draft-ietf-secevent-http-push-12.txt   draft-ietf-secevent-http-push-13.txt 
Security Events Working Group A. Backman, Ed. Security Events Working Group A. Backman, Ed.
Internet-Draft Amazon Internet-Draft Amazon
Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones, Ed. Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones, Ed.
Expires: December 17, 2020 Microsoft Expires: December 26, 2020 Microsoft
M. Scurtescu M. Scurtescu
Coinbase Coinbase
M. Ansari M. Ansari
Cisco Cisco
A. Nadalin A. Nadalin
Microsoft Microsoft
June 15, 2020 June 24, 2020
Push-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP Push-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP
draft-ietf-secevent-http-push-12 draft-ietf-secevent-http-push-13
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines how a Security Event Token (SET) can be This specification defines how a Security Event Token (SET) can be
delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over TLS. The SET delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over TLS. The SET
is transmitted in the body of an HTTP POST request to an endpoint is transmitted in the body of an HTTP POST request to an endpoint
operated by the recipient, and the recipient indicates successful or operated by the recipient, and the recipient indicates successful or
failed transmission via the HTTP response. failed transmission via the HTTP response.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
skipping to change at page 1, line 41 skipping to change at page 1, line 41
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 17, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 26, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 22 skipping to change at page 2, line 22
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. SET Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. SET Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Transmitting a SET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1. Transmitting a SET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Success Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.2. Success Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. Failure Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3. Failure Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes . . . . . . . . 8 2.4. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes . . . . . . . . 8
3. Authentication and Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3. Authentication and Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Delivery Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4. Delivery Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2. HTTP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.2. HTTP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.3. Confidentiality of SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.3. Confidentiality of SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.4. Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.4. Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.5. Authenticating Persisted SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.5. Authenticating Persisted SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.1. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes . . . . . . . . 11 7.1. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes . . . . . . . . 12
7.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. Unencrypted Transport Considerations . . . . . . . . 14 Appendix A. Unencrypted Transport Considerations . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix B. Other Streaming Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Appendix B. Other Streaming Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix C. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Appendix C. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix D. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Appendix D. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1. Introduction and Overview 1. Introduction and Overview
This specification defines a mechanism by which a transmitter of a This specification defines a mechanism by which a transmitter of a
Security Event Token (SET) [RFC8417] can deliver the SET to an Security Event Token (SET) [RFC8417] can deliver the SET to an
intended SET Recipient via HTTP POST [RFC7231] over TLS. This is an intended SET Recipient via HTTP POST [RFC7231] over TLS. This is an
alternative SET delivery method to the one defined in alternative SET delivery method to the one defined in
[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-poll]. [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-poll].
Push-based SET delivery over HTTP POST is intended for scenarios Push-based SET delivery over HTTP POST is intended for scenarios
where all of the following apply: where all of the following apply:
o The transmitter of the SET is capable of making outbound HTTP o The transmitter of the SET is capable of making outbound HTTP
requests. requests.
o The recipient is capable of hosting an HTTP endpoint using TLS o The recipient is capable of hosting a TLS-enabled HTTP endpoint
that is accessible to the transmitter. that is accessible to the transmitter.
o The transmitter and recipient are known to one another. o The transmitter and recipient are willing to exchange data with
one another.
In some scenarios, either push-based or poll-based delivery could be
used, and in others, only one of them would be applicable.
A mechanism for exchanging configuration metadata such as endpoint A mechanism for exchanging configuration metadata such as endpoint
URLs and cryptographic keys between the transmitter and recipient is URLs, cryptographic keys, and possible implementation constraints
out of scope for this specification. How SETs are defined and the such as buffer size limitations between the transmitter and recipient
is out of scope for this specification. How SETs are defined and the
process by which security events are identified for SET Recipients process by which security events are identified for SET Recipients
are specified in [RFC8417]. are specified in [RFC8417].
1.1. Notational Conventions 1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
Throughout this document, all figures may contain spaces and extra Throughout this document, all figures may contain spaces and extra
line wrapping for readability and due to space limitations. line wrapping for readability and due to space limitations.
1.2. Definitions 1.2. Definitions
This specification utilizes the following terms defined in [RFC8417]: This specification utilizes the following terms defined in [RFC8417]:
"Security Event Token (SET)", "SET Issuer", "SET Recipient", and "Security Event Token (SET)", "SET Issuer", "SET Recipient", and
"Event Payload". "Event Payload", as well as the term defined below:
This specification utilizes terminology defined in [RFC8417], as well
as the terms defined below:
SET Transmitter An entity that delivers SETs in its possession to SET Transmitter An entity that delivers SETs in its possession to
one or more SET Recipients. one or more SET Recipients.
