draft-ietf-send-ndopt-06.txt   rfc3971.txt 
Secure Neighbor Discovery Working J. Arkko (Editor) Network Working Group J. Arkko, Ed.
Group Ericsson Request for Comments: 3971 Ericsson
Internet-Draft J. Kempf Category: Standards Track J. Kempf
Expires: January 15, 2005 DoCoMo Communications Labs USA DoCoMo Communications Labs USA
B. Sommerfeld
Sun Microsystems
B. Zill B. Zill
Microsoft Microsoft
P. Nikander P. Nikander
Ericsson Ericsson
July 17, 2004 March 2005
SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)
draft-ietf-send-ndopt-06
Status of this Memo
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and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved. Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
Abstract Abstract
IPv6 nodes use the Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) to discover IPv6 nodes use the Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) to discover
other nodes on the link, to determine the link-layer addresses of other nodes on the link, to determine their link-layer addresses to
other nodes on the link, to find routers, and to maintain find routers, and to maintain reachability information about the
reachability information about the paths to active neighbors. If not paths to active neighbors. If not secured, NDP is vulnerable to
secured, NDP is vulnerable to various attacks. This document various attacks. This document specifies security mechanisms for
specifies security mechanisms for NDP. Unlike the original NDP NDP. Unlike those in the original NDP specifications, these
specifications these mechanisms do not make use of IPsec. mechanisms do not use IPsec.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1 Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1. Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2. Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Neighbor and Router Discovery Overview . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3. Neighbor and Router Discovery Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Secure Neighbor Discovery Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4. Secure Neighbor Discovery Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Neighbor Discovery Protocol Options . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5. Neighbor Discovery Protocol Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1 CGA Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.1. CGA Option. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1.1 Processing Rules for Senders . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.1.1. Processing Rules for Senders. . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1.2 Processing Rules for Receivers . . . . . . . . . 15 5.1.2. Processing Rules for Receivers. . . . . . . . . 12
5.1.3 Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.1.3. Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2 RSA Signature Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.2. RSA Signature Option. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2.1 Processing Rules for Senders . . . . . . . . . . 18 5.2.1. Processing Rules for Senders. . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2.2 Processing Rules for Receivers . . . . . . . . . 19 5.2.2. Processing Rules for Receivers. . . . . . . . . 16
5.2.3 Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 5.2.3. Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.2.4 Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5.2.4. Performance Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.3 Timestamp and Nonce options . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5.3. Timestamp and Nonce Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.3.1 Timestamp Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5.3.1. Timestamp Option. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.3.2 Nonce Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.3.2. Nonce Option. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.3.3 Processing rules for senders . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.3.3. Processing Rules for Senders. . . . . . . . . . 21
5.3.4 Processing rules for receivers . . . . . . . . . 24 5.3.4. Processing Rules for Receivers. . . . . . . . . 21
6. Authorization Delegation Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 6. Authorization Delegation Discovery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.1 Authorization Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 6.1. Authorization Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.2 Deployment Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 6.2. Deployment Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.3 Certificate Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 6.3. Certificate Format. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.3.1 Router Authorization Certificate Profile . . . . 29 6.3.1. Router Authorization Certificate Profile. . . . 26
6.3.2 Suitability of Standard Identity Certificates . 32 6.3.2. Suitability of Standard Identity Certificates . 29
6.4 Certificate Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 6.4. Certificate Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.4.1 Certification Path Solicitation Message Format . 32 6.4.1. Certification Path Solicitation Message Format. 30
6.4.2 Certification Path Advertisement Message Format 34 6.4.2. Certification Path Advertisement Message Format 32
6.4.3 Trust Anchor Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 6.4.3. Trust Anchor Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.4.4 Certificate Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 6.4.4. Certificate Option. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6.4.5 Processing Rules for Routers . . . . . . . . . . 39 6.4.5. Processing Rules for Routers. . . . . . . . . . 37
6.4.6 Processing Rules for Hosts . . . . . . . . . . . 40 6.4.6. Processing Rules for Hosts. . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.5 Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 6.5. Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7. Addressing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7. Addressing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.1 CGAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7.1. CGAs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.2 Redirect Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7.2. Redirect Addresses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.3 Advertised Subnet Prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7.3. Advertised Subnet Prefixes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.4 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 7.4. Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8. Transition Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 8. Transition Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
9.1 Threats to the Local Link Not Covered by SEND . . . . 49 9.1. Threats to the Local Link Not Covered by SEND . . . . . 44
9.2 How SEND Counters Threats to NDP . . . . . . . . . . . 49 9.2. How SEND Counters Threats to NDP. . . . . . . . . . . . 45
9.2.1 Neighbor Solicitation/Advertisement Spoofing . . 50 9.2.1. Neighbor Solicitation/Advertisement Spoofing. . 45
9.2.2 Neighbor Unreachability Detection Failure . . . 50 9.2.2. Neighbor Unreachability Detection Failure . . . 46
9.2.3 Duplicate Address Detection DoS Attack . . . . . 50 9.2.3. Duplicate Address Detection DoS Attack. . . . . 46
9.2.4 Router Solicitation and Advertisement Attacks . 51 9.2.4. Router Solicitation and Advertisement Attacks . 46
9.2.5 Replay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 9.2.5. Replay Attacks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
9.2.6 Neighbor Discovery DoS Attack . . . . . . . . . 52 9.2.6. Neighbor Discovery DoS Attack . . . . . . . . . 48
9.3 Attacks against SEND Itself . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 9.3. Attacks against SEND Itself . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
10. Protocol Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 10. Protocol Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
10.1 Constants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 10.1. Constants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
10.2 Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 10.2. Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 12. References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 12.1. Normative References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 12.2. Informative References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
A. Contributors and Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Appendices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
B. Cache Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 A. Contributors and Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . 53
C. Message Size When Carrying Certificates . . . . . . . . . . 62 B. Cache Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 63 C. Message Size When Carrying Certificates . . . . . . . . 54
Authors' Addresses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Full Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
IPv6 defines the Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) in RFCs 2461 [7] IPv6 defines the Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) in RFCs 2461 [4]
and 2462 [8]. Nodes on the same link use NDP to discover each and 2462 [5]. Nodes on the same link use NDP to discover each
other's presence, to determine each other's link-layer addresses, to other's presence and link-layer addresses, to find routers, and to
find routers, and to maintain reachability information about the maintain reachability information about the paths to active
paths to active neighbors. NDP is used both by hosts and routers. neighbors. NDP is used by both hosts and routers. Its functions
Its functions include Neighbor Discovery (ND), Router Discovery (RD), include Neighbor Discovery (ND), Router Discovery (RD), Address
Address Autoconfiguration, Address Resolution, Neighbor Autoconfiguration, Address Resolution, Neighbor Unreachability
Unreachability Detection (NUD), Duplicate Address Detection (DAD), Detection (NUD), Duplicate Address Detection (DAD), and Redirection.
and Redirection.
The original NDP specifications called for the use of IPsec to The original NDP specifications called for the use of IPsec to
protect NDP messages. However, the RFCs do not give detailed protect NDP messages. However, the RFCs do not give detailed
instructions for using IPsec for this. In this particular instructions for using IPsec to do this. In this particular
application, IPsec can only be used with a manual configuration of application, IPsec can only be used with a manual configuration of
security associations, due to bootstrapping problems in using IKE security associations, due to bootstrapping problems in using IKE
[22, 18]. Furthermore, the number of such manually configured [19, 15]. Furthermore, the number of manually configured security
security associations needed for protecting NDP can be very large associations needed for protecting NDP can be very large [20], making
[23], making that approach impractical for most purposes. that approach impractical for most purposes.
The SEND protocol is designed to counter the threats to NDP. These The SEND protocol is designed to counter the threats to NDP. These
threats are described in detail in [25]. SEND is applicable in threats are described in detail in [22]. SEND is applicable in
environments where physical security on the link is not assured (such environments where physical security on the link is not assured (such
as over wireless) and attacks on NDP are a concern. as over wireless) and attacks on NDP are a concern.
This document is organized as follows. Section 2 and Section 3 define This document is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 define some
some terminology and present a brief review of NDP, respectively. terminology and present a brief review of NDP, respectively. Section
Section 4 describes the overall approach to securing NDP. This 4 describes the overall approach to securing NDP. This approach
approach involves the use of new NDP options to carry public-key involves the use of new NDP options to carry public key - based
based signatures. A zero-configuration mechanism is used for showing signatures. A zero-configuration mechanism is used for showing
address ownership on individual nodes; routers are certified by a address ownership on individual nodes; routers are certified by a
trust anchor [10]. The formats, procedures, and cryptographic trust anchor [7]. The formats, procedures, and cryptographic
mechanisms for the zero-configuration mechanism are described in a mechanisms for the zero-configuration mechanism are described in a
related specification [14]. related specification [11].
