draft-ietf-secevent-token-13.txt   rfc8417.txt 
Security Events Working Group P. Hunt, Ed. Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) P. Hunt, Ed.
Internet-Draft Oracle Request for Comments: 8417 Oracle
Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones Category: Standards Track M. Jones
Expires: November 10, 2018 Microsoft ISSN: 2070-1721 Microsoft
W. Denniss W. Denniss
Google Google
M. Ansari M. Ansari
Cisco Cisco
May 9, 2018 July 2018
Security Event Token (SET) Security Event Token (SET)
draft-ietf-secevent-token-13
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines the Security Event Token (SET) data This specification defines the Security Event Token (SET) data
structure. A SET describes statements of fact from the perspective structure. A SET describes statements of fact from the perspective
of an issuer about a subject. These statements of fact represent an of an issuer about a subject. These statements of fact represent an
event that occurred directly to or about a security subject, for event that occurred directly to or about a security subject, for
example, a statement about the issuance or revocation of a token on example, a statement about the issuance or revocation of a token on
behalf of a subject. This specification is intended to enable behalf of a subject. This specification is intended to enable
representing security- and identity-related events. A SET is a JSON representing security- and identity-related events. A SET is a JSON
Web Token (JWT), which can be optionally signed and/or encrypted. Web Token (JWT), which can be optionally signed and/or encrypted.
SETs can be distributed via protocols such as HTTP. SETs can be distributed via protocols such as HTTP.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
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Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 10, 2018. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8417.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. The Security Event Token (SET) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. The Security Event Token (SET) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1. Illustrative Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1. Illustrative Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.1. SCIM Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1.1. SCIM Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.2. Logout Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.1.2. Logout Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.3. Consent Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.1.3. Consent Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.4. RISC Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.1.4. RISC Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2. Core SET Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.2. Core SET Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3. Explicit Typing of SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.3. Explicit Typing of SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4. Security Event Token Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.4. Security Event Token Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3. Requirements for SET Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3. Requirements for SET Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4. Preventing Confusion between SETs and other JWTs . . . . . . 16 4. Preventing Confusion between SETs and Other JWTs . . . . . . 17
4.1. Distinguishing SETs from ID Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.1. Distinguishing SETs from ID Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.2. Distinguishing SETs from Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . 16 4.2. Distinguishing SETs from Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . 18
4.3. Distinguishing SETs from other kinds of JWTs . . . . . . 17 4.3. Distinguishing SETs from Other Kinds of JWTs . . . . . . 18
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.1. Confidentiality and Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5.1. Confidentiality and Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.2. Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5.2. Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.3. Sequencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5.3. Sequencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.4. Timing Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 5.4. Timing Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.5. Preventing Confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 5.5. Preventing Confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.2. Structured Syntax Suffix Registration . . . . . . . . . . 21 7.2. Structured Syntax Suffix Registration . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 7.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.3. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 7.3. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.3.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 7.3.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1. Introduction and Overview 1. Introduction and Overview
This specification defines an extensible Security Event Token (SET) This specification defines an extensible Security Event Token (SET)
data structure, which can be exchanged using protocols such as HTTP. data structure, which can be exchanged using protocols such as HTTP.
The specification builds on the JSON Web Token (JWT) format [RFC7519] The specification builds on the JSON Web Token (JWT) format [RFC7519]
in order to provide a self-contained token that can be optionally in order to provide a self-contained token that can be optionally
signed using JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] and/or encrypted signed using JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] and/or encrypted
using JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [RFC7516]. using JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [RFC7516].
This specification profiles the use of JWT for the purpose of issuing This specification profiles the use of JWT for the purpose of issuing
Security Event Tokens (SETs). This specification defines a base SETs. This specification defines a base format used by profiling
format used by profiling specifications to define actual events and specifications to define actual events and their meanings. This
their meanings. This specification uses non-normative example events specification uses non-normative example events to demonstrate how
to demonstrate how events can be constructed. events can be constructed.
This specification is scoped to security- and identity-related This specification is scoped to security- and identity-related
events. While Security Event Tokens may be used for other purposes, events. While SETs may be used for other purposes, the specification
the specification only considers security and privacy concerns only considers security and privacy concerns relevant to identity and
relevant to identity and personal information. personal information.
Security events are not commands issued between parties. A SET Security events are not commands issued between parties. A SET
describes statements of fact from the perspective of an issuer about describes statements of fact from the perspective of an issuer about
a subject (e.g., a web resource, token, IP address, the issuer a subject (e.g., a web resource, token, IP address, the issuer
itself). These statements of fact represent a logical event that itself). These statements of fact represent a logical event that
occurred directly to or about a security subject, for example, a occurred directly to or about a security subject, for example, a
statement about the issuance or revocation of a token on behalf of a statement about the issuance or revocation of a token on behalf of a
subject. A security subject may be permanent (e.g., a user account) subject. A security subject may be permanent (e.g., a user account)
or temporary (e.g., an HTTP session) in nature. A state change could or temporary (e.g., an HTTP session) in nature. A state change could
describe a direct change of entity state, an implicit change of describe a direct change of entity state, an implicit change of
state, or other higher-level security statements such as: state, or other higher-level security statements such as:
o The creation, modification, removal of a resource. o The creation, modification, removal of a resource.
o The resetting or suspension of an account. o The resetting or suspension of an account.
o The revocation of a security token prior to its expiry. o The revocation of a security token prior to its expiry.
o The logout of a user session. Or, o The logout of a user session.
o An indication that a user has been given control of an email o An indication that a user has been given control of an email
identifier that was previously controlled by another user. identifier that was previously controlled by another user.
While subject state changes are often triggered by a user agent or While subject state changes are often triggered by a user agent or
security subsystem, the issuance and transmission of an event may security subsystem, the issuance and transmission of an event may
occur asynchronously and in a back channel to the action that caused occur asynchronously and in a back channel to the action that caused
the change that generated the security event. Subsequently, a SET the change that generated the security event. Subsequently, a SET
recipient, having received a SET, validates and interprets the recipient, having received a SET, validates and interprets the
received SET and takes its own independent actions, if any. For received SET and takes its own independent actions, if any. For
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While SET recipients will often take actions upon receiving SETs, While SET recipients will often take actions upon receiving SETs,
security events cannot be assumed to be commands or requests. The security events cannot be assumed to be commands or requests. The
intent of this specification is to define a syntax for statements of intent of this specification is to define a syntax for statements of
fact that SET recipients may interpret for their own purposes. fact that SET recipients may interpret for their own purposes.
1.1. Notational Conventions 1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
For purposes of readability, examples are not URL encoded. For purposes of readability, examples are not URL encoded.
Implementers MUST percent encode URLs as described in Section 2.1 of Implementers MUST percent-encode URLs as described in Section 2.1 of
[RFC3986]. [RFC3986].
Throughout this document, all figures may contain spaces and extra Throughout this document, all figures may contain spaces and extra
line-wrapping for readability and space limitations. Similarly, some line-wrapping for readability and space limitations. Similarly, some
URIs contained within examples have been shortened for space and URIs contained within examples have been shortened for space and
readability reasons. readability reasons.
