draft-ietf-secevent-token-05.txt   draft-ietf-secevent-token-06.txt 
Security Events Working Group P. Hunt, Ed. Security Events Working Group P. Hunt, Ed.
Internet-Draft Oracle Internet-Draft Oracle
Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones
Expires: August 6, 2018 Microsoft Expires: September 1, 2018 Microsoft
W. Denniss W. Denniss
Google Google
M. Ansari M. Ansari
Cisco Cisco
February 2, 2018 February 28, 2018
Security Event Token (SET) Security Event Token (SET)
draft-ietf-secevent-token-05 draft-ietf-secevent-token-06
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines the Security Event Token (SET) data This specification defines the Security Event Token (SET) data
structure. A SET describes a statement of fact from the perspective structure. A SET describes a statement of fact from the perspective
of an issuer, which is intended to be shared with one or more of an issuer about the state of a security subject, which is intended
recipients. A SET is a JSON Web Token (JWT), which can be optionally to be shared with one or more recipients. This statement of fact
signed and/or encrypted. SETs can be distributed via protocols such represents an event that occurred to the security subject. In some
as HTTP. use cases, the security subject may be a digitial identity, but SETs
are also applicable to non-identity use cases. A SET is a JSON Web
Token (JWT), which can be optionally signed and/or encrypted. SETs
can be distributed via protocols such as HTTP.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 6, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 1, 2018.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. The Security Event Token (SET) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. The Security Event Token (SET) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Illustrative Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1. Illustrative Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.1. SCIM Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1.1. SCIM Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.2. Logout Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.1.2. Logout Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.3. Consent Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.1.3. Consent Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.4. RISC Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.1.4. RISC Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2. Core SET Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.2. Core SET Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3. Explicit Typing of SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.3. Explicit Typing of SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4. Security Event Token Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.4. Security Event Token Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3. Requirements for SET Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3. Requirements for SET Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.1. Confidentiality and Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.1. Confidentiality and Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2. Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.2. Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.3. Sequencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.3. Sequencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.4. Timing Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.4. Timing Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.5. Distinguishing SETs from ID Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.5. Distinguishing SETs from ID Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.6. Distinguishing SETs from Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . 16 4.6. Distinguishing SETs from Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . 17
4.7. Distinguishing SETs from other kinds of JWTs . . . . . . 17 4.7. Distinguishing SETs from other kinds of JWTs . . . . . . 18
5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.2. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 6.2. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 6.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1. Introduction and Overview 1. Introduction and Overview
This specification defines an extensible Security Event Token (SET) This specification defines an extensible Security Event Token (SET)
data structure, which can be exchanged using protocols such as HTTP. data structure, which can be exchanged using protocols such as HTTP.
The specification builds on the JSON Web Token (JWT) format [RFC7519] The specification builds on the JSON Web Token (JWT) format [RFC7519]
in order to provide a self-contained token that can be optionally in order to provide a self-contained token that can be optionally
signed using JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] and/or encrypted signed using JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] and/or encrypted
using JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [RFC7516]. using JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [RFC7516].
This specification profiles the use of JWT for the purpose of issuing This specification profiles the use of JWT for the purpose of issuing
Security Event Tokens (SETs). This specification defines a base Security Event Tokens (SETs). This specification defines a base
format used by profiling specifications to define actual events and format used by profiling specifications to define actual events and
their meanings. This specification uses non-normative example events their meanings. This specification uses non-normative example events
to demonstrate how events can be constructed. to demonstrate how events can be constructed.
This specification is scoped to security and identity related events. This specification is scoped to security and identity related events.
While security event tokens may be used for other purposes, the While Security Event Tokens may be used for other purposes, the
specification only considers security and privacy concerns relevant specification only considers security and privacy concerns relevant
to identity and personal information. to identity and personal information.
Security Events are not commands issued between parties. A security Security events are not commands issued between parties. A security
event is a statement of fact from the perspective of an issuer about event is a statement of fact from the perspective of an issuer about
the state of a security subject (e.g., a web resource, token, IP the state of a security subject (e.g., a web resource, token, IP
address, the issuer itself) that the issuer controls or is aware of, address, the issuer itself) that the issuer controls or is aware of,
that has changed in some way (explicitly or implicitly). A security that has changed in some way (explicitly or implicitly). A security
subject MAY be permanent (e.g., a user account) or temporary (e.g., subject may be permanent (e.g., a user account) or temporary (e.g.,
an HTTP session) in nature. A state change could describe a direct an HTTP session) in nature. A state change could describe a direct
change of entity state, an implicit change of state, or other higher- change of entity state, an implicit change of state, or other higher-
level security statements such as: level security statements such as:
o The creation, modification, removal of a resource. o The creation, modification, removal of a resource.
o The resetting or suspension of an account. o The resetting or suspension of an account.
o The revocation of a security token prior to its expiry. o The revocation of a security token prior to its expiry.
o The logout of a user session. Or, o The logout of a user session. Or,
o An indication that a user has been given control of an email o An indication that a user has been given control of an email
identifier that was previously controlled by another user. identifier that was previously controlled by another user.
