draft-ietf-secevent-token-08.txt   draft-ietf-secevent-token-09.txt 
Security Events Working Group P. Hunt, Ed. Security Events Working Group P. Hunt, Ed.
Internet-Draft Oracle Internet-Draft Oracle
Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones
Expires: October 6, 2018 Microsoft Expires: October 19, 2018 Microsoft
W. Denniss W. Denniss
Google Google
M. Ansari M. Ansari
Cisco Cisco
April 4, 2018 April 17, 2018
Security Event Token (SET) Security Event Token (SET)
draft-ietf-secevent-token-08 draft-ietf-secevent-token-09
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines the Security Event Token (SET) data This specification defines the Security Event Token (SET) data
structure. A SET describes a statement of fact from the perspective structure. A SET describes statements of fact from the perspective
of an issuer about the state of a security subject, which is intended of an issuer about a subject. These statements of fact represent an
to be shared with one or more recipients. This statement of fact event that occurred directly to or about a security subject, for
represents an event that occurred to the security subject. This example, a statement about the issuance or revocation of a token on
specification is intended to enable representing security- and behalf of a subject. This specification is intended to enable
identity-related events. A SET is a JSON Web Token (JWT), which can representing security- and identity-related events. A SET is a JSON
be optionally signed and/or encrypted. SETs can be distributed via Web Token (JWT), which can be optionally signed and/or encrypted.
protocols such as HTTP. SETs can be distributed via protocols such as HTTP.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 6, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 19, 2018.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. The Security Event Token (SET) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. The Security Event Token (SET) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Illustrative Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1. Illustrative Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.1. SCIM Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1.1. SCIM Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.2. Logout Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.1.2. Logout Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.3. Consent Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.1.3. Consent Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.4. RISC Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.1.4. RISC Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2. Core SET Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.2. Core SET Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3. Explicit Typing of SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.3. Explicit Typing of SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4. Security Event Token Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.4. Security Event Token Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3. Requirements for SET Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3. Requirements for SET Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4. Preventing Confusion between SETs and other JWTs . . . . . . 15
4.1. Confidentiality and Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.1. Distinguishing SETs from ID Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2. Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.2. Distinguishing SETs from Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3. Sequencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.3. Distinguishing SETs from other kinds of JWTs . . . . . . 17
4.4. Timing Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.5. Distinguishing SETs from ID Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5.1. Confidentiality and Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.6. Distinguishing SETs from Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . 17 5.2. Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.7. Distinguishing SETs from other kinds of JWTs . . . . . . 18 5.3. Sequencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5.4. Timing Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 5.5. Preventing Confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 19 6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.2. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7.2. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1. Introduction and Overview 1. Introduction and Overview
This specification defines an extensible Security Event Token (SET) This specification defines an extensible Security Event Token (SET)
data structure, which can be exchanged using protocols such as HTTP. data structure, which can be exchanged using protocols such as HTTP.
The specification builds on the JSON Web Token (JWT) format [RFC7519] The specification builds on the JSON Web Token (JWT) format [RFC7519]
in order to provide a self-contained token that can be optionally in order to provide a self-contained token that can be optionally
signed using JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] and/or encrypted signed using JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] and/or encrypted
using JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [RFC7516]. using JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [RFC7516].
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Security Event Tokens (SETs). This specification defines a base Security Event Tokens (SETs). This specification defines a base
format used by profiling specifications to define actual events and format used by profiling specifications to define actual events and
their meanings. This specification uses non-normative example events their meanings. This specification uses non-normative example events
to demonstrate how events can be constructed. to demonstrate how events can be constructed.
This specification is scoped to security- and identity-related This specification is scoped to security- and identity-related
events. While Security Event Tokens may be used for other purposes, events. While Security Event Tokens may be used for other purposes,
the specification only considers security and privacy concerns the specification only considers security and privacy concerns
relevant to identity and personal information. relevant to identity and personal information.
Security events are not commands issued between parties. A security Security events are not commands issued between parties. A SET
event is a statement of fact from the perspective of an issuer about describes statements of fact from the perspective of an issuer about
the state of a security subject (e.g., a web resource, token, IP a subject (e.g., a web resource, token, IP address, the issuer
address, the issuer itself) that the issuer controls or is aware of, itself). These statements of fact represent a logical event that
that has changed in some way (explicitly or implicitly). A security occurred directly to or about a security subject, for example, a
subject may be permanent (e.g., a user account) or temporary (e.g., statement about the issuance or revocation of a token on behalf of a
an HTTP session) in nature. A state change could describe a direct subject. A security subject may be permanent (e.g., a user account)
change of entity state, an implicit change of state, or other higher- or temporary (e.g., an HTTP session) in nature. A state change could
level security statements such as: describe a direct change of entity state, an implicit change of
state, or other higher-level security statements such as:
o The creation, modification, removal of a resource. o The creation, modification, removal of a resource.
o The resetting or suspension of an account. o The resetting or suspension of an account.
o The revocation of a security token prior to its expiry. o The revocation of a security token prior to its expiry.
o The logout of a user session. Or, o The logout of a user session. Or,
o An indication that a user has been given control of an email o An indication that a user has been given control of an email
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Throughout this document, all figures MAY contain spaces and extra Throughout this document, all figures MAY contain spaces and extra
line-wrapping for readability and space limitations. Similarly, some line-wrapping for readability and space limitations. Similarly, some
URIs contained within examples have been shortened for space and URIs contained within examples have been shortened for space and
readability reasons. readability reasons.
