draft-ietf-secevent-token-00.txt   draft-ietf-secevent-token-01.txt 
Security Events Working Group P. Hunt, Ed. Security Events Working Group P. Hunt, Ed.
Internet-Draft Oracle Internet-Draft Oracle
Intended status: Standards Track W. Denniss Intended status: Standards Track W. Denniss
Expires: July 27, 2017 Google Expires: September 10, 2017 Google
M. Ansari M. Ansari
Cisco Cisco
M. Jones M. Jones
Microsoft Microsoft
January 23, 2017 March 9, 2017
Security Event Token (SET) Security Event Token (SET)
draft-ietf-secevent-token-00 draft-ietf-secevent-token-01
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines the Security Event Token, which may be This specification defines the Security Event Token, which may be
distributed via a protocol such as HTTP. The Security Event Token distributed via a protocol such as HTTP. The Security Event Token
(SET) specification profiles the JSON Web Token (JWT) and may be (SET) specification profiles the JSON Web Token (JWT), which can be
optionally signed and/or encrypted. A SET describes a statement of optionally signed and/or encrypted. A SET describes a statement of
fact that may be shared by an event publisher with event subscribers. fact from the perspective of an issuer that it intends to share with
one or more receivers.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 27, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 10, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 17 skipping to change at page 2, line 18
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. The Security Event Token (SET) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. The Security Event Token (SET) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Core SET Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.1. Core SET Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2. Security Event Token Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.2. Security Event Token Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1. Confidentiality and Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.1. Confidentiality and Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2. Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.2. Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3. Sequencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.3. Sequencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.4. Timing Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.4. Timing Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.5. Distinguishing SETs from Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . 14 3.5. Distinguishing SETs from Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . 13
4. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Introduction and Overview 1. Introduction and Overview
This specification defines an extensible Security Event Token (SET) This specification defines an extensible Security Event Token (SET)
format which may be exchanged using protocols such as HTTP. The format which may be exchanged using protocols such as HTTP. The
specification builds on the JSON Web Token (JWT) format [RFC7519] in specification builds on the JSON Web Token (JWT) format [RFC7519] in
order to provide a self-contained token that can be optionally signed order to provide a self-contained token that can be optionally signed
using JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] and/or encrypted using JSON using JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] and/or encrypted using JSON
Web Encryption (JWE) [RFC7516]. Web Encryption (JWE) [RFC7516].
For the purpose of this specification, an event is a statement of This specification profiles the use of JWT for the purpose of issuing
fact by a publisher (also known as the event issuer) that the state security event tokens (SETs). This specification defines a base
of a security subject (e.g., a web resource, token, IP address) it format upon which profiling specifications define actual events and
controls or is aware of, has changed in some way (explicitly or their meanings. Unless otherwise specified, this specification uses
implicitly). A security subject may be permanent (e.g., a user non-normative example events intended to demonstrate how events may
account) or temporary (e.g., an HTTP session) in nature. A state be constructed.
change may include direct changes of entity state, implicit changes
to state or other higher-level security statements such as: This specification is scoped to security and identity related events.
While security event tokens may be used for other purposes, the
specification only considers security and privacy concerns relevant
to identity and personal information.
Security Events are not commands issued between parties. A security
event is a statement of fact from the perspective of an issuer about
the state of a security subject (e.g., a web resource, token, IP
address, the issuer itself) that the issuer controls or is aware of,
that has changed in some way (explicitly or implicitly). A security
subject MAY be permanent (e.g., a user account) or temporary (e.g.,
an HTTP session) in nature. A state change could describe a direct
change of entity state, an implicit change of state or other higher-
level security statements such as:
o The creation, modification, removal of a resource. o The creation, modification, removal of a resource.
o The resetting or suspension of an account. o The resetting or suspension of an account.
o The revocation of a security token prior to its expiry. o The revocation of a security token prior to its expiry.
o The logout of a user session. Or, o The logout of a user session. Or,
o A cumulative conclusion such as to indicate that a user has taken o A cumulative conclusion such as to indicate that a user has taken
over an email identifier that may have been used in the past by over an email identifier that may have been used in the past by
another user. another user.