While subject state changes are often triggered by a user agent or While subject state changes are often triggered by a user agent or
security subsystem, the issuance and transmission of an event may security subsystem, the issuance and transmission of an event may
occur asynchronously and in a back channel to the action that caused occur asynchronously and in a back channel to the action that caused
the change that generated the security event. Subsequently, an Event the change that generated the security event. Subsequently, a SET
Recipient, having received a SET, validates and interprets the recipient, having received a SET, validates and interprets the
received SET and takes its own independent actions, if any. For received SET and takes its own independent actions, if any. For
example, having been informed of a personal identifier being example, having been informed of a personal identifier being
associated with a different security subject (e.g., an email address associated with a different security subject (e.g., an email address
is being used by someone else), the Event Recipient may choose to is being used by someone else), the SET recipient may choose to
ensure that the new user is not granted access to resources ensure that the new user is not granted access to resources
associated with the previous user. Or, the Event Recipient may not associated with the previous user. Or, the SET recipient may not
have any relationship with the subject, and no action is taken. have any relationship with the subject, and no action is taken.
While Event Recipients will often take actions upon receiving SETs, While SET recipients will often take actions upon receiving SETs,
security events cannot be assumed to be commands or requests. The security events cannot be assumed to be commands or requests. The
intent of this specification is to define a syntax for statements of intent of this specification is to define a syntax for statements of
fact that Event Recipients may interpret for their own purposes. As fact that SET recipients may interpret for their own purposes.
such, SETs have no capability for error signaling to ensure the
validation of a received SET.
1.1. Notational Conventions 1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
For purposes of readability, examples are not URL encoded. For purposes of readability, examples are not URL encoded.
skipping to change at page 4, line 35 skipping to change at page 4, line 38
line-wrapping for readability and space limitations. Similarly, some line-wrapping for readability and space limitations. Similarly, some
URIs contained within examples have been shortened for space and URIs contained within examples have been shortened for space and
readability reasons. readability reasons.
1.2. Definitions 1.2. Definitions
The following definitions are used with SETs: The following definitions are used with SETs:
Security Event Token (SET) Security Event Token (SET)
A SET is a JWT [RFC7519] conforming to this specification that is A SET is a JWT [RFC7519] conforming to this specification that is
distributed to one or more Event Recipients. distributed to one or more SET recipients.
Event Issuer SET Issuer
A service provider that creates SETs to be sent to other providers A service provider that creates SETs to be sent to other service
known as Event Recipients. providers known as SET recipients.
Event Recipient SET Recipient
An Event Recipient is an entity that receives SETs through some A SET recipient is an entity that receives SETs through some
distribution method. An Event Recipient is the same entity distribution method. A SET recipient is the same entity referred
referred as a "recipient" or "receiver" in [RFC7519] and related as a "recipient" in [RFC7519] or "receiver" in related
specifications. specifications.
Subject Subject
A SET describes an event or state change that has occurred about a A SET describes an event or state change that has occurred to a
Subject. A Subject might, for instance, be a principal (e.g., subject. A subject might, for instance, be a principal (e.g.,
Section 4.1.2 of [RFC7519]), a web resource, an entity such as an Section 4.1.2 of [RFC7519]), a web resource, an entity such as an
IP address, or the issuer of the SET. IP address, or the issuer of the SET.
Event Identifier
A member name for an element of the JSON object that is the value
of the "events" claim in a SET. This member name MUST be a URI.
Event Payload
A member value for an element of the JSON object that is the value
of the "events" claim in a SET. This member value MUST be JSON
object.
Profiling Specification Profiling Specification
A specification that profiles the SET data structure to define one A specification that profiles the SET data structure to define one
or more specific event types and their associated claims and or more specific event types and their associated claims and
processing rules. processing rules.
2. The Security Event Token (SET) 2. The Security Event Token (SET)
A SET is a JWT [RFC7519] data structure that represents one or more A SET is a JWT [RFC7519] data structure that represents one or more
related aspects of a security event about a Subject. The JWT Claims related aspects of a security event that occurred to a subject. The
Set in a SET has the following structure: JWT Claims Set in a SET has the following structure:
o The top-level claims in the JWT Claims Set are called the SET o The top-level claims in the JWT Claims Set are called the SET
"envelope". Some of these claims are present in every SET; others "envelope". Some of these claims are present in every SET; others
will be specific to particular SET profiles or profile families. will be specific to particular SET profiles or profile families.
Claims in the envelope SHOULD be registered in the "JSON Web Token Claims in the envelope SHOULD be registered in the "JSON Web Token
Claims" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims] or be Public Claims or Private Claims" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims] or be Public Claims or Private
Claims, as defined in [RFC7519]. Claims, as defined in [RFC7519].
o Envelope claims that are profiled and defined in this o Envelope claims that are profiled and defined in this
specification are used to validate the SET and provide information specification are used to validate the SET and provide information
about the event data included in the SET. The claim "events" about the event data included in the SET. The claim "events"
contains the event identifiers and event-specific data expressed contains the event identifiers and event-specific data expressed
about the Security Subject. The envelope MAY include event- about the security subject. The envelope MAY include event-
specific or profile-specific data. specific or profile-specific data.
o Each member of the "events" JSON object is a name/value pair. The o Each member of the "events" JSON object is a name/value pair. The
JSON member name is a URI string value is an event identifier, and JSON member name is a URI string value, which is the event
the corresponding value is a JSON object known as the event identifier, and the corresponding value is a JSON object known as
"payload". The payload JSON object contains claims that pertain the event "payload". The payload JSON object contains claims that
to that event identifier and need not be registered as JWT claims. pertain to that event identifier and need not be registered as JWT
These claims are defined by the Profiling Specification that claims. These claims are defined by the profiling specification
defines the event. An event with no payload claims SHALL be that defines the event. An event with no payload claims SHALL be
represented as the empty JSON object ("{}"). represented as the empty JSON object ("{}").