1.2. Definitions 1.2. Definitions
The following definitions are used with SETs: The following definitions are used with SETs:
Security Event Token (SET) Security Event Token (SET)
A SET is a JWT [RFC7519] conforming to this specification that is A SET is a JWT [RFC7519] conforming to this specification.
distributed to one or more SET recipients.
SET Issuer SET Issuer
A service provider that creates SETs to be sent to other service A service provider that creates SETs to be sent to other service
providers known as SET recipients. providers known as SET recipients.
SET Recipient SET Recipient
A SET recipient is an entity that receives SETs through some A SET recipient is an entity that receives SETs through some
distribution method. A SET recipient is the same entity referred distribution method. A SET recipient is the same entity referred
as a "recipient" in [RFC7519] or "receiver" in related as a "recipient" in [RFC7519] or "receiver" in related
specifications. specifications.
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subject. A subject might, for instance, be a principal (e.g., subject. A subject might, for instance, be a principal (e.g.,
Section 4.1.2 of [RFC7519]), a web resource, an entity such as an Section 4.1.2 of [RFC7519]), a web resource, an entity such as an
IP address, or the issuer of the SET. IP address, or the issuer of the SET.
Event Identifier Event Identifier
A member name for an element of the JSON object that is the value A member name for an element of the JSON object that is the value
of the "events" claim in a SET. This member name MUST be a URI. of the "events" claim in a SET. This member name MUST be a URI.
Event Payload Event Payload
A member value for an element of the JSON object that is the value A member value for an element of the JSON object that is the value
of the "events" claim in a SET. This member value MUST be JSON of the "events" claim in a SET. This member value MUST be a JSON
object. object.
Profiling Specification Profiling Specification
A specification that profiles the SET data structure to define one A specification that profiles the SET data structure to define one
or more specific event types and their associated claims and or more specific event types and their associated claims and
processing rules. processing rules.
2. The Security Event Token (SET) 2. The Security Event Token (SET)
A SET is a JWT [RFC7519] data structure that represents one or more A SET is a JWT [RFC7519] data structure that represents one or more
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* Specific-purpose event URIs used between particular SET issuers * Specific-purpose event URIs used between particular SET issuers
and SET recipients. and SET recipients.
2.1. Illustrative Examples 2.1. Illustrative Examples
This section illustrates several possible uses of SETs through non- This section illustrates several possible uses of SETs through non-
normative examples. normative examples.
2.1.1. SCIM Example 2.1.1. SCIM Example
The following example shows the JWT Claims Set for a hypothetical The following example shows the JWT Claims Set for a hypothetical
SCIM [RFC7644] password reset SET. This example uses a second SCIM [RFC7644] password reset SET. Such a SET might be used by a
"events" value ("https://example.com/scim/event/passwordResetExt") to receiver as a trigger to reset active user-agent sessions related to
convey additional information about the state change -- in this case, the identified user.
the current count of reset attempts:
{ {
"iss": "https://scim.example.com", "iss": "https://scim.example.com",
"iat": 1458496025, "iat": 1458496025,
"jti": "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30", "jti": "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30",
"aud": [ "aud": [
"https://jhub.example.com/Feeds/98d52461fa5bbc879593b7754", "https://jhub.example.com/Feeds/98d52461fa5bbc879593b7754",
"https://jhub.example.com/Feeds/5d7604516b1d08641d7676ee7" "https://jhub.example.com/Feeds/5d7604516b1d08641d7676ee7"
], ],
"sub": "https://scim.example.com/Users/44f6142df96bd6ab61e7521d9", "sub": "https://scim.example.com/Users/44f6142df96bd6ab61e7521d9",
"events": { "events": {
"urn:ietf:params:scim:event:passwordReset": "urn:ietf:params:scim:event:passwordReset":
{ "id": "44f6142df96bd6ab61e7521d9"}, { "id": "44f6142df96bd6ab61e7521d9"},
"https://example.com/scim/event/passwordResetExt": "https://example.com/scim/event/passwordResetExt":
{ "resetAttempts": 5} { "resetAttempts": 5}
} }
} }
Figure 1: Example SCIM Password Reset Event Figure 1: Example SCIM Password Reset Event
The JWT Claims Set consists of: The JWT Claims Set usage consists of:
o The "events" claim specifying the hypothetical SCIM URN o The "events" claim specifying the hypothetical SCIM URN
("urn:ietf:params:scim:event:passwordReset") for a password reset, ("urn:ietf:params:scim:event:passwordReset") for a password reset,
and a second value, "https://example.com/scim/event/ and a second value, "https://example.com/scim/event/
passwordResetExt", that is used to provide additional event passwordResetExt", that is used to provide additional event
information such as the current count of resets. information such as the current count of resets.
o The "iss" claim, denoting the SET issuer. o The "iss" claim, denoting the SET issuer.
o The "sub" claim, specifying the SCIM resource URI that was o The "sub" claim, specifying the SCIM resource URI that was
affected. affected.
o The "aud" claim, specifying the intended audiences for the event. o The "aud" claim, specifying the intended audiences for the event.
(The syntax of the "aud" claim is defined in Section 4.1.3 of (The syntax of the "aud" claim is defined in Section 4.1.3 of
[RFC7519].) [RFC7519].)
The SET contains two event payloads:
o The "id" claim represents SCIM's unique identifier for a subject.
o The second payload identified by "https://example.com/scim/event/
passwordResetExt") and the payload claim "resetAttempts" conveys
the current count of reset attempts. In this example, while the
count is a simple factual statement for the issuer, the meaning of
the value (a count) is up to the receiver. As an example, such a
value might be used by the receiver to infer increasing risk.
