draft-ietf-secevent-token-02.txt   draft-ietf-secevent-token-03.txt 
Security Events Working Group P. Hunt, Ed. Security Events Working Group P. Hunt, Ed.
Internet-Draft Oracle Internet-Draft Oracle
Intended status: Standards Track W. Denniss Intended status: Standards Track W. Denniss
Expires: January 1, 2018 Google Expires: April 29, 2018 Google
M. Ansari M. Ansari
Cisco Cisco
M. Jones M. Jones
Microsoft Microsoft
June 30, 2017 October 26, 2017
Security Event Token (SET) Security Event Token (SET)
draft-ietf-secevent-token-02 draft-ietf-secevent-token-03
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines the Security Event Token, which may be This specification defines the Security Event Token, which may be
distributed via a protocol such as HTTP. The Security Event Token distributed via a protocol such as HTTP. The Security Event Token
(SET) specification profiles the JSON Web Token (JWT), which can be (SET) specification profiles the JSON Web Token (JWT), which can be
optionally signed and/or encrypted. A SET describes a statement of optionally signed and/or encrypted. A SET describes a statement of
fact from the perspective of an issuer that it intends to share with fact from the perspective of an issuer that it intends to share with
one or more receivers. one or more receivers.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 1, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 29, 2018.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
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3. Requirements for SET Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3. Requirements for SET Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. Confidentiality and Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.1. Confidentiality and Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2. Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.2. Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3. Sequencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.3. Sequencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.4. Timing Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.4. Timing Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.5. Distinguishing SETs from ID Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.5. Distinguishing SETs from ID Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.6. Distinguishing SETs from Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . 15 4.6. Distinguishing SETs from Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . 15
4.7. Distinguishing SETs from other kinds of JWTs . . . . . . 15 4.7. Distinguishing SETs from other kinds of JWTs . . . . . . 15
5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.2. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.2. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1. Introduction and Overview 1. Introduction and Overview
This specification defines an extensible Security Event Token (SET) This specification defines an extensible Security Event Token (SET)
format which may be exchanged using protocols such as HTTP. The format which may be exchanged using protocols such as HTTP. The
specification builds on the JSON Web Token (JWT) format [RFC7519] in specification builds on the JSON Web Token (JWT) format [RFC7519] in
order to provide a self-contained token that can be optionally signed order to provide a self-contained token that can be optionally signed
using JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] and/or encrypted using JSON using JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] and/or encrypted using JSON
Web Encryption (JWE) [RFC7516]. Web Encryption (JWE) [RFC7516].
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an Event Receiver, having received a SET, validates and interprets an Event Receiver, having received a SET, validates and interprets
the received SET and takes its own independent actions, if any. For the received SET and takes its own independent actions, if any. For
example, having been informed of a personal identifier being example, having been informed of a personal identifier being
associated with a different security subject (e.g., an email address associated with a different security subject (e.g., an email address
is being used by someone else), the Event Receiver may choose to is being used by someone else), the Event Receiver may choose to
ensure that the new user is not granted access to resources ensure that the new user is not granted access to resources
associated with the previous user. Or, the Event Receiver may not associated with the previous user. Or, the Event Receiver may not
have any relationship with the subject, and no action is taken. have any relationship with the subject, and no action is taken.
While Event Receivers will often take actions upon receiving SETs, While Event Receivers will often take actions upon receiving SETs,
security events MUST NOT be assumed to be commands or requests. The security events cannot be assumed to be commands or requests. The
intent of this specification is to define a way of exchanging intent of this specification is to define a way of exchanging
statements of fact that subscribers may interpret for their own statements of fact that Event Receivers may interpret for their own
purposes. As such, SETs have no capability for error signaling other purposes. As such, SETs have no capability for error signaling other
to ensure the validation of a received SET. to ensure the validation of a received SET.