o When multiple event identifiers are contained in a SET, they o When multiple event identifiers are contained in a SET, they
represent multiple aspects of the same state transition that represent multiple aspects of the same state transition that
occurred to the Security Subject. They are not intended to be occurred to the security subject. They are not intended to be
used to aggregate distinct events about the same subject. Beyond used to aggregate distinct events about the same subject. Beyond
this, the interpretation of SETs containing multiple event this, the interpretation of SETs containing multiple event
identifiers is out of scope for this specification; Profiling identifiers is out of scope for this specification; profiling
Specifications MAY define their own rules regarding their use of specifications MAY define their own rules regarding their use of
SETs containing multiple event identifiers, as described in SETs containing multiple event identifiers, as described in
Section 3. Possible uses of multiple values include, but are not Section 3. Possible uses of multiple values include, but are not
limited to: limited to:
* Values to provide classification information (e.g., threat type * Values to provide classification information (e.g., threat type
or level). or level).
* Additions to existing event representations. * Additions to existing event representations.
* Values used to link potential series of events. * Values used to link potential series of events.
* Specific-purpose event URIs used between particular Event * Specific-purpose event URIs used between particular SET issuers
Issuers and Event Recipients. and SET recipients.
2.1. Illustrative Examples 2.1. Illustrative Examples
2.1.1. SCIM Example 2.1.1. SCIM Example
The following is a non-normative example showing the JWT Claims Set The following is a non-normative example showing the JWT Claims Set
for a hypothetical SCIM [RFC7644] password reset SET. This example for a hypothetical SCIM [RFC7644] password reset SET. This example
uses a second "events" value ("https://example.com/scim/event/ uses a second "events" value ("https://example.com/scim/event/
passwordResetExt") to convey additional information about the state passwordResetExt") to convey additional information about the state
change -- in this case, the current count of reset attempts: change -- in this case, the current count of reset attempts:
{ {
"iss": "https://scim.example.com", "iss": "https://scim.example.com",
"iat": 1458496025, "iat": 1458496025,
"jti": "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30", "jti": "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30",
skipping to change at page 6, line 49 skipping to change at page 7, line 37
Figure 1: Example SCIM Password Reset Event Figure 1: Example SCIM Password Reset Event
The JWT Claims Set consists of: The JWT Claims Set consists of:
o The "events" claim specifying the hypothetical SCIM URN o The "events" claim specifying the hypothetical SCIM URN
("urn:ietf:params:scim:event:passwordReset") for a password reset, ("urn:ietf:params:scim:event:passwordReset") for a password reset,
and a second value, "https://example.com/scim/event/ and a second value, "https://example.com/scim/event/
passwordResetExt", that is used to provide additional event passwordResetExt", that is used to provide additional event
information such as the current count of resets. information such as the current count of resets.
o The "iss" claim, denoting the Event Issuer. o The "iss" claim, denoting the SET issuer.
o The "sub" claim, specifying the SCIM resource URI that was o The "sub" claim, specifying the SCIM resource URI that was
affected. affected.
o The "aud" claim, specifying the intended audiences for the event. o The "aud" claim, specifying the intended audiences for the event.
(The syntax of the "aud" claim is defined in Section 4.1.3 of (The syntax of the "aud" claim is defined in Section 4.1.3 of
[RFC7519].) [RFC7519].)
In this example, the SCIM event indicates that a password has been In this example, the SCIM event indicates that a password has been
updated and the current password reset count is 5. Notice that the updated and the current password reset count is 5. Notice that the
skipping to change at page 8, line 32 skipping to change at page 9, line 32
"https://terms.med.example.org/labdisclosure.html#Agree" "https://terms.med.example.org/labdisclosure.html#Agree"
] ]
} }
} }
} }
Figure 3: Example Consent Event Figure 3: Example Consent Event
In the above example, the attribute "iss" contained within the In the above example, the attribute "iss" contained within the
payload for the event "https://openid.net/heart/specs/consent.html" payload for the event "https://openid.net/heart/specs/consent.html"
refers to the issuer of the Security Subject ("sub") rather than the refers to the issuer of the security subject ("sub") rather than the
event issuer "https://my.med.example.org". They are distinct from SET issuer "https://my.med.example.org". They are distinct from the
the top-level value of "iss", which always refers to the issuer of top-level value of "iss", which always refers to the issuer of the
the event -- a medical consent service that is a relying party to the event -- a medical consent service that is a relying party to the
OpenID Provider. OpenID Provider.
2.1.4. RISC Example 2.1.4. RISC Example
The following example JWT Claims Set is for an account disabled The following example JWT Claims Set is for an account disabled
event. This example was taken from a working draft of the RISC event. This example was taken from a working draft of the RISC
events specification, where RISC is the OpenID RISC (Risk and events specification, where RISC is the OpenID RISC (Risk and
Incident Sharing and Coordination) working group [RISC]. The example Incident Sharing and Coordination) working group [RISC]. The example
is subject to change. is subject to change.