1.2. Definitions 1.2. Definitions
The following definitions are used with SETs: The following definitions are used with SETs:
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o The top-level claims in the JWT Claims Set are called the SET o The top-level claims in the JWT Claims Set are called the SET
"envelope". Some of these claims are present in every SET; others "envelope". Some of these claims are present in every SET; others
will be specific to particular SET profiles or profile families. will be specific to particular SET profiles or profile families.
Claims in the envelope SHOULD be registered in the "JSON Web Token Claims in the envelope SHOULD be registered in the "JSON Web Token
Claims" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims] or be Public Claims or Private Claims" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims] or be Public Claims or Private
Claims, as defined in [RFC7519]. Claims, as defined in [RFC7519].
o Envelope claims that are profiled and defined in this o Envelope claims that are profiled and defined in this
specification are used to validate the SET and provide information specification are used to validate the SET and provide information
about the event data included in the SET. The claim "events" about the event data included in the SET. The "events" claim
contains the event identifiers and event-specific data expressed contains the event identifiers and event-specific data expressed
about the security subject. The envelope MAY include event- about the security subject. The envelope MAY include event-
specific or profile-specific data. The "events" claim value MUST specific or profile-specific data. The "events" claim value MUST
be a JSON object that contains at least one member. be a JSON object that contains at least one member.
o Each member of the "events" JSON object is a name/value pair. The o Each member of the "events" JSON object is a name/value pair. The
JSON member name is a URI string value, which is the event JSON member name is a URI string value, which is the event
identifier, and the corresponding value is a JSON object known as identifier, and the corresponding value is a JSON object known as
the event "payload". The payload JSON object contains claims that the event "payload". The payload JSON object contains claims that
pertain to that event identifier and need not be registered as JWT pertain to that event identifier and need not be registered as JWT
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and SET recipients. and SET recipients.
2.1. Illustrative Examples 2.1. Illustrative Examples
This section illustrates several possible uses of SETs through non- This section illustrates several possible uses of SETs through non-
normative examples. normative examples.
2.1.1. SCIM Example 2.1.1. SCIM Example
The following example shows the JWT Claims Set for a hypothetical The following example shows the JWT Claims Set for a hypothetical
SCIM [RFC7644] password reset SET. Such a SET might be used by a System for Cross-domain Identity Management (SCIM) [RFC7644] password
receiver as a trigger to reset active user-agent sessions related to reset SET. Such a SET might be used by a receiver as a trigger to
the identified user. reset active user-agent sessions related to the identified user.
{ {
"iss": "https://scim.example.com", "iss": "https://scim.example.com",
"iat": 1458496025, "iat": 1458496025,
"jti": "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30", "jti": "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30",
"aud": [ "aud": [
"https://jhub.example.com/Feeds/98d52461fa5bbc879593b7754", "https://jhub.example.com/Feeds/98d52461fa5bbc879593b7754",
"https://jhub.example.com/Feeds/5d7604516b1d08641d7676ee7" "https://jhub.example.com/Feeds/5d7604516b1d08641d7676ee7"
], ],
"sub": "https://scim.example.com/Users/44f6142df96bd6ab61e7521d9", "sub": "https://scim.example.com/Users/44f6142df96bd6ab61e7521d9",
"events": { "events": {
"urn:ietf:params:scim:event:passwordReset": "urn:ietf:params:scim:event:passwordReset": {
{ "id": "44f6142df96bd6ab61e7521d9"}, "id": "44f6142df96bd6ab61e7521d9"
"https://example.com/scim/event/passwordResetExt": },
{ "resetAttempts": 5} "https://example.com/scim/event/passwordResetExt": {
"resetAttempts": 5
}
} }
} }
Figure 1: Example SCIM Password Reset Event Figure 1: Example SCIM Password Reset Event
The JWT Claims Set usage consists of: The JWT Claims Set usage consists of:
o The "events" claim specifying the hypothetical SCIM URN o The "events" claim specifying the hypothetical SCIM URN
("urn:ietf:params:scim:event:passwordReset") for a password reset, ("urn:ietf:params:scim:event:passwordReset") for a password reset,
and a second value, "https://example.com/scim/event/ and a second value, "https://example.com/scim/event/
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o The "aud" claim, specifying the intended audiences for the event. o The "aud" claim, specifying the intended audiences for the event.
(The syntax of the "aud" claim is defined in Section 4.1.3 of (The syntax of the "aud" claim is defined in Section 4.1.3 of
[RFC7519].) [RFC7519].)
The SET contains two event payloads: The SET contains two event payloads:
o The "id" claim represents SCIM's unique identifier for a subject. o The "id" claim represents SCIM's unique identifier for a subject.
o The second payload identified by "https://example.com/scim/event/ o The second payload identified by "https://example.com/scim/event/
passwordResetExt") and the payload claim "resetAttempts" conveys passwordResetExt" and the payload claim "resetAttempts" conveys
the current count of reset attempts. In this example, while the the current count of reset attempts. In this example, while the
count is a simple factual statement for the issuer, the meaning of count is a simple factual statement for the issuer, the meaning of
the value (a count) is up to the receiver. As an example, such a the value (a count) is up to the receiver. As an example, such a
value might be used by the receiver to infer increasing risk. value might be used by the receiver to infer increasing risk.
In this example, the SCIM event indicates that a password has been In this example, the SCIM event indicates that a password has been
updated and the current password reset count is 5. Notice that the updated and the current password reset count is 5. Notice that the
value for "resetAttempts" is in the event payload of an event used to value for "resetAttempts" is in the event payload of an event used to
convey this information. convey this information.
2.1.2. Logout Example 2.1.2. Logout Example
Here is another example JWT Claims Set for a security event token, Here is another example JWT Claims Set for a security event token,
this one for a Logout Token: this one for a Logout Token:
{ {
"iss": "https://server.example.com", "iss": "https://server.example.com",
"sub": "248289761001", "sub": "248289761001",
"aud": "s6BhdRkqt3", "aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"iat": 1471566154, "iat": 1471566154,
"jti": "bWJq", "jti": "bWJq",
"sid": "08a5019c-17e1-4977-8f42-65a12843ea02", "sid": "08a5019c-17e1-4977-8f42-65a12843ea02",
"events": { "events": {
"http://schemas.openid.net/event/backchannel-logout": {} "http://schemas.openid.net/event/backchannel-logout": {}
} }
} }
Figure 2: Example OpenID Back-Channel Logout Event Figure 2: Example OpenID Back-Channel Logout Event
Note that the above SET has an empty JSON object and uses the JWT Note that the above SET has an empty JSON object and uses the JWT
claims "sub" and "sid" to identify the subject that was logged out. claims "sub" and "sid" to identify the subject that was logged out.
At the time of this writing, this example corresponds to the logout At the time of this writing, this example corresponds to the logout
token defined in the OpenID Connect Back-Channel Logout 1.0 token defined in the OpenID Connect Back-Channel Logout 1.0
[OpenID.BackChannel] specification. [OpenID.BackChannel] specification.