In this example, the SCIM event indicates that a password has been In this example, the SCIM event indicates that a password has been
updated and the current password reset count is 5. Notice that the updated and the current password reset count is 5. Notice that the
value for "resetAttempts" is in the event payload of an event used to value for "resetAttempts" is in the event payload of an event used to
convey this information. convey this information.
2.1.2. Logout Example 2.1.2. Logout Example
Here is another example JWT Claims Set for a security event token, Here is another example JWT Claims Set for a security event token,
this one for a Logout Token: this one for a Logout Token:
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"jti": "bWJq", "jti": "bWJq",
"sid": "08a5019c-17e1-4977-8f42-65a12843ea02", "sid": "08a5019c-17e1-4977-8f42-65a12843ea02",
"events": { "events": {
"http://schemas.openid.net/event/backchannel-logout": {} "http://schemas.openid.net/event/backchannel-logout": {}
} }
} }
Figure 2: Example OpenID Back-Channel Logout Event Figure 2: Example OpenID Back-Channel Logout Event
Note that the above SET has an empty JSON object and uses the JWT Note that the above SET has an empty JSON object and uses the JWT
registered claims "sub" and "sid" to identify the subject that was claims "sub" and "sid" to identify the subject that was logged out.
logged out. At the time of this writing, this example corresponds to the logout
token defined in the OpenID Connect Back-Channel Logout 1.0
[OpenID.BackChannel] specification.
2.1.3. Consent Example 2.1.3. Consent Example
In the following example JWT Claims Set, a fictional medical service In the following example JWT Claims Set, a fictional medical service
collects consent for medical actions and notifies other parties. The collects consent for medical actions and notifies other parties. The
individual for whom consent is identified was originally individual for whom consent is identified was originally
authenticated via OpenID Connect. In this case, the issuer of the authenticated via OpenID Connect. In this case, the issuer of the
security event is an application rather than the OpenID provider: security event is an application rather than the OpenID provider:
{ {
"iss": "https://my.med.example.org", "iss": "https://my.med.example.org",
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that they are for SETs conforming to that profile. This claim is that they are for SETs conforming to that profile. This claim is
REQUIRED. REQUIRED.
"iat" (Issued At) Claim "iat" (Issued At) Claim
As defined by Section 4.1.6 of [RFC7519], this claim contains a As defined by Section 4.1.6 of [RFC7519], this claim contains a
value representing when the SET was issued. This claim is value representing when the SET was issued. This claim is
REQUIRED. REQUIRED.
"jti" (JWT ID) Claim "jti" (JWT ID) Claim
As defined by Section 4.1.7 of [RFC7519], this claim contains a As defined by Section 4.1.7 of [RFC7519], this claim contains a
unique identifier for the SET. The identifier SHOULD be unique unique identifier for the SET. The identifier MUST be unique
within a particular event feed and MAY be used by clients to track within a particular event feed and MAY be used by clients to track
whether a particular SET has already been received. This claim is whether a particular SET has already been received. This claim is
REQUIRED. REQUIRED.
"aud" (Audience) Claim "aud" (Audience) Claim
As defined by Section 4.1.3 of [RFC7519], this claim contains one As defined by Section 4.1.3 of [RFC7519], this claim contains one
or more audience identifiers for the SET. This claim is or more audience identifiers for the SET. This claim is
RECOMMENDED. RECOMMENDED.
"sub" (Subject) Claim "sub" (Subject) Claim
As defined by Section 4.1.2 of [RFC7519], this claim contains a As defined by Section 4.1.2 of [RFC7519], this claim contains a
StringOrURI value representing the principal that is the subject StringOrURI value representing the principal that is the subject
of the SET. This is usually the entity whose "state" was changed. of the SET. This is usually the entity whose "state" was changed.
For example, an IP Address was added to a black list. A URI For example:
representing a user resource that was modified. A token
identifier for a revoked token. If used, the profiling * an IP Address was added to a black list;
specification SHOULD define the content and format semantics for
the value. This claim is OPTIONAL, as the principal for any given * a URI representing a user resource that was modified; or,
profile may already be identified without the inclusion of a
subject claim. Note that some SET profiles MAY choose to convey * a token identifier (e.g. "jti") for a revoked token.
event subject information in the event payload (either using the
"sub" member name or another name), particularly if the subject If used, the profiling specification SHOULD define the content and
information is relative to issuer information that is also format semantics for the value. This claim is OPTIONAL, as the
conveyed in the event payload, which may be the case for some principal for any given profile may already be identified without
identity SET profiles. the inclusion of a subject claim. Note that some SET profiles MAY
choose to convey event subject information in the event payload
(either using the "sub" member name or another name), particularly
if the subject information is relative to issuer information that
is also conveyed in the event payload, which may be the case for
some identity SET profiles.
"exp" (Expiration Time) Claim "exp" (Expiration Time) Claim
As defined by Section 4.1.4 of [RFC7519], this claim is the time As defined by Section 4.1.4 of [RFC7519], this claim is the time
after which the JWT MUST NOT be accepted for processing. In the after which the JWT MUST NOT be accepted for processing. In the
context of a SET however, this notion does not typically apply, context of a SET however, this notion does not typically apply,
since a SET represents something that has already occurred and is since a SET represents something that has already occurred and is
historical in nature. Therefore, its use is NOT RECOMMENDED. historical in nature. Therefore, its use is NOT RECOMMENDED.