Based on some externally agreed criteria for an event feed, the While subject state changes are often triggered by a user-agent or
publisher distributes events to the appropriate subscribers of a security-subsystem, the issuance and transmission of an event often
feed. While an event may be delivered via synchronous means (e.g., occurs asynchronously and in a back-channel to the action which
HTTP POST), the distribution of the event often happens caused the change that generated the security event. Subsequently,
asynchronously to the change of state which generated the security an Event Receiver having received a SET, validates and interprets the
event. As an example, an OAuth2 Authorization Server [RFC6749], received SET and takes its own independent action, if any. For
having received a token revocation request [RFC7009], may issue a example, having been informed of a personal identifier being
token revocation event to downstream web resource providers. Having associated with a different security subject (e.g., an email address
been informed of a token revocation, the OAuth2 web resource service is being used by someone else), the Event Receiver may choose to
provider may add the token identifier to its local revocation list ensure that the new user is not granted access to resources
assuming the token has not already expired. associated with the previous user. Or, the Event Receiver may not
have any relationship with the subject, and no action is taken.
A subscriber having received an event, validates and interprets the
event and takes its own independent action, if any. For example,
having been informed of a personal identifier now being associated
with a different security subject (i.e., is being used by someone
else), the subscriber may choose to ensure that the new user is not
granted access to resources associated with the previous user. Or it
may not have any relationship with the subject, and no action is
taken.
While subscribers will often take actions upon receiving one or more While Event Receivers will often take actions upon receiving SETs,
events, events MUST NOT be assumed to be commands or requests. To do security events MUST NOT be assumed to be commands or requests. The
so requires complex bi-directional signals and error recovery
mechanisms that fall outside the scope of this specification. The
intent of this specification is to define a way of exchanging intent of this specification is to define a way of exchanging
statements of fact that subscribers may interpret for their own statements of fact that subscribers may interpret for their own
purposes. Since events are typically historical statements by a purposes. As such, SETs have no capability for error signaling other
publisher and are not commands, idempotency or lack thereof, does not to ensure the validation of a received SET.
apply.
Unless otherwise specified, this specification uses example events
intended to serve as non-normative examples showing how an event may
be constructed. It is expected that other "profiling" specifications
will use this specification to define normative events within some
specified context or protocol.
This specification is scoped to security and identity related events.
While security event tokens may be used for other purposes, the
specification only considers security and privacy concerns relevant
to identity and personal information.
1.1. Notational Conventions 1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. These document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. These
keywords are capitalized when used to unambiguously specify keywords are capitalized when used to unambiguously specify
requirements of the protocol or application features and behavior requirements of the protocol or application features and behavior
that affect the inter-operability and security of implementations. that affect the inter-operability and security of implementations.
When these words are not capitalized, they are meant in their When these words are not capitalized, they are meant in their
skipping to change at page 4, line 34 skipping to change at page 4, line 29
Throughout this document, all figures MAY contain spaces and extra Throughout this document, all figures MAY contain spaces and extra
line-wrapping for readability and space limitations. Similarly, some line-wrapping for readability and space limitations. Similarly, some
URIs contained within examples have been shortened for space and URIs contained within examples have been shortened for space and
readability reasons. readability reasons.
1.2. Definitions 1.2. Definitions
The following definitions are used with SETs: The following definitions are used with SETs:
Feed Publisher
The Feed Publisher creates SETs to be distributed to registered
subscribers. In JWT terminology, the Feed Publisher is also known
as the issuer ("iss").
Security Event Token (SET) Security Event Token (SET)
An SET is a JWT that is to be distributed to one or more A SET is a JWT [RFC7519] that is distributed to one or more
registered subscribers. A SET MAY be signed or encrypted using registered Event Receivers.
JWS and/or JWE for authentication and confidentiality reasons.
Feed Event Transmitter
A Feed is a logical grouping of SETs or a context under which SETs A service provider that delivers SETs to other providers known as
may be issued. A Subscriber registers with the Feed Publisher to Event Receivers.
subscribe to SETs associated with a Feed. How a Feed is defined
or the method for subscription is out-of-scope of this
specification.
Subscriber Event Receiver
A Subscriber registers to receive SETs from a Feed Publisher using An Event Receiver is an entity that receives SETs through some
a protocol such as HTTP. The method of registration and delivery distribution method.
is out-of-scope of this specification.