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In the above example, the attribute "iss" contained within the In the above example, the attribute "iss" contained within the
payload for the event "https://openid.net/heart/specs/consent.html" payload for the event "https://openid.net/heart/specs/consent.html"
refers to the issuer of the security subject ("sub") rather than the refers to the issuer of the security subject ("sub") rather than the
SET issuer "https://my.med.example.org". They are distinct from the SET issuer "https://my.med.example.org". They are distinct from the
top-level value of "iss", which always refers to the issuer of the top-level value of "iss", which always refers to the issuer of the
event -- a medical consent service that is a relying party to the event -- a medical consent service that is a relying party to the
OpenID Provider. OpenID Provider.
2.1.4. RISC Example 2.1.4. RISC Example
The following example JWT Claims Set is for an account disabled The following example JWT Claims Set is for an account disabled
event. This example was taken from a working draft of the RISC event. At the time of this writing, this example corresponds to the
events specification, where RISC is the OpenID RISC (Risk and account disabled event defined in the OpenID RISC Event Types 1.0
Incident Sharing and Coordination) working group [RISC]. The example [OpenID.RISC.Events] specification.
is subject to change.
{ {
"iss": "https://idp.example.com/", "iss": "https://idp.example.com/",
"jti": "756E69717565206964656E746966696572", "jti": "756E69717565206964656E746966696572",
"iat": 1508184845, "iat": 1508184845,
"aud": "636C69656E745F6964", "aud": "636C69656E745F6964",
"events": { "events": {
"http://schemas.openid.net/secevent/risc/event-type/\ "https://schemas.openid.net/secevent/risc/event-type/account-disabled"
account-disabled": { : {
"subject": { "subject": {
"subject_type": "iss-sub", "subject_type": "iss-sub",
"iss": "https://idp.example.com/", "iss": "https://idp.example.com/",
"sub": "7375626A656374" "sub": "7375626A656374"
}, },
"reason": "hijacking", "reason": "hijacking"
"cause-time": 1508012752 }
} }
} }
}
Figure 4: Example RISC Event Figure 4: Example RISC Event
Notice that parameters to the event are included in the event Notice that parameters to the event are included in the event
payload, in this case, the "reason" and "cause-time" values. The payload, in this case, the "reason" and "cause-time" values. The
subject of the event is identified using the "subject" payload value, subject of the event is identified using the "subject" payload value,
which itself is a JSON object. which itself is a JSON object.
2.2. Core SET Claims 2.2. Core SET Claims
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As defined by Section 4.1.3 of [RFC7519], this claim contains one As defined by Section 4.1.3 of [RFC7519], this claim contains one
or more audience identifiers for the SET. This claim is or more audience identifiers for the SET. This claim is
RECOMMENDED. RECOMMENDED.
"sub" (Subject) Claim "sub" (Subject) Claim
As defined by Section 4.1.2 of [RFC7519], this claim contains a As defined by Section 4.1.2 of [RFC7519], this claim contains a
StringOrURI value representing the principal that is the subject StringOrURI value representing the principal that is the subject
of the SET. This is usually the entity whose "state" was changed. of the SET. This is usually the entity whose "state" was changed.
For example: For example:
* an IP Address was added to a black list; * an IP Address was added to a blacklist;
* a URI representing a user resource that was modified; or, * a URI representing a user resource that was modified; or,
* a token identifier (e.g. "jti") for a revoked token. * a token identifier (e.g. "jti") for a revoked token.
If used, the profiling specification MUST define the content and If used, the profiling specification MUST define the content and
format semantics for the value. This claim is OPTIONAL, as the format semantics for the value. This claim is OPTIONAL, as the
principal for any given profile may already be identified without principal for any given profile may already be identified without
the inclusion of a subject claim. Note that some SET profiles MAY the inclusion of a subject claim. Note that some SET profiles MAY
choose to convey event subject information in the event payload choose to convey event subject information in the event payload
(either using the "sub" member name or another name), particularly (either using the "sub" member name or another name), particularly
if the subject information is relative to issuer information that if the subject information is relative to issuer information that
is also conveyed in the event payload, which may be the case for is also conveyed in the event payload, which may be the case for
some identity SET profiles. some identity SET profiles.
"exp" (Expiration Time) Claim "exp" (Expiration Time) Claim
As defined by Section 4.1.4 of [RFC7519], this claim is the time As defined by Section 4.1.4 of [RFC7519], this claim is the time
after which the JWT MUST NOT be accepted for processing. In the after which the JWT MUST NOT be accepted for processing. In the
context of a SET however, this notion does not typically apply, context of a SET, however, this notion does not typically apply,
since a SET represents something that has already occurred and is since a SET represents something that has already occurred and is
historical in nature. Therefore, its use is NOT RECOMMENDED. historical in nature. Therefore, its use is NOT RECOMMENDED.
(Also, see Section 4.1 for additional reasons not to use the "exp" (Also, see Section 4.1 for additional reasons not to use the "exp"
claim in some SET use cases.) claim in some SET use cases.)
The following new claims are defined by this specification: The following new claims are defined by this specification:
"events" (Security Events) Claim "events" (Security Events) Claim
This claim contains a set of event statements that each provide This claim contains a set of event statements that each provide
information describing a single logical event that has occurred information describing a single logical event that has occurred
skipping to change at page 13, line 10 skipping to change at page 14, line 10
Per the definition of "typ" in Section 4.1.9 of [RFC7515], it is Per the definition of "typ" in Section 4.1.9 of [RFC7515], it is
RECOMMENDED that the "application/" prefix be omitted. Therefore, RECOMMENDED that the "application/" prefix be omitted. Therefore,
the "typ" value used SHOULD be "secevent+jwt". the "typ" value used SHOULD be "secevent+jwt".
2.4. Security Event Token Construction 2.4. Security Event Token Construction
This section describes how to construct a SET. This section describes how to construct a SET.
The following is an example JWT Claims Set for a hypothetical SCIM The following is an example JWT Claims Set for a hypothetical SCIM
SET (which has been formatted for readability): SET:
{ {
"iss": "https://scim.example.com", "iss": "https://scim.example.com",
"iat": 1458496404, "iat": 1458496404,
"jti": "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8", "jti": "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8",
"aud": [ "aud": [
"https://scim.example.com/Feeds/98d52461fa5bbc879593b7754", "https://scim.example.com/Feeds/98d52461fa5bbc879593b7754",
"https://scim.example.com/Feeds/5d7604516b1d08641d7676ee7" "https://scim.example.com/Feeds/5d7604516b1d08641d7676ee7"
], ],
"events": { "events": {
"urn:ietf:params:scim:event:create": { "urn:ietf:params:scim:event:create": {
"ref": "ref":
"https://scim.example.com/Users/44f6142df96bd6ab61e7521d9", "https://scim.example.com/Users/44f6142df96bd6ab61e7521d9",
"attributes": ["id", "name", "userName", "password", "emails"] "attributes": ["id", "name", "userName", "password", "emails"]
} }
} }
} }
Figure 5: Example Event Claims Figure 5: Example Event Claims
The JSON Claims Set is encoded per [RFC7519]. The JSON Claims Set is encoded per [RFC7519].
In this example, the SCIM SET claims are encoded in an unsecured JWT. In this example, the SCIM SET claims are encoded in an unsecured JWT.