(Also, see Section 4.5 for additional reasons not to use the "exp" (Also, see Section 4.1 for additional reasons not to use the "exp"
claim in some SET use cases.) claim in some SET use cases.)
The following new claims are defined by this specification: The following new claims are defined by this specification:
"events" (Security Events) Claim "events" (Security Events) Claim
This claim contains a set of event statements that each provide This claim contains a set of event statements that each provide
information describing a single logical event that has occurred information describing a single logical event that has occurred
about a security subject (e.g., a state change to the subject). about a security subject (e.g., a state change to the subject).
Multiple event identifiers with the same value MUST NOT be used. Multiple event identifiers with the same value MUST NOT be used.
The "events" claim SHOULD NOT be used to express multiple The "events" claim MUST NOT be used to express multiple
independent logical events. independent logical events.
The value of the "events" claim is a JSON object whose members are The value of the "events" claim is a JSON object whose members are
name/value pairs whose names are URIs identifying the event name/value pairs whose names are URIs identifying the event
statements being expressed. Event identifiers SHOULD be stable statements being expressed. Event identifiers SHOULD be stable
values (e.g., a permanent URL for an event specification). For values (e.g., a permanent URL for an event specification). For
each name present, the corresponding value MUST be a JSON object. each name present, the corresponding value MUST be a JSON object.
The JSON object MAY be an empty object ("{}"), or it MAY be a JSON The JSON object MAY be an empty object ("{}"), or it MAY be a JSON
object containing data described by the profiling specification. object containing data described by the profiling specification.
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identifier. In cases in which multiple related JWTs are issued, identifier. In cases in which multiple related JWTs are issued,
the transaction identifier claim can be used to correlate these the transaction identifier claim can be used to correlate these
related JWTs. Note that this claim can be used in JWTs that are related JWTs. Note that this claim can be used in JWTs that are
SETs and also in JWTs using non-SET profiles. SETs and also in JWTs using non-SET profiles.
"toe" (Time of Event) Claim "toe" (Time of Event) Claim
A value that represents the date and time at which the event A value that represents the date and time at which the event
occurred. This value is a NumericDate (see Section 2 of occurred. This value is a NumericDate (see Section 2 of
[RFC7519]). By omitting this claim, the issuer indicates that [RFC7519]). By omitting this claim, the issuer indicates that
they are not sharing an event time with the recipient. (Note that they are not sharing an event time with the recipient. (Note that
in some use cases, the represented time might be approximate.) in some use cases, the represented time might be approximate;
This claim is OPTIONAL. statements about the accuracy of this field MAY be made by
profiling specifications.) This claim is OPTIONAL.
2.3. Explicit Typing of SETs 2.3. Explicit Typing of SETs
This specification registers the "application/secevent+jwt" media This specification registers the "application/secevent+jwt" media
type, which can be used to indicate that the content is a SET. SETs type, which can be used to indicate that the content is a SET. SETs
MAY include this media type in the "typ" header parameter of the JWT MAY include this media type in the "typ" header parameter of the JWT
representing the SET to explicitly declare that the JWT is a SET. representing the SET to explicitly declare that the JWT is a SET.
This MUST be included if the SET could be used in an application This MUST be included if the SET could be used in an application
context in which it could be confused with other kinds of JWTs. context in which it could be confused with other kinds of JWTs.
skipping to change at page 14, line 21 skipping to change at page 14, line 32
NzU0IiwiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL0ZlZWRzLzVkNzYwNDUxNmIxZDA4 NzU0IiwiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL0ZlZWRzLzVkNzYwNDUxNmIxZDA4
NjQxZDc2NzZlZTciXSwiZXZlbnRzIjp7InVybjppZXRmOnBhcmFtczpzY2ltOmV2ZW50 NjQxZDc2NzZlZTciXSwiZXZlbnRzIjp7InVybjppZXRmOnBhcmFtczpzY2ltOmV2ZW50
OmNyZWF0ZSI6eyJyZWYiOiJodHRwczovL3NjaW0uZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vVXNlcnMvNDRm OmNyZWF0ZSI6eyJyZWYiOiJodHRwczovL3NjaW0uZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vVXNlcnMvNDRm
NjE0MmRmOTZiZDZhYjYxZTc1MjFkOSIsImF0dHJpYnV0ZXMiOlsiaWQiLCJuYW1lIiwi NjE0MmRmOTZiZDZhYjYxZTc1MjFkOSIsImF0dHJpYnV0ZXMiOlsiaWQiLCJuYW1lIiwi
dXNlck5hbWUiLCJwYXNzd29yZCIsImVtYWlscyJdfX19. dXNlck5hbWUiLCJwYXNzd29yZCIsImVtYWlscyJdfX19.
Figure 6: Example Unsecured Security Event Token Figure 6: Example Unsecured Security Event Token
For the purpose of having a simpler example in Figure 6, an unsecured For the purpose of having a simpler example in Figure 6, an unsecured
token is shown. When SETs are not signed or encrypted, other token is shown. When SETs are not signed or encrypted, other
mechanisms such as TLS MUST be employed to provide integrity, mechanisms such as TLS MUST be employed to provide integrity
confidentiality, and issuer authenticity, as needed by the protection, confidentiality, and issuer authenticity, as needed by
application. the application.