{ {
skipping to change at page 9, line 40 skipping to change at page 10, line 40
Notice that parameters to the event are included in the event Notice that parameters to the event are included in the event
payload, in this case, the "reason" and "cause-time" values. The payload, in this case, the "reason" and "cause-time" values. The
subject of the event is identified using the "subject" payload value, subject of the event is identified using the "subject" payload value,
which itself is a JSON object. which itself is a JSON object.
2.2. Core SET Claims 2.2. Core SET Claims
The following claims from [RFC7519] are profiled for use in SETs: The following claims from [RFC7519] are profiled for use in SETs:
iss "iss" (Issuer) Claim
A string identifying the service provider publishing the SET (the As defined by Section 4.1.1 of [RFC7519], this claim contains a
string identifying the service provider publishing the SET (the
issuer). In some cases, the SET issuer is not the issuer of the issuer). In some cases, the SET issuer is not the issuer of the
Security Subject. Therefore, implementers cannot assume that the security subject. Therefore, implementers cannot assume that the
issuers are the same unless the Profiling Specification specifies issuers are the same unless the profiling specification specifies
that they are for SETs conforming to that profile. This claim is that they are for SETs conforming to that profile. This claim is
REQUIRED. REQUIRED.
iat "iat" (Issued At) Claim
As defined by Section 4.1.6 of [RFC7519], a value representing As defined by Section 4.1.6 of [RFC7519], this claim contains a
when the event was issued. This claim is REQUIRED. value representing when the SET was issued. This claim is
REQUIRED.
jti "jti" (JWT ID) Claim
As defined by Section 4.1.7 of [RFC7519] contains a unique As defined by Section 4.1.7 of [RFC7519], this claim contains a
identifier for an event. The identifier SHOULD be unique within a unique identifier for the SET. The identifier SHOULD be unique
particular event feed and MAY be used by clients to track whether within a particular event feed and MAY be used by clients to track
a particular event has already been received. This claim is whether a particular SET has already been received. This claim is
REQUIRED. REQUIRED.
aud "aud" (Audience) Claim
The syntax of the claim is as defined in Section 4.1.3 of As defined by Section 4.1.3 of [RFC7519], this claim contains one
[RFC7519]. This claim contains one or more audience identifiers or more audience identifiers for the SET. This claim is
for the SET. This claim is RECOMMENDED. RECOMMENDED.
sub "sub" (Subject) Claim
As defined by Section 4.1.2 of [RFC7519], a String or URI value As defined by Section 4.1.2 of [RFC7519], this claim contains a
representing the principal or the subject of the SET. This is StringOrURI value representing the principal that is the subject
usually the entity whose "state" was changed. For example, an IP of the SET. This is usually the entity whose "state" was changed.
Address was added to a black list. A URI representing a user For example, an IP Address was added to a black list. A URI
resource that was modified. A token identifier for a revoked representing a user resource that was modified. A token
token. If used, the Profiling Specification SHOULD define the identifier for a revoked token. If used, the profiling
content and format semantics for the value. This claim is specification SHOULD define the content and format semantics for
OPTIONAL, as the principal for any given profile may already be the value. This claim is OPTIONAL, as the principal for any given
identified without the inclusion of a subject claim. Note that profile may already be identified without the inclusion of a
some SET profiles MAY choose to convey event subject information subject claim. Note that some SET profiles MAY choose to convey
in the event payload (either using the "sub" member name or event subject information in the event payload (either using the
another name), particularly if the subject information is relative "sub" member name or another name), particularly if the subject
to issuer information that is also conveyed in the event payload, information is relative to issuer information that is also
which may be the case for some identity SET profiles. conveyed in the event payload, which may be the case for some
identity SET profiles.
exp "exp" (Expiration Time) Claim
As defined by Section 4.1.4 of [RFC7519], this claim is time after As defined by Section 4.1.4 of [RFC7519], this claim is the time
which the JWT MUST NOT be accepted for processing. In the context after which the JWT MUST NOT be accepted for processing. In the
of a SET however, this notion does not apply, since a SET context of a SET however, this notion does not typically apply,
represents something that has already occurred and is historical since a SET represents something that has already occurred and is
in nature. While some profiles MAY choose to use this claim, its historical in nature. Therefore, its use is NOT RECOMMENDED.
use is NOT RECOMMENDED. (Also, see Section 4.5 for additional reasons not to use the "exp"
claim in some SET use cases.)
The following new claims are defined by this specification: The following new claims are defined by this specification:
events "events" (Security Events) Claim
This claim contains a set of event statements that each provide This claim contains a set of event statements that each provide
information describing a single logical event that has occurred information describing a single logical event that has occurred
about a Security Subject (e.g., a state change to the subject). about a security subject (e.g., a state change to the subject).
Multiple event identifiers with the same value MUST NOT be used. Multiple event identifiers with the same value MUST NOT be used.
The "events" claim SHOULD NOT be used to express multiple The "events" claim SHOULD NOT be used to express multiple
independent logical events. independent logical events.
The value of the "events" claim is a JSON object whose members are The value of the "events" claim is a JSON object whose members are
name/value pairs whose names are URIs identifying the event name/value pairs whose names are URIs identifying the event
statements being expressed. Event identifiers SHOULD be stable statements being expressed. Event identifiers SHOULD be stable
values (e.g., a permanent URL for an event specification). For values (e.g., a permanent URL for an event specification). For
each name present, the corresponding value MUST be a JSON object. each name present, the corresponding value MUST be a JSON object.