2. SET Delivery 2. SET Delivery
To deliver a SET to a given SET Recipient, the SET Transmitter makes To deliver a SET to a given SET Recipient, the SET Transmitter makes
a SET transmission request to the SET Recipient, with the SET itself a SET transmission request to the SET Recipient, with the SET itself
contained within the request. The SET Recipient replies to this contained within the request. The SET Recipient replies to this
request with a response either acknowledging successful transmission request with a response either acknowledging successful transmission
skipping to change at page 4, line 18 skipping to change at page 4, line 20
o The SET Recipient can parse the SET. o The SET Recipient can parse the SET.
o The SET is authentic (i.e., it was issued by the issuer specified o The SET is authentic (i.e., it was issued by the issuer specified
within the SET, and if signed, was signed by a key belonging to within the SET, and if signed, was signed by a key belonging to
the issuer). the issuer).
o The SET Recipient is identified as an intended audience of the o The SET Recipient is identified as an intended audience of the
SET. SET.
o The SET Issuer is recognized as an issuer that the SET Recipient o The SET Issuer is recognized as an issuer that the SET Recipient
is willing to receive SETs from (e.g., the issuer is whitelisted is willing to receive SETs from (e.g., the issuer is listed as
by the SET Recipient). allowed by the SET Recipient).
o The SET Recipient is willing to accept the SET when transmitted by o The SET Recipient is willing to accept this SET from this SET
the SET Transmitter (e.g., the SET Transmitter is expected to send Transmitter (e.g., the SET Transmitter is expected to send SETs
SETs with the subject of the SET in question). with the issuer and subject of the SET in question).
The mechanisms by which the SET Recipient performs this validation The mechanisms by which the SET Recipient performs this validation
are out of scope for this document. SET parsing and issuer and are out of scope for this document. SET parsing, issuer
audience identification are defined in [RFC8417]. The mechanism for identification, and audience identification are defined in [RFC8417].
validating the authenticity of a SET is deployment specific, and may The mechanism for validating the authenticity of a SET is deployment
vary depending on the authentication mechanisms in use, and whether specific, and may vary depending on the authentication mechanisms in
the SET is signed and/or encrypted (See Section 3). use, and whether the SET is signed and/or encrypted (See Section 3).
SET Transmitters MAY transmit SETs issued by another entity. The SET SET Transmitters MAY transmit SETs issued by another entity. The SET
Recipient may accept or reject (i.e., return an error response such Recipient may accept or reject (i.e., return an error response such
as "access_denied") a SET at its own discretion. as "access_denied") a SET at its own discretion.
The SET Recipient SHOULD ensure that the SET is persisted in a way The SET Recipient persists the SET in a way that is sufficient to
that is sufficient to meet the SET Recipient's own reliability meet the SET Recipient's own reliability requirements, and MUST NOT
requirements, and MUST NOT expect or depend on a SET Transmitter to expect or depend on a SET Transmitter to re-transmit or otherwise
re-transmit or otherwise make available to the SET Recipient a SET make available to the SET Recipient a SET once the SET Recipient
once the SET Recipient acknowledges that it was received acknowledges that it was received successfully. The level and method
successfully. of retention of SETs by SET Recipients is out of scope of this
specification.
Once the SET has been validated and persisted, the SET Recipient Once the SET has been validated and persisted, the SET Recipient
SHOULD immediately return a response indicating that the SET was SHOULD immediately return a response indicating that the SET was
successfully delivered. The SET Recipient SHOULD NOT perform successfully delivered. The SET Recipient SHOULD NOT perform further
anything beyond the required validation steps prior to sending this processing of the SET beyond the required validation steps prior to
response. Any additional steps SHOULD be executed asynchronously sending this response. Any additional steps SHOULD be executed
from delivery, in order to minimize the expense and impact of SET asynchronously from delivery to minimize the time the SET Transmitter
delivery on the SET Transmitter. is waiting for a response.
The SET Transmitter MAY re-transmit a SET if the responses from The SET Transmitter MAY re-transmit a SET if the responses from
previous transmissions timed out or indicated potentially recoverable previous transmissions timed out or indicated potentially recoverable
error (such as server unavailability that may be transient). In all errors (such as server unavailability that may be transient). In all
other cases, the SET Transmitter SHOULD NOT re-transmit a SET. The other cases, the SET Transmitter SHOULD NOT re-transmit a SET. The
SET Transmitter SHOULD delay retransmission for an appropriate amount SET Transmitter SHOULD delay retransmission for an appropriate amount
of time to avoid overwhelming the SET Recipient (see Section 4). of time to avoid overwhelming the SET Recipient (see Section 4).
2.1. Transmitting a SET 2.1. Transmitting a SET
To transmit a SET to a SET Recipient, the SET Transmitter makes an To transmit a SET to a SET Recipient, the SET Transmitter makes an
HTTP POST request to an HTTP endpoint using TLS provided by the SET HTTP POST request to a TLS-enabled HTTP endpoint provided by the SET
Recipient. The "Content-Type" header of this request MUST be Recipient. The "Content-Type" header field of this request MUST be
"application/secevent+jwt" as defined in Sections 2.3 and 7.2 of "application/secevent+jwt" as defined in Sections 2.3 and 7.2 of
[RFC8417], and the "Accept" header MUST be "application/json". The [RFC8417], and the "Accept" header field MUST be "application/json".
request body MUST consist of the SET itself, represented as a JWT The request body MUST consist of the SET itself, represented as a JWT
[RFC7519]. [RFC7519].