The required new NDP options are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 The required new NDP options are discussed in Section 5. Section 6
describes the mechanism for distributing certification paths to describes the mechanism for distributing certification paths to
establish an authorization delegation chain to a trust anchor. establish an authorization delegation chain to a trust anchor.
Finally, Section 8 discusses the co-existence of secured and Finally, Section 8 discusses the co-existence of secured and
unsecured NDP on the same link and Section 9 discusses security unsecured NDP on the same link, and Section 9 discusses security
considerations for Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND). considerations for SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND).
Out of scope for this document is the use of identity certificates The use of identity certificates provisioned on end hosts for
provisioned on end hosts for authorizing address use, and security of authorizing address use is out of the scope for this document, as is
NDP when the entity defending an address is not the same as the the security of NDP when the entity defending an address is not the
entity claiming that adddress (also known as "proxy ND"). These are same as the entity claiming that address (also known as "proxy ND").
extensions of SEND that may be treated in separate documents should These are extensions of SEND that may be treated in separate
the need arise. documents, should the need arise.
1.1 Specification of Requirements 1.1. Specification of Requirements
In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
of the specification. These words are often capitalized. The key of the specification. These words are often capitalized. The key
words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", and words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", and
"MAY" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [2]. "MAY" are to be interpreted as described in [2].
2. Terms 2. Terms
Authorization Delegation Discovery (ADD) Authorization Delegation Discovery (ADD)
A process through which SEND nodes can acquire a certification A process through which SEND nodes can acquire a certification
path from a peer node to a trust anchor. path from a peer node to a trust anchor.
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
In one method of certificate revocation, an authority periodically In one method of certificate revocation, an authority periodically
issues a signed data structure called the Certificate Revocation issues a signed data structure called the Certificate Revocation
List. This list is a time stamped list identifying revoked List. This is a time-stamped list identifying revoked
certificates, signed by the issuer, and made freely available in a certificates, signed by the issuer, and made freely available in a
public repository. public repository.
Certification Path Advertisement (CPA) Certification Path Advertisement (CPA)
The advertisement message used in the ADD process. The advertisement message used in the ADD process.
Certification Path Solicitation (CPS) Certification Path Solicitation (CPS)
The solicitation message used in the ADD process. The solicitation message used in the ADD process.
Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA) Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA)
A technique [14] whereby an IPv6 address of a node is A technique [11] whereby an IPv6 address of a node is
cryptographically generated using a one-way hash function from the cryptographically generated by using a one-way hash function from
node's public key and some other parameters. the node's public key and some other parameters.
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)
An encoding scheme for data values, defined in [15]. An encoding scheme for data values, defined in [12].
Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) Duplicate Address Detection (DAD)
A mechanism which assures that two IPv6 nodes on the same link are A mechanism assuring that two IPv6 nodes on the same link are not
not using the same address. using the same address.
Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN)
A fully qualified domain name consists of a host and domain name, A fully qualified domain name consists of a host and domain name,
including top-level domain. including the top-level domain.
Internationalized Domain Name (IDN) Internationalized Domain Name (IDN)
Internationalized Domain Names can be used to represent domain Internationalized Domain Names can be used to represent domain
names that contain characters outside the ASCII repertoire. See names that contain characters outside the ASCII set. See RFC 3490
RFC 3490 [12]. [9].
Neighbor Discovery (ND) Neighbor Discovery (ND)
The Neighbor Discovery function of the Neighbor Discovery Protocol The Neighbor Discovery function of the Neighbor Discovery Protocol
(NDP). NDP contains other functions besides ND. (NDP). NDP contains functions besides ND.
Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP)
The IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol [7, 8]. The IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol [7, 8].
The Neighbor Discovery Protocol is a part of ICMPv6 [9]. The Neighbor Discovery Protocol is a part of ICMPv6 [6].
Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD) Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD)
A mechanism used for tracking the reachability of neighbors. A mechanism used for tracking the reachability of neighbors.
Non-SEND node Non-SEND node
An IPv6 node that does not implement this specification but uses An IPv6 node that does not implement this specification but uses
only the Neighbor Discovery protocol defined in RFC 2461 and RFC only the Neighbor Discovery protocol defined in RFCs 2461 and
2462, as updated, without security. 2462, as updated, without security.
Nonce Nonce
An unpredictable random or pseudorandom number generated by a node An unpredictable random or pseudo-random number generated by a
and used exactly once. In SEND, nonces are used to assure that a node and used exactly once. In SEND, nonces are used to assure
particular advertisement is linked to the solicitation that that a particular advertisement is linked to the solicitation that
triggered it. triggered it.
Router Authorization Certificate Router Authorization Certificate
An X.509v3 [10] public key certificate using the profile specified An X.509v3 [7] public key certificate using the profile specified
in Section 6.3.1. in Section 6.3.1.
SEND node SEND node
An IPv6 node that implements this specification. An IPv6 node that implements this specification.
Router Discovery (RD) Router Discovery (RD)
Router Discovery allows the hosts to discover what routers exist Router Discovery allows the hosts to discover what routers exist
on the link, and what subnet prefixes are available. Router on the link, and what subnet prefixes are available. Router
Discovery is a part of the Neighbor Discovery Protocol. Discovery is a part of the Neighbor Discovery Protocol.
Trust Anchor Trust Anchor
Hosts are configured with a set of trust anchors for the purposes Hosts are configured with a set of trust anchors to protect Router
of protecting Router Discovery. A trust anchor is an entity that Discovery. A trust anchor is an entity that the host trusts to
the host trusts to authorize routers to act as routers. A trust authorize routers to act as routers. A trust anchor configuration
anchor configuration consists of a public key and some associated consists of a public key and some associated parameters (see
parameters (see Section 6.5 for a detailed explanation of these Section 6.5 for a detailed explanation of these parameters).
parameters).
3. Neighbor and Router Discovery Overview 3. Neighbor and Router Discovery Overview
The Neighbor Discovery Protocol has several functions. Many of these The Neighbor Discovery Protocol has several functions. Many of these
functions are overloaded on a few central message types, such as the are overloaded on a few central message types, such as the ICMPv6
ICMPv6 Neighbor Advertisement message. In this section we review Neighbor Advertisement message. In this section, we review some of
some of these tasks and their effects in order to understand better these tasks and their effects in order to better understand how the
how the messages should be treated. This section is not normative, messages should be treated. This section is not normative, and if
and if this section and the original Neighbor Discovery RFCs are in this section and the original Neighbor Discovery RFCs are in
conflict, the original RFCs, as updated, take precedence. conflict, the original RFCs, as updated, take precedence.
The main functions of NDP are the following. The main functions of NDP are as follows:
o The Router Discovery function allows IPv6 hosts to discover the o The Router Discovery function allows IPv6 hosts to discover the
local routers on an attached link. Router Discovery is described local routers on an attached link. Router Discovery is described
in Section 6 of RFC 2461 [7]. The main purpose of Router in Section 6 of RFC 2461 [4]. The main purpose of Router
Discovery is to find neighboring routers that are willing to Discovery is to find neighboring routers willing to forward
forward packets on behalf of hosts. Subnet prefix discovery packets on behalf of hosts. Subnet prefix discovery involves
involves determining which destinations are directly on a link; determining which destinations are directly on a link; this
this information is necessary in order to know whether a packet information is necessary in order to know whether a packet should
should be sent to a router or directly to the destination node. be sent to a router or directly to the destination node.
o The Redirect function is used for automatically redirecting a host o The Redirect function is used for automatically redirecting a host
to a better first-hop router, or to inform hosts that a to a better first-hop router, or to inform hosts that a
destination is in fact a neighbor (i.e., on-link). Redirect is destination is in fact a neighbor (i.e., on-link). Redirect is
specified in Section 8 of RFC 2461 [7]. specified in Section 8 of RFC 2461 [4].
o Address Autoconfiguration is used for automatically assigning o Address Autoconfiguration is used for automatically assigning
addresses to a host [8]. This allows hosts to operate without addresses to a host [5]. This allows hosts to operate without
explicit configuration related to IP connectivity. The default explicit configuration related to IP connectivity. The default
autoconfiguration mechanism is stateless. To create IP addresses, autoconfiguration mechanism is stateless. To create IP addresses,
hosts use any prefix information delivered to them during Router hosts use any prefix information delivered to them during Router
Discovery, and then test the newly formed addresses for Discovery and then test the newly formed addresses for uniqueness.
uniqueness. A stateful mechanism, DHCPv6 [21], provides additional A stateful mechanism, DHCPv6 [18], provides additional
autoconfiguration features. autoconfiguration features.
o Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) is used for preventing address o Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) is used for preventing address
collisions [8], for instance during Address Autoconfiguration. A collisions [5]: for instance, during Address Autoconfiguration. A
node that intends to assign a new address to one of its interfaces node that intends to assign a new address to one of its interfaces
first runs the DAD procedure to verify that there is no other node first runs the DAD procedure to verify that no other node is using
using the same address. Since the rules forbid the use of an the same address. As the rules forbid the use of an address until
address until it has been found unique, no higher layer traffic is it has been found unique, no higher layer traffic is possible
possible until this procedure has been completed. Thus, until this procedure has been completed. Thus, preventing attacks
preventing attacks against DAD can help ensure the availability of against DAD can help ensure the availability of communications for
communications for the node in question. the node in question.
o The Address Resolution function allows a node on the link to o The Address Resolution function allows a node on the link to
resolve another node's IPv6 address to the corresponding resolve another node's IPv6 address to the corresponding link-
link-layer address. Address Resolution is defined in Section 7.2 layer address. Address Resolution is defined in Section 7.2 of
of RFC 2461 [7], and it is used for hosts and routers alike. RFC 2461 [4], and it is used for hosts and routers alike. Again,
Again, no higher level traffic can proceed until the sender knows no higher level traffic can proceed until the sender knows the
the link layer address of the destination node or the next hop link layer address of the destination node or the next hop router.
router. Note the source link layer address on link layer frames is Note that the source link layer address on link layer frames is
not checked against the information learned through Address not checked against the information learned through Address
Resolution. This allows for an easier addition of network Resolution. This allows for an easier addition of network
elements such as bridges and proxies, and eases the stack elements such as bridges and proxies and eases the stack
implementation requirements as less information needs to be passed implementation requirements, as less information has to be passed
from layer to layer. from layer to layer.
o Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD) is used for tracking the o Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD) is used for tracking the
reachability of neighboring nodes, both hosts and routers. NUD is reachability of neighboring nodes, both hosts and routers. NUD is
defined in Section 7.3 of RFC 2461 [7]. NUD is defined in Section 7.3 of RFC 2461 [4]. NUD is security
security-sensitive, because an attacker could falsely claim that sensitive, because an attacker could claim that reachability
reachability exists when it in fact does not. exists when in fact it does not.
The NDP messages follow the ICMPv6 message format. All NDP functions The NDP messages follow the ICMPv6 message format. All NDP functions
are realized using the Router Solicitation (RS), Router Advertisement are realized by using the Router Solicitation (RS), Router
(RA), Neighbor Solicitation (NS), Neighbor Advertisement (NA), and Advertisement (RA), Neighbor Solicitation (NS), Neighbor
Redirect messages. An actual NDP message includes an NDP message Advertisement (NA), and Redirect messages. An actual NDP message
header, consisting of an ICMPv6 header and ND message-specific data, includes an NDP message header, consisting of an ICMPv6 header and ND
and zero or more NDP options. The NDP message options are formatted message-specific data, and zero or more NDP options. The NDP message
in the Type-Length-Value format. options are formatted in the Type-Length-Value format.
<------------NDP Message----------------> <------------NDP Message---------------->
*-------------------------------------------------------------* *-------------------------------------------------------------*
| IPv6 Header | ICMPv6 | ND Message- | ND Message | | IPv6 Header | ICMPv6 | ND Message- | ND Message |
| Next Header = 58 | Header | specific | Options | | Next Header = 58 | Header | specific | Options |
| (ICMPv6) | | data | | | (ICMPv6) | | data | |
*-------------------------------------------------------------* *-------------------------------------------------------------*
<--NDP Message header--> <--NDP Message header-->
4. Secure Neighbor Discovery Overview 4. Secure Neighbor Discovery Overview
skipping to change at page 11, line 28 skipping to change at page 9, line 5
certify the authority of routers. A host must be configured with certify the authority of routers. A host must be configured with
a trust anchor to which the router has a certification path before a trust anchor to which the router has a certification path before
the host can adopt the router as its default router. the host can adopt the router as its default router.
Certification Path Solicitation and Advertisement messages are Certification Path Solicitation and Advertisement messages are
used to discover a certification path to the trust anchor without used to discover a certification path to the trust anchor without
requiring the actual Router Discovery messages to carry lengthy requiring the actual Router Discovery messages to carry lengthy
certification paths. The receipt of a protected Router certification paths. The receipt of a protected Router
Advertisement message for which no certification path is available Advertisement message for which no certification path is available
triggers the authorization delegation discovery process. triggers the authorization delegation discovery process.
o Cryptographically Generated Addresses are used to assure that the o Cryptographically Generated Addresses are used to make sure that
sender of a Neighbor Discovery message is the "owner" of the the sender of a Neighbor Discovery message is the "owner" of the
claimed address. A public-private key pair is generated by all claimed address. A public-private key pair is generated by all
nodes before they can claim an address. A new NDP option, the CGA nodes before they can claim an address. A new NDP option, the CGA
option, is used to carry the public key and associated parameters. option, is used to carry the public key and associated parameters.
This specification also allows a node to use non-CGAs with This specification also allows a node to use non-CGAs with
certificates to authorize their use. However, the details of such certificates that authorize their use. However, the details of
use are beyond the scope of this specification and are left for such use are beyond the scope of this specification and are left
future work. for future work.
o A new NDP option, the RSA Signature option, is used to protect all o A new NDP option, the RSA Signature option, is used to protect all
messages relating to Neighbor and Router discovery. messages relating to Neighbor and Router discovery.
Public key signatures protect the integrity of the messages and Public key signatures protect the integrity of the messages and
authenticate the identity of their sender. The authority of a authenticate the identity of their sender. The authority of a
public key is established either with the authorization delegation public key is established either with the authorization delegation
process, using certificates, or through the address ownership process, by using certificates, or through the address ownership
proof mechanism, using CGAs, or both, depending on configuration proof mechanism, by using CGAs, or with both, depending on
and the type of the message protected. configuration and the type of the message protected.
Note: RSA is mandated because having multiple signature algorithms Note: RSA is mandated because having multiple signature algorithms
would break compatibility between implementations or increase would break compatibility between implementations or increase
implementation complexity by forcing implementation of multiple implementation complexity by forcing the implementation of
algorithms and the mechanism to select among them. A second multiple algorithms and the mechanism to select among them. A
signature algorithm is only necessary as a recovery mechanism, in second signature algorithm is only necessary as a recovery
case a flaw is found in RSA. If that happens, a stronger signature mechanism, in case a flaw is found in RSA. If this happens, a
algorithm can be selected and SEND can be revised. The stronger signature algorithm can be selected, and SEND can be
relationship between the new algorithm and the RSA-based SEND revised. The relationship between the new algorithm and the RSA-
described in this document would be similar to that between the based SEND described in this document would be similar to that
RSA-based SEND and Neighbor Discovery without SEND. Information between the RSA-based SEND and Neighbor Discovery without SEND.
signed with the stronger algorithm has precedence over that signed Information signed with the stronger algorithm has precedence over
with RSA, in the same way as RSA-signed information now takes that signed with RSA, in the same way that RSA-signed information
precedence over unsigned information. Implementations of the now takes precedence over unsigned information. Implementations
current and revised specs would still be compatible. of the current and revised specs would still be compatible.
o In order to prevent replay attacks, two new Neighbor Discovery o In order to prevent replay attacks, two new Neighbor Discovery
options, Timestamp and Nonce, are introduced. Given that Neighbor options, Timestamp and Nonce, are introduced. Given that Neighbor
and Router Discovery messages are in some cases sent to multicast and Router Discovery messages are in some cases sent to multicast
addresses, the Timestamp option offers replay protection without addresses, the Timestamp option offers replay protection without
any previously established state or sequence numbers. When the any previously established state or sequence numbers. When the
messages are used in solicitation - advertisement pairs, they are messages are used in solicitation - advertisement pairs, they are
protected using the Nonce option. protected with the Nonce option.
5. Neighbor Discovery Protocol Options 5. Neighbor Discovery Protocol Options
The options described in this section MUST be supported. The options described in this section MUST be supported.
5.1 CGA Option 5.1. CGA Option
The CGA option allows the verification of the sender's CGA. The The CGA option allows the verification of the sender's CGA. The
format of the CGA option is described as follows. format of the CGA option is described as follows:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Pad Length | Reserved | | Type | Length | Pad Length | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
. . . .
. CGA Parameters . . CGA Parameters .
. . . .
skipping to change at page 13, line 34 skipping to change at page 10, line 30
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
. . . .
. Padding . . Padding .
. . . .
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type Type
TBD <To be assigned by IANA for CGA>. 11
Length Length
The length of the option (including the Type, Length, Pad Length, The length of the option (including the Type, Length, Pad Length,
Reserved, CGA Parameters, and Padding fields) in units of 8 Reserved, CGA Parameters, and Padding fields) in units of 8
octets. octets.