The JSON object MAY be an empty object ("{}"), or it MAY be a JSON The JSON object MAY be an empty object ("{}"), or it MAY be a JSON
object containing data described by the Profiling Specification. object containing data described by the profiling specification.
txn "txn" (Transaction Identifier) Claim
An OPTIONAL string value that represents a unique transaction An OPTIONAL string value that represents a unique transaction
identifier. In cases in which multiple related JWTs are issued, identifier. In cases in which multiple related JWTs are issued,
the transaction identifier claim can be used to correlate these the transaction identifier claim can be used to correlate these
related JWTs. related JWTs. Note that this claim can be used in JWTs that are
SETs and also in JWTs using non-SET profiles.
toe "toe" (Time of Event) Claim
A value that represents the date and time at which the event A value that represents the date and time at which the event
occurred. This value is a NumericDate (see Section 2 of occurred. This value is a NumericDate (see Section 2 of
[RFC7519]). By omitting this claim, the issuer indicates that [RFC7519]). By omitting this claim, the issuer indicates that
they are not sharing an event time with the recipient. (Note that they are not sharing an event time with the recipient. (Note that
in some use cases, the represented time might be approximate.) in some use cases, the represented time might be approximate.)
This claim is OPTIONAL. This claim is OPTIONAL.
2.3. Explicit Typing of SETs 2.3. Explicit Typing of SETs
This specification registers the "application/secevent+jwt" media This specification registers the "application/secevent+jwt" media
skipping to change at page 13, line 20 skipping to change at page 14, line 20
dHBzOi8vc2NpbS5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9GZWVkcy85OGQ1MjQ2MWZhNWJiYzg3OTU5M2I3 dHBzOi8vc2NpbS5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9GZWVkcy85OGQ1MjQ2MWZhNWJiYzg3OTU5M2I3
NzU0IiwiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL0ZlZWRzLzVkNzYwNDUxNmIxZDA4 NzU0IiwiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL0ZlZWRzLzVkNzYwNDUxNmIxZDA4
NjQxZDc2NzZlZTciXSwiZXZlbnRzIjp7InVybjppZXRmOnBhcmFtczpzY2ltOmV2ZW50 NjQxZDc2NzZlZTciXSwiZXZlbnRzIjp7InVybjppZXRmOnBhcmFtczpzY2ltOmV2ZW50
OmNyZWF0ZSI6eyJyZWYiOiJodHRwczovL3NjaW0uZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vVXNlcnMvNDRm OmNyZWF0ZSI6eyJyZWYiOiJodHRwczovL3NjaW0uZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vVXNlcnMvNDRm
NjE0MmRmOTZiZDZhYjYxZTc1MjFkOSIsImF0dHJpYnV0ZXMiOlsiaWQiLCJuYW1lIiwi NjE0MmRmOTZiZDZhYjYxZTc1MjFkOSIsImF0dHJpYnV0ZXMiOlsiaWQiLCJuYW1lIiwi
dXNlck5hbWUiLCJwYXNzd29yZCIsImVtYWlscyJdfX19. dXNlck5hbWUiLCJwYXNzd29yZCIsImVtYWlscyJdfX19.
Figure 6: Example Unsecured Security Event Token Figure 6: Example Unsecured Security Event Token
For the purpose of having a simpler example in Figure 6, an unsecured For the purpose of having a simpler example in Figure 6, an unsecured
token is shown. When SETs are not signed or encrypted, the Event token is shown. When SETs are not signed or encrypted, other
Recipient MUST employ other mechanisms such as TLS to provide mechanisms such as TLS MUST be employed to provide integrity,
integrity, confidentiality, and issuer validation, as needed by the confidentiality, and issuer authenticity, as needed by the
application. application.
When validation (i.e., auditing), or additional transmission security When validation (i.e., auditing), or additional transmission security
is required, JWS signing and/or JWE encryption MAY be used. To is required, JWS signing and/or JWE encryption MAY be used. To
create and or validate a signed and/or encrypted SET, follow the create and or validate a signed and/or encrypted SET, follow the
instructions in Section 7 of [RFC7519]. instructions in Section 7 of [RFC7519].
3. Requirements for SET Profiles 3. Requirements for SET Profiles
Profiling Specifications for SETs define the syntax and semantics of Profiling specifications for SETs define the syntax and semantics of
SETs conforming to that SET profile and rules for validating those SETs conforming to that SET profile and rules for validating those
SETs. The syntax defined by profiling specifications includes what SETs. The syntax defined by profiling specifications includes what
claims and event payload values are used by SETs utilizing the claims and event payload values are used by SETs utilizing the
profile. profile.
Defining the semantics of the SET contents for SETs utilizing the Defining the semantics of the SET contents for SETs utilizing the
profile is equally important. Possibly most important is defining profile is equally important. Possibly most important is defining
the procedures used to validate the SET issuer and to obtain the keys the procedures used to validate the SET issuer and to obtain the keys
controlled by the issuer that were used for cryptographic operations controlled by the issuer that were used for cryptographic operations
used in the JWT representing the SET. For instance, some profiles used in the JWT representing the SET. For instance, some profiles
may define an algorithm for retrieving the SET issuer's keys that may define an algorithm for retrieving the SET issuer's keys that
uses the "iss" claim value as its input. Likewise, if the profile uses the "iss" claim value as its input. Likewise, if the profile
allows (or requires) that the JWT be unsecured, the means by which allows (or requires) that the JWT be unsecured, the means by which
the integrity of the JWT is ensured MUST be specified. the integrity of the JWT is ensured MUST be specified.