1.1. Notational Conventions 1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119]. These keywords are capitalized when used to unambiguously [RFC2119]. These keywords are capitalized when used to unambiguously
specify requirements of the protocol or application features and specify requirements of the protocol or application features and
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Security Event Token (SET) Security Event Token (SET)
A SET is a JWT [RFC7519] that is distributed to one or more A SET is a JWT [RFC7519] that is distributed to one or more
registered Event Receivers. registered Event Receivers.
Event Transmitter Event Transmitter
A service provider that delivers SETs to other providers known as A service provider that delivers SETs to other providers known as
Event Receivers. Event Receivers.
Event Receiver Event Receiver
An Event Receiver is an entity that receives SETs through some An Event Receiver is an entity that receives SETs through some
distribution method. distribution method. An Event Receiver is the same entity
referred as "recipient" or "receiver" in and related
specifications. [RFC7519]
Subject Subject
A SET describes an event or state change that has occurred about a A SET describes an event or state change that has occurred about a
Subject. A Subject may be a principal (e.g., Section 4.1.2 Subject. A Subject may be a principal (e.g., Section 4.1.2
[RFC7519]), a web resource, an entity such as an IP address, or [RFC7519]), a web resource, an entity such as an IP address, or
the issuer itself that a SET might reference. the issuer itself that a SET might reference.
Profiling Specification A specification that uses the SET Token Profiling Specification A specification that uses the SET Token
specification to define one or more event types and the associated specification to define one or more event types and the associated
claims included. claims included.
2. The Security Event Token (SET) 2. The Security Event Token (SET)
A SET is a data structure (in the form of a JWT [RFC7519]) A SET is a data structure (in the form of a JWT [RFC7519])
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The schema and structure of a SET follows the JWT [RFC7519] The schema and structure of a SET follows the JWT [RFC7519]
specification. A SET has the following structure: specification. A SET has the following structure:
o An outer JSON object that acts as the SET "envelope". The o An outer JSON object that acts as the SET "envelope". The
envelope contains a set of name/value pairs called the JWT Claims envelope contains a set of name/value pairs called the JWT Claims
Set, typically common to every SET or common to a number of Set, typically common to every SET or common to a number of
different Events within a single Profiling Specification or a different Events within a single Profiling Specification or a
related series of specifications. Claims in the envelope (the related series of specifications. Claims in the envelope (the
outer JSON structure) SHOULD be registered in the JWT Token Claims outer JSON structure) SHOULD be registered in the JWT Token Claims
Registry Section 10.1 [RFC7519] or be Public Claims or Private Registry [IANA.JWT.Claims] or be Public Claims or Private Claims
Claims as also defined in [RFC7519]. as also defined in [RFC7519].
o Envelope claims that are profiled and defined in this o Envelope claims that are profiled and defined in this
specification are used to validate a SET and declare the contents specification are used to validate a SET and declare the contents
of the event data included in the SET. The claim "events" of the event data included in the SET. The claim "events"
identifies the event types expressed that are related to the identifies the event types expressed that are related to the
Security Subject and MAY also include event-specific data. Security Subject and MAY also include event-specific data.
o Each JSON member of the "events" object is a name and value pair. o Each JSON member of the "events" object is a name and value pair.
The JSON attribute name is a URI String value that expresses an The JSON attribute name is a URI String value that expresses an
event type, and the corresponding value is a JSON object known as event type, and the corresponding value is a JSON object known as
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logged-out. logged-out.