The JOSE Header for this example is: The JOSE Header for this example is:
{"typ":"secevent+jwt","alg":"none"} {"typ":"secevent+jwt","alg":"none"}
Base64url encoding (see Section 2 of [RFC7515]) of the octets of the Base64url encoding (as defined by Section 2 of [RFC7515], including
the omission of all trailing '=' characters) of the octets of the
UTF-8 [RFC3629] representation of the JOSE Header yields: UTF-8 [RFC3629] representation of the JOSE Header yields:
eyJ0eXAiOiJzZWNldmVudCtqd3QiLCJhbGciOiJub25lIn0 eyJ0eXAiOiJzZWNldmVudCtqd3QiLCJhbGciOiJub25lIn0
The above example JWT Claims Set is encoded as follows:
eyJqdGkiOiI0ZDM1NTllYzY3NTA0YWFiYTY1ZDQwYjAzNjNmYWFkOCIsImlhdCI6MTQ1 The above example JWT Claims Set (with insignificant whitespace
ODQ5NjQwNCwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwiYXVkIjpbImh0 removed) is encoded as follows (with line breaks for display purposes
dHBzOi8vc2NpbS5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9GZWVkcy85OGQ1MjQ2MWZhNWJiYzg3OTU5M2I3 only):
NzU0IiwiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL0ZlZWRzLzVkNzYwNDUxNmIxZDA4
NjQxZDc2NzZlZTciXSwiZXZlbnRzIjp7InVybjppZXRmOnBhcmFtczpzY2ltOmV2ZW50
OmNyZWF0ZSI6eyJyZWYiOiJodHRwczovL3NjaW0uZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vVXNlcnMvNDRm
NjE0MmRmOTZiZDZhYjYxZTc1MjFkOSIsImF0dHJpYnV0ZXMiOlsiaWQiLCJuYW1lIiwi
dXNlck5hbWUiLCJwYXNzd29yZCIsImVtYWlscyJdfX19
The encoded JWS signature is the empty string. Concatenating the eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL3NjaW0uZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iLCJpYXQiOjE0NTg0OTY0M
parts yields this complete SET: DQsImp0aSI6IjRkMzU1OWVjNjc1MDRhYWJhNjVkNDBiMDM2M2ZhYWQ4IiwiYXVkIj
pbImh0dHBzOi8vc2NpbS5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9GZWVkcy85OGQ1MjQ2MWZhNWJiYzg
3OTU5M2I3NzU0IiwiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL0ZlZWRzLzVkNzYw
NDUxNmIxZDA4NjQxZDc2NzZlZTciXSwiZXZlbnRzIjp7InVybjppZXRmOnBhcmFtc
zpzY2ltOmV2ZW50OmNyZWF0ZSI6eyJyZWYiOiJodHRwczovL3NjaW0uZXhhbXBsZS
5jb20vVXNlcnMvNDRmNjE0MmRmOTZiZDZhYjYxZTc1MjFkOSIsImF0dHJpYnV0ZXM
iOlsiaWQiLCJuYW1lIiwidXNlck5hbWUiLCJwYXNzd29yZCIsImVtYWlscyJdfX19
eyJ0eXAiOiJzZWNldmVudCtqd3QiLCJhbGciOiJub25lIn0. The encoded JWS signature is the empty string.
eyJqdGkiOiI0ZDM1NTllYzY3NTA0YWFiYTY1ZDQwYjAzNjNmYWFkOCIsImlhdCI6MTQ1
ODQ5NjQwNCwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwiYXVkIjpbImh0 Concatenating the three encoded parts (JOSE Header, JWT Claims Set,
dHBzOi8vc2NpbS5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9GZWVkcy85OGQ1MjQ2MWZhNWJiYzg3OTU5M2I3 and JWS signature) in order with period ('.') characters between the
NzU0IiwiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL0ZlZWRzLzVkNzYwNDUxNmIxZDA4 parts yields this complete SET (with line breaks for display purposes
NjQxZDc2NzZlZTciXSwiZXZlbnRzIjp7InVybjppZXRmOnBhcmFtczpzY2ltOmV2ZW50 only):
OmNyZWF0ZSI6eyJyZWYiOiJodHRwczovL3NjaW0uZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vVXNlcnMvNDRm
NjE0MmRmOTZiZDZhYjYxZTc1MjFkOSIsImF0dHJpYnV0ZXMiOlsiaWQiLCJuYW1lIiwi eyJ0eXAiOiJzZWNldmVudCtqd3QiLCJhbGciOiJub25lIn0
dXNlck5hbWUiLCJwYXNzd29yZCIsImVtYWlscyJdfX19. .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.
Figure 6: Example Unsecured Security Event Token Figure 6: Example Unsecured Security Event Token
For the purpose of having a simpler example in Figure 6, an unsecured For the purpose of having a simpler example in Figure 6, an unsecured
token is shown. When SETs are not signed or encrypted, other token is shown. When SETs are not signed or encrypted, other
mechanisms such as TLS MUST be employed to provide integrity mechanisms such as TLS MUST be employed to provide integrity
protection, confidentiality, and issuer authenticity, as needed by protection, confidentiality, and issuer authenticity, as needed by
the application. the application.
When validation (i.e., auditing), or additional transmission security When validation (i.e., auditing) or additional transmission security
is required, JWS signing and/or JWE encryption MAY be used. To is required, JWS signing and/or JWE encryption MAY be used. To
create and or validate a signed and/or encrypted SET, follow the create and or validate a signed and/or encrypted SET, follow the
instructions in Section 7 of [RFC7519]. instructions in Section 7 of [RFC7519].
3. Requirements for SET Profiles 3. Requirements for SET Profiles
Profiling specifications of this specification define actual SETs to Profiling specifications of this specification define actual SETs to
be used in particular use cases. These profiling specifications be used in particular use cases. These profiling specifications
define the syntax and semantics of SETs conforming to that SET define the syntax and semantics of SETs conforming to that SET
profile and rules for validating those SETs. Profiling profile and rules for validating those SETs. Profiling
specifications SHOULD define syntax, semantics, subject specifications SHOULD define syntax, semantics, subject
identification, and validation. identification, and validation.
Syntax Syntax
The syntax of the SETs defined, including: The syntax of the SETs defined, including:
Top-Level Claims Top-Level Claims
Claims and values placed at the JWT Claims Set. Examples are Claims and values in the JWT Claims Set. Examples are claims
claims defined by the JWT specification (see [RFC7519]), the defined by the JWT specification [RFC7519], this specification,
SET specification, and by the profiling specification. and by the profiling specification.
Event Payload Event Payload
The JSON data structure contents and format, containing event- The JSON data structure contents and format, containing event-
specific information, if any (see Section 1.2). specific information, if any (see Section 1.2).
Semantics Semantics
Defining the semantics of the SET contents for SETs utilizing the Defining the semantics of the SET contents for SETs utilizing the
profile is equally important. Possibly most important is defining profile is equally important. Possibly most important is defining
the procedures used to validate the SET issuer and to obtain the the procedures used to validate the SET issuer and to obtain the
keys controlled by the issuer that were used for cryptographic keys controlled by the issuer that were used for cryptographic
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for SETs conforming to that profile. Many valid choices are for SETs conforming to that profile. Many valid choices are
possible. For instance, some profiles might allow multiple event possible. For instance, some profiles might allow multiple event
identifiers to be present and specify that any that are not identifiers to be present and specify that any that are not
understood by recipients be ignored, thus enabling extensibility. understood by recipients be ignored, thus enabling extensibility.