Pad Length Pad Length
The number of padding octets beyond the end of the CGA Parameters The number of padding octets beyond the end of the CGA Parameters
field but within the length specified by the Length field. Padding field but within the length specified by the Length field.
octets MUST be set to zero by senders and ignored by receivers. Padding octets MUST be set to zero by senders and ignored by
receivers.
Reserved Reserved
An 8-bit field reserved for future use. The value MUST be An 8-bit field reserved for future use. The value MUST be
initialized to zero by the sender, and MUST be ignored by the initialized to zero by the sender and MUST be ignored by the
receiver. receiver.
CGA Parameters CGA Parameters
A variable length field containing the CGA Parameters data A variable-length field containing the CGA Parameters data
structure described in Section 4 of [14]. structure described in Section 4 of [11].
This specification requires that if both the CGA option and the This specification requires that if both the CGA option and the
RSA Signature option are present, then the public key found from RSA Signature option are present, then the public key found from
the CGA Parameters field in the CGA option MUST be the public key the CGA Parameters field in the CGA option MUST be that referred
referred by the Key Hash field in the RSA Signature option. by the Key Hash field in the RSA Signature option. Packets
Packets received with two different keys MUST be silently received with two different keys MUST be silently discarded. Note
discarded. Note that a future extension may provide a mechanism that a future extension may provide a mechanism allowing the owner
which allows the owner of an address and the signer to be of an address and the signer to be different parties.
different parties.
Padding Padding
A variable length field making the option length a multiple of 8, A variable-length field making the option length a multiple of 8,
containing as many octets as specified in the Pad Length field. containing as many octets as specified in the Pad Length field.
5.1.1 Processing Rules for Senders 5.1.1. Processing Rules for Senders
If the node has been configured to use SEND, the CGA option MUST be If the node has been configured to use SEND, the CGA option MUST be
present in all Neighbor Solicitation and Advertisement messages, and present in all Neighbor Solicitation and Advertisement messages and
MUST be present in Router Solicitation messages unless they are sent MUST be present in Router Solicitation messages unless they are sent
with the unspecified source address. The CGA option MAY be present in with the unspecified source address. The CGA option MAY be present
other messages. in other messages.
A node sending a message using the CGA option MUST construct the A node sending a message using the CGA option MUST construct the
message as follows. message as follows:
The CGA Parameter field in the CGA option is filled in according to The CGA Parameter field in the CGA option is filled according to
the rules presented above and in [14]. The public key in the field is the rules presented above and in [11]. The public key in the
taken from the node's configuration used to generate the CGA; field is taken from the configuration used to generate the CGA,
typically from a data structure associated with the source address. typically from a data structure associated with the source
The address MUST be constructed as specified in Section 4 of [14]. address. The address MUST be constructed as specified in Section
Depending on the type of the message, this address appears in 4 of [11]. Depending on the type of the message, this address
different places: appears in different places, as follows:
Redirect Redirect
The address MUST be the source address of the message. The address MUST be the source address of the message.
Neighbor Solicitation Neighbor Solicitation
The address MUST be the Target Address for solicitations sent for The address MUST be the Target Address for solicitations sent for
Duplicate Address Detection, and the source address of the message Duplicate Address Detection; otherwise it MUST be the source
otherwise. address of the message.
Neighbor Advertisement Neighbor Advertisement
The address MUST be the source address of the message. The address MUST be the source address of the message.
Router Solicitation Router Solicitation
The address MUST be the source address of the message. Note that The address MUST be the source address of the message. Note that
the CGA option is not used when the source address is the the CGA option is not used when the source address is the
unspecified address. unspecified address.
Router Advertisement Router Advertisement
The address MUST be the source address of the message. The address MUST be the source address of the message.
5.1.2 Processing Rules for Receivers 5.1.2. Processing Rules for Receivers
Neighbor Solicitation and Advertisement messages without the CGA Neighbor Solicitation and Advertisement messages without the CGA
option MUST be treated as unsecured, i.e., processed in the same way option MUST be treated as unsecured (i.e., processed in the same way
as NDP messages sent by a non-SEND node. The processing of unsecured as NDP messages sent by a non-SEND node). The processing of
messages is specified in Section 8. Note that SEND nodes that do not unsecured messages is specified in Section 8. Note that SEND nodes
attempt to interoperate with non-SEND nodes MAY simply discard the that do not attempt to interoperate with non-SEND nodes MAY simply
unsecured messages. discard the unsecured messages.
Router Solicitation messages without the CGA option MUST also be Router Solicitation messages without the CGA option MUST also be
treated as unsecured, unless the source address of the message is the treated as unsecured, unless the source address of the message is the
unspecified address. unspecified address.
Redirect, Neighbor Solicitation, Neighbor Advertisement, Router Redirect, Neighbor Solicitation, Neighbor Advertisement, Router
Solicitation, and Router Advertisement messages containing a CGA Solicitation, and Router Advertisement messages containing a CGA
option MUST be checked as follows: option MUST be checked as follows:
If the interface has been configured to use CGA, the receiving If the interface has been configured to use CGA, the receiving
node MUST verify the source address of the packet using the node MUST verify the source address of the packet by using the
algorithm described in Section 5 of [14]. The inputs to the algorithm described in Section 5 of [11]. The inputs to the
algorithm are the claimed address, as defined in the previous algorithm are the claimed address, as defined in the previous
section, and the CGA Parameters field. section, and the CGA Parameters field.
If the CGA verification is successful, the recipient proceeds with If the CGA verification is successful, the recipient proceeds with
more time consuming cryptographic check of the signature. Note a more time-consuming cryptographic check of the signature. Note
that even if the CGA verification succeeds, no claims about the that even if the CGA verification succeeds, no claims about the
validity of the use can be made, until the signature has been validity of the use can be made until the signature has been
checked. checked.
A receiver that does not support CGA or has not specified its use for A receiver that does not support CGA or has not specified its use for
a given interface can still verify packets using trust anchors, even a given interface can still verify packets by using trust anchors,
if a CGA is used on a packet. In such a case, the CGA property of even if a CGA is used on a packet. In such a case, the CGA property
the address is simply left unverified. of the address is simply left unverified.
5.1.3 Configuration 5.1.3. Configuration
All nodes that support the verification of the CGA option MUST record All nodes that support the verification of the CGA option MUST record
the following configuration information: the following configuration information:
minbits minbits
The minimum acceptable key length for public keys used in the The minimum acceptable key length for public keys used in the
generation of CGAs. The default SHOULD be 1024 bits. generation of CGAs. The default SHOULD be 1024 bits.
Implementations MAY also set an upper limit in order to limit the Implementations MAY also set an upper limit for the amount of
amount of computation they need to perform when verifying packets computation needed when verifying packets that use these security
that use these security associations. The upper limit SHOULD be at associations. The upper limit SHOULD be at least 2048 bits. Any
least 2048 bits. Any implementation should follow prudent implementation should follow prudent cryptographic practice in
cryptographic practice in determining the appropriate key lengths. determining the appropriate key lengths.
All nodes that support the sending of the CGA option MUST record the All nodes that support the sending of the CGA option MUST record the
following configuration information: following configuration information:
CGA parameters CGA parameters
Any information required to construct CGAs, as described in [14]. Any information required to construct CGAs, as described in [11].
5.2 RSA Signature Option 5.2. RSA Signature Option
The RSA Signature option allows public-key based signatures to be The RSA Signature option allows public key-based signatures to be
attached to NDP messages. The format of the RSA Signature option is attached to NDP messages. The format of the RSA Signature option is
described in the following diagram: described in the following diagram:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Reserved | | Type | Length | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
| Key Hash | | Key Hash |
skipping to change at page 17, line 30 skipping to change at page 14, line 36
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
. . . .
. Padding . . Padding .
. . . .
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type Type
TBD <To be assigned by IANA for RSA Signature>. 12
Length Length
The length of the option (including the Type, Length, Reserved, The length of the option (including the Type, Length, Reserved,
Key Hash, Digital Signature, and Padding fields) in units of 8 Key Hash, Digital Signature, and Padding fields) in units of 8
octets. octets.
Reserved Reserved
A 16-bit field reserved for future use. The value MUST be A 16-bit field reserved for future use. The value MUST be
initialized to zero by the sender, and MUST be ignored by the initialized to zero by the sender, and MUST be ignored by the
receiver. receiver.