Security Subject Subject
A Security Subject is the entity to which a SET refers. A A SET describes an event or state change that has occurred about a
Security Subject may be a principle (e.g., Section 4.1.2 Subject. A Subject may be a principal (e.g., Section 4.1.2
[RFC7519]), a web resource, or other thing such as an IP address [RFC7519]), a web resource, an entity such as an IP address, or
that a SET might reference. the issuer itself that a SET might reference.
Profiling Specification A specification that uses the SET Token
specification to define one or more event types and the associated
claims included.
2. The Security Event Token (SET) 2. The Security Event Token (SET)
A SET conveys a statement (in the form of a JWT [RFC7519]) about a A SET conveys a statement (in the form of a JWT [RFC7519]) about a
single security event in relation to a Security Subject that may be single security event in relation to a Subject.
of interest to a Subscriber or set of Subscribers receiving SETs from
a Feed Publisher.
The schema and structure of a SET follows the JWT [RFC7519] The schema and structure of a SET follows the JWT [RFC7519]
specification. A SET has the following structure: specification. A SET has the following structure:
o An outer JSON structure that acts as the SET envelope. The o An outer JSON object that acts as the SET "envelope". The
envelope contains a set of name/value pairs called the JWT Claims envelope contains a set of name/value pairs called the JWT Claims
Set, typically common to every SET or common to a number of Set, typically common to every SET or common to a number of
different Security Events within a single profiling specification different Events within a single Profiling Specification or a
or a related series of specifications. Claims in the envelope related series of specifications. Claims in the envelope (the
SHOULD be registered in the JWT Token Claims Registry Section 10.1 outer JSON structure) SHOULD be registered in the JWT Token Claims
[RFC7519] or be Public Claims or Private Claims as also defined in Registry Section 10.1 [RFC7519] or be Public Claims or Private
[RFC7519]. Claims as also defined in [RFC7519].
o Envelope claims that are profiled and defined in this o Envelope claims that are profiled and defined in this
specification are used to validate a SET and declare the event specification are used to validate a SET and declare the contents
data included in the SET. The claim "events" identifies the of the event data included in the SET. The claim "events"
security event types being expressed related to the Security identifies the event types expressed that are related to the
Subject and MAY also include event-specific data. Security Subject and MAY also include event-specific data.
o Each JSON member of the "events" object is a name/value pair. The o Each JSON member of the "events" object is a name and value pair.
JSON attribute name is a URI String value that expresses an event The JSON attribute name is a URI String value that expresses an
type. The corresponding value is a JSON object known as the event event type, and the corresponding value is a JSON object known as
"payload". The payload JSON object contains claims typically the event "payload". The payload JSON object contains claims
unique to the event's URI type value and are not registered as JWT typically unique to the event's URI type value and are not
claims. These claims are defined by their associated event registered as JWT claims. These claims are defined by their
specification. An event with no payload claims SHALL be associated Profiling Specification. An event with no payload
represented as the empty JSON object ("{}"). In many cases, one claims SHALL be represented as the empty JSON object ("{}"). In
event URI expresses the primary event URI, while other events many cases, one event URI expresses the primary event URI, while
might be considered extensions that MAY be used to do things such other events might be considered extensions that MAY be used to do
as: things such as:
* A categorization event type to provide classification * A categorization event type to provide classification
information (e.g., threat type or level). information (e.g., threat type or level).
* An enhancement of an existing specifications the arise over * An enhancement of an existing specifications the arise over
time. time.
* An extensions needed to link a potential series of events. * An extension needed to link a potential series of events.
* Localized specific purpose extensions needed between a * Localized specific purpose event URI used between a particular
particular publisher and subscriber. Event Transmitter and Receiver.