Profiling Specifications MUST define how the event Subject is Profiling specifications MUST define how the event subject is
identified in the SET, as well as how to differentiate between the identified in the SET, as well as how to differentiate between the
event Subject's Issuer and the SET Issuer, if applicable. It is NOT event subject's issuer and the SET issuer, if applicable. It is NOT
RECOMMENDED for Profiling Specifications to use the "sub" claim in RECOMMENDED for profiling specifications to use the "sub" claim in
cases in which the Subject is not globally unique and has a different cases in which the subject is not globally unique and has a different
Issuer from the SET itself. issuer from the SET itself.
Among the syntax and semantics of SETs that Profiling Specifications Among the syntax and semantics of SETs that profiling specifications
define is whether and how multiple "events" values are used for SETs define is whether and how multiple members of the JSON object that is
conforming to those profiles. Many valid choices are possible. For the value of the "events" claim are used for SETs conforming to those
instance, some profiles might allow multiple event identifiers to be profiles. Many valid choices are possible. For instance, some
present and specify that any that are not understood by recipients be profiles might allow multiple event identifiers to be present and
ignored, thus enabling extensibility. Other profiles might allow specify that any that are not understood by recipients be ignored,
multiple event identifiers to be present but require that all be thus enabling extensibility. Other profiles might allow multiple
understood if the SET is to be accepted. Some profiles might require event identifiers to be present but require that all be understood if
that only a single value be present. All such choices are within the the SET is to be accepted. Some profiles might require that only a
scope of Profiling Specifications to define. single value be present. All such choices are within the scope of
profiling specifications to define.
Profiling Specifications MUST clearly specify the steps that a Profiling specifications MUST clearly specify the steps that a
recipient of a SET utilizing that profile MUST perform to validate recipient of a SET utilizing that profile MUST perform to validate
that the SET is both syntactically and semantically valid. that the SET is both syntactically and semantically valid.
4. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
4.1. Confidentiality and Integrity 4.1. Confidentiality and Integrity
SETs may contain sensitive information. Therefore, methods for SETs may contain sensitive information. Therefore, methods for
distribution of events SHOULD require the use of a transport-layer distribution of events SHOULD require the use of a transport-layer
security mechanism when distributing events. Parties MUST support security mechanism when distributing events. Parties MUST support
TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and MAY support additional transport-layer TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] or a higher version and MAY support additional
mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the transport-layer mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When
client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per using TLS, the client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate
[RFC6125]. Implementation security considerations for TLS can be check, per [RFC6125]. Implementation security considerations for TLS
found in "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525]. can be found in "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS"
[RFC7525].
Security Events distributed through third parties or that carry Security events distributed through third parties or that carry
personally identifiable information SHOULD be encrypted using JWE personally identifiable information SHOULD be encrypted using JWE
[RFC7516] or secured for confidentiality by other means. [RFC7516] or secured for confidentiality by other means.
Unless integrity of the JWT is ensured by other means, it MUST be Unless integrity of the JWT is ensured by other means, it MUST be
signed using JWS [RFC7515] so that the SET can be authenticated and signed using JWS [RFC7515] so that the SET can be authenticated and
validated by the Event Recipient. validated by the SET recipient.
4.2. Delivery 4.2. Delivery
This specification does not define a delivery mechanism for SETs. In This specification does not define a delivery mechanism for SETs. In
addition to confidentiality and integrity (discussed above), addition to confidentiality and integrity (discussed above),
implementers and Profiling Specifications MUST consider the implementers and profiling specifications MUST consider the
consequences of delivery mechanisms that are not secure and/or not consequences of delivery mechanisms that are not secure and/or not
assured. For example, while a SET may be end-to-end secured using assured. For example, while a SET may be end-to-end secured using
JWE encrypted SETs, without TLS, there is no assurance that the JWE encrypted SETs, without TLS, there is no assurance that the
correct endpoint received the SET and that it could be successfully correct endpoint received the SET and that it could be successfully
processed. processed.
4.3. Sequencing 4.3. Sequencing
This specification defines no means of ordering multiple SETs in a This specification defines no means of ordering multiple SETs in a
sequence. Depending on the type and nature of the events represented sequence. Depending on the type and nature of the events represented
by SETs, order may or may not matter. For example, in provisioning, by SETs, order may or may not matter. For example, in provisioning,
event order is critical -- an object cannot be modified before it is event order is critical -- an object cannot be modified before it is
created. In other SET types, such as a token revocation, the order created. In other SET types, such as a token revocation, the order
of SETs for revoked tokens does not matter. If, however, the event of SETs for revoked tokens does not matter. If, however, the event
conveys a logged in or logged out status for a user subject, then conveys a logged in or logged out status for a user subject, then
order becomes important. order becomes important.
Profiling Specifications and implementers SHOULD take caution when Profiling specifications and implementers SHOULD take caution when
using timestamps such as "iat" to define order. Distributed systems using timestamps such as "iat" to define order. Distributed systems
will have some amount of clock skew. Thus, time by itself will not will have some amount of clock skew. Thus, time by itself will not
guarantee order. guarantee order.