Key Hash Key Hash
A 128-bit field containing the most significant (leftmost) A 128-bit field containing the most significant (leftmost) 128
128-bits of a SHA-1 hash of the public key used for constructing bits of a SHA-1 [14] hash of the public key used for constructing
the signature. The SHA-1 hash is taken over the presentation used the signature. The SHA-1 hash is taken over the presentation used
in the Public Key field of the CGA Parameters data structure that in the Public Key field of the CGA Parameters data structure
is carried in the CGA option. Its purpose is to associate the carried in the CGA option. Its purpose is to associate the
signature to a particular key known by the receiver. Such a key signature to a particular key known by the receiver. Such a key
can be either stored in the certificate cache of the receiver, or can either be stored in the certificate cache of the receiver or
be received in the CGA option in the same message. be received in the CGA option in the same message.
Digital Signature Digital Signature
A variable length field containing a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature, A variable-length field containing a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature,
constructed using the sender's private key, over the the following constructed by using the sender's private key over the following
sequence of octets: sequence of octets:
1. The 128-bit CGA Message Type tag [14] value for SEND, 0x086F 1. The 128-bit CGA Message Type tag [11] value for SEND, 0x086F
CA5E 10B2 00C9 9C8C E001 6427 7C08. (The tag value has been CA5E 10B2 00C9 9C8C E001 6427 7C08. (The tag value has been
generated randomly by the editor of this specification.). generated randomly by the editor of this specification.).
2. The 128-bit Source Address field from the IP header. 2. The 128-bit Source Address field from the IP header.
3. The 128-bit Destination Address field from the IP header. 3. The 128-bit Destination Address field from the IP header.
4. The 8-bit Type, 8-bit Code, and 16-bit Checksum fields from 4. The 8-bit Type, 8-bit Code, and 16-bit Checksum fields from the
the ICMP header. ICMP header.
5. The NDP message header, starting from the octet after the ICMP 5. The NDP message header, starting from the octet after the ICMP
Checksum field and continuing up to but not including NDP Checksum field and continuing up to but not including NDP
options. options.
6. All NDP options preceding the RSA Signature option. 6. All NDP options preceding the RSA Signature option.
The signature value is computed with the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 The signature value is computed with the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
algorithm and SHA-1 hash as defined in [16]. algorithm and SHA-1 hash, as defined in [13].
This field starts after the Key Hash field. The length of the This field starts after the Key Hash field. The length of the
Digital Signature field is determined by the length of the RSA Digital Signature field is determined by the length of the RSA
Signature option minus the length of the other fields (including Signature option minus the length of the other fields (including
the variable length Pad field). the variable length Pad field).
Padding Padding
This variable length field contains padding, as many bytes as This variable-length field contains padding, as many bytes long as
remains after end of the signature. remain after the end of the signature.
5.2.1 Processing Rules for Senders 5.2.1. Processing Rules for Senders
If the node has been configured to use SEND, Neighbor Solicitation, If the node has been configured to use SEND, Neighbor Solicitation,
Neighbor Advertisement, Router Advertisement, and Redirect messages Neighbor Advertisement, Router Advertisement, and Redirect messages
MUST contain the RSA Signature option. Router Solicitation messages MUST contain the RSA Signature option. Router Solicitation messages
not sent with the unspecified source address MUST contain the RSA not sent with the unspecified source address MUST contain the RSA
Signature option. Signature option.
A node sending a message using the RSA Signature option MUST A node sending a message with the RSA Signature option MUST construct
construct the message as follows: the message as follows:
o The message is constructed in its entirety, without the RSA o The message is constructed in its entirety, without the RSA
Signature option. Signature option.
o The RSA Signature option is added as the last option in the o The RSA Signature option is added as the last option in the
message. message.
o The data to be signed is constructed as explained in Section 5.2, o The data to be signed is constructed as explained in Section 5.2,
under the description of the Digital Signature field. under the description of the Digital Signature field.
o The message, in the form defined above, is signed using the o The message, in the form defined above, is signed by using the
configured private key, and the resulting PKCS#1 v1.5 signature is configured private key, and the resulting PKCS#1 v1.5 signature is
put in the Digital Signature field. put in the Digital Signature field.
5.2.2 Processing Rules for Receivers 5.2.2. Processing Rules for Receivers
Neighbor Solicitation, Neighbor Advertisement, Router Advertisement, Neighbor Solicitation, Neighbor Advertisement, Router Advertisement,
and Redirect messages without the RSA Signature option MUST be and Redirect messages without the RSA Signature option MUST be
treated as unsecured, i.e., processed in the same way as NDP messages treated as unsecured (i.e., processed in the same way as NDP messages
sent by a non-SEND node. See Section 8. sent by a non-SEND node). See Section 8.
Router Solicitation messages without the RSA Signature option MUST Router Solicitation messages without the RSA Signature option MUST
also be treated as unsecured, unless the source address of the also be treated as unsecured, unless the source address of the
message is the unspecified address. message is the unspecified address.
Redirect, Neighbor Solicitation, Neighbor Advertisement, Router Redirect, Neighbor Solicitation, Neighbor Advertisement, Router
Solicitation, and Router Advertisement messages containing an RSA Solicitation, and Router Advertisement messages containing an RSA
Signature option MUST be checked as follows: Signature option MUST be checked as follows:
o The receiver MUST ignore any options that come after the first RSA o The receiver MUST ignore any options that come after the first RSA
Signature option. (The options are ignored for both signature Signature option. (The options are ignored for both signature
verification and NDP processing purposes.) verification and NDP processing purposes.)
o The Key Hash field MUST indicate the use of a known public key, o The Key Hash field MUST indicate the use of a known public key,
either one learned from a preceding CGA option in the same either one learned from a preceding CGA option in the same
message, or one known by other means. message, or one known by other means.
o The Digital Signature field MUST have correct encoding, and not o The Digital Signature field MUST have correct encoding and MUST
exceed the length of the RSA Signature option minus the Padding. not exceed the length of the RSA Signature option minus the
Padding.
o The Digital Signature verification MUST show that the signature o The Digital Signature verification MUST show that the signature
has been calculated as specified in the previous section. has been calculated as specified in the previous section.
o If the use of a trust anchor has been configured, a valid o If the use of a trust anchor has been configured, a valid
certification path (see Section 6.3) MUST be known between the certification path (see Section 6.3) between the receiver's trust
receiver's trust anchor and the sender's public key. anchor and the sender's public key MUST be known.
Note that the receiver may verify just the CGA property of a Note that the receiver may verify just the CGA property of a
packet, even if, in addition to CGA, the sender has used a trust packet, even if, in addition to CGA, the sender has used a trust
anchor. anchor.
Messages that do not pass all the above tests MUST be silently Messages that do not pass all the above tests MUST be silently
discarded if the host has been configured to only accept secured ND discarded if the host has been configured to accept only secured ND
messages. The messages MAY be accepted if the host has been messages. The messages MAY be accepted if the host has been
configured to accept both secured and unsecured messages, but MUST be configured to accept both secured and unsecured messages but MUST be
treated as an unsecured message. The receiver MAY also otherwise treated as an unsecured message. The receiver MAY also otherwise
silently discard packets, e.g., as a response to an apparent CPU silently discard packets (e.g., as a response to an apparent CPU
exhausting DoS attack. exhausting DoS attack).
5.2.3 Configuration 5.2.3. Configuration
All nodes that support the reception of the RSA Signature options All nodes that support the reception of the RSA Signature options
MUST allow the following information to be configured for each MUST allow the following information to be configured for each
separate NDP message type: separate NDP message type:
authorization method authorization method
This parameter determines the method through which the authority This parameter determines the method through which the authority
of the sender is determined. It can have four values: of the sender is determined. It can have four values:
trust anchor trust anchor
The authority of the sender is verified as described in Section The authority of the sender is verified as described in
6.3. The sender may claim additional authorization through the Section 6.3. The sender may claim additional authorization
use of CGAs, but that is neither required nor verified. through the use of CGAs, but this is neither required nor
verified.
CGA CGA
The CGA property of the sender's address is verified as The CGA property of the sender's address is verified as
described in [14]. The sender may claim additional authority described in [11]. The sender may claim additional
through a trust anchor, but that is neither required nor authority through a trust anchor, but this is neither
verified. required nor verified.
trust anchor and CGA trust anchor and CGA
Both the trust anchor and the CGA verification is required. Both the trust anchor and the CGA verification is required.
trust anchor or CGA trust anchor or CGA
Either the trust anchor or the CGA verification is required. Either the trust anchor or the CGA verification is required.
anchor anchor
The allowed trust anchor(s), if the authorization method is not The allowed trust anchor(s), if the authorization method is not
set to CGA. set to CGA.
All nodes that support the sending of RSA Signature options MUST All nodes that support sending RSA Signature options MUST record the
record the following configuration information: following configuration information:
keypair keypair
A public-private key pair. If authorization delegation is in use, A public-private key pair. If authorization delegation is in
there must exist a certification path from a trust anchor to this use, a certification path from a trust anchor to this key pair
key pair. must exist.