The SET Transmitter MAY include in the request an "Accept-Language" The SET Transmitter MAY include in the request an "Accept-Language"
header to indicate to the SET Recipient the preferred language(s) in header field to indicate to the SET Recipient the preferred
which to receive error messages. language(s) in which to receive error messages.
The mechanisms by which the SET Transmitter determines the HTTP The mechanisms by which the SET Transmitter determines the HTTP
endpoint to use when transmitting a SET to a given SET Recipient are endpoint to use when transmitting a SET to a given SET Recipient are
not defined by this specification and are deployment specific. not defined by this specification and are deployment specific.
The following is a non-normative example of a SET transmission The following is a non-normative example of a SET transmission
request: request:
POST /Events HTTP/1.1 POST /Events HTTP/1.1
Host: notify.rp.example.com Host: notify.rp.example.com
Accept: application/json Accept: application/json
Accept-Language: en-US, en;q=0.5 Accept-Language: en-US, en;q=0.5
Content-Type: application/secevent+jwt Content-Type: application/secevent+jwt
eyJ0eXAiOiJzZWNldmVudCtqd3QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9Cg eyJ0eXAiOiJzZWNldmVudCtqd3QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9Cg
. .
eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2lkcC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS8iLCJqdGkiOiI3NTZFNjk eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL2lkcC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS8iLCJqdGkiOiI3NTZFNjk
3MTc1NjUyMDY5NjQ2NTZFNzQ2OTY2Njk2NTcyIiwiaWF0IjoxNTA4MTg0ODQ1LC 3MTc1NjUyMDY5NjQ2NTZFNzQ2OTY2Njk2NTcyIiwiaWF0IjoxNTA4MTg0ODQ1LC
JhdWQiOiI2MzZDNjk2NTZFNzQ1RjY5NjQiLCJldmVudHMiOnsiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY JhdWQiOiI2MzZDNjk2NTZFNzQ1RjY5NjQiLCJldmVudHMiOnsiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY
2hlbWFzLm9wZW5pZC5uZXQvc2VjZXZlbnQvcmlzYy9ldmVudC10eXBlL2FjY291 2hlbWFzLm9wZW5pZC5uZXQvc2VjZXZlbnQvcmlzYy9ldmVudC10eXBlL2FjY291
bnQtZGlzYWJsZWQiOnsic3ViamVjdCI6eyJzdWJqZWN0X3R5cGUiOiJpc3Mtc3V bnQtZGlzYWJsZWQiOnsic3ViamVjdCI6eyJzdWJqZWN0X3R5cGUiOiJpc3Mtc3V
iIiwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9pZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vIiwic3ViIjoiNzM3NT iIiwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9pZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vIiwic3ViIjoiNzM3NT
YyNkE2NTYzNzQifSwicmVhc29uIjoiaGlqYWNraW5nIn19fQ YyNkE2NTYzNzQifSwicmVhc29uIjoiaGlqYWNraW5nIn19fQ
. .
Y4rXxMD406P2edv00cr9Wf3_XwNtLjB9n-jTqN1_lLc Y4rXxMD406P2edv00cr9Wf3_XwNtLjB9n-jTqN1_lLc
Figure 1: Example SET Transmission Request Figure 1: Example SET Transmission Request
2.2. Success Response 2.2. Success Response
If the SET is determined to be valid, the SET Recipient SHALL If the SET is determined to be valid, the SET Recipient SHALL
acknowledge successful transmission by responding with HTTP Response acknowledge successful transmission by responding with HTTP Response
Status Code 202 (Accepted) (see Section 6.3.3 of [RFC7231]). The Status Code 202 (Accepted) (see Section 6.3.3 of [RFC7231]). The
body of the response MUST be empty. body of the response MUST be empty.
The following is a non-normative example of a successful receipt of a The following is a non-normative example of a successful receipt of a
SET. SET.
HTTP/1.1 202 Accepted HTTP/1.1 202 Accepted
Figure 2: Example Successful Delivery Response Figure 2: Example Successful Delivery Response
Note that the purpose of the acknowledgement response is to let the
SET Transmitter know that a SET has been delivered and the
information no longer needs to be retained by the SET Transmitter.
Before acknowledgement, SET Recipients SHOULD ensure they have
validated received SETs and retained them in a manner appropriate to
information retention requirements appropriate to the SET event types
signaled. The level and method of retention of SETs by SET
Recipients is out of scope of this specification.
2.3. Failure Response 2.3. Failure Response
In the event of a general HTTP error condition, the SET Recipient In the event of a general HTTP error condition, the SET Recipient
SHOULD respond with an appropriate HTTP Status Code as defined in responds with the applicable HTTP Status Code, as defined in
Section 6 of [RFC7231]. Section 6 of [RFC7231].