In the following example JWT Claims Set, a fictional medical service In the following example JWT Claims Set, a fictional medical service
collects consent for medical actions and notifies other parties. The collects consent for medical actions and notifies other parties. The
individual for whom consent is identified was originally individual for whom consent is identified was originally
authenticated via OpenID Connect. In this case, the issuer of the authenticated via OpenID Connect. In this case, the issuer of the
security event is an application rather than the OpenID provider: security event is an application rather than the OpenID provider:
{ {
"jti": "fb4e75b5411e4e19b6c0fe87950f7749", "jti": "fb4e75b5411e4e19b6c0fe87950f7749",
"sub": "248289761001",
"iat": 1458496025, "iat": 1458496025,
"iss": "https://my.examplemed.com", "iss": "https://my.examplemed.com",
"aud": [ "aud": [
"https://rp.example.com" "https://rp.example.com"
], ],
"events": { "events": {
"https://openid.net/heart/specs/consent.html":{ "https://openid.net/heart/specs/consent.html":{
"iss":"https://connect.example.com", "iss":"https://connect.example.com",
"sub": "248289761001",
"consentUri":[ "consentUri":[
"https://terms.examplemed.com/labdisclosure.html#Agree" "https://terms.examplemed.com/labdisclosure.html#Agree"
] ]
} }
} }
} }
Figure 3: Example Consent Event Figure 3: Example Consent Event
In the above example, the attribute "iss" contained within the In the above example, the attribute "iss" contained within the
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The syntax of the claim is as defined in Section 4.1.3 [RFC7519]. The syntax of the claim is as defined in Section 4.1.3 [RFC7519].
This claim contains one or more audience identifiers for the SET. This claim contains one or more audience identifiers for the SET.
This claim is RECOMMENDED. This claim is RECOMMENDED.
iat iat
As defined by Section 4.1.6 [RFC7519], a value containing a As defined by Section 4.1.6 [RFC7519], a value containing a
NumericDate, which represents when the event was issued. Unless NumericDate, which represents when the event was issued. Unless
otherwise specified, the value SHOULD be interpreted as equivalent otherwise specified, the value SHOULD be interpreted as equivalent
to the actual time of the event. This claim is REQUIRED. to the actual time of the event. This claim is REQUIRED.
nbf toe A number whose value is a Numeric Data ( see Section 2
Defined by Section 4.1.5 [RFC7519], a number whose value is a [RFC7519]). The value is the date and time in which the event is
NumericDate. In the context of the SET token it SHALL be believed to have occurred in the past or will occur in the future.
interpreted to mean a date in which the event is believed to have This claim is RECOMMENDED. Note that some profiles may choose to
occurred (in the past) or will occur in the future. Note: there omit "toe" and convey event time information with the "iat"claim
MAY be some cases where "nbf" is still smaller than "iat" such as or another claim.
when it took an extended time for a SET to be issued (for example
after some analysis). This claim is OPTIONAL.
sub As defined by Section 4.1.2 [RFC7519], a String or URI value sub As defined by Section 4.1.2 [RFC7519], a String or URI value
representing the principal or the subject of the SET. This is representing the principal or the subject of the SET. This is
usually the entity whose "state" was changed. For example, an IP usually the entity whose "state" was changed. For example, an IP
Address was added to a black list. A URI representing a user Address was added to a black list. A URI representing a user
resource that was modified. A token identifier for a revoked resource that was modified. A token identifier for a revoked
token. If used, the Profile Specification SHOULD define the token. If used, the Profiling Specification SHOULD define the
content and format semantics for the value. This claim is content and format semantics for the value. This claim is
OPTIONAL, as the principal for any given profile may already be OPTIONAL, as the principal for any given profile may already be
identified without the inclusion of a subject claim. Note that identified without the inclusion of a subject claim. Note that
some SET profiles MAY choose to convey event subject information some SET profiles MAY choose to convey event subject information
in the event payload, particularly if the subject information is in the event payload (either using the "sub" member name or
relative to issuer information that is also conveyed in the event another name), particularly if the subject information is relative
payload, which may be the case for some identity SET profiles. to issuer information that is also conveyed in the event payload,
which may be the case for some identity SET profiles.
exp As defined by [RFC7519], this claim is time on which the JWT exp As defined by [RFC7519], this claim is time on which the JWT
MUST NOT be accepted for processing. In the context of a SET MUST NOT be accepted for processing. In the context of a SET
however, this notion does not apply since a SET reflects something however, this notion does not apply since a SET reflects something
that has already been processed and is historical in nature. that has already been processed and is historical in nature.