Other profiles might allow multiple event identifiers to be Other profiles might allow multiple event identifiers to be
present but require that all be understood if the SET is to be present but require that all be understood if the SET is to be
accepted. Some profiles might require that only a single value be accepted. Some profiles might require that only a single value be
present. All such choices are within the scope of profiling present. All such choices are within the scope of profiling
specifications to define. specifications to define.
4. Preventing Confusion between SETs and other JWTs 4. Preventing Confusion between SETs and Other JWTs
Because [RFC7519] states that "all claims that are not understood by Because [RFC7519] states that "all claims that are not understood by
implementations MUST be ignored", there is a consideration that a SET implementations MUST be ignored", there is a consideration that a SET
might be confused with another kind of JWT from the same issuer. might be confused with another kind of JWT from the same issuer.
Unless this confusion is prevented, this might enable an attacker who Unless this confusion is prevented, this might enable an attacker who
possesses a SET to use it in a context in which another kind of JWT possesses a SET to use it in a context in which another kind of JWT
is expected, or vice-versa. This section presents concrete is expected, or vice versa. This section presents concrete
techniques for preventing confusion between SETs and several other techniques for preventing confusion between SETs and several other
specific kinds of JWTs, as well as generic techniques for preventing specific kinds of JWTs, as well as generic techniques for preventing
possible confusion between SETs and other kinds of JWTs. possible confusion between SETs and other kinds of JWTs.
4.1. Distinguishing SETs from ID Tokens 4.1. Distinguishing SETs from ID Tokens
A SET might be confused with ID Token [OpenID.Core] if a SET is A SET might be confused with an ID Token [OpenID.Core] if a SET is
mistakenly or maliciously used in a context requiring an ID Token. mistakenly or maliciously used in a context requiring an ID Token.
If a SET could otherwise be interpreted as a valid ID Token (because If a SET could otherwise be interpreted as a valid ID Token (because
it includes the required claims for an ID Token and valid issuer and it includes the required claims for an ID Token and valid issuer and
audience claim values for an ID Token) then that SET profile MUST audience claim values for an ID Token), then that SET profile MUST
require that the "exp" claim not be present in the SET. Because require that the "exp" claim not be present in the SET. Because
"exp" is a required claim in ID Tokens, valid ID Token "exp" is a required claim in ID Tokens, valid ID Token
implementations will reject such a SET if presented as if it were an implementations will reject such a SET if presented as if it were an
ID Token. ID Token.
Excluding "exp" from SETs that could otherwise be confused with ID Excluding "exp" from SETs that could otherwise be confused with ID
Tokens is actually defense in depth. In any OpenID Connect contexts Tokens is actually defense in depth. In any OpenID Connect contexts
in which an attacker could attempt to substitute a SET for an ID in which an attacker could attempt to substitute a SET for an ID
Token, the SET would actually already be rejected as an ID Token Token, the SET would actually already be rejected as an ID Token
because it would not contain the correct "nonce" claim value for the because it would not contain the correct "nonce" claim value for the
skipping to change at page 16, line 45 skipping to change at page 18, line 13
possible. possible.
Note that the use of explicit typing, as described in Section 2.3, Note that the use of explicit typing, as described in Section 2.3,
will not achieve disambiguation between ID Tokens and SETs, as the ID will not achieve disambiguation between ID Tokens and SETs, as the ID
Token validation rules do not use the "typ" header parameter value. Token validation rules do not use the "typ" header parameter value.
4.2. Distinguishing SETs from Access Tokens 4.2. Distinguishing SETs from Access Tokens
OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] defines access tokens as being opaque. OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] defines access tokens as being opaque.
Nonetheless, some implementations implement access tokens as JWTs. Nonetheless, some implementations implement access tokens as JWTs.
Because the structure of these JWTs is implementation-specific, Because the structure of these JWTs is implementation specific,
ensuring that a SET cannot be confused with such an access token is ensuring that a SET cannot be confused with such an access token is,
therefore likewise, in general, implementation specific. therefore, also implementation specific, generally. Nonetheless, it
Nonetheless, it is recommended that SET profiles employ the following is recommended that SET profiles employ the following strategies to
strategies to prevent possible substitutions of SETs for access prevent possible substitutions of SETs for access tokens in contexts
tokens in contexts in which that might be possible: in which that might be possible:
o Prohibit use of the "exp" claim, as is done to prevent ID Token o Prohibit use of the "exp" claim, as is done to prevent ID Token
confusion. confusion.
o Where possible, use a separate "aud" claim value to distinguish o Where possible, use a separate "aud" claim value to distinguish
between the SET recipient and the protected resource that is the between the SET recipient and the protected resource that is the
audience of an access token. audience of an access token.
o Modify access token validation systems to check for the presence o Modify access token validation systems to check for the presence
of the "events" claim as a means to detect security event tokens. of the "events" claim as a means to detect security event tokens.
This is particularly useful if the same endpoint may receive both This is particularly useful if the same endpoint may receive both
types of tokens. types of tokens.
o Employ explicit typing, as described in Section 2.3, and modify o Employ explicit typing, as described in Section 2.3, and modify
access token validation systems to use the "typ" header parameter access token validation systems to use the "typ" header parameter
value. value.
4.3. Distinguishing SETs from other kinds of JWTs 4.3. Distinguishing SETs from Other Kinds of JWTs
JWTs are now being used in application areas beyond the identity JWTs are now being used in application areas beyond the identity
applications in which they first appeared. For instance, the applications in which they first appeared. For instance, the
"Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Via Header Field Parameter to "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Via Header Field Parameter to
Indicate Received Realm" [RFC8055] and "Personal Assertion Token Indicate Received Realm" [RFC8055] and "PASSporT: Personal Assertion
(PASSporT)" [RFC8225] specifications both define JWT profiles that Token" [RFC8225] specifications both define JWT profiles that use
use mostly or completely different sets of claims than are used by ID mostly or completely different sets of claims than are used by ID
Tokens. If it would otherwise be possible for an attacker to Tokens. If it would otherwise be possible for an attacker to
substitute a SET for one of these (or other) kinds of JWTs, then the substitute a SET for one of these (or other) kinds of JWTs, then the
SET profile must be defined in such a way that any substituted SET SET profile must be defined in such a way that any substituted SET
will result in its rejection when validated as the intended kind of will result in its rejection when validated as the intended kind of
JWT. JWT.
The most direct way to prevent confusion is to employ explicit The most direct way to prevent confusion is to employ explicit
typing, as described in Section 2.3, and modify applicable token typing, as described in Section 2.3, and modify applicable token
validation systems to use the "typ" header parameter value. This validation systems to use the "typ" header parameter value. This
approach can be employed for new systems but may not be applicable to approach can be employed for new systems but may not be applicable to
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JWT is to have the JWT validation logic reject JWTs containing an JWT is to have the JWT validation logic reject JWTs containing an
"events" claim unless the JWT is intended to be a SET. This approach "events" claim unless the JWT is intended to be a SET. This approach
can be employed for new systems but may not be applicable to existing can be employed for new systems but may not be applicable to existing
systems. Validating that the JWT has an "events" claim will be systems. Validating that the JWT has an "events" claim will be
effective in preventing attackers from passing other kinds of JWTs effective in preventing attackers from passing other kinds of JWTs
off as SETs. off as SETs.