The following is a non-normative example showing the JWT Claims Set The following is a non-normative example showing the JWT Claims Set
for a hypothetical SCIM password reset SET. This example shows an for a hypothetical SCIM password reset SET. This example shows an
extension ("https://example.com/scim/event/passwordResetExt") that is additional events value ("https://example.com/scim/event/
used to convey additional information -- in this case, the current passwordResetExt") used to convey additional information -- in this
count of reset attempts: case, the current count of reset attempts:
{ {
"jti": "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30", "jti": "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30",
"iat": 1458496025, "iat": 1458496025,
"iss": "https://scim.example.com", "iss": "https://scim.example.com",
"aud": [ "aud": [
"https://jhub.example.com/Feeds/98d52461fa5bbc879593b7754", "https://jhub.example.com/Feeds/98d52461fa5bbc879593b7754",
"https://jhub.example.com/Feeds/5d7604516b1d08641d7676ee7" "https://jhub.example.com/Feeds/5d7604516b1d08641d7676ee7"
], ],
"sub": "https://scim.example.com/Users/44f6142df96bd6ab61e7521d9", "sub": "https://scim.example.com/Users/44f6142df96bd6ab61e7521d9",
skipping to change at page 6, line 46 skipping to change at page 6, line 35
} }
} }
Figure 1: Example SCIM Password Reset Event Figure 1: Example SCIM Password Reset Event
The event in the figure above expresses hypothetical password reset The event in the figure above expresses hypothetical password reset
event for SCIM [RFC7644]. The JWT consists of: event for SCIM [RFC7644]. The JWT consists of:
o An "events" claim specifying the hypothetical SCIM URN o An "events" claim specifying the hypothetical SCIM URN
("urn:ietf:params:scim:event:passwordReset") for a password reset, ("urn:ietf:params:scim:event:passwordReset") for a password reset,
and a custom extension, "https://example.com/scim/event/ and a local schema, "https://example.com/scim/event/
passwordResetExt", that is used to provide additional event passwordResetExt", that is used to provide additional event
information such as the current count of resets. information such as the current count of resets.
o An "iss" claim, denoting the event publisher. o An "iss" claim, denoting the Event Transmitter.
o The "sub" claim specifies the SCIM resource URI that was affected. o The "sub" claim specifies the SCIM resource URI that was affected.
o The "aud" claim specifies the intended audiences for the event. o The "aud" claim specifies the intended audiences for the event.
In practical terms, an audience MAY be the URI for an event feed The syntax of the "aud" claim is defined in Section 4.1.3
that a client has subscribed to. [RFC7519].
In this example, the SCIM event indicates that a password has been In this example, the SCIM event indicates that a password has been
updated and the current password reset count is 5. Notice that the updated and the current password reset count is 5. Notice that the
value for "resetAttempts" is actually part of its own JSON object value for "resetAttempts" is actually part of its own JSON object
associated with its own event URI attribute. associated with its own event URI attribute.
Here is another example JWT Claims Set for a security event token, Here is another example JWT Claims Set for a security event token,
this one for a Logout Token: this one for a Logout Token:
{ {
skipping to change at page 9, line 13 skipping to change at page 8, line 35
iss iss
A single valued String containing the URI of the service provider A single valued String containing the URI of the service provider
publishing the SET (the issuer). This claim is REQUIRED. Note publishing the SET (the issuer). This claim is REQUIRED. Note
that when a SET is expressing an event about a Security Subject that when a SET is expressing an event about a Security Subject
for which the SET issuer is not the issuer of the Security for which the SET issuer is not the issuer of the Security
Subject, the conflict SHALL be resolved by including the Security Subject, the conflict SHALL be resolved by including the Security
Subject "iss" value within the event "payload" (see "events" Subject "iss" value within the event "payload" (see "events"
claim). claim).
aud aud
As defined in Section 4.1.3 [RFC7519], an array containing the The syntax of the claim is as defined in Section 4.1.3 [RFC7519].
StringOrURI values representing the audience of the event. Values This claim MAY contains one or more audience identifiers for the
are typically URLs of the feeds the event is associated with. SET. This claim is RECOMMENDED.
This claim is RECOMMENDED.
iat iat
As defined by Section 4.1.6 [RFC7519], a value containing a As defined by Section 4.1.6 [RFC7519], a value containing a
NumericDate, which represents when the event was issued. Unless NumericDate, which represents when the event was issued. Unless
otherwise specified, the value SHOULD be interpreted by the otherwise specified, the value SHOULD be interpreted as equivalent
subscriber as equivalent to the actual time of the event. This to the actual time of the event. This claim is REQUIRED.
claim is REQUIRED.
nbf nbf
Defined by Section 4.1.5 [RFC7519], a number whose value is a Defined by Section 4.1.5 [RFC7519], a number whose value is a
NumericDate. In the context of the SET token it SHALL be NumericDate. In the context of the SET token it SHALL be
interpreted to mean a date in which the event is believed to have interpreted to mean a date in which the event is believed to have
occurred (in the past) or will occur in the future. Note: there occurred (in the past) or will occur in the future. Note: there
MAY be some cases where "nbf" is still smaller than "iat" such as MAY be some cases where "nbf" is still smaller than "iat" such as
when it took an extended time for a SET to be issued (for example when it took an extended time for a SET to be issued (for example
after some analysis). This claim is OPTIONAL. after some analysis). This claim is OPTIONAL.