When validation (i.e., auditing), or additional transmission security When validation (i.e., auditing), or additional transmission security
is required, JWS signing and/or JWE encryption MAY be used. To is required, JWS signing and/or JWE encryption MAY be used. To
create and or validate a signed and/or encrypted SET, follow the create and or validate a signed and/or encrypted SET, follow the
instructions in Section 7 of [RFC7519]. instructions in Section 7 of [RFC7519].
3. Requirements for SET Profiles 3. Requirements for SET Profiles
Profiling specifications of this specification define actual SETs to Profiling specifications of this specification define actual SETs to
be used in particular use cases. These profiling specifications be used in particular use cases. These profiling specifications
skipping to change at page 15, line 25 skipping to change at page 15, line 36
thus enabling extensibility. Other profiles might allow multiple thus enabling extensibility. Other profiles might allow multiple
event identifiers to be present but require that all be understood if event identifiers to be present but require that all be understood if
the SET is to be accepted. Some profiles might require that only a the SET is to be accepted. Some profiles might require that only a
single value be present. All such choices are within the scope of single value be present. All such choices are within the scope of
profiling specifications to define. profiling specifications to define.
Profiling specifications MUST clearly specify the steps that a Profiling specifications MUST clearly specify the steps that a
recipient of a SET utilizing that profile MUST perform to validate recipient of a SET utilizing that profile MUST perform to validate
that the SET is both syntactically and semantically valid. that the SET is both syntactically and semantically valid.
4. Security Considerations 4. Preventing Confusion between SETs and other JWTs
4.1. Confidentiality and Integrity
SETs may contain sensitive information. Therefore, methods for
distribution of events SHOULD require the use of a transport-layer
security mechanism when distributing events. Parties MUST support
TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] or a higher version and MAY support additional
transport-layer mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When
using TLS, the client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate
check, per [RFC6125]. Implementation security considerations for TLS
can be found in "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS"
[RFC7525].
Security events distributed through third parties or that carry
personally identifiable information SHOULD be encrypted using JWE
[RFC7516] or secured for confidentiality by other means.
Unless integrity of the JWT is ensured by other means, it MUST be
signed using JWS [RFC7515] so that the SET can be authenticated and
validated by the SET recipient.
4.2. Delivery
This specification does not define a delivery mechanism for SETs. In
addition to confidentiality and integrity (discussed above),
implementers and profiling specifications MUST consider the
consequences of delivery mechanisms that are not secure and/or not
assured. For example, while a SET may be end-to-end secured using
JWE encrypted SETs, without TLS, there is no assurance that the
correct endpoint received the SET and that it could be successfully
processed.
4.3. Sequencing
This specification defines no means of ordering multiple SETs in a
sequence. Depending on the type and nature of the events represented
by SETs, order may or may not matter. For example, in provisioning,
event order is critical -- an object cannot be modified before it is
created. In other SET types, such as a token revocation, the order
of SETs for revoked tokens does not matter. If, however, the event
conveys a logged in or logged out status for a user subject, then
order becomes important.
Profiling specifications and implementers SHOULD take caution when
using timestamps such as "iat" to define order. Distributed systems
will have some amount of clock skew. Thus, time by itself will not
guarantee order.
Specifications profiling SET SHOULD define a mechanism for detecting
order or sequence of events when the order matters. For example, the
"txn" claim could contain an ordered value (e.g., a counter) that the
issuer includes.
4.4. Timing Issues
When SETs are delivered asynchronously and/or out-of-band with
respect to the original action that incurred the security event, it
is important to consider that a SET might be delivered to a SET
recipient in advance of or behind the process that caused the event.
For example, a user having been required to log out and then log back
in again, may cause a logout SET to be issued that may arrive at the
same time as the user agent accesses a web site having just logged
in. If timing is not handled properly, the effect would be to
erroneously treat the new user session as logged out. Profiling
specifications SHOULD be careful to anticipate timing and subject
selection information. For example, it might be more appropriate to
cancel a "session" rather than a "user". Alternatively, the
specification could use timestamps that allow new sessions to be
started immediately after a stated logout event time.
4.5. Distinguishing SETs from ID Tokens
Because [RFC7519] states that "all claims that are not understood by Because [RFC7519] states that "all claims that are not understood by
implementations MUST be ignored", there is a consideration that a SET implementations MUST be ignored", there is a consideration that a SET
might be confused with ID Token [OpenID.Core] if a SET is mistakenly might be confused with another kind of JWT from the same issuer.
or maliciously used in a context requiring an ID Token. If a SET Unless this confusion is prevented, this might enable an attacker who
could otherwise be interpreted as a valid ID Token (because it possesses a SET to use it in a context in which another kind of JWT
includes the required claims for an ID Token and valid issuer and is expected, or vice-versa. This section presents concrete
techniques for preventing confusion between SETs and several other
specific kinds of JWTs, as well as generic techniques for preventing
possible confusion between SETs and other kinds of JWTs.
4.1. Distinguishing SETs from ID Tokens
A SET might be confused with ID Token [OpenID.Core] if a SET is
mistakenly or maliciously used in a context requiring an ID Token.
If a SET could otherwise be interpreted as a valid ID Token (because
it includes the required claims for an ID Token and valid issuer and
audience claim values for an ID Token) then that SET profile MUST audience claim values for an ID Token) then that SET profile MUST
require that the "exp" claim not be present in the SET. Because require that the "exp" claim not be present in the SET. Because
"exp" is a required claim in ID Tokens, valid ID Token "exp" is a required claim in ID Tokens, valid ID Token
implementations will reject such a SET if presented as if it were an implementations will reject such a SET if presented as if it were an
ID Token. ID Token.