Specifications profiling SET SHOULD define a mechanism for detecting Specifications profiling SET SHOULD define a mechanism for detecting
order or sequence of events when the order matters. For example, the order or sequence of events when the order matters. For example, the
"txn" claim could contain an ordered value (e.g., a counter) that the "txn" claim could contain an ordered value (e.g., a counter) that the
issuer includes. issuer includes.
4.4. Timing Issues 4.4. Timing Issues
When SETs are delivered asynchronously and/or out-of-band with When SETs are delivered asynchronously and/or out-of-band with
respect to the original action that incurred the security event, it respect to the original action that incurred the security event, it
is important to consider that a SET might be delivered to an Event is important to consider that a SET might be delivered to a SET
Recipient in advance of or behind the process that caused the event. recipient in advance of or behind the process that caused the event.
For example, a user having been required to log out and then log back For example, a user having been required to log out and then log back
in again, may cause a logout SET to be issued that may arrive at the in again, may cause a logout SET to be issued that may arrive at the
same time as the user agent accesses a web site having just logged same time as the user agent accesses a web site having just logged
in. If timing is not handled properly, the effect would be to in. If timing is not handled properly, the effect would be to
erroneously treat the new user session as logged out. Profiling erroneously treat the new user session as logged out. Profiling
Specifications SHOULD be careful to anticipate timing and subject specifications SHOULD be careful to anticipate timing and subject
selection information. For example, it might be more appropriate to selection information. For example, it might be more appropriate to
cancel a "session" rather than a "user". Alternatively, the cancel a "session" rather than a "user". Alternatively, the
specification could use timestamps that allow new sessions to be specification could use timestamps that allow new sessions to be
started immediately after a stated logout event time. started immediately after a stated logout event time.
4.5. Distinguishing SETs from ID Tokens 4.5. Distinguishing SETs from ID Tokens
Because [RFC7519] states that "all claims that are not understood by Because [RFC7519] states that "all claims that are not understood by
implementations MUST be ignored", there is a consideration that a SET implementations MUST be ignored", there is a consideration that a SET
might be confused with ID Token [OpenID.Core] if a SET is mistakenly might be confused with ID Token [OpenID.Core] if a SET is mistakenly
or intentionally used in a context requiring an ID Token. If a SET or maliciously used in a context requiring an ID Token. If a SET
could otherwise be interpreted as a valid ID Token (because it could otherwise be interpreted as a valid ID Token (because it
includes the required claims for an ID Token and valid issuer and includes the required claims for an ID Token and valid issuer and
audience claim values for an ID Token) then that SET profile MUST audience claim values for an ID Token) then that SET profile MUST
require that the "exp" claim not be present in the SET. Because require that the "exp" claim not be present in the SET. Because
"exp" is a required claim in ID Tokens, valid ID Token "exp" is a required claim in ID Tokens, valid ID Token
implementations will reject such a SET if presented as if it were an implementations will reject such a SET if presented as if it were an
ID Token. ID Token.
Excluding "exp" from SETs that could otherwise be confused with ID Excluding "exp" from SETs that could otherwise be confused with ID
Tokens is actually defense in depth. In any OpenID Connect contexts Tokens is actually defense in depth. In any OpenID Connect contexts
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ensuring that a SET cannot be confused with such an access token is ensuring that a SET cannot be confused with such an access token is
therefore likewise, in general, implementation specific. therefore likewise, in general, implementation specific.
Nonetheless, it is recommended that SET profiles employ the following Nonetheless, it is recommended that SET profiles employ the following
strategies to prevent possible substitutions of SETs for access strategies to prevent possible substitutions of SETs for access
tokens in contexts in which that might be possible: tokens in contexts in which that might be possible:
o Prohibit use of the "exp" claim, as is done to prevent ID Token o Prohibit use of the "exp" claim, as is done to prevent ID Token
confusion. confusion.
o Where possible, use a separate "aud" claim value to distinguish o Where possible, use a separate "aud" claim value to distinguish
between the Event Recipient and the protected resource that is the between the SET recipient and the protected resource that is the
audience of an access token. audience of an access token.
o Modify access token validation systems to check for the presence o Modify access token validation systems to check for the presence
of the "events" claim as a means to detect security event tokens. of the "events" claim as a means to detect security event tokens.
This is particularly useful if the same endpoint may receive both This is particularly useful if the same endpoint may receive both
types of tokens. types of tokens.
o Employ explicit typing, as described in Section 2.3, and modify o Employ explicit typing, as described in Section 2.3, and modify
access token validation systems to use the "typ" header parameter access token validation systems to use the "typ" header parameter
value. value.
skipping to change at page 17, line 48 skipping to change at page 18, line 48
topic is being explored in a more general fashion in JSON Web Token topic is being explored in a more general fashion in JSON Web Token
Best Current Practices [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp]. The proposed best Best Current Practices [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp]. The proposed best
practices in that draft may also be applicable for particular SET practices in that draft may also be applicable for particular SET
profiles and use cases. profiles and use cases.
5. Privacy Considerations 5. Privacy Considerations
If a SET needs to be retained for audit purposes, the signature can If a SET needs to be retained for audit purposes, the signature can
be used to provide verification of its authenticity. be used to provide verification of its authenticity.
Event Issuers SHOULD attempt to specialize SETs so that their content SET issuers SHOULD attempt to specialize SETs so that their content
is targeted to the specific business and protocol needs of the is targeted to the specific business and protocol needs of the
intended Event Recipients. intended SET recipients.