sub As defined by Section 4.1.2 [RFC7519], a String or URI value sub As defined by Section 4.1.2 [RFC7519], a String or URI value
representing the principal or the subject of the SET. This is representing the principal or the subject of the SET. This is
usually the entity whose "state" was changed. For example, an IP usually the entity whose "state" was changed. For example, an IP
Address was added to a black list. A URI representing a user Address was added to a black list. A URI representing a user
resource that was modified. A token identifier for a revoked resource that was modified. A token identifier for a revoked
token. If used, the profile specification SHOULD define the token. If used, the Profile Specification SHOULD define the
content and format semantics for the value. This claim is content and format semantics for the value. This claim is
OPTIONAL, as the principal for any given profile may already be OPTIONAL, as the principal for any given profile may already be
identified without the inclusion of a subject claim. identified without the inclusion of a subject claim.
exp As defined by [RFC7519], this claim is time on which the JWT exp As defined by [RFC7519], this claim is time on which the JWT
MUST NOT be accepted for processing. In the context of a SET MUST NOT be accepted for processing. In the context of a SET
however, this notion does not apply since a SET reflects something however, this notion does not apply since a SET reflects something
that has already been processed and is historical in nature. that has already been processed and is historical in nature.
While some specifications MAY have a need for this claim, its use While some specifications MAY have a need for this claim, its use
in general cases is NOT RECOMMENDED. in general cases is NOT RECOMMENDED.
skipping to change at page 10, line 19 skipping to change at page 9, line 38
subject). Multiple event statements of the same type SHALL NOT be subject). Multiple event statements of the same type SHALL NOT be
accepted. The "events" claim SHOULD NOT be used to express accepted. The "events" claim SHOULD NOT be used to express
multiple logical events. multiple logical events.
The value of "events" is a JSON object whose members are a set of The value of "events" is a JSON object whose members are a set of
JSON name/value pairs whose names are URIs representing the event JSON name/value pairs whose names are URIs representing the event
statements being expressed. Event URI values SHOULD be stable statements being expressed. Event URI values SHOULD be stable
values (e.g. a permanent URL for an event specification). For values (e.g. a permanent URL for an event specification). For
each name present, the corresponding value SHALL be a JSON object. each name present, the corresponding value SHALL be a JSON object.
The JSON object MAY be an empty object ("{}"), or it MAY be a JSON The JSON object MAY be an empty object ("{}"), or it MAY be a JSON
object containing data as described by the profiling event object containing data as described by the Profiling
specification. Specification.
txn txn
An OPTIONAL String value that represents a unique transaction An OPTIONAL String value that represents a unique transaction
identifier. In cases where multiple SETs are issued based on identifier. In cases where multiple SETs are issued based on
different event URIs, the transaction identifier MAY be used to different event URIs, the transaction identifier MAY be used to
correlate SETs to the same originating event or stateful change. correlate SETs to the same originating event or stateful change.
2.2. Security Event Token Construction 2.2. Security Event Token Construction
A SET is a JWT [RFC7519] that is constructed by building a JSON A SET is a JWT [RFC7519] that is constructed by building a JSON
structure that constitutes an event object and which is then used as structure that constitutes an event object which is then used as the
the body of a JWT. body of a JWT.
While this specification uses JWT to convey a SET, implementers SHALL While this specification uses JWT to convey a SET, implementers SHALL
NOT use SETs to convey authentication or authorization assertions. NOT use SETs to convey authentication or authorization assertions.