While some specifications MAY have a need for this claim, its use While some specifications MAY have a need for this claim, its use
in general cases is NOT RECOMMENDED. in general cases is NOT RECOMMENDED.
The following are new claims defined by this specification: The following are new claims defined by this specification:
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integrity, confidentiality, and issuer validation, as needed by the integrity, confidentiality, and issuer validation, as needed by the
application. application.
When validation (i.e. auditing), or additional transmission security When validation (i.e. auditing), or additional transmission security
is required, JWS signing and/or JWE encryption MAY be used. To is required, JWS signing and/or JWE encryption MAY be used. To
create and or validate a signed and/or encrypted SET, follow the create and or validate a signed and/or encrypted SET, follow the
instructions in Section 7 of [RFC7519]. instructions in Section 7 of [RFC7519].
3. Requirements for SET Profiles 3. Requirements for SET Profiles
Profile Specifications for SETs define the syntax and semantics of Profiling Specifications for SETs define the syntax and semantics of
SETs conforming to that SET profile and rules for validating those SETs conforming to that SET profile and rules for validating those
SETs. The syntax defined by profiling specifications includes what SETs. The syntax defined by profiling specifications includes what
claims and event payload values are used by SETs utilizing the claims and event payload values are used by SETs utilizing the
profile. profile.
Defining the semantics of the SET contents for SETs utilizing the Defining the semantics of the SET contents for SETs utilizing the
profile is equally important. Possibly most important is defining profile is equally important. Possibly most important is defining
the procedures used to validate the SET issuer and to obtain the keys the procedures used to validate the SET issuer and to obtain the keys
controlled by the issuer that were used for cryptographic operations controlled by the issuer that were used for cryptographic operations
used in the JWT representing the SET. For instance, some profiles used in the JWT representing the SET. For instance, some profiles
may define an algorithm for retrieving the SET issuer's keys that may define an algorithm for retrieving the SET issuer's keys that
uses the "iss" claim value as its input. uses the "iss" claim value as its input. Likewise, if the profile
allows (or requires) that the JWT be unsecured, the means by which
the integrity of the JWT is ensured MUST be specified.
Profile Specifications MUST clearly specify the steps that a Profiling Specifications MUST define how the event Subject is
identified in the SET, as well as how to differentiate between the
event Subject's Issuer and the SET Issuer, if applicable. It is NOT
RECOMMENDED for Profiling Specifications to use the "sub" claim in
cases in which the Subject is not globally unique and has a different
Issuer from the SET itself.
Profiling Specifications MUST clearly specify the steps that a
recipient of a SET utilizing that profile MUST perform to validate recipient of a SET utilizing that profile MUST perform to validate
that the SET is both syntactically and semantically valid. that the SET is both syntactically and semantically valid.
4. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
4.1. Confidentiality and Integrity 4.1. Confidentiality and Integrity
SETs may often contain sensitive information. Therefore, methods for SETs may often contain sensitive information. Therefore, methods for
distribution of events SHOULD require the use of a transport-layer distribution of events SHOULD require the use of a transport-layer
security mechanism when distributing events. Parties MUST support security mechanism when distributing events. Parties MUST support
TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and MAY support additional transport-layer TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and MAY support additional transport-layer
mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the
client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per
[RFC6125]. Implementation security considerations for TLS can be [RFC6125]. Implementation security considerations for TLS can be
found in "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525]. found in "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525].
Security Events distributed through third-parties or that carry Security Events distributed through third-parties or that carry
personally identifiable information, SHOULD be encrypted using JWE personally identifiable information, SHOULD be encrypted using JWE
[RFC7516] or secured for confidentiality by other means. [RFC7516] or secured for confidentiality by other means.
Security Events distributed without authentication over the channel, Unless integrity of the JWT is ensured by other means, it MUST be
such as via TLS ([RFC5246] and [RFC6125]), and/or OAuth 2.0 signed using JWS [RFC7515] so that individual events can be
[RFC6749], or Basic Authentication [RFC7617], MUST be signed using authenticated and validated by the Event Receiver.