When the SET Recipient detects an error parsing, validating, or When the SET Recipient detects an error parsing, validating, or
authenticating a SET transmitted in a SET Transmission Request, the authenticating a SET transmitted in a SET Transmission Request, the
SET Recipient SHALL respond with an HTTP Response Status Code of 400 SET Recipient SHALL respond with an HTTP Response Status Code of 400
(Bad Request). The "Content-Type" header of this response MUST be (Bad Request). The "Content-Type" header field of this response MUST
"application/json", and the body MUST be a UTF-8 encoded JSON be "application/json", and the body MUST be a UTF-8 encoded JSON
[RFC8259] object containing the following name/value pairs: [RFC8259] object containing the following name/value pairs:
err A Security Event Token Error Code (see Section 2.4). err A Security Event Token Error Code (see Section 2.4).
description A UTF-8 string containing a human-readable description description A UTF-8 string containing a human-readable description
of the error that MAY provide additional diagnostic information. of the error that may provide additional diagnostic information.
The exact content of this field is implementation specific. The exact content of this field is implementation specific.
The response MUST include a "Content-Language" header, whose value The response MUST include a "Content-Language" header field, whose
indicates the language of the error descriptions included in the value indicates the language of the error descriptions included in
response body. If the SET Recipient can provide error descriptions the response body. If the SET Recipient can provide error
in multiple languages, they SHOULD choose the language to use descriptions in multiple languages, they SHOULD choose the language
according to the value of the "Accept-Language" header sent by the to use according to the value of the "Accept-Language" header field
SET Transmitter in the transmission request, as described in sent by the SET Transmitter in the transmission request, as described
Section 5.3.5 of [RFC7231]. If the SET Transmitter did not send an in Section 5.3.5 of [RFC7231]. If the SET Transmitter did not send
"Accept-Language" header, or if the SET Recipient does not support an "Accept-Language" header field, or if the SET Recipient does not
any of the languages included in the header, the SET Recipient MUST support any of the languages included in the header field, the SET
respond with messages that are understandable by an English-speaking Recipient MUST respond with messages that are understandable by an
person, as described in Section 4.5 of [RFC2277]. English-speaking person, as described in Section 4.5 of [RFC2277].
The following is an example non-normative error response indicating The following is a non-normative example error response indicating
that the key used to encrypt the SET has been revoked. that the key used to encrypt the SET has been revoked.
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
{ {
"err": "invalid_key", "err": "invalid_key",
"description": "Key ID 12345 has been revoked." "description": "Key ID 12345 has been revoked."
} }
Figure 3: Example Error Response (invalid_key) Figure 3: Example Error Response (invalid_key)
The following is an example non-normative error response indicating The following is a non-normative example error response indicating
that the access token included in the request is expired. that the access token included in the request is expired.
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
{ {
"err": "authentication_failed", "err": "authentication_failed",
"description": "Access token has expired." "description": "Access token has expired."
} }
Figure 4: Example Error Response (authentication_failed) Figure 4: Example Error Response (authentication_failed)
The following is an example non-normative error response indicating The following is a non-normative example error response indicating
that the SET Receiver is not willing to accept SETs issued by the that the SET Receiver is not willing to accept SETs issued by the
specified issuer from this particular SET Transmitter. specified issuer from this particular SET Transmitter.
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
{ {
"err": "access_denied", "err": "invalid_issuer",
"description": "Not authorized for issuer https://iss.example.com/." "description": "Not authorized for issuer https://iss.example.com/."
} }
Figure 5: Example Error Response (access_denied) Figure 5: Example Error Response (access_denied)
2.4. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes 2.4. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes
Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes are strings that identify a Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes are strings that identify a
specific category of error that may occur when parsing or validating specific category of error that may occur when parsing or validating
a SET. Every Security Event Token Delivery Error Code MUST have a a SET. Every Security Event Token Delivery Error Code MUST have a
skipping to change at page 8, line 26 skipping to change at page 9, line 14
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+ +-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| Error Code | Description | | Error Code | Description |
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+ +-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| invalid_request | The request body cannot be parsed as a | | invalid_request | The request body cannot be parsed as a |
| | SET, or the Event Payload within the SET | | | SET, or the Event Payload within the SET |
| | does not conform to the event's | | | does not conform to the event's |
| | definition. | | | definition. |
| invalid_key | One or more keys used to encrypt or sign | | invalid_key | One or more keys used to encrypt or sign |
| | the SET is invalid or otherwise | | | the SET is invalid or otherwise |
| | unacceptable to the SET Recipient. (e.g., | | | unacceptable to the SET Recipient |
| | expired, revoked, failed certificate | | | (expired, revoked, failed certificate |
| | validation, etc.) | | | validation, etc.). |
| invalid_issuer | The SET issuer is invalid for the SET |
| | Recipient. |
| invalid_audience | The SET audience does not correspond to |
| | the SET Recipient. |
| authentication_failed | The SET Recipient could not authenticate | | authentication_failed | The SET Recipient could not authenticate |
| | the SET Transmitter. | | | the SET Transmitter. |
| access_denied | The SET Transmitter is not authorized to | | access_denied | The SET Transmitter is not authorized to |
| | transmit the SET to the SET Recipient. | | | transmit the SET to the SET Recipient. |
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+ +-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
Table 1: SET Delivery Error Codes Table 1: SET Delivery Error Codes
Implementations SHOULD expect that other Error Codes may also be Other Error Codes may also be received, as the set of Error Codes is
received, as the set of Error Codes is extensible via the IANA extensible via the IANA "Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes"
"Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes" registry established in registry established in Section 7.1.