For many use cases, the simplest way to prevent substitution is For many use cases, the simplest way to prevent substitution is
requiring that the SET not include claims that are required for the requiring that the SET not include claims that are required for the
kind of JWT that might be the target of an attack. For example, for kind of JWT that might be the target of an attack. For example, for
[RFC8055], the "sip_callid" claim could be omitted and for [RFC8225], [RFC8055], the "sip_callid" claim could be omitted and for [RFC8225],
the "orig" claim could be omitted. the "orig" claim could be omitted.
In many contexts, simple measures such as these will accomplish the In many contexts, simple measures such as these will accomplish the
task, should confusion otherwise even be possible. Note that this task, should confusion otherwise even be possible. Note that this
topic is being explored in a more general fashion in JSON Web Token topic is being explored in a more general fashion in "JSON Web Token
Best Current Practices [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp]. The proposed best Best Current Practices" [JWT-BCP]. The proposed best practices in
practices in that draft may also be applicable for particular SET that document may also be applicable for particular SET profiles and
profiles and use cases. use cases.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
5.1. Confidentiality and Integrity 5.1. Confidentiality and Integrity
SETs may contain sensitive information. Therefore, methods for SETs may contain sensitive information. Therefore, methods for
distribution of events SHOULD require the use of a transport-layer distribution of events SHOULD require the use of a transport-layer
security mechanism when distributing events. Parties MUST support security mechanism when distributing events. Parties MUST support
TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] or a higher version and MAY support additional TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] or a higher version and MAY support additional
transport-layer mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When transport-layer mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When
using TLS, the client MUST perform a TLS server certificate check, using TLS, the client MUST perform a TLS server certificate check,
per [RFC6125]. Implementation security considerations for TLS can be per [RFC6125]. Implementation security considerations for TLS can be
found in "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525]. found in "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security
(TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)" [RFC7525].
Security events distributed through third parties or that carry Security events distributed through third parties or that carry
personally identifiable information MUST be encrypted using JWE personally identifiable information MUST be encrypted using JWE
[RFC7516] or secured for confidentiality by other means. [RFC7516] or secured for confidentiality by other means.
Unless integrity of the JWT is ensured by other means, it MUST be Unless integrity of the JWT is ensured by other means, it MUST be
signed using JWS [RFC7515] by an issuer that is trusted to do so for signed using JWS [RFC7515] by an issuer that is trusted to do so for
the use case so that the SET can be authenticated and validated by the use case so that the SET can be authenticated and validated by
the SET recipient. the SET recipient.
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5.4. Timing Issues 5.4. Timing Issues
When SETs are delivered asynchronously and/or out-of-band with When SETs are delivered asynchronously and/or out-of-band with
respect to the original action that incurred the security event, it respect to the original action that incurred the security event, it
is important to consider that a SET might be delivered to a SET is important to consider that a SET might be delivered to a SET
recipient in advance of or behind the process that caused the event. recipient in advance of or behind the process that caused the event.
For example, a user having been required to log out and then log back For example, a user having been required to log out and then log back
in again, may cause a "token revoked" SET to be issued, typically in again, may cause a "token revoked" SET to be issued, typically
causing the receiver to reset all active sessions at the receiver causing the receiver to reset all active sessions at the receiver
that are related to that user. If revocation SET arrives at the same that are related to that user. If a revocation SET arrives at the
time as the user agent re-logs in, timing could cause problems by same time as the user agent re-logs in, timing could cause problems
erroneously treating the new user session as logged out. Profiling by erroneously treating the new user session as logged out.
specifications SHOULD be careful to consider both SET expression and Profiling specifications SHOULD be careful to consider both SET
timing issues. For example, it might be more appropriate to revoke a expression and timing issues. For example, it might be more
specific session or identity token rather than a general logout appropriate to revoke a specific session or ID Token rather than a
statement about a "user". Alternatively, profiling specifications general logout statement about a "user". Alternatively, profiling
could use timestamps that allow new sessions to be started specifications could use timestamps that allow new sessions to be
immediately after a stated logout event time. started immediately after a stated logout event time.
5.5. Preventing Confusion 5.5. Preventing Confusion
Also, see Section 4 above for both additional security considerations Also, see Section 4 above for both additional security considerations
and normative text on preventing SETs from being confused with other and normative text on preventing SETs from being confused with other
kinds of JWTs. kinds of JWTs.
6. Privacy Considerations 6. Privacy Considerations
If a SET needs to be retained for audit purposes, the signature can If a SET needs to be retained for audit purposes, the signature can
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unrelated identifiers relate to the same individual. SET issuers unrelated identifiers relate to the same individual. SET issuers
SHOULD take steps to minimize the chance of event correlation, when SHOULD take steps to minimize the chance of event correlation, when
such correlation would constitute a privacy violation. For instance, such correlation would constitute a privacy violation. For instance,
they could use approximate values for the "toe" claim or arbitrarily they could use approximate values for the "toe" claim or arbitrarily
delay SET issuance, where such delay can be tolerated. delay SET issuance, where such delay can be tolerated.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
7.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration 7.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration
This specification registers the "events", "toe", and "txn" claims in IANA has registered the "events", "toe", and "txn" claims in the IANA
the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims] "JSON Web Token Claims" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims] established by
established by [RFC7519]. [RFC7519].
7.1.1. Registry Contents 7.1.1. Registry Contents
o Claim Name: "events" o Claim Name: "events"
o Claim Description: Security Events o Claim Description: Security Events
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [RFC8417]
o Claim Name: "toe" o Claim Name: "toe"
o Claim Description: Time of Event o Claim Description: Time of Event
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [RFC8417]
o Claim Name: "txn" o Claim Name: "txn"
o Claim Description: Transaction Identifier o Claim Description: Transaction Identifier
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [RFC8417]
7.2. Structured Syntax Suffix Registration 7.2. Structured Syntax Suffix Registration
This section registers the "+jwt" structured syntax suffix [RFC6838] IANA has registered the "+jwt" structured syntax suffix [RFC6838] in
in the "Structured Syntax Suffix" registry [IANA.StructuredSuffix] in the "Structured Syntax Suffix" registry [IANA.StructuredSuffix] in
the manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that
the media type is encoded as a JWT. the media type is encoded as a JWT.
7.2.1. Registry Contents 7.2.1. Registry Contents
o Name: JSON Web Token (JWT) o Name: JSON Web Token (JWT)
o +suffix: +jwt o +suffix: +jwt
o References: Section 3 of [RFC7519] o References: Section 3 of [RFC7519], Section 7.2 of [RFC8417]
o Encoding considerations: binary; JWT values are encoded as a o Encoding Considerations: binary; JWT values are encoded as a
series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty series of base64url-encoded values (with trailing '=' characters
string) separated by period ('.') characters. removed), some of which may be the empty string, separated by
o Interoperability considerations: n/a period ('.') characters.
o Fragment identifier considerations: o Interoperability Considerations: N/A
o Fragment Identifier Considerations:
The syntax and semantics of fragment identifiers specified for The syntax and semantics of fragment identifiers specified for
+jwt SHOULD be as specified for "application/jwt". (At +jwt SHOULD be as specified for "application/jwt". (At
publication of this document, there is no fragment identification publication of this document, there is no fragment identification
syntax defined for "application/jwt".) syntax defined for "application/jwt".)