CGA flag CGA flag
A flag that indicates whether CGA is used or not. This flag may be A flag that indicates whether CGA is used or not. This flag
per interface or per node. (Note that in future extensions of the may be per interface or per node. (Note that in future
SEND protocol, this flag may also be per subnet-prefix.) extensions of the SEND protocol, this flag may also be per
subnet prefix.)
5.2.4 Performance Considerations 5.2.4. Performance Considerations
The construction and verification of the RSA Signature option is The construction and verification of the RSA Signature option is
computationally expensive. In the NDP context, however, hosts computationally expensive. In the NDP context, however, hosts
typically need to perform only a few signature operations as they typically only have to perform a few signature operations as they
enter a link, a few operations as they find a new on-link peer with enter a link, a few operations as they find a new on-link peer with
which to communicate, or Neighbor Unreachability Detection with which to communicate, or Neighbor Unreachability Detection with
existing neighbors. existing neighbors.
Routers are required to perform a larger number of operations, Routers are required to perform a larger number of operations,
particularly when the frequency of router advertisements is high due particularly when the frequency of router advertisements is high due
to mobility requirements. Still, the number of required signature to mobility requirements. Still, the number of required signature
operations is on the order of a few dozen per second, some of which operations is on the order of a few dozen per second, some of which
can be precomputed as explained below. A large number of router can be precomputed as explained below. A large number of router
solicitations may cause higher demand for performing asymmetric solicitations may cause a higher demand for performing asymmetric
operations, although the base NDP protocol limits the rate at which operations, although the base NDP protocol limits the rate at which
responses to solicitations can be sent. multicast responses to solicitations can be sent.
Signatures can be precomputed for unsolicited (multicast) Neighbor Signatures can be precomputed for unsolicited (multicast) Neighbor
and Router Advertisements if the timing of such future advertisements and Router Advertisements if the timing of the future advertisements
is known. Typically, solicited advertisements are sent to the unicast is known. Typically, solicited neighbor advertisements are sent to
address from which the solicitation was sent. Given that the IPv6 the unicast address from which the solicitation was sent. Given that
header is covered by the signature, it is not possible to precompute the IPv6 header is covered by the signature, it is not possible to
solicited advertisements. precompute solicited advertisements.
5.3 Timestamp and Nonce options 5.3. Timestamp and Nonce Options
5.3.1 Timestamp Option 5.3.1. Timestamp Option
The purpose of the Timestamp option is to assure that unsolicited The purpose of the Timestamp option is to make sure that unsolicited
advertisements and redirects have not been replayed. The format of advertisements and redirects have not been replayed. The format of
this option is described in the following: this option is described in the following:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Reserved | | Type | Length | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
+ Timestamp + + Timestamp +
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type Type
TBD <To be assigned by IANA for Timestamp>. 13
Length Length
The length of the option (including the Type, Length, Reserved, The length of the option (including the Type, Length, Reserved,
and Timestamp fields) in units of 8 octets, i.e., 2. and Timestamp fields) in units of 8 octets; i.e., 2.
Reserved Reserved
A 48-bit field reserved for future use. The value MUST be A 48-bit field reserved for future use. The value MUST be
initialized to zero by the sender, and MUST be ignored by the initialized to zero by the sender and MUST be ignored by the
receiver. receiver.
Timestamp Timestamp
A 64-bit unsigned integer field containing a timestamp. The value A 64-bit unsigned integer field containing a timestamp. The value
indicates the number of seconds since January 1, 1970 00:00 UTC, indicates the number of seconds since January 1, 1970, 00:00 UTC,
using a fixed point format. In this format the integer number of by using a fixed point format. In this format, the integer number
seconds is contained in the first 48 bits of the field, and the of seconds is contained in the first 48 bits of the field, and the
remaining 16 bits indicate the number of 1/64K fractions of a remaining 16 bits indicate the number of 1/64K fractions of a
second. second.
Implementation note: This format is compatible with the usual Implementation note: This format is compatible with the usual
representation of time under UNIX, although the number of bits representation of time under UNIX, although the number of bits
available for the integer and fraction parts may vary. available for the integer and fraction parts may vary.
5.3.2 Nonce Option 5.3.2. Nonce Option
The purpose of the Nonce option is to assure that an advertisement is The purpose of the Nonce option is to make sure that an advertisement
a fresh response to a solicitation sent earlier by the node. The is a fresh response to a solicitation sent earlier by the node. The
format of this option is described in the following: format of this option is described in the following:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Nonce ... | | Type | Length | Nonce ... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| | | |
. . . .
. . . .
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type Type
TBD <To be assigned by IANA for Nonce>. 14
Length Length
The length of the option (including the Type, Length, and Nonce The length of the option (including the Type, Length, and Nonce
fields) in units of 8 octets. fields) in units of 8 octets.
Nonce Nonce
A field containing a random number selected by the sender of the A field containing a random number selected by the sender of the
solicitation message. The length of the random number MUST be at solicitation message. The length of the random number MUST be at
least 6 bytes. The length of the random number MUST be selected so least 6 bytes. The length of the random number MUST be selected
that the length of the nonce option is a multiple of 8 octets. so that the length of the nonce option is a multiple of 8 octets.
5.3.3 Processing rules for senders 5.3.3. Processing Rules for Senders
If the node has been configured to use SEND, all solicitation If the node has been configured to use SEND, all solicitation
messages MUST include a Nonce. When sending a solicitation, the messages MUST include a Nonce. When sending a solicitation, the
sender MUST store the nonce internally so that it can recognize any sender MUST store the nonce internally so that it can recognize any
replies containing that particular nonce. replies containing that particular nonce.
If the node has been configured to use SEND, all advertisements sent If the node has been configured to use SEND, all advertisements sent
in reply to a solicitation MUST include a Nonce, copied from the in reply to a solicitation MUST include a Nonce, copied from the
received solicitation. Note that routers may decide to send a received solicitation. Note that routers may decide to send a
multicast advertisement to all nodes instead of a response to a multicast advertisement to all nodes instead of a response to a
specific host. In such case the router MAY still include the nonce specific host. In such a case, the router MAY still include the
value for the host that triggered the multicast advertisement. nonce value for the host that triggered the multicast advertisement.
(Omitting the nonce value may cause the host to ignore the router's (Omitting the nonce value may cause the host to ignore the router's
advertisement, unless the clocks in these nodes are sufficiently advertisement, unless the clocks in these nodes are sufficiently
synchronized so that timestamps function properly.) synchronized so that timestamps function properly.)
If the node has been configured to use SEND, all solicitation, If the node has been configured to use SEND, all solicitation,
advertisement, and redirect messages MUST include a Timestamp. advertisement, and redirect messages MUST include a Timestamp.
Senders SHOULD set the Timestamp field to the current time, according Senders SHOULD set the Timestamp field to the current time, according
to their real time clock. to their real time clocks.
5.3.4 Processing rules for receivers 5.3.4. Processing Rules for Receivers
The processing of the Nonce and Timestamp options depends on whether The processing of the Nonce and Timestamp options depends on whether
a packet is a solicited advertisement. A system may implement the a packet is a solicited advertisement. A system may implement the
distinction in various ways. Section 5.3.4.1 defines the processing distinction in various ways. Section 5.3.4.1 defines the processing
rules for solicited advertisements. Section 5.3.4.2 defines the rules for solicited advertisements. Section 5.3.4.2 defines the
processing rules for all other messages. processing rules for all other messages.
In addition, the following rules apply in all cases: In addition, the following rules apply in all cases:
o Messages received without at least one of the the Timestamp and o Messages received without at least one of the Timestamp and Nonce
Nonce options MUST be treated as unsecured, i.e., processed in the options MUST be treated as unsecured (i.e., processed in the same
same way as NDP messages sent by a non-SEND node. way as NDP messages sent by a non-SEND node).
o Messages received with the RSA Signature option but without the o Messages received with the RSA Signature option but without the
Timestamp option MUST be silently discarded. Timestamp option MUST be silently discarded.
o Solicitation messages received with the RSA Signature option but o Solicitation messages received with the RSA Signature option but
without the Nonce option MUST be silently discarded. without the Nonce option MUST be silently discarded.
o Advertisements sent to a unicast destination address with the RSA o Advertisements sent to a unicast destination address with the RSA
Signature option but without a Nonce option SHOULD be processed as Signature option but without a Nonce option SHOULD be processed as
unsolicited advertisements. unsolicited advertisements.
o An implementation MAY utilize some mechanism such as a timestamp o An implementation MAY use some mechanism such as a timestamp cache
cache to strengthen resistance to replay attacks. When there is a to strengthen resistance to replay attacks. When there is a very
very large number of nodes on the same link, or when a cache large number of nodes on the same link, or when a cache filling
filling attack is in progress, it is possible that the cache attack is in progress, it is possible that the cache holding the
holding the most recent timestamp per sender becomes full. In most recent timestamp per sender will become full. In this case,
this case the node MUST remove some entries from the cache or the node MUST remove some entries from the cache or refuse some
refuse some new requested entries. The specific policy as to new requested entries. The specific policy as to which entries
which entries are preferred over the others is left as an are preferred over others is left as an implementation decision.
implementation decision. However, typical policies may prefer However, typical policies may prefer existing entries to new ones,
existing entries over new ones, CGAs with a large Sec value over CGAs with a large Sec value to smaller Sec values, and so on. The
smaller Sec values, and so on. The issue is briefly discussed in issue is briefly discussed in Appendix B.