Section 7.1.
3. Authentication and Authorization 3. Authentication and Authorization
The SET delivery method described in this specification is based upon The SET delivery method described in this specification is based upon
HTTP over TLS [RFC2818] and standard HTTP authentication and HTTP over TLS [RFC2818] and standard HTTP authentication and
authorization schemes, as per [RFC7235]. The TLS server certificate authorization schemes, as per [RFC7235]. The TLS server certificate
MUST be validated, per [RFC6125]. MUST be validated using DNS-ID [RFC6125] and/or DANE [RFC6698].
Authorization for the eligibility to provide actionable SETs can be Authorization for the eligibility to provide actionable SETs can be
determined by using the identity of the SET Issuer, the identity of determined by using the identity of the SET Issuer, the identity of
the SET Transmitter, perhaps using mutual TLS, or via other employed the SET Transmitter, perhaps using mutual TLS, or via other employed
authentication methods. Because SETs are not commands, SET authentication methods. Because SETs are not commands, SET
Recipients are free to ignore SETs that are not of interest. Recipients are free to ignore SETs that are not of interest.
4. Delivery Reliability 4. Delivery Reliability
Delivery reliability requirements may vary depending upon the use Delivery reliability requirements may vary depending upon the use
cases. This specification defines the response from the SET cases. This specification defines the response from the SET
Recipient in such a way as to provide the SET Transmitter with the Recipient in such a way as to provide the SET Transmitter with the
information necessary to determine what further action is required, information necessary to determine what further action is required,
if any, in order to meet their requirements. SET Transmitters with if any, in order to meet their requirements. SET Transmitters with
high reliability requirements may be tempted to always retry failed high reliability requirements may be tempted to always retry failed
transmissions, however, it should be noted that for many types of SET transmissions. However, it should be noted that for many types of
delivery errors, a retry is extremely unlikely to be successful. For SET delivery errors, a retry is extremely unlikely to be successful.
example, "invalid_request" indicates a structural error in the For example, "invalid_request" indicates a structural error in the
content of the request body that is likely to remain when re- content of the request body that is likely to remain when re-
transmitting the same SET. Others such as "access_denied" may be transmitting the same SET. Others such as "access_denied" may be
transient, for example if the SET Transmitter refreshes expired transient, for example if the SET Transmitter refreshes expired
credentials prior to re-transmission. credentials prior to re-transmission.
Implementers SHOULD evaluate the reliability requirements of their Implementers SHOULD evaluate the reliability requirements of their
use cases and the impact of various retry mechanisms on the use cases and the impact of various retry mechanisms on the
performance of their systems to determine an appropriate strategy for performance of their systems to determine an appropriate strategy for
handling various error conditions. handling various error conditions.
skipping to change at page 9, line 44 skipping to change at page 10, line 34
Issuer is authorized to provide actionable SETs. Issuer is authorized to provide actionable SETs.
5.2. HTTP Considerations 5.2. HTTP Considerations
SET delivery depends on the use of Hypertext Transfer Protocol and is SET delivery depends on the use of Hypertext Transfer Protocol and is
thus subject to the security considerations of HTTP Section 9 of thus subject to the security considerations of HTTP Section 9 of
[RFC7230] and its related specifications. [RFC7230] and its related specifications.
5.3. Confidentiality of SETs 5.3. Confidentiality of SETs
SETs may contain sensitive information that is considered Personally SETs may contain sensitive information, including Personally
Identifiable Information (PII). In such cases, SET Transmitters and Identifiable Information (PII), or be distributed through third
SET Recipients MUST protect the confidentiality of the SET contents. parties. In such cases, SET Transmitters and SET Recipients MUST
In some use cases, using TLS to secure the transmitted SETs will be protect the confidentiality of the SET contents. TLS MUST be used to
sufficient. In other use cases, encrypting the SET as described in secure the transmitted SETs. In some use cases, encrypting the SET
JWE [RFC7516] will also be required. The Event delivery endpoint as described in JWE [RFC7516] will also be required. The Event
MUST support at least TLS version 1.2 [RFC5246] and SHOULD support delivery endpoint MUST support at least TLS version 1.2 [RFC5246] and
the newest version of TLS that meets its security requirements, which SHOULD support the newest version of TLS that meets its security
as of the time of this publication is TLS 1.3 [RFC8446]. The client requirements, which as of the time of this publication is TLS 1.3
MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check using DNS-ID [RFC8446]. The client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate
[RFC6125]. How a SET Transmitter determines the expected service check using DNS-ID [RFC6125] and/or DANE [RFC6698]. How a SET
identity to match the SET Recipient's server certificate against is Transmitter determines the expected service identity to match the SET
out of scope for this document. Implementation security Recipient's server certificate against is out of scope for this
considerations for TLS can be found in "Recommendations for Secure document. The implementation security considerations for TLS in
Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525]. "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525] MUST be
followed.
