a SET may be
considered a violation of privacy. SET Issuers should consider the considered a violation of privacy. SET Issuers should consider the
ramifications of sharing a particular subject identifier with a SET ramifications of sharing a particular subject identifier with a SET
Recipient (e.g., whether doing so could enable correlation and/or de- Recipient (e.g., whether doing so could enable correlation and/or de-
anonymization of data) and choose appropriate subject identifiers for anonymization of data) and choose appropriate subject identifiers for
their use cases. their use cases.
If SETs are transmitted over unencrypted channels, some privacy-
sensitive information about them might leak, even though the SETs
themselves are encrypted. For instance, an attacker may be able to
determine whether or not a SET was accepted and the reason for its
rejection or may be able to derive information from being able to
observe the size of the encrypted SET.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
7.1. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes 7.1. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes
This document defines Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes, for This document defines Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes, for
which IANA is asked to create and maintain a new registry titled which IANA is asked to create and maintain a new registry titled
"Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes". Initial values for the "Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes". Initial values for the
Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes registry are defined in Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes registry are defined in
Table 1 and registered below. Future assignments are to be made Table 1 and registered below. Future assignments are to be made
through the Specification Required registration policy ([RFC8126]) through the Specification Required registration policy ([RFC8126])
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"Security Event Token (SET)", RFC 8417, "Security Event Token (SET)", RFC 8417,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8417, July 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8417, July 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8417>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8417>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-poll]
Backman, A., Jones, M., Scurtescu, M., Ansari, M., and A.
Nadalin, "Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery
Using HTTP", draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-10 (work in
progress), June 2020.
[RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer [RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235, Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>.
Appendix A. Other Streaming Specifications Appendix A. Unencrypted Transport Considerations
Earlier versions of this specification made the use of TLS optional
and described security and privacy considerations resulting from use
of unencrypted HTTP as the underlying transport. When the working
group decided to mandate usage HTTP over TLS, it also decided to
preserve the description of these considerations in this non-
normative appendix.
SETs may contain sensitive information that is considered Personally
Identifiable Information (PII). In such cases, SET Transmitters and
SET Recipients MUST protect the confidentiality of the SET contents.
When TLS is not used, this means that the SET MUST be encrypted as
described in JWE [RFC7516].
If SETs are transmitted over unencrypted channels, some privacy-
sensitive information about them might leak, even though the SETs
themselves are encrypted. For instance, an attacker may be able to
determine whether or not a SET was accepted and the reason for its
rejection or may be able to derive information from being able to
observe the size of the encrypted SET.
Appendix B. Other Streaming Specifications
[[ NOTE TO THE RFC EDITOR: This section to be removed prior to [[ NOTE TO THE RFC EDITOR: This section to be removed prior to
publication ]] publication ]]
The following pub/sub, queuing, streaming systems were reviewed as The following pub/sub, queuing, streaming systems were reviewed as
possible solutions or as input to the current draft: possible solutions or as input to the current draft:
Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP
In addition to this specification, the WG is defining a polling-based In addition to this specification, the WG is defining a polling-based
SET delivery protocol. That protocol's draft (draft-ietf-secevent- SET delivery protocol. That protocol [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-poll]
http-poll) describes it as: describes it as:
This specification defines how a series of Security Event Tokens This specification defines how a series of Security Event Tokens
(SETs) may be delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over (SETs) can be delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over
TLS initiated as a poll by the recipient. The specification also TLS initiated as a poll by the recipient. The specification also
defines how delivery can be assured, subject to the SET Recipient's defines how delivery can be assured, subject to the SET Recipient's
need for assurance. need for assurance.
XMPP Events XMPP Events
The WG considered XMPP Events and their ability to provide a single The WG considered XMPP Events and their ability to provide a single
messaging solution without the need for both polling and push modes. messaging solution without the need for both polling and push modes.