Appendix B.
o The receiver MUST be prepared to receive the Timestamp and Nonce o The receiver MUST be prepared to receive the Timestamp and Nonce
options in any order, as per RFC 2461 [7] Section 9. options in any order, as per RFC 2461 [4], Section 9.
5.3.4.1 Processing solicited advertisements 5.3.4.1. Processing Solicited Advertisements
The receiver MUST verify that it has recently sent a matching The receiver MUST verify that it has recently sent a matching
solicitation, and that the received advertisement contains a copy of solicitation, and that the received advertisement contains a copy of
the Nonce sent in the solicitation. the Nonce sent in the solicitation.
If the message contains a Nonce option, but the Nonce value is not If the message contains a Nonce option but the Nonce value is not
recognized, the message MUST be silently discarded. recognized, the message MUST be silently discarded.
Otherwise, if the message does not contain a Nonce option, it MAY be Otherwise, if the message does not contain a Nonce option, it MAY be
considered as an unsolicited advertisement, and processed according considered an unsolicited advertisement and processed according to
to Section 5.3.4.2. Section 5.3.4.2.
If the message is accepted, the receiver SHOULD store the receive If the message is accepted, the receiver SHOULD store the receive
time of the message and the time stamp time in the message, as time of the message and the time stamp time in the message, as
specified in Section 5.3.4.2. specified in Section 5.3.4.2.
5.3.4.2 Processing all other messages 5.3.4.2. Processing All Other Messages
Receivers SHOULD be configured with an allowed timestamp Delta value, Receivers SHOULD be configured with an allowed timestamp Delta value,
a "fuzz factor" for comparisons, and an allowed clock drift a "fuzz factor" for comparisons, and an allowed clock drift
parameter. The recommended default value for the allowed Delta is parameter. The recommended default value for the allowed Delta is
TIMESTAMP_DELTA, for fuzz factor TIMESTAMP_FUZZ, and for clock drift TIMESTAMP_DELTA; for fuzz factor TIMESTAMP_FUZZ; and for clock drift,
TIMESTAMP_DRIFT (see Section 10.2). TIMESTAMP_DRIFT (see Section 10.2).
To facilitate timestamp checking, each node SHOULD store the To facilitate timestamp checking, each node SHOULD store the
following information for each peer: following information for each peer:
o The receive time of the last received and accepted SEND message. o The receive time of the last received and accepted SEND message.
This is called RDlast. This is called RDlast.
o The time stamp in the last received and accepted SEND message. o The time stamp in the last received and accepted SEND message.
This is called TSlast. This is called TSlast.
An accepted SEND message is any successfully verified Neighbor An accepted SEND message is any successfully verified Neighbor
Solicitation, Neighbor Advertisement, Router Solicitation, Router Solicitation, Neighbor Advertisement, Router Solicitation, Router
Advertisement, or Redirect message from the given peer. The RSA Advertisement, or Redirect message from the given peer. The RSA
Signature option MUST be used in such a message before it can update Signature option MUST be used in such a message before it can update
the above variables. the above variables.
Receivers SHOULD then check the Timestamp field as follows: Receivers SHOULD then check the Timestamp field as follows:
o When a message is received from a new peer (i.e., one that is not o When a message is received from a new peer (i.e., one that is not
stored in the cache) the received timestamp, TSnew, is checked and stored in the cache), the received timestamp, TSnew, is checked,
the packet is accepted if the timestamp is recent enough with and the packet is accepted if the timestamp is recent enough to
respect to the reception time of the packet, RDnew: the reception time of the packet, RDnew:
-Delta < (RDnew - TSnew) < +Delta -Delta < (RDnew - TSnew) < +Delta
The RDnew and TSnew values SHOULD be stored into the cache as The RDnew and TSnew values SHOULD be stored in the cache as RDlast
RDlast and TSlast. and TSlast.
o Even if the timestamp is NOT within the boundaries but the message o If the timestamp is NOT within the boundaries but the message is a
is a Neighbor Solicitation message that should be answered by the Neighbor Solicitation message that the receiver should answer, the
receiver, the receiver SHOULD respond to the message. However, if receiver SHOULD respond to the message. However, even if it does
it does respond to the message, it MUST NOT create a Neighbor respond to the message, it MUST NOT create a Neighbor Cache entry.
Cache entry. This allows nodes that have large differences in This allows nodes that have large differences in their clocks to
their clocks to still communicate with each other, by exchanging continue communicating with each other by exchanging NS/NA pairs.
NS/NA pairs.
o When a message is received from a known peer, i.e., one that o When a message is received from a known peer (i.e., one that
already has an entry in the cache, the time stamp is checked already has an entry in the cache), the timestamp is checked
against the previously received SEND message: against the previously received SEND message:
TSnew + fuzz > TSlast + (RDnew - RDlast) x (1 - drift) - fuzz TSnew + fuzz > TSlast + (RDnew - RDlast) x (1 - drift) - fuzz
If this inequality does not hold, the receiver SHOULD silently If this inequality does not hold, the receiver SHOULD silently
discard the message. On the other hand, if the inequality holds, discard the message. If, on the other hand, the inequality holds,
the receiver SHOULD process the message. the receiver SHOULD process the message.
Moreover, if the above inequality holds and TSnew > TSlast, the Moreover, if the above inequality holds and TSnew > TSlast, the
receiver SHOULD update RDlast and TSlast. Otherwise, the receiver receiver SHOULD update RDlast and TSlast. Otherwise, the receiver
MUST NOT update update RDlast or TSlast. MUST NOT update RDlast or TSlast.
As unsolicited messages may be used in a Denial-of-Service attack to As unsolicited messages may be used in a Denial-of-Service attack to
cause the receiver to verify computationally expensive signatures, make the receiver verify computationally expensive signatures, all
all nodes SHOULD apply a mechanism to prevent excessive use of nodes SHOULD apply a mechanism to prevent excessive use of resources
resources for processing such messages. for processing such messages.
6. Authorization Delegation Discovery 6. Authorization Delegation Discovery
NDP allows a node to automatically configure itself based on NDP allows a node to configure itself automatically based on
information learned shortly after connecting to a new link. It is information learned shortly after connecting to a new link. It is
particularly easy to configure "rogue" routers on an unsecured link, particularly easy to configure "rogue" routers on an unsecured link,
and it is particularly difficult for a node to distinguish between and it is particularly difficult for a node to distinguish between
valid and invalid sources of router information, because the node valid and invalid sources of router information, because the node
needs this information before being able to communicate with nodes needs this information before communicating with nodes outside of the
outside of the link. link.
Since the newly-connected node cannot communicate off-link, it cannot As the newly-connected node cannot communicate off-link, it cannot be
be responsible for searching information to help validate the responsible for searching information to help validate the router(s).
router(s); however, given a certification path, the node can check However, given a certification path, the node can check someone
someone else's search results and conclude that a particular message else's search results and conclude that a particular message comes
comes from an authorized source. In the typical case, a router from an authorized source. In the typical case, a router already
already connected beyond the link, can (if necessary) communicate connected beyond the link can communicate if necessary with off-link
with off-link nodes and construct such a certification path. nodes and construct a certification path.
The Secure Neighbor Discovery Protocol mandates a certificate format The Secure Neighbor Discovery Protocol mandates a certificate format
and introduces two new ICMPv6 messages that are used between hosts and introduces two new ICMPv6 messages used between hosts and routers
and routers to allow the host to learn a certification path with the to allow the host to learn a certification path with the assistance
assistance of the router. of the router.