When sharing personally identifiable information or information that When sharing personally identifiable information or information that
is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, Event Issuers is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET issuers
and Recipients MUST have the appropriate legal agreements and user and recipients MUST have the appropriate legal agreements and user
consent and/or terms of service in place. consent and/or terms of service in place.
The propagation of subject identifiers can be perceived as personally The propagation of subject identifiers can be perceived as personally
identifiable information. Where possible, Event Issuers and identifiable information. Where possible, SET issuers and recipients
Recipients SHOULD devise approaches that prevent propagation -- for SHOULD devise approaches that prevent propagation -- for example, the
example, the passing of a hash value that requires the Event passing of a hash value that requires the SET recipient to know the
Recipient to know the subject. subject.
In some cases, it may be possible for an Event Recipient to correlate In some cases, it may be possible for a SET recipient to correlate
different events and thereby gain information about a subject that different events and thereby gain information about a subject that
the Event Issuer did not intend to share. For example, an Event the SET issuer did not intend to share. For example, a SET recipient
Recipient might be able to use "iat" values or highly precise "toe" might be able to use "iat" values or highly precise "toe" values to
values to determine that two otherwise un-relatable events actually determine that two otherwise un-relatable events actually relate to
relate to the same real-world event. The union of information from the same real-world event. The union of information from both events
both events could allow an Event Recipient to de-anonymize data or could allow a SET recipient to de-anonymize data or recognize that
recognize that unrelated identifiers relate to the same individual. unrelated identifiers relate to the same individual. SET issuers
Event Issuers SHOULD take steps to minimize the chance of event SHOULD take steps to minimize the chance of event correlation, when
correlation, when such correlation would constitute a privacy such correlation would constitute a privacy violation. For instance,
violation. For instance, they could use approximate values for the they could use approximate values for the "toe" claim or arbitrarily
"toe" claim or arbitrarily delay SET issuance, where such delay can delay SET issuance, where such delay can be tolerated.
be tolerated.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
6.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration 6.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration
This specification registers the "events", "toe", and "txn" claims in This specification registers the "events", "toe", and "txn" claims in
the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims] the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims]
established by [RFC7519]. established by [RFC7519].
6.1.1. Registry Contents 6.1.1. Registry Contents
o Claim Name: "events" o Claim Name: "events"
o Claim Description: Security Event URI o Claim Description: Security Events
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]]
o Claim Name: "toe" o Claim Name: "toe"
o Claim Description: Time of Event o Claim Description: Time of Event
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]]
o Claim Name: "txn" o Claim Name: "txn"
o Claim Description: Transaction Identifier o Claim Description: Transaction Identifier
skipping to change at page 20, line 45 skipping to change at page 21, line 41
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>. 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[RFC7617] Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme",
RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp] [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp]
Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best
Current Practices", draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-00 (work in Current Practices", draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-00 (work in
progress), July 2017. progress), July 2017.
skipping to change at page 22, line 14 skipping to change at page 23, line 9
[RFC8055] Holmberg, C. and Y. Jiang, "Session Initiation Protocol [RFC8055] Holmberg, C. and Y. Jiang, "Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP) Via Header Field Parameter to Indicate Received (SIP) Via Header Field Parameter to Indicate Received
Realm", RFC 8055, DOI 10.17487/RFC8055, January 2017, Realm", RFC 8055, DOI 10.17487/RFC8055, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8055>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8055>.
[RISC] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Risk and Incident Sharing and [RISC] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Risk and Incident Sharing and
Coordination (RISC) Working Group", Coordination (RISC) Working Group",
<http://openid.net/wg/risc/>. <http://openid.net/wg/risc/>.
[saml-core-2.0]
Internet2, "Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", March
2005.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments Appendix A. Acknowledgments
The editors would like to thank the members of the IETF SCIM working The editors would like to thank the members of the IETF SCIM working
group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with
draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 in 2015. draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 in 2015.
The editors would like to thank the participants in the IETF id-event The editors would like to thank the participants in the IETF id-event
mailing list, the Security Events working group, and related working mailing list, the Security Events working group, and related working
groups for their contributions to this specification. groups for their contributions to this specification.
skipping to change at page 26, line 13 skipping to change at page 27, line 5
o Added privacy considerations text suggested by Annabelle Backman. o Added privacy considerations text suggested by Annabelle Backman.
o Updated the RISC event example, courtesy of Marius Scurtescu. o Updated the RISC event example, courtesy of Marius Scurtescu.
o Reordered the claim definitions to place the required claims o Reordered the claim definitions to place the required claims
first. first.
o Changed to using the RFC 8174 boilerplate instead of the RFC 2119 o Changed to using the RFC 8174 boilerplate instead of the RFC 2119
boilerplate. boilerplate.
Draft 06 - mbj - Changes were as follows:
o Changed "when the event was issued" to "when the SET was issued"
in the "iat" description, as suggested by Annabelle Backman.
o Applied editorial improvements that improve the consistency of the
specification that were suggested by Annabelle Backman, Marius
Scurtescu, and Yaron Sheffer.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Phil Hunt (editor) Phil Hunt (editor)
Oracle Corporation Oracle Corporation
Email: phil.hunt@yahoo.com Email: phil.hunt@yahoo.com
Michael B. Jones Michael B. Jones
Microsoft Microsoft
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