Excluding "exp" from SETs that could otherwise be confused with ID Excluding "exp" from SETs that could otherwise be confused with ID
Tokens is actually defense in depth. In any OpenID Connect contexts Tokens is actually defense in depth. In any OpenID Connect contexts
in which an attacker could attempt to substitute a SET for an ID in which an attacker could attempt to substitute a SET for an ID
Token, the SET would actually already be rejected as an ID Token Token, the SET would actually already be rejected as an ID Token
because it would not contain the correct "nonce" claim value for the because it would not contain the correct "nonce" claim value for the
ID Token to be accepted in contexts for which substitution is ID Token to be accepted in contexts for which substitution is
possible. possible.
Note that the use of explicit typing, as described in Section 2.3, Note that the use of explicit typing, as described in Section 2.3,
will not achieve disambiguation between ID Tokens and SETs, as the ID will not achieve disambiguation between ID Tokens and SETs, as the ID
Token validation rules do not use the "typ" header parameter value. Token validation rules do not use the "typ" header parameter value.
4.6. Distinguishing SETs from Access Tokens 4.2. Distinguishing SETs from Access Tokens
OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] defines access tokens as being opaque. OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] defines access tokens as being opaque.
Nonetheless, some implementations implement access tokens as JWTs. Nonetheless, some implementations implement access tokens as JWTs.
Because the structure of these JWTs is implementation-specific, Because the structure of these JWTs is implementation-specific,
ensuring that a SET cannot be confused with such an access token is ensuring that a SET cannot be confused with such an access token is
therefore likewise, in general, implementation specific. therefore likewise, in general, implementation specific.
Nonetheless, it is recommended that SET profiles employ the following Nonetheless, it is recommended that SET profiles employ the following
strategies to prevent possible substitutions of SETs for access strategies to prevent possible substitutions of SETs for access
tokens in contexts in which that might be possible: tokens in contexts in which that might be possible:
skipping to change at page 18, line 9 skipping to change at page 17, line 9
o Modify access token validation systems to check for the presence o Modify access token validation systems to check for the presence
of the "events" claim as a means to detect security event tokens. of the "events" claim as a means to detect security event tokens.
This is particularly useful if the same endpoint may receive both This is particularly useful if the same endpoint may receive both
types of tokens. types of tokens.
o Employ explicit typing, as described in Section 2.3, and modify o Employ explicit typing, as described in Section 2.3, and modify
access token validation systems to use the "typ" header parameter access token validation systems to use the "typ" header parameter
value. value.
4.7. Distinguishing SETs from other kinds of JWTs 4.3. Distinguishing SETs from other kinds of JWTs
JWTs are now being used in application areas beyond the identity JWTs are now being used in application areas beyond the identity
applications in which they first appeared. For instance, the Session applications in which they first appeared. For instance, the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP) Via Header Field [RFC8055] and Personal Initiation Protocol (SIP) Via Header Field [RFC8055] and Personal
Assertion Token (PASSporT) [I-D.ietf-stir-passport] specifications Assertion Token (PASSporT) [RFC8225] specifications both define JWT
both define JWT profiles that use mostly or completely different sets profiles that use mostly or completely different sets of claims than
of claims than are used by ID Tokens. If it would otherwise be are used by ID Tokens. If it would otherwise be possible for an
possible for an attacker to substitute a SET for one of these (or attacker to substitute a SET for one of these (or other) kinds of
other) kinds of JWTs, then the SET profile must be defined in such a JWTs, then the SET profile must be defined in such a way that any
way that any substituted SET will result in its rejection when substituted SET will result in its rejection when validated as the
validated as the intended kind of JWT. intended kind of JWT.
The most direct way to prevent confusion is to employ explicit The most direct way to prevent confusion is to employ explicit
typing, as described in Section 2.3, and modify applicable token typing, as described in Section 2.3, and modify applicable token
validation systems to use the "typ" header parameter value. This validation systems to use the "typ" header parameter value. This
approach can be employed for new systems but may not be applicable to approach can be employed for new systems but may not be applicable to
existing systems. existing systems.
Another way to ensure that a SET is not confused with another kind of Another way to ensure that a SET is not confused with another kind of
JWT is to have the JWT validation logic reject JWTs containing an JWT is to have the JWT validation logic reject JWTs containing an
"events" claim unless the JWT is intended to be a SET. This approach "events" claim unless the JWT is intended to be a SET. This approach
can be employed for new systems but may not be applicable to existing can be employed for new systems but may not be applicable to existing
systems. systems.
For many use cases, the simplest way to prevent substitution is For many use cases, the simplest way to prevent substitution is
requiring that the SET not include claims that are required for the requiring that the SET not include claims that are required for the
kind of JWT that might be the target of an attack. For example, for kind of JWT that might be the target of an attack. For example, for
[RFC8055], the "sip_callid" claim could be omitted and for [RFC8055], the "sip_callid" claim could be omitted and for [RFC8225],
[I-D.ietf-stir-passport], the "orig" claim could be omitted. the "orig" claim could be omitted.