The following is an example JWT Claims Set for a security event token The following is an example JWT Claims Set for a security event token
(which has been formatted for readability): (which has been formatted for readability):
{ {
"jti": "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8", "jti": "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8",
"iat": 1458496404, "iat": 1458496404,
skipping to change at page 12, line 23 skipping to change at page 11, line 36
bXBsZS5jb20vRmVlZHMvNWQ3NjA0NTE2YjFkMDg2NDFkNzY3NmVlNyIKICBdLCAgCiAg bXBsZS5jb20vRmVlZHMvNWQ3NjA0NTE2YjFkMDg2NDFkNzY3NmVlNyIKICBdLCAgCiAg
CiAgImV2ZW50cyI6IHsKICAgICJ1cm46aWV0ZjpwYXJhbXM6c2NpbTpldmVudDpjcmVh CiAgImV2ZW50cyI6IHsKICAgICJ1cm46aWV0ZjpwYXJhbXM6c2NpbTpldmVudDpjcmVh
dGUiOiB7CiAgICAgICJyZWYiOgogICAgICAgICJodHRwczovL3NjaW0uZXhhbXBsZS5j dGUiOiB7CiAgICAgICJyZWYiOgogICAgICAgICJodHRwczovL3NjaW0uZXhhbXBsZS5j
b20vVXNlcnMvNDRmNjE0MmRmOTZiZDZhYjYxZTc1MjFkOSIsCiAgICAgICJhdHRyaWJ1 b20vVXNlcnMvNDRmNjE0MmRmOTZiZDZhYjYxZTc1MjFkOSIsCiAgICAgICJhdHRyaWJ1
dGVzIjpbImlkIiwgIm5hbWUiLCAidXNlck5hbWUiLCAicGFzc3dvcmQiLCAiZW1haWxz dGVzIjpbImlkIiwgIm5hbWUiLCAidXNlck5hbWUiLCAicGFzc3dvcmQiLCAiZW1haWxz
Il0KICAgIH0KICB9Cn0 Il0KICAgIH0KICB9Cn0
. .
Figure 5: Example Unsecured Security Event Token Figure 5: Example Unsecured Security Event Token
For the purpose of a simpler example in Figure 5 an unencrypted token For the purpose of a simpler example in Figure 5, an unencrypted
was shown. When SETs are not signed or encrypted, the subscriber token was shown. When SETs are not signed or encrypted, the Event
MUST depend upon TLS and HTTP to authenticate the sender and the Receiver MUST depend upon TLS and HTTP to authenticate the sender and
security of the channel to authenticate the SET and its sender. the security of the channel to authenticate the SET and its sender.
When validation (i.e. auditing), or additional transmission security When validation (i.e. auditing), or additional transmission security
is required, JWS Signing and JWS Encryption MAY be used. To create is required, JWS Signing and JWS Encryption MAY be used. To create
and or validate a signed or encrypted SET, follow the instructions in and or validate a signed or encrypted SET, follow the instructions in
section 7 of [RFC7519]. section 7 of [RFC7519].
3. Security Considerations 3. Security Considerations
3.1. Confidentiality and Integrity 3.1. Confidentiality and Integrity
SETs may often contain sensitive information. Therefore, methods for SETs may often contain sensitive information. Therefore, methods for
distribution of events SHOULD require the use of a transport-layer distribution of events SHOULD require the use of a transport-layer
security mechanism when distributing events. Parties MUST support security mechanism when distributing events. Parties MUST support
TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and MAY support additional transport-layer TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and MAY support additional transport-layer
mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the
client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per
[RFC6125]. Implementation security considerations for TLS can be [RFC6125]. Implementation security considerations for TLS can be
found in "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525]. found in "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525].
skipping to change at page 13, line 6 skipping to change at page 12, line 23
found in "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525]. found in "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525].
Security Events distributed through third-parties or that carry Security Events distributed through third-parties or that carry
personally identifiable information, SHOULD be encrypted using JWE personally identifiable information, SHOULD be encrypted using JWE
[RFC7516] or secured for confidentiality by other means. [RFC7516] or secured for confidentiality by other means.
Security Events distributed without authentication over the channel, Security Events distributed without authentication over the channel,
such as via TLS ([RFC5246] and [RFC6125]), and/or OAuth2 [RFC6749], such as via TLS ([RFC5246] and [RFC6125]), and/or OAuth2 [RFC6749],
or Basic Authentication [RFC7617], MUST be signed using JWS [RFC7515] or Basic Authentication [RFC7617], MUST be signed using JWS [RFC7515]
so that individual events MAY be authenticated and validated by the so that individual events MAY be authenticated and validated by the
subscriber. Event Receiver.
3.2. Delivery 3.2. Delivery
This specification does not define a delivery mechanism by itself. This specification does not define a delivery mechanism by itself.