JWS [RFC7515] so that individual events can be authenticated and
validated by the Event Receiver.
4.2. Delivery 4.2. Delivery
This specification does not define a delivery mechanism by itself. This specification does not define a delivery mechanism by itself.
In addition to confidentiality and integrity (discussed above), In addition to confidentiality and integrity (discussed above),
implementers and Profile Specifications MUST consider the implementers and Profiling Specifications MUST consider the
consequences of delivery mechanisms that are not secure and/or not consequences of delivery mechanisms that are not secure and/or not
assured. For example, while a SET may be end-to-end secured using assured. For example, while a SET may be end-to-end secured using
JWE encrypted SETs, without TLS there is no assurance that the JWE encrypted SETs, without TLS there is no assurance that the
correct endpoint received the SET and that it could be successfully correct endpoint received the SET and that it could be successfully
processed. processed.
4.3. Sequencing 4.3. Sequencing
As defined in this specification, there is no defined way to order As defined in this specification, there is no defined way to order
multiple SETs in a sequence. Depending on the type and nature of SET multiple SETs in a sequence. Depending on the type and nature of SET
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guarantee order. guarantee order.
Specifications profiling SET SHOULD define a mechanism for detecting Specifications profiling SET SHOULD define a mechanism for detecting
order or sequence of events. For example, the "txn" claim could order or sequence of events. For example, the "txn" claim could
contain an ordered value (e.g., a counter) that the issuer defines. contain an ordered value (e.g., a counter) that the issuer defines.
4.4. Timing Issues 4.4. Timing Issues
When SETs are delivered asynchronously and/or out-of-band with When SETs are delivered asynchronously and/or out-of-band with
respect to the original action that incurred the security event, it respect to the original action that incurred the security event, it
is important to consider that a SET might be delivered to a is important to consider that a SET might be delivered to an Event
Subscriber in advance or well behind the process that caused the Receiver in advance or well behind the process that caused the event.
event. For example, a user having been required to logout and then For example, a user having been required to logout and then log back
log back in again, may cause a logout SET to be issued that may in again, may cause a logout SET to be issued that may arrive at the
arrive at the same time as the user-agent accesses a web site having same time as the user-agent accesses a web site having just logged-
just logged-in. If timing is not handled properly, the effect would in. If timing is not handled properly, the effect would be to
be to erroneously treat the new user session as logged out. erroneously treat the new user session as logged out. Profiling
Profiling Specifications SHOULD be careful to anticipate timing and Specifications SHOULD be careful to anticipate timing and subject
subject selection information. For example, it might be more selection information. For example, it might be more appropriate to
appropriate to cancel a "session" rather than a "user". cancel a "session" rather than a "user". Alternatively, the
Alternatively, the specification could use timestamps that allows new specification could use timestamps that allows new sessions to be
sessions to be started immediately after a stated logout event time. started immediately after a stated logout event time.
4.5. Distinguishing SETs from ID Tokens 4.5. Distinguishing SETs from ID Tokens
Because [RFC7519] states that "all claims that are not understood by Because [RFC7519] states that "all claims that are not understood by
implementations MUST be ignored", there is a consideration that a SET implementations MUST be ignored", there is a consideration that a SET
token might be confused with ID Token [OpenID.Core] if a SET is token might be confused with ID Token [OpenID.Core] if a SET is
mistakenly or intentionally used in a context requiring an ID Token. mistakenly or intentionally used in a context requiring an ID Token.
If a SET could otherwise be interpreted as a valid ID Token (because If a SET could otherwise be interpreted as a valid ID Token (because
it includes the required claims for an ID Token and valid issuer and it includes the required claims for an ID Token and valid issuer and
audience claim values for an ID Token) then that SET profile MUST audience claim values for an ID Token) then that SET profile MUST
require that the "exp" claim not be present in the SET. Because require that the "exp" claim not be present in the SET. Because
"exp" is a required claim in ID Tokens, valid ID Token "exp" is a required claim in ID Tokens, valid ID Token
implementations will reject such a SET if presented as if it were an implementations will reject such a SET if presented as if it were an
ID Token. ID Token.