5.4. Denial of Service 5.4. Denial of Service
The SET Recipient may be vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack The SET Recipient may be vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack
where a malicious party makes a high volume of requests containing where a malicious party makes a high volume of requests containing
invalid SETs, causing the endpoint to expend significant resources on invalid SETs, causing the endpoint to expend significant resources on
cryptographic operations that are bound to fail. This may be cryptographic operations that are bound to fail. This may be
mitigated by authenticating SET Transmitters with a mechanism such as mitigated by authenticating SET Transmitters with a mechanism such as
mutual TLS. mutual TLS. Rate-limiting problematic transmitters is also a
possible means of mitigation.
5.5. Authenticating Persisted SETs 5.5. Authenticating Persisted SETs
At the time of receipt, the SET Recipient can rely upon transport At the time of receipt, the SET Recipient can rely upon TLS
layer mechanisms, HTTP authentication methods, and/or other context mechanisms, HTTP authentication methods, and/or other context from
from the transmission request to authenticate the SET Transmitter and the transmission request to authenticate the SET Transmitter and
validate the authenticity of the SET. However, this context is validate the authenticity of the SET. However, this context is
typically unavailable to systems that the SET Recipient forwards the typically unavailable to systems to which the SET Recipient forwards
SET onto, or to systems that retrieve the SET from storage. If the the SET, or to systems that retrieve the SET from storage. If the
SET Recipient requires the ability to validate SET authenticity SET Recipient requires the ability to validate SET authenticity
outside of the context of the transmission request, then the SET outside of the context of the transmission request, then the SET
Recipient SHOULD ensure that such SETs have been signed in accordance Recipient SHOULD ensure that such SETs have been signed in accordance
with [RFC7515]. with [RFC7515]. Needed context could also be stored with the SET and
retrieved with it.
6. Privacy Considerations 6. Privacy Considerations
SET Transmitters SHOULD attempt to deliver SETs that are targeted to SET Transmitters should attempt to deliver SETs that are targeted to
the specific business and protocol needs of subscribers. the specific business and protocol needs of subscribers.
When sharing personally identifiable information or information that When sharing personally identifiable information or information that
is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET
Transmitters and Recipients MUST have the appropriate legal Transmitters and Recipients MUST have the appropriate legal
agreements and user consent or terms of service in place. agreements and user consent or terms of service in place.
Furthermore, data that needs confidentiality protection MUST be Furthermore, data that needs confidentiality protection MUST be
encrypted, at least with TLS and sometimes also using JSON Web encrypted, at least with TLS and sometimes also using JSON Web
Encryption (JWE) [RFC7516]. Encryption (JWE) [RFC7516].
In some cases, subject identifiers themselves may be considered In some cases, subject identifiers themselves may be considered
sensitive information, such that their inclusion within a SET may be sensitive information, such that their inclusion within a SET may be
considered a violation of privacy. SET Issuers should consider the considered a violation of privacy. SET Issuers and SET Transmitters
ramifications of sharing a particular subject identifier with a SET should consider the ramifications of sharing a particular subject
Recipient (e.g., whether doing so could enable correlation and/or de- identifier with a SET Recipient (e.g., whether doing so could enable
anonymization of data) and choose appropriate subject identifiers for correlation and/or de-anonymization of data) and choose appropriate
their use cases. subject identifiers for their use cases.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
7.1. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes 7.1. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes
This document defines Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes, for This document defines Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes, for
which IANA is asked to create and maintain a new registry titled which IANA is asked to create and maintain a new registry titled
"Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes". Initial values for the "Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes". Initial values for the
Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes registry are defined in Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes registry are defined in
Table 1 and registered below. Future assignments are to be made Table 1 and registered below. Future assignments are to be made
through the Specification Required registration policy ([RFC8126]) through the Specification Required registration policy ([RFC8126])
and shall follow the template presented in Section 7.1.1. and shall follow the template below.
Error Codes are intended to be interpreted by automated systems, and Error Codes are intended to be interpreted by automated systems, and
therefore SHOULD identify classes of errors to which an automated therefore SHOULD identify classes of errors to which an automated
system could respond in a meaningfully distinct way (e.g., by system could respond in a meaningfully distinct way (e.g., by
refreshing authentication credentials and retrying the request). refreshing authentication credentials and retrying the request).
Error Code names are case sensitive. Names may not match other
registered names in a case-insensitive manner unless the Designated
Experts state that there is a compelling reason to allow an
exception.
Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts includes
determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing
functionality, whether it is likely to be of general applicability or
whether it is useful only for a single application, and whether the
registration description is clear.