In addition to confidentiality and integrity (discussed above), In addition to confidentiality and integrity (discussed above),
implementers and profile specifications MUST consider the implementers and Profile Specifications MUST consider the
consequences of delivery mechanisms that are not secure and/or not consequences of delivery mechanisms that are not secure and/or not
assured. For example, while a SET may be end-to-end secured using assured. For example, while a SET may be end-to-end secured using
JWE encrypted SETs, without TLS there is no assurance that the JWE encrypted SETs, without TLS there is no assurance that the
correct endpoint received the SET and that it could be successfully correct endpoint received the SET and that it could be successfully
processed. processed.
3.3. Sequencing 3.3. Sequencing
As defined in this specification, there is no defined way to order As defined in this specification, there is no defined way to order
multiple SETs in a sequence. Depending on the type and nature of SET multiple SETs in a sequence. Depending on the type and nature of SET
event, order may or may not matter. For example, in provisioning, event, order may or may not matter. For example, in provisioning,
event order is critical -- an object could not be modified before it event order is critical -- an object could not be modified before it
was created. In other SET types, such as a token revocation, the was created. In other SET types, such as a token revocation, the
order of SETs for revoked tokens does not matter. If however, the order of SETs for revoked tokens does not matter. If however, the
event was described as a log-in or logged-out status for a user event was described as a log-in or logged-out status for a user
subject, then order becomes important. subject, then order becomes important.
Extension specifications and implementers SHOULD take caution when Profiling Specifications and implementers SHOULD take caution when
using timestamps such as "iat" to define order. Distributed systems using timestamps such as "iat" to define order. Distributed systems
will have some amount of clock-skew and thus time by itself will not will have some amount of clock-skew and thus time by itself will not
guarantee order. guarantee order.
Specifications profiling SET SHOULD define a mechanism for detecting Specifications profiling SET SHOULD define a mechanism for detecting
order or sequence of events. For example, the "txn" claim could order or sequence of events. For example, the "txn" claim could
contain an ordered value (e.g., a counter) that the publisher contain an ordered value (e.g., a counter) that the issuer defines.
defines.
3.4. Timing Issues 3.4. Timing Issues
When SETs are delivered asynchronously and/or out-of-band with When SETs are delivered asynchronously and/or out-of-band with
respect to the original action that incurred the security event, it respect to the original action that incurred the security event, it
is important to consider that a SET might be delivered to a is important to consider that a SET might be delivered to a
Subscriber in advance or well behind the process that caused the Subscriber in advance or well behind the process that caused the
event. For example, a user having been required to logout and then event. For example, a user having been required to logout and then
log back in again, may cause a logout SET to be issued that may log back in again, may cause a logout SET to be issued that may
arrive at the same time as the user-agent accesses a web site having arrive at the same time as the user-agent accesses a web site having
just logged-in. If timing is not handled properly, the effect would just logged-in. If timing is not handled properly, the effect would
be to erroneously treat the new user session as logged out. be to erroneously treat the new user session as logged out.
Profiling specifications SHOULD be careful to anticipate timing and Profiling Specifications SHOULD be careful to anticipate timing and
subject selection information. For example, it might be more subject selection information. For example, it might be more
appropriate to cancel a "session" rather than a "user". appropriate to cancel a "session" rather than a "user".
Alternatively, the specification could use timestamps that allows new Alternatively, the specification could use timestamps that allows new
sessions to be started immediately after a stated logout event time. sessions to be started immediately after a stated logout event time.
3.5. Distinguishing SETs from Access Tokens 3.5. Distinguishing SETs from Access Tokens
Because [RFC7519] states that "all claims that are not understood by Because [RFC7519] states that "all claims that are not understood by
implementations MUST be ignored.", there is a consideration that a implementations MUST be ignored.", there is a consideration that a
SET token might be confused as an access or authorization token in SET token might be confused as an access or authorization token in
skipping to change at page 14, line 38 skipping to change at page 14, line 10
is particularly useful if the same endpoint may receive both types is particularly useful if the same endpoint may receive both types
of tokens. of tokens.
o Consider avoiding use of the "sub" claim at the top level. o Consider avoiding use of the "sub" claim at the top level.
4. Privacy Considerations 4. Privacy Considerations
If a SET needs to be retained for audit purposes, JWS MAY be used to If a SET needs to be retained for audit purposes, JWS MAY be used to
provide verification of its authenticity. provide verification of its authenticity.