The feeling was the size and methodology of XMPP was too far apart The feeling was the size and methodology of XMPP was too far apart
from the current capabilities of the SECEVENTs community, which from the current capabilities of the SECEVENTs community, which
focuses in on HTTP based service delivery and authorization. focuses in on HTTP based service delivery and authorization.
Amazon Simple Notification Service Amazon Simple Notification Service
Simple Notification Service is a pub/sub messaging product from AWS. Simple Notification Service is a pub/sub messaging product from AWS.
SNS supports a variety of subscriber types: HTTP/HTTPS endpoints, AWS SNS supports a variety of subscriber types: HTTP/HTTPS endpoints, AWS
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Information: Information:
o Cloud Overview - https://cloud.google.com/pubsub/ o Cloud Overview - https://cloud.google.com/pubsub/
o Subscriber Overview - https://cloud.google.com/pubsub/docs/ o Subscriber Overview - https://cloud.google.com/pubsub/docs/
subscriber subscriber
o Subscriber Pull(poll) - https://cloud.google.com/pubsub/docs/pull o Subscriber Pull(poll) - https://cloud.google.com/pubsub/docs/pull
Appendix B. Acknowledgments Appendix C. Acknowledgments
The editors would like to thank the members of the SCIM working The editors would like to thank the members of the SCIM working
group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with
draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 in 2015. We would like to thank Phil Hunt draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 in 2015. We would like to thank Phil Hunt
and the other authors of draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02, upon which and the other authors of draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02, upon which
this specification is based. We would like to thank the participants this specification is based. We would like to thank the participants
in the SecEvents working group for their contributions to this in the SecEvents working group for their contributions to this
specification. specification.
Additionally, we would like to thank the following individuals for Additionally, we would like to thank the following individuals for
their reviews of the specification: Joe Clarke, Vijay Gurbani, their reviews of the specification: Joe Clarke, Vijay Gurbani,
Benjamin Kaduk, Yaron Sheffer, and Valery Smyslov. Benjamin Kaduk, Yaron Sheffer, and Valery Smyslov.
Appendix C. Change Log Appendix D. Change Log
[[ NOTE TO THE RFC EDITOR: This section to be removed prior to [[ NOTE TO THE RFC EDITOR: This section to be removed prior to
publication ]] publication ]]
Draft 00 - AB - Based on draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02 with the Draft 00 - AB - Based on draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02 with the
following changes: following changes:
o Renamed to "Push-Based SET Token Delivery Using HTTP" o Renamed to "Push-Based SET Token Delivery Using HTTP"
o Removed references to the HTTP Polling delivery method. o Removed references to the HTTP Polling delivery method.
skipping to change at page 21, line 21 skipping to change at page 21, line 40
* Minor editorial corrections. * Minor editorial corrections.
Draft 11 - mbj Draft 11 - mbj
o Addressed SecDir review comments by Valery Smyslov. o Addressed SecDir review comments by Valery Smyslov.
o Addressed OpsDir review comments by Joe Clarke. o Addressed OpsDir review comments by Joe Clarke.
o Addressed GenArt review comments by Vijay Gurbani. o Addressed GenArt review comments by Vijay Gurbani.
Draft 12 - mbj
o Revised to unambiguously require the use of TLS, while preserving
descriptions of precautions needed for non-TLS use in an appendix.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Annabelle Backman (editor) Annabelle Backman (editor)
Amazon Amazon
Email: richanna@amazon.com Email: richanna@amazon.com
Michael B. Jones (editor) Michael B. Jones (editor)
Microsoft Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com Email: mbj@microsoft.com
URI: http://self-issued.info/ URI: https://self-issued.info/
Marius Scurtescu Marius Scurtescu
Coinbase Coinbase
Email: marius.scurtescu@coinbase.com Email: marius.scurtescu@coinbase.com
Morteza Ansari Morteza Ansari
Cisco Cisco
Email: morteza.ansari@cisco.com Email: morteza.ansari@cisco.com
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