It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are
able to represent the perspectives of different applications using
this specification, in order to enable broadly informed review of
registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could
be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular
Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other
Experts.
7.1.1. Registration Template 7.1.1. Registration Template
Error Code Error Code
The name of the Security Event Token Delivery Error Code, as The name of the Security Event Token Delivery Error Code, as
described in Section 2.4. The name MUST be a case-sensitive ASCII described in Section 2.4. The name MUST be a case-sensitive ASCII
string consisting only of letters, digits, and underscore; these string consisting only of letters, digits, and underscore; these
are the characters whose codes fall within the inclusive ranges are the characters whose codes fall within the inclusive ranges
0x30-39, 0x41-5A, 0x5F and 0x61-7A. 0x30-39, 0x41-5A, 0x5F and 0x61-7A.
Description Description
A brief human-readable description of the Security Event Token A brief human-readable description of the Security Event Token
Delivery Error Code. Delivery Error Code.
Change Controller Change Controller
For error codes registered by the IETF or its working groups, list For error codes registered by the IETF or its working groups, list
"IETF SecEvent Working Group". For all other error codes, list "IETF". For all other error codes, list the name of the party
the name of the party responsible for the registration. Contact responsible for the registration. Contact information such as
information such as mailing address, email address, or phone mailing address, email address, or phone number may also be
number may also be provided. provided.
Defining Document(s) Defining Document(s)
A reference to the document or documents that define the Security A reference to the document or documents that define the Security
Event Token Delivery Error Code. The definition MUST specify the Event Token Delivery Error Code. The definition MUST specify the
name and description of the error code and explain under what name and description of the error code and explain under what
circumstances the error code may be used. URIs that can be used circumstances the error code may be used. URIs that can be used
to retrieve copies of each document at no cost SHOULD be included. to retrieve copies of each document at no cost SHOULD be included.
7.1.2. Initial Registry Contents 7.1.2. Initial Registry Contents
Error Code: invalid_request Error Code: invalid_request
Description: The request body cannot be parsed as a SET or the Description: The request body cannot be parsed as a SET or the
event payload within the SET does not conform to the event's event payload within the SET does not conform to the event's
definition. definition.
Change Controller: IETF Change Controller: IETF
Defining Document(s): Section 2.4 of [[ this specification ]] Defining Document(s): Section 2.4 of [[ this specification ]]
Error Code: invalid_key Error Code: invalid_key
Description: One or more keys used to encrypt or sign the SET is Description: One or more keys used to encrypt or sign the SET is
invalid or otherwise unacceptable to the SET Recipient. (e.g., invalid or otherwise unacceptable to the SET Recipient (expired,
expired, revoked, failed certificate validation, etc.) revoked, failed certificate validation, etc.).
Change Controller: IETF
Defining Document(s): Section 2.4 of [[ this specification ]]
Error Code: invalid_issuer
Description: The SET issuer is invalid for the SET Recipient.
Change Controller: IETF
Defining Document(s): Section 2.4 of [[ this specification ]]
Error Code: invalid_audience
Description: The SET audience does not correspond to the SET
Recipient.
Change Controller: IETF Change Controller: IETF
Defining Document(s): Section 2.4 of [[ this specification ]] Defining Document(s): Section 2.4 of [[ this specification ]]
Error Code: authentication_failed Error Code: authentication_failed
Description: The SET Recipient could not authenticate the SET Description: The SET Recipient could not authenticate the SET
Transmitter. Transmitter.
Change Controller: IETF Change Controller: IETF
Defining Document(s): Section 2.4 of [[ this specification ]] Defining Document(s): Section 2.4 of [[ this specification ]]
Error Code: access_denied Error Code: access_denied
skipping to change at page 13, line 17 skipping to change at page 14, line 38
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>. 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August
2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698>.
[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer [RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing", Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014, RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer [RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
skipping to change at page 14, line 24 skipping to change at page 15, line 51
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-secevent-http-poll] [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-poll]
Backman, A., Jones, M., Scurtescu, M., Ansari, M., and A. Backman, A., Jones, M., Scurtescu, M., Ansari, M., and A.
Nadalin, "Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Nadalin, "Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery
Using HTTP", draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-10 (work in Using HTTP", draft-ietf-secevent-http-poll-11 (work in
progress), June 2020. progress), June 2020.
[RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer [RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235, Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>.
Appendix A. Unencrypted Transport Considerations Appendix A. Unencrypted Transport Considerations
Earlier versions of this specification made the use of TLS optional Earlier versions of this specification made the use of TLS optional
skipping to change at page 14, line 47 skipping to change at page 16, line 25
group decided to mandate usage HTTP over TLS, it also decided to group decided to mandate usage HTTP over TLS, it also decided to
preserve the description of these considerations in this non- preserve the description of these considerations in this non-
normative appendix. normative appendix.