Event Publishers SHOULD attempt to specialize feeds so that the Event Transmitters SHOULD attempt to specialize feeds so that the
content is targeted to the specific business and protocol needs of content is targeted to the specific business and protocol needs of
subscribers. subscribers.
When sharing personally identifiable information or information that When sharing personally identifiable information or information that
is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, the is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, Event
publishers and subscribers MUST have the appropriate legal agreements Transmitters and Receivers MUST have the appropriate legal agreements
and user consent in place. and user consent or terms of service in place.
The propagation of subject identifiers can be perceived as personally The propagation of subject identifiers can be perceived as personally
identifiable information. Where possible, publishers and subscribers identifiable information. Where possible, Event Transmitters and
should devise approaches that prevent propagation -- for example, the Receivers SHOULD devise approaches that prevent propagation -- for
passing of a hash value that requires the subscriber to already know example, the passing of a hash value that requires the subscriber to
the subject. already know the subject.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
5.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration 5.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration
This specification registers the "events" and "txn" claims in the This specification registers the "events" and "txn" claims in the
IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims] established IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims] established
by [RFC7519]. by [RFC7519].
5.1.1. Registry Contents 5.1.1. Registry Contents
skipping to change at page 16, line 32 skipping to change at page 15, line 47
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>. 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[RFC7617] Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme", [RFC7617] Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme",
RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015, RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617>.
6.2. Informative References 6.2. Informative References
[openid-connect-core]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", November 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[RFC7009] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth [RFC7009] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth
2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009, 2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009,
August 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7009>. August 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7009>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>. 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", [RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015, RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
skipping to change at page 17, line 5 skipping to change at page 16, line 26
[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, [RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015, DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
[RFC7644] Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E., [RFC7644] Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E.,
and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain Identity and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain Identity
Management: Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644, Management: Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,
September 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644>. September 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644>.
[saml-core-2.0]
Internet2, "Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", March
2005.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments Appendix A. Acknowledgments
The editors would like to thank the members of the SCIM WG which
began discussions of provisioning events starting with: draft-hunt-
scim-notify-00 in 2015.
The editors would like to thank the participants in the IETF id-event The editors would like to thank the participants in the IETF id-event
mailing list and related working groups for their support of this mailing list and related working groups for their support of this
specification. specification.
Appendix B. Change Log Appendix B. Change Log
From the original draft-hunt-idevent-token:
Draft 01 - PH - Renamed eventUris to events Draft 01 - PH - Renamed eventUris to events
Draft 00 - PH - First Draft Draft 00 - PH - First Draft
Draft 01 - PH - Fixed some alignment issues with JWT. Remove event Draft 01 - PH - Fixed some alignment issues with JWT. Remove event
type attribute. type attribute.
Draft 02 - PH - Renamed to Security Events, removed questions, Draft 02 - PH - Renamed to Security Events, removed questions,
clarified examples and intro text, and added security and privacy clarified examples and intro text, and added security and privacy
section. section.
skipping to change at page 18, line 22 skipping to change at page 18, line 9
o mbj - Applied terminology consistency and grammar cleanups. o mbj - Applied terminology consistency and grammar cleanups.
Draft 08 - PH - Draft 08 - PH -
o Added clarification to status of examples o Added clarification to status of examples
o Changed from primary vs. extension to state that multiple events o Changed from primary vs. extension to state that multiple events
may be expressed, some of which may or may not be considered may be expressed, some of which may or may not be considered
extensions of others (which is for the subscriber or profiling extensions of others (which is for the subscriber or profiling
specifications to determine). specifications to determine).
o Other editorial changes suggested by Yaron o Other editorial changes suggested by Yaron
From draft-ietf-secevent-token:
Draft 00 - PH - First WG Draft based on draft-hunt-idevent-token
Draft 01 - PH - Changes as follows:
o Changed terminology away from pub-sub to transmitter/receiver
based on WG feedback
o Cleaned up/removed some text about extensions (now only used as
example)
o Clarify purpose of spec vs. future profiling specs that define
actual events
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Phil Hunt (editor) Phil Hunt (editor)
Oracle Corporation Oracle Corporation
Email: phil.hunt@yahoo.com Email: phil.hunt@yahoo.com
William Denniss William Denniss
Google Google
 End of changes. 50 change blocks. 
153 lines changed or deleted 161 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.45. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/