The syntax and semantics for fragment identifiers for a specific The syntax and semantics for fragment identifiers for a specific
"xxx/yyy+jwt" SHOULD be processed as follows: "xxx/yyy+jwt" SHOULD be processed as follows:
For cases defined in +jwt, where the fragment identifier resolves For cases defined in +jwt where the fragment identifier resolves
per the +jwt rules, then process as specified in +jwt. per the +jwt rules, process as specified in +jwt.
For cases defined in +jwt, where the fragment identifier does not For cases defined in +jwt where the fragment identifier does not
resolve per the +jwt rules, then process as specified in "xxx/ resolve per the +jwt rules, process as specified in "xxx/yyy+jwt".
yyy+jwt".
For cases not defined in +jwt, then process as specified in "xxx/ For cases not defined in +jwt, process as specified in "xxx/
yyy+jwt". yyy+jwt".
o Security considerations: See Section 11 of [RFC7519]. o Security Considerations: See Section 11 of [RFC7519].
o Contact: o Contact:
Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com
o Author/Change controller: o Author/Change Controller:
Security Events Working Group. Security Events Working Group.
The IESG has change control over this registration. The IESG has change control over this registration.
7.3. Media Type Registration 7.3. Media Type Registration
7.3.1. Registry Contents 7.3.1. Registry Contents
This section registers the "application/secevent+jwt" media type This section registers the "application/secevent+jwt" media type
[RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the [RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the
manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the
content is a SET. content is a SET.
o Type name: application o Type name: application
o Subtype name: secevent+jwt o Subtype name: secevent+jwt
o Required parameters: n/a o Required parameters: N/A
o Optional parameters: n/a o Optional parameters: N/A
o Encoding considerations: binary; A SET is a JWT; JWT values are o Encoding considerations: binary; A SET is a JWT; JWT values are
encoded as a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may encoded as a series of base64url-encoded values (with trailing '='
be the empty string) separated by period ('.') characters. characters removed), some of which may be the empty string,
o Security considerations: See Section 5 of [[ this specification ]] separated by period ('.') characters.
o Interoperability considerations: n/a o Security considerations: See Section 5 of [RFC8417]
o Published specification: Section 2.3 of [[ this specification ]] o Interoperability considerations: N/A
o Published specification: Section 2.3 of [RFC8417]
o Applications that use this media type: Applications that exchange o Applications that use this media type: Applications that exchange
SETs SETs
o Fragment identifier considerations: n/a o Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
o Additional information: o Additional information:
Magic number(s): n/a Magic number(s): N/A
File extension(s): n/a File extension(s): N/A
Macintosh file type code(s): n/a Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
o Person & email address to contact for further information: o Person & email address to contact for further information:
Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com
o Intended usage: COMMON o Intended usage: COMMON
o Restrictions on usage: none o Restrictions on usage: none
o Author: Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com o Author: Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com
o Change controller: IESG o Change controller: IESG
o Provisional registration? No o Provisional registration? No
8. References 8. References
skipping to change at page 24, line 17 skipping to change at page 26, line 29
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>. 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp] [JWT-BCP] Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best
Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best Current Practices", Work in Progress,
Current Practices", draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-03 (work in draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-03, May 2018.
progress), May 2018.
[OpenID.BackChannel] [OpenID.BackChannel]
Jones, M. and J. Bradley, "OpenID Connect Back-Channel Jones, M. and J. Bradley, "OpenID Connect Back-Channel
Logout 1.0", January 2017, <http://openid.net/specs/ Logout 1.0", January 2017, <http://openid.net/specs/
openid-connect-backchannel-1_0.html>. openid-connect-backchannel-1_0.html>.
[OpenID.Core] [OpenID.Core]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", November 2014, C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", November 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>. <http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[OpenID.RISC.Events]
Scurtescu, M., Backman, A., Hunt, P., and J. Bradley,
"OpenID RISC Event Types 1.0", April 2018,
<http://openid.net/specs/
openid-risc-event-types-1_0.html>.
[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail [RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046, Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996, DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.
[RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type [RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013, RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>.
skipping to change at page 25, line 9 skipping to change at page 27, line 24
[RFC8055] Holmberg, C. and Y. Jiang, "Session Initiation Protocol [RFC8055] Holmberg, C. and Y. Jiang, "Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP) Via Header Field Parameter to Indicate Received (SIP) Via Header Field Parameter to Indicate Received
Realm", RFC 8055, DOI 10.17487/RFC8055, January 2017, Realm", RFC 8055, DOI 10.17487/RFC8055, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8055>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8055>.
[RFC8225] Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "PASSporT: Personal Assertion [RFC8225] Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "PASSporT: Personal Assertion
Token", RFC 8225, DOI 10.17487/RFC8225, February 2018, Token", RFC 8225, DOI 10.17487/RFC8225, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8225>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8225>.
[RISC] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Risk and Incident Sharing and Acknowledgments
Coordination (RISC) Working Group",
<http://openid.net/wg/risc/>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments
The editors would like to thank the members of the IETF SCIM working The editors would like to thank the members of the IETF SCIM working
group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with
draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 in 2015. The editors would like to thank draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 in 2015. The editors would like to thank
the participants in the IETF id-event mailing list, the Security the participants in the IETF id-event mailing list, the Security
Events working group, and related working groups for their Events working group, and related working groups for their
contributions to this specification. The specification incorporates contributions to this specification. The specification incorporates
suggestions made by many people, including Annabelle Backman, John suggestions made by many people, including Annabelle Backman, John
Bradley, Alissa Cooper, Ned Freed, Dick Hardt, Russ Housley, Benjamin Bradley, Alissa Cooper, Ned Freed, Dick Hardt, Russ Housley, Benjamin
Kaduk, Mirja Kuehlewind, Mark Lizar, Alexey Melnikov, Andrew Nash, Kaduk, Mirja Kuehlewind, Mark Lizar, Alexey Melnikov, Andrew Nash,
Eric Rescorla, Adam Roach, Justin Richer, Nat Sakimura, Marius Eric Rescorla, Adam Roach, Justin Richer, Nat Sakimura, Marius
Scurtescu, Yaron Sheffer, and Martin Vigoureux. Scurtescu, Yaron Sheffer, and Martin Vigoureux.
Appendix B. Change Log
[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
From the original draft-hunt-idevent-token:
Draft 01 - PH - Renamed eventUris to events
Draft 00 - PH - First Draft
Draft 01 - PH - Fixed some alignment issues with JWT. Remove event
type attribute.
Draft 02 - PH - Renamed to Security Events, removed questions,
clarified examples and intro text, and added security and privacy
section.
Draft 03 - PH
General edit corrections from Sarah Squire
Changed "event" term to "SET"
Corrected author organization for William Denniss to Google
Changed definition of SET to be 2 parts, an envelope and 1 or more
payloads.