In many contexts, simple measures such as these will accomplish the In many contexts, simple measures such as these will accomplish the
task, should confusion otherwise even be possible. Note that this task, should confusion otherwise even be possible. Note that this
topic is being explored in a more general fashion in JSON Web Token topic is being explored in a more general fashion in JSON Web Token
Best Current Practices [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp]. The proposed best Best Current Practices [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp]. The proposed best
practices in that draft may also be applicable for particular SET practices in that draft may also be applicable for particular SET
profiles and use cases. profiles and use cases.
5. Privacy Considerations 5. Security Considerations
5.1. Confidentiality and Integrity
SETs may contain sensitive information. Therefore, methods for
distribution of events SHOULD require the use of a transport-layer
security mechanism when distributing events. Parties MUST support
TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] or a higher version and MAY support additional
transport-layer mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When
using TLS, the client MUST perform a TLS server certificate check,
per [RFC6125]. Implementation security considerations for TLS can be
found in "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525].
Security events distributed through third parties or that carry
personally identifiable information SHOULD be encrypted using JWE
[RFC7516] or secured for confidentiality by other means.
Unless integrity of the JWT is ensured by other means, it MUST be
signed using JWS [RFC7515] so that the SET can be authenticated and
validated by the SET recipient.
5.2. Delivery
This specification does not define a delivery mechanism for SETs. In
addition to confidentiality and integrity (discussed above),
implementers and profiling specifications MUST consider the
consequences of delivery mechanisms that are not secure and/or not
assured. For example, while a SET may be end-to-end secured using
JWE encrypted SETs, without (mutual) TLS, there is no assurance that
the correct endpoint received the SET and that it could be
successfully processed.
5.3. Sequencing
This specification defines no means of ordering multiple SETs in a
sequence. Depending on the type and nature of the events represented
by SETs, order may or may not matter. For example, in provisioning,
event order is critical -- an object cannot be modified before it is
created. In other SET types, such as a token revocation, the order
of SETs for revoked tokens does not matter. If, however, the event
conveys a logged in or logged out status for a user subject, then
order becomes important.
Profiling specifications and implementers SHOULD take caution when
using timestamps such as "iat" to define order. Distributed systems
will have some amount of clock skew. Thus, time by itself will not
guarantee order.
Specifications profiling SET SHOULD define a mechanism for detecting
order or sequence of events when the order matters. For example, the
"txn" claim could contain an ordered value (e.g., a counter) that the
issuer includes, although just as for timestamps, ensuring such
ordering can be difficult in distributed systems.
5.4. Timing Issues
When SETs are delivered asynchronously and/or out-of-band with
respect to the original action that incurred the security event, it
is important to consider that a SET might be delivered to a SET
recipient in advance of or behind the process that caused the event.
For example, a user having been required to log out and then log back
in again, may cause a token revoked SET to be issued, typically
causing the receiver to reset all active sessions at the receiver
that are related to that user. If revocation SET arrives at the same
time as the user agent re-logs in, timing could cause problems by
erroneously treating the new user session as logged out. Profiling
specifications SHOULD be careful to consider both SET expression and
timing issues. For example, it might be more appropriate to revoke a
specific session or identity token rather than a general logout
statement about a "user". Alternatively, profiling specifications
could use timestamps that allow new sessions to be started
immediately after a stated logout event time.
5.5. Preventing Confusion
Also, see Section 4 above for both additional security considerations
and normative text on preventing SETs from being confused with other
kinds of JWTs.
6. Privacy Considerations
If a SET needs to be retained for audit purposes, the signature can If a SET needs to be retained for audit purposes, the signature can
be used to provide verification of its authenticity. be used to provide verification of its authenticity.
SET issuers SHOULD attempt to specialize SETs so that their content SET issuers SHOULD attempt to specialize SETs so that their content
is targeted to the specific business and protocol needs of the is targeted to the specific business and protocol needs of the
intended SET recipients. intended SET recipients.
When sharing personally identifiable information or information that When sharing personally identifiable information or information that
is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET issuers is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET issuers
and recipients MUST have the appropriate legal agreements and user and recipients should have the appropriate legal agreements and user
consent and/or terms of service in place. consent and/or terms of service in place.
The propagation of subject identifiers can be perceived as personally The propagation of subject identifiers can be perceived as personally
identifiable information. Where possible, SET issuers and recipients identifiable information. Where possible, SET issuers and recipients
SHOULD devise approaches that prevent propagation -- for example, the SHOULD devise approaches that prevent propagation -- for example, the
passing of a hash value that requires the SET recipient to know the passing of a salted hash value that requires the SET recipient to
subject. know the subject.
In some cases, it may be possible for a SET recipient to correlate In some cases, it may be possible for a SET recipient to correlate
different events and thereby gain information about a subject that different events and thereby gain information about a subject that
the SET issuer did not intend to share. For example, a SET recipient the SET issuer did not intend to share. For example, a SET recipient
might be able to use "iat" values or highly precise "toe" values to might be able to use "iat" values or highly precise "toe" values to
determine that two otherwise un-relatable events actually relate to determine that two otherwise un-relatable events actually relate to
the same real-world event. The union of information from both events the same real-world event. The union of information from both events
could allow a SET recipient to de-anonymize data or recognize that could allow a SET recipient to de-anonymize data or recognize that
unrelated identifiers relate to the same individual. SET issuers unrelated identifiers relate to the same individual. SET issuers
SHOULD take steps to minimize the chance of event correlation, when SHOULD take steps to minimize the chance of event correlation, when
such correlation would constitute a privacy violation. For instance, such correlation would constitute a privacy violation. For instance,
they could use approximate values for the "toe" claim or arbitrarily they could use approximate values for the "toe" claim or arbitrarily
delay SET issuance, where such delay can be tolerated. delay SET issuance, where such delay can be tolerated.
6. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
6.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration 7.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration
This specification registers the "events", "toe", and "txn" claims in This specification registers the "events", "toe", and "txn" claims in
the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims] the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims]
established by [RFC7519]. established by [RFC7519].
6.1.1. Registry Contents 7.1.1. Registry Contents
o Claim Name: "events" o Claim Name: "events"
o Claim Description: Security Events o Claim Description: Security Events
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]]
o Claim Name: "toe" o Claim Name: "toe"
o Claim Description: Time of Event o Claim Description: Time of Event
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]]
skipping to change at page 20, line 4 skipping to change at page 20, line 37
o Claim Name: "events" o Claim Name: "events"
o Claim Description: Security Events o Claim Description: Security Events
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]]
o Claim Name: "toe" o Claim Name: "toe"
o Claim Description: Time of Event o Claim Description: Time of Event
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]]
o Claim Name: "txn" o Claim Name: "txn"
o Claim Description: Transaction Identifier o Claim Description: Transaction Identifier
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]]
6.2. Media Type Registration 7.2. Media Type Registration
6.2.1. Registry Contents 7.2.1. Registry Contents
This section registers the "application/secevent+jwt" media type This section registers the "application/secevent+jwt" media type
[RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the [RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the
manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the
content is a SET. content is a SET.
o Type name: application o Type name: application
o Subtype name: secevent+jwt o Subtype name: secevent+jwt
o Required parameters: n/a o Required parameters: n/a
o Optional parameters: n/a o Optional parameters: n/a
skipping to change at page 20, line 45 skipping to change at page 21, line 30
Macintosh file type code(s): n/a Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
o Person & email address to contact for further information: o Person & email address to contact for further information:
Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com
o Intended usage: COMMON o Intended usage: COMMON
o Restrictions on usage: none o Restrictions on usage: none
o Author: Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com o Author: Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com
o Change controller: IESG o Change controller: IESG
o Provisional registration? No o Provisional registration? No
7. References 8. References
7.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[IANA.JWT.Claims] [IANA.JWT.Claims]
IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims", IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>. <http://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.
[IANA.MediaTypes] [IANA.MediaTypes]
IANA, "Media Types", IANA, "Media Types",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>. <http://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
skipping to change at page 22, line 5 skipping to change at page 22, line 35
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>. 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
7.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp] [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp]
Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best
Current Practices", draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-00 (work in Current Practices", draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-01 (work in
progress), July 2017. progress), March 2018.
[I-D.ietf-stir-passport] [OpenID.BackChannel]
Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "Personal Assertion Token Jones, M. and J. Bradley, "OpenID Connect Back-Channel
(PASSporT)", draft-ietf-stir-passport-11 (work in Logout 1.0", January 2017, <http://openid.net/specs/
progress), February 2017. openid-connect-backchannel-1_0.html>.
[OpenID.Core] [OpenID.Core]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", November 2014, C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", November 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>. <http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail [RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046, Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996, DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.
skipping to change at page 23, line 10 skipping to change at page 23, line 41
[RFC7644] Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E., [RFC7644] Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E.,
and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain Identity and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain Identity
Management: Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644, Management: Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644,
September 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644>. September 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7644>.
[RFC8055] Holmberg, C. and Y. Jiang, "Session Initiation Protocol [RFC8055] Holmberg, C. and Y. Jiang, "Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP) Via Header Field Parameter to Indicate Received (SIP) Via Header Field Parameter to Indicate Received
Realm", RFC 8055, DOI 10.17487/RFC8055, January 2017, Realm", RFC 8055, DOI 10.17487/RFC8055, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8055>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8055>.
[RFC8225] Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "PASSporT: Personal Assertion
Token", RFC 8225, DOI 10.17487/RFC8225, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8225>.
[RISC] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Risk and Incident Sharing and [RISC] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Risk and Incident Sharing and
Coordination (RISC) Working Group", Coordination (RISC) Working Group",
<http://openid.net/wg/risc/>. <http://openid.net/wg/risc/>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments Appendix A. Acknowledgments
The editors would like to thank the members of the IETF SCIM working The editors would like to thank the members of the IETF SCIM working
group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with
draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 in 2015. The editors would like to thank draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 in 2015. The editors would like to thank
the participants in the IETF id-event mailing list, the Security the participants in the IETF id-event mailing list, the Security
skipping to change at page 27, line 32 skipping to change at page 28, line 24
Draft 07 - PH - Text refinement to Section 3 proposed by Annabelle Draft 07 - PH - Text refinement to Section 3 proposed by Annabelle
Backman post WGLC Backman post WGLC
Draft 08 - mbj - Changes were as follows: Draft 08 - mbj - Changes were as follows:
o Incorporated wording improvements resulting from Russ Housley's o Incorporated wording improvements resulting from Russ Housley's
SecDir comments. SecDir comments.
o Acknowledged individuals who made significant contributions. o Acknowledged individuals who made significant contributions.
Draft 09 - pjh/mbj - Changes addressing AD review comments by
Benjamin Kaduk
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Phil Hunt (editor) Phil Hunt (editor)
Oracle Corporation Oracle Corporation
Email: phil.hunt@yahoo.com Email: phil.hunt@yahoo.com
Michael B. Jones Michael B. Jones
Microsoft Microsoft
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