SETs may contain sensitive information that is considered Personally SETs may contain sensitive information that is considered Personally
Identifiable Information (PII). In such cases, SET Transmitters and Identifiable Information (PII). In such cases, SET Transmitters and
SET Recipients MUST protect the confidentiality of the SET contents. SET Recipients MUST protect the confidentiality of the SET contents.
When TLS is not used, this means that the SET MUST be encrypted as When TLS is not used, this means that the SET MUST be encrypted as
described in JWE [RFC7516]. described in JWE [RFC7516].
If SETs are transmitted over unencrypted channels, some privacy- If SETs were allowed to be transmitted over unencrypted channels,
sensitive information about them might leak, even though the SETs some privacy-sensitive information about them might leak, even though
themselves are encrypted. For instance, an attacker may be able to the SETs themselves are encrypted. For instance, an attacker may be
determine whether or not a SET was accepted and the reason for its able to determine whether or not a SET was accepted and the reason
rejection or may be able to derive information from being able to for its rejection or may be able to derive information from being
observe the size of the encrypted SET. able to observe the size of the encrypted SET. (Note that even when
TLS is utilized, some information leakage is still possible; message
padding algorithms to prevent side channels remain an open research
topic.)
Appendix B. Other Streaming Specifications Appendix B. Other Streaming Specifications
[[ NOTE TO THE RFC EDITOR: This section to be removed prior to [[ NOTE TO THE RFC EDITOR: This section to be removed prior to
publication ]] publication ]]
The following pub/sub, queuing, streaming systems were reviewed as The following pub/sub, queuing, and streaming systems were reviewed
possible solutions or as input to the current draft: as possible solutions or as input to the current draft:
Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP Poll-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP
In addition to this specification, the WG is defining a polling-based In addition to this specification, the WG is defining a polling-based
SET delivery protocol. That protocol [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-poll] SET delivery protocol. That protocol [I-D.ietf-secevent-http-poll]
describes it as: describes it as:
This specification defines how a series of Security Event Tokens This specification defines how a series of Security Event Tokens
(SETs) can be delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over (SETs) can be delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST over
TLS initiated as a poll by the recipient. The specification also TLS initiated as a poll by the recipient. The specification also
skipping to change at page 16, line 48 skipping to change at page 18, line 34
The editors would like to thank the members of the SCIM working The editors would like to thank the members of the SCIM working
group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with
draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 in 2015. We would like to thank Phil Hunt draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 in 2015. We would like to thank Phil Hunt
and the other authors of draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02, upon which and the other authors of draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02, upon which
this specification is based. We would like to thank the participants this specification is based. We would like to thank the participants
in the SecEvents working group for their contributions to this in the SecEvents working group for their contributions to this
specification. specification.
Additionally, we would like to thank the following individuals for Additionally, we would like to thank the following individuals for
their reviews of the specification: Joe Clarke, Vijay Gurbani, their reviews of the specification: Joe Clarke, Roman Danyliw, Vijay
Benjamin Kaduk, Yaron Sheffer, and Valery Smyslov. Gurbani, Benjamin Kaduk, Erik Kline, Murray Kucherawy, Barry Leiba,
Yaron Sheffer, Robert Sparks, Valery Smyslov, Eric Vyncke, and Robert
Wilton.
Appendix D. Change Log Appendix D. Change Log
[[ NOTE TO THE RFC EDITOR: This section to be removed prior to [[ NOTE TO THE RFC EDITOR: This section to be removed prior to
publication ]] publication ]]
Draft 00 - AB - Based on draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02 with the Draft 00 - AB - Based on draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02 with the
following changes: following changes:
o Renamed to "Push-Based SET Token Delivery Using HTTP" o Renamed to "Push-Based SET Token Delivery Using HTTP"
skipping to change at page 21, line 45 skipping to change at page 23, line 33
o Addressed OpsDir review comments by Joe Clarke. o Addressed OpsDir review comments by Joe Clarke.
o Addressed GenArt review comments by Vijay Gurbani. o Addressed GenArt review comments by Vijay Gurbani.
Draft 12 - mbj Draft 12 - mbj
o Revised to unambiguously require the use of TLS, while preserving o Revised to unambiguously require the use of TLS, while preserving
descriptions of precautions needed for non-TLS use in an appendix. descriptions of precautions needed for non-TLS use in an appendix.
Draft 13 - mbj
o Addressed IESG comments.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Annabelle Backman (editor) Annabelle Backman (editor)
Amazon Amazon
Email: richanna@amazon.com Email: richanna@amazon.com
Michael B. Jones (editor) Michael B. Jones (editor)
Microsoft Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com Email: mbj@microsoft.com
URI: https://self-issued.info/ URI: https://self-issued.info/
Marius Scurtescu Marius Scurtescu
Coinbase Coinbase
Email: marius.scurtescu@coinbase.com Email: marius.scurtescu@coinbase.com
Morteza Ansari Morteza Ansari
Cisco Cisco
Email: morteza.ansari@cisco.com Email: morteza.ansari@cisco.com
 End of changes. 58 change blocks. 
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