Excluding "exp" from SETs that could otherwise be confused with ID Excluding "exp" from SETs that could otherwise be confused with ID
Tokens is actually defense in depth. In any OpenID Connect contexts Tokens is actually defense in depth. In any OpenID Connect contexts
in which an attacker could attempt to substitute a SET for an ID in which an attacker could attempt to substitute a SET for an ID
Token, the SET would actually already be rejected as an ID Token Token, the SET would actually already be rejected as an ID Token
because it would not contain the correct "nonce" claim value for the because it would not contain the correct "nonce" claim value for the
ID Token to be accepted in that context. ID Token to be accepted in contexts for which substitution is
possible.
Note that the use of explicit typing, as described in Section 2.2, Note that the use of explicit typing, as described in Section 2.2,
will not achieve disambiguation between ID Tokens and SETs, as the ID will not achieve disambiguation between ID Tokens and SETs, as the ID
Token validation rules do not use the "typ" header parameter value. Token validation rules do not use the "typ" header parameter value.
4.6. Distinguishing SETs from Access Tokens 4.6. Distinguishing SETs from Access Tokens
OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] defines access tokens as being opaque. OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] defines access tokens as being opaque.
Nonetheless, some implementations implement access tokens as JWTs. Nonetheless, some implementations implement access tokens as JWTs.
Because the structure of these JWTs is implementation-specific, Because the structure of these JWTs is implementation-specific,
ensuring that a SET cannot be confused with such an access token is ensuring that a SET cannot be confused with such an access token is
therefore likewise, in general, implementation specific. therefore likewise, in general, implementation specific.
Nonetheless, it is recommended that SET profiles employ the following Nonetheless, it is recommended that SET profiles employ the following
strategies to prevent possible substitutions of SETs for access strategies to prevent possible substitutions of SETs for access
tokens in contexts in which that might be possible: tokens in contexts in which that might be possible:
o Prohibit use of the "exp" claim, as is done to prevent ID Token o Prohibit use of the "exp" claim, as is done to prevent ID Token
confusion. confusion.
o Where possible, use a separate "aud" claim value to distinguish o Where possible, use a separate "aud" claim value to distinguish
between the SET subscriber and the protected resource that is the between the Event Receiver and the protected resource that is the
audience of an access token. audience of an access token.
o Modify access token validation systems to check for the presence o Modify access token validation systems to check for the presence
of the "events" claim as a means to detect security event tokens. of the "events" claim as a means to detect security event tokens.
This is particularly useful if the same endpoint may receive both This is particularly useful if the same endpoint may receive both
types of tokens. types of tokens.
o Employ explicit typing, as described in Section 2.2, and modify o Employ explicit typing, as described in Section 2.2, and modify
access token validation systems to use the "typ" header parameter access token validation systems to use the "typ" header parameter
value. value.
skipping to change at page 15, line 45 skipping to change at page 16, line 5
applications in which they first appeared. For instance, the Session applications in which they first appeared. For instance, the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP) Via Header Field [RFC8055] and Personal Initiation Protocol (SIP) Via Header Field [RFC8055] and Personal
Assertion Token (PASSporT) [I-D.ietf-stir-passport] specifications Assertion Token (PASSporT) [I-D.ietf-stir-passport] specifications
both define JWT profiles that use mostly or completely different sets both define JWT profiles that use mostly or completely different sets
of claims than are used by ID Tokens. If it would otherwise be of claims than are used by ID Tokens. If it would otherwise be
possible for an attacker to substitute a SET for one of these (or possible for an attacker to substitute a SET for one of these (or
other) kinds of JWTs, then the SET profile must be defined in such a other) kinds of JWTs, then the SET profile must be defined in such a
way that any substituted SET will result in its rejection when way that any substituted SET will result in its rejection when
validated as the intended kind of JWT. validated as the intended kind of JWT.