Clarified that the intent is to express a single event with
optional extensions only.
- mbj - Registered "events" claim, and proof-reading corrections.
Draft 04 - PH -
o Re-added the "sub" claim with clarifications that any SET type may
use it.
o Added additional clarification on the use of envelope vs. payload
attributes
o Added security consideration for event timing.
o Switched use of "attribute" to "claim" for consistency.
o Revised examples to put "sub" claim back in the top level.
o Added clarification that SETs typically do not use "exp".
o Added security consideration for distinguishing Access Tokens and
SETs.
Draft 05 - PH - Fixed find/replace error that resulted in claim being
spelled claimc
Draft 06 - PH -
o Corrected typos
o New txn claim
o New security considerations Sequencing and Timing Issues
Draft 07 -
o PH - Moved payload objects to be values of event URI attributes,
per discussion.
o mbj - Applied terminology consistency and grammar cleanups.
Draft 08 - PH -
o Added clarification to status of examples
o Changed from primary vs. extension to state that multiple events
may be expressed, some of which may or may not be considered
extensions of others (which is for the subscriber or profiling
specifications to determine).
o Other editorial changes suggested by Yaron
From draft-ietf-secevent-token:
Draft 00 - PH - First WG Draft based on draft-hunt-idevent-token
Draft 01 - PH - Changes as follows:
o Changed terminology away from pub-sub to transmitter/receiver
based on WG feedback
o Cleaned up/removed some text about extensions (now only used as
example)
o Clarify purpose of spec vs. future profiling specs that define
actual events
Draft 02 - Changes are as follows:
o mbj - Added the Requirements for SET Profiles section.
o mbj - Expanded the Security Considerations section to describe how
to prevent confusion of SETs with ID Tokens, access tokens, and
other kinds of JWTs.
o mbj - Registered the "application/secevent+jwt" media type and
defined how to use it for explicit typing of SETs.
o mbj - Clarified the misleading statement that used to say that a
SET conveys a single security event.
o mbj - Added a note explicitly acknowledging that some SET profiles
may choose to convey event subject information in the event
payload.
o PH - Corrected encoded claim example on page 10.
o mbj - Applied grammar corrections.
Draft 03 - Changes are as follows:
o pjh - Corrected old "subscriber" to "Event Receiver". Added
clarification in definition that Event Receiver is the same as JWT
recipient.
o pjh - Added definition for "toe" (and IANA registration).
o pjh - Removed "nbf" claim.
o pjh - Figure 3, moved "sub" to the events payload next to "iss".
o pjh - Clarified the use of "nonce" in contexts where substitution
is possible.
o mbj - Addressed WGLC comments by Nat Sakimura.
o mbj - Addressed WGLC comments by Annabelle Backman.
o mbj - Addressed WGLC comments by Marius Scurtescu.
Draft 04 - mbj - Changes were as follows:
o Clarified that all "events" values must represent aspects of the
same state change that occurred to the subject -- not an
aggregation of unrelated events about the subject.
o Removed ambiguities about the roles of multiple "events" values
and the responsibilities of profiling specifications for defining
how and when they are used.
o Corrected places where the term JWT was used when what was
actually being discussed was the JWT Claims Set.
o Addressed terminology inconsistencies. In particular,
standardized on using the term "issuer" to align with JWT
terminology and the "iss" claim. Previously the term
"transmitter" was sometimes used and "issuer" was sometimes used.
Likewise, standardized on using the term "recipient" instead of
"receiver" for the same reasons.
o Added a RISC event example, courtesy of Marius Scurtescu.
o Applied wording clarifications suggested by Annabelle Backman and
Yaron Sheffer.
o Applied numerous grammar, syntax, and formatting corrections.
Draft 05 - mbj - Changes were as follows:
o Simplified the definitions of the "iat" and "toe" claims in ways
suggested by Annabelle Backman.
o Added privacy considerations text suggested by Annabelle Backman.
o Updated the RISC event example, courtesy of Marius Scurtescu.
o Reordered the claim definitions to place the required claims
first.
o Changed to using the RFC 8174 boilerplate instead of the RFC 2119
boilerplate.
Draft 06 - mbj - Changes were as follows:
o Changed "when the event was issued" to "when the SET was issued"
in the "iat" description, as suggested by Annabelle Backman.
o Applied editorial improvements that improve the consistency of the
specification that were suggested by Annabelle Backman, Marius
Scurtescu, and Yaron Sheffer.
Draft 07 - PH - Text refinement to Section 3 proposed by Annabelle
Backman post WGLC
Draft 08 - mbj - Changes were as follows:
o Incorporated wording improvements resulting from Russ Housley's
SecDir comments.
o Acknowledged individuals who made significant contributions.
Draft 09 - pjh/mbj - Changes addressing AD review comments by
Benjamin Kaduk
Draft 10 - pjh/mbj - Changes were as follows:
o Incorporated wording improvements resulting from Russ Housley's
additional SecDir comments.
o Registered +jwt structured syntax suffix.
Draft 11 - pjh/mbj - Incorporated feedback from Security Area
Director Eric Rescorla and IANA Designated Expert Ned Freed.
o Clarified "iss" claim language about the SET issuer versus the
security subject issuer.
o Changed a "SHOULD" to a "MUST" in the "sub" claim description to
be consistent with the Requirements for SET Profiles section.
o Described the use of the "events" claim to prevent attackers from
passing off other kinds of JWTs as SETs.
o Stated that SETs are to be signed by an issuer that is trusted to
do so for the use case.
o Added quotes in the phrase '"token revoked" SET to be issued' in
the Timing Issues section.
o Added section number references to the media type and media type
suffix registrations.
o Changed the encodings of the media type and media type suffix
registrations to binary (since no line breaks are allowed).
o Replaced a "TBD" in the media type registration with descriptive
text.
o Acknowledged Eric Rescorla and Ned Freed.
Draft 12 - pjh/mbj - Incorporated feedback from Adam Roach, Alexey
Melnikov, and Alissa Cooper.
o Removed unused references to RFC 7009 and RFC 7517.
o Corrected name of RFC 8055 in Section 4.3 to "Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP) Via Header Field Parameter to Indicate Received
Realm".
o Added normative references for base64url and UTF-8.
o Section 5.1 - Changed SHOULD to MUST in "personally identifiable
information MUST be encrypted using JWE [RFC7516] or ...".
o Section 5.2 - Changed "MUST consider" to "must consider".
Draft 13 - ph - Added edit from Martin Vigoureaux regarding a non-
normative "MAY" in Section 1.1. Updated acknowledgements.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Phil Hunt (editor) Phil Hunt (editor)
Oracle Corporation Oracle Corporation
Email: phil.hunt@yahoo.com Email: phil.hunt@yahoo.com
Michael B. Jones Michael B. Jones
Microsoft Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com Email: mbj@microsoft.com
URI: http://self-issued.info/ URI: http://self-issued.info/
William Denniss William Denniss
Google Google
Email: wdenniss@google.com Email: rfc8417@wdenniss.com
URI: https://wdenniss.com/SET
Morteza Ansari Morteza Ansari
Cisco Cisco
Email: morteza.ansari@cisco.com Email: morteza.ansari@cisco.com
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