The most direct way to ensure that a SET is not confused with another The most direct way to prevent confusion is to employ explicit
kind of JWT is to have the JWT validation logic reject JWTs typing, as described in Section 2.2, and modify applicable token
containing an "events" claim unless the JWT is intended to be a SET. validation systems to use the "typ" header parameter value. This
This approach can be employed for new systems but may not be approach can be employed for new systems but may not be applicable to
applicable to existing systems. existing systems.
Another direct way to prevent confusion is to employ explicit typing, Another way to ensure that a SET is not confused with another kind of
as described in Section 2.2, and modify applicable token validation JWT is to have the JWT validation logic reject JWTs containing an
systems to use the "typ" header parameter value. This approach can "events" claim unless the JWT is intended to be a SET. This approach
be employed for new systems but may not be applicable to existing can be employed for new systems but may not be applicable to existing
systems. systems.
For many use cases, the simplest way to prevent substitution is For many use cases, the simplest way to prevent substitution is
requiring that the SET not include claims that are required for the requiring that the SET not include claims that are required for the
kind of JWT that might be the target of an attack. For example, for kind of JWT that might be the target of an attack. For example, for
[RFC8055], the "sip_callid" claim could be omitted and for [RFC8055], the "sip_callid" claim could be omitted and for
[I-D.ietf-stir-passport], the "orig" claim could be omitted. [I-D.ietf-stir-passport], the "orig" claim could be omitted.
In many contexts, simple measures such as these will accomplish the In many contexts, simple measures such as these will accomplish the
task, should confusion otherwise even be possible. Note that this task, should confusion otherwise even be possible. Note that this
skipping to change at page 16, line 27 skipping to change at page 16, line 36
Best Current Practices [I-D.sheffer-oauth-jwt-bcp]. The proposed Best Current Practices [I-D.sheffer-oauth-jwt-bcp]. The proposed
best practices in that draft may also be applicable for particular best practices in that draft may also be applicable for particular
SET profiles and use cases. SET profiles and use cases.
5. Privacy Considerations 5. Privacy Considerations
If a SET needs to be retained for audit purposes, JWS MAY be used to If a SET needs to be retained for audit purposes, JWS MAY be used to
provide verification of its authenticity. provide verification of its authenticity.
Event Transmitters SHOULD attempt to specialize feeds so that the Event Transmitters SHOULD attempt to specialize feeds so that the
content is targeted to the specific business and protocol needs of content is targeted to the specific business and protocol needs of an
subscribers. Event Receiver.
When sharing personally identifiable information or information that When sharing personally identifiable information or information that
is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, Event is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, Event
Transmitters and Receivers MUST have the appropriate legal agreements Transmitters and Receivers MUST have the appropriate legal agreements
and user consent or terms of service in place. and user consent or terms of service in place.
The propagation of subject identifiers can be perceived as personally The propagation of subject identifiers can be perceived as personally
identifiable information. Where possible, Event Transmitters and identifiable information. Where possible, Event Transmitters and
Receivers SHOULD devise approaches that prevent propagation -- for Receivers SHOULD devise approaches that prevent propagation -- for
example, the passing of a hash value that requires the subscriber to example, the passing of a hash value that requires the Event Receiver
already know the subject. to know the subject.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
6.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration 6.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration
This specification registers the "events" and "txn" claims in the This specification registers the "events", "toe", and "txn" claims in
IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims] established the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims]
by [RFC7519]. established by [RFC7519].
6.1.1. Registry Contents 6.1.1. Registry Contents
o Claim Name: "events" o Claim Name: "events"
o Claim Description: Security Event Object o Claim Description: Security Event URI
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 2.1 of [[ this specification ]]
o Claim Name: "toe"
o Claim Description: Time Of Event
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2.1 of [[ this specification ]]
o Claim Name: "txn" o Claim Name: "txn"
o Claim Description: Transaction Identifier o Claim Description: Transaction Identifier
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 2.1 of [[ this specification ]]
6.2. Media Type Registration 6.2. Media Type Registration
6.2.1. Registry Contents 6.2.1. Registry Contents
This section registers the "application/secevent+jwt" media type This section registers the "application/secevent+jwt" media type
[RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the [RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the
manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the
content is a SET. content is a SET.
skipping to change at page 18, line 20 skipping to change at page 18, line 32
IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims", IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>. <http://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.
[IANA.MediaTypes] [IANA.MediaTypes]
IANA, "Media Types", IANA, "Media Types",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>. <http://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>. 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>. 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[RFC7617] Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme", [RFC7617] Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme",
RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015, RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617>.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-stir-passport] [I-D.ietf-stir-passport]
Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "Personal Assertion Token Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "Personal Assertion Token
(PASSporT)", draft-ietf-stir-passport-11 (work in (PASSporT)", draft-ietf-stir-passport-11 (work in
progress), February 2017. progress), February 2017.
[I-D.sheffer-oauth-jwt-bcp] [I-D.sheffer-oauth-jwt-bcp]
Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best
skipping to change at page 19, line 29 skipping to change at page 19, line 43
in progress), June 2017. in progress), June 2017.
[OpenID.Core] [OpenID.Core]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", November 2014, C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", November 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>. <http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail [RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046, Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996, DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.
[RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type [RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013, RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>.
[RFC7009] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth [RFC7009] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth
2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009, 2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009,
August 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7009>. August 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7009>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>. 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", [RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015, RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, [RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015, DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
[RFC7644] Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E., [RFC7644] Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E.,
and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain Identity and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain Identity
Management: Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644, Management: Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,
September 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644>. September 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644>.
[RFC8055] Holmberg, C. and Y. Jiang, "Session Initiation Protocol [RFC8055] Holmberg, C. and Y. Jiang, "Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP) Via Header Field Parameter to Indicate Received (SIP) Via Header Field Parameter to Indicate Received
Realm", RFC 8055, DOI 10.17487/RFC8055, January 2017, Realm", RFC 8055, DOI 10.17487/RFC8055, January 2017,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8055>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8055>.
[saml-core-2.0] [saml-core-2.0]
Internet2, "Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS Internet2, "Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", March Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", March
2005. 2005.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments Appendix A. Acknowledgments
The editors would like to thank the members of the IETF SCIM working The editors would like to thank the members of the IETF SCIM working
group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with
skipping to change at page 22, line 47 skipping to change at page 23, line 13
SET conveys a single security event. SET conveys a single security event.
o mbj - Added a note explicitly acknowledging that some SET profiles o mbj - Added a note explicitly acknowledging that some SET profiles
may choose to convey event subject information in the event may choose to convey event subject information in the event
payload. payload.
o PH - Corrected encoded claim example on page 10. o PH - Corrected encoded claim example on page 10.
o mbj - Applied grammar corrections. o mbj - Applied grammar corrections.
Draft 03 - Changes As Follows:
o pjh - Corrected old "subscriber" to "Event Receiver". Added
clarification in definition that Event Receiver is the same as JWT
recipient.
o pjh - Added definition for "toe" (and IANA registration).
o pjh - Removed "nbf" claim.
o pjh - Figure 3, moved "sub" to the events payload next to "iss".
o pjh - Clarified the use of "nonce" in contexts where susbstitution
is possible.
o mbj - Addressed WGLC comments by Nat Sakimura.
o mbj - Addressed WGLC comments by Annabelle Bachman.
o mbj - Addressed WGLC comments by Marius Scurtescu.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Phil Hunt (editor) Phil Hunt (editor)
Oracle Corporation Oracle Corporation
Email: phil.hunt@yahoo.com Email: phil.hunt@yahoo.com
William Denniss William Denniss
Google Google
Email: wdenniss@google.com Email: wdenniss@google.com
 End of changes. 52 change blocks. 
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