6.1 Authorization Model 6.1. Authorization Model
To protect Router Discovery, SEND requires routers to be authorized To protect Router Discovery, SEND requires that routers be authorized
to act as routers. This authorization is provisioned in both routers to act as routers. This authorization is provisioned in both routers
and hosts: routers are given certificates from a trust anchor and the and hosts. Routers are given certificates from a trust anchor, and
hosts are configured with the trust anchor(s) to authorize routers. the hosts are configured with the trust anchor(s) to authorize
This provisioning is specific to SEND, and does not assume that routers. This provisioning is specific to SEND and does not assume
certificates already deployed for some other purpose can be used. that certificates already deployed for some other purpose can be
used.
The authorization for routers in SEND is twofold: The authorization for routers in SEND is twofold:
o Routers are authorized to act as routers. The router belongs to o Routers are authorized to act as routers. The router belongs to
the set of routers trusted by the trust anchor. All routers in the set of routers trusted by the trust anchor. All routers in
this set have the same authorization. this set have the same authorization.
o Optionally, routers may also be authorized to advertise a certain o Optionally, routers may also be authorized to advertise a certain
set of subnet prefixes. A specific router is given a specific set set of subnet prefixes. A specific router is given a specific set
of subnet prefixes to advertise; other routers have an of subnet prefixes to advertise; other routers have an
authorization to advertise other subnet prefixes. Trust anchors authorization to advertise other subnet prefixes. Trust anchors
may also delegate a certain set of subnet prefixes to someone may also delegate a certain set of subnet prefixes to someone
(such as an ISP), who in turn delegates parts of this set to (such as an ISP) who, in turn, delegates parts of this set to
individual routers. individual routers.
Note that while communicating with hosts, routers typically present Note that while communicating with hosts, routers typically also
also a number of other parameters beyond the above. For instance, present a number of other parameters beyond the above. For instance,
routers have their own IP addresses, subnet prefixes have lifetimes, routers have their own IP addresses, subnet prefixes have lifetimes,
routers control the use of stateless and stateful address and routers control the use of stateless and stateful address
autoconfiguration, and so on. However, the ability to be a router and autoconfiguration. However, the ability to be a router and the
the subnet prefixes are the most fundamental parameters to authorize. subnet prefixes are the most fundamental parameters to authorize.
This is because the host needs to choose a router that it uses as its This is because the host needs to choose a router that it uses as its
default router, and because the advertised subnet prefixes have an default router, and because the advertised subnet prefixes have an
impact on the addresses the host uses. In addition, the subnet impact on the addresses the host uses. The subnet prefixes also
prefixes also represent a claim about the topological location of the represent a claim about the topological location of the router in the
router in the network. network.
Care should be taken if the certificates used in SEND are also used Care should be taken if the certificates used in SEND are also used
to provide authorization in other circumstances, for example with to provide authorization in other circumstances; for example, with
routing protocols. It is necessary to ensure that the authorization routing protocols. It is necessary to ensure that the authorization
information is appropriate for all applications. SEND certificates information is appropriate for all applications. SEND certificates
may authorize a larger set of subnet prefixes than the router is may authorize a larger set of subnet prefixes than the router is
really authorized to advertise on a given interface. For instance, authorized to advertise on a given interface. For instance, SEND
SEND allows the use of the null prefix. This prefix might cause allows the use of the null prefix, which might cause verification or
verification or routing problems in other applications. It is routing problems in other applications. It is RECOMMENDED that SEND
RECOMMENDED that SEND certificates containing the null prefix are certificates containing the null prefix are only used for SEND.
only used for SEND.
Note that end hosts need not be provisioned with their own certified Note that end hosts need not be provisioned with their own certified
public keys, just as Web clients today do not require end host public keys, just as Web clients today do not require end host
provisioning with certified keys. Public keys for CGA generation do provisioning with certified keys. Public keys for CGA generation do
not need to be certified, since such keys derive their ability to not need to be certified, as these keys derive their ability to
authorize operations on the CGA by the tie to the address. authorize operations on the CGA by the tie to the address.
6.2 Deployment Model 6.2. Deployment Model
The deployment model for trust anchors can be either a globally The deployment model for trust anchors can be either a globally
rooted public key infrastructure, or a more local, decentralized rooted public key infrastructure or a more local, decentralized
deployment model similar to the current model used for TLS in Web deployment model similar to that currently used for TLS in Web
servers. The centralized model assumes a global root capable of servers. The centralized model assumes a global root capable of
authorizing routers and, optionally, the address space they authorizing routers and, optionally, the address space they
advertise. The end hosts are configured with the public keys of the advertise. The end hosts are configured with the public keys of the
global root. The global root could operate, for instance, under the global root. The global root could operate, for instance, under the
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) or as a co-operative among Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) or as a co-operative among
Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). However, no such global root Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). However, no such global root
currently exists. currently exists.
In the decentralized model, end hosts are configured with a In the decentralized model, end hosts are configured with a
collection of trusted public keys. The public keys could be issued collection of trusted public keys. The public keys could be issued
from a variety of places, for example: a) a public key for the end from various places; for example, a) a public key for the end host's
host's own organization, b) a public key for the end host's home ISP own organization, b) a public key for the end host's home ISP and for
and for ISPs with which the home ISP has a roaming agreement, or c) ISPs with which the home ISP has a roaming agreement, or c) public
public keys for roaming brokers that act as intermediaries for ISPs keys for roaming brokers acting as intermediaries for ISPs that don't
that don't want to run their own certification authority. want to run their own certification authority.
This decentralized model works even when a SEND node is used both in This decentralized model works even when a SEND node is used both in
networks that have certified routers and in networks that do not. As networks that have certified routers and in networks that do not. As
discussed in Section 8, a SEND node can fall back to the use of a discussed in Section 8, a SEND node can fall back to the use of a
non-SEND router. This makes it possible to start with a local trust non-SEND router. This makes it possible to start with a local trust
anchor even if there is no trust anchor for all possible networks. anchor even if there is no trust anchor for all possible networks.
6.3 Certificate Format 6.3. Certificate Format
The certification path of a router terminates in a Router The certification path of a router terminates in a Router
Authorization Certificate that authorizes a specific IPv6 node to act Authorization Certificate that authorizes a specific IPv6 node to act
as a router. Because authorization paths are not a common practice as a router. Because authorization paths are not a common practice
in the Internet at the time this specification was written, the path in the Internet at the time of this writing, the path MUST consist of
MUST consist of standard Public Key Certificates (PKC, in the sense standard Public Key Certificates (PKC, in the sense of [8]). The
of [11]). The certification path MUST start from the identity of a certification path MUST start from the identity of a trust anchor
trust anchor that is shared by the host and the router. This allows shared by the host and the router. This allows the host to anchor
the host to anchor trust for the router's public key in the trust trust for the router's public key in the trust anchor. Note that
anchor. Note that there MAY be multiple certificates issued by a there MAY be multiple certificates issued by a single trust anchor.
single trust anchor.
6.3.1 Router Authorization Certificate Profile 6.3.1. Router Authorization Certificate Profile
Router Authorization Certificates are X.509v3 certificates, as Router Authorization Certificates are X.509v3 certificates, as
defined in RFC 3280 [10], and SHOULD contain at least one instance of defined in RFC 3280 [7], and SHOULD contain at least one instance of
the X.509 extension for IP addresses, as defined in [13]. The parent the X.509 extension for IP addresses, as defined in [10]. The parent
certificates in the certification path SHOULD contain one or more certificates in the certification path SHOULD contain one or more
X.509 IP address extensions, back up to a trusted party (such as the X.509 IP address extensions, back up to a trusted party (such as the
user's ISP) that configured the original IP address block for the user's ISP) that configured the original IP address block for the
router in question, or delegated the right to do so. The certificates router in question, or that delegated the right to do so. The
for the intermediate delegating authorities SHOULD contain X.509 IP certificates for the intermediate delegating authorities SHOULD
address extension(s) for subdelegations. The router's certificate is contain X.509 IP address extension(s) for subdelegations. The
signed by the delegating authority for the subnet prefixes the router router's certificate is signed by the delegating authority for the
is authorized to advertise. subnet prefixes the router is authorized to advertise.
The X.509 IP address extension MUST contain at least one The X.509 IP address extension MUST contain at least one
addressesOrRanges element. This element MUST contain an addressPrefix addressesOrRanges element. This element MUST contain an
element containing an IPv6 address prefix for a prefix the router or addressPrefix element containing an IPv6 address prefix for a prefix
the intermediate entity is authorized to route. If the entity is that the router or the intermediate entity is authorized to route.
allowed to route any prefix, the used IPv6 address prefix is the null If the entity is allowed to route any prefix, the IPv6 address prefix
prefix, ::/0. The addressFamily element of the containing used is the null prefix, ::/0. The addressFamily element of the
IPAddrBlocks sequence element MUST contain the IPv6 Address Family IPAddrBlocks sequence element MUST contain the IPv6 Address Family
Identifier (0002), as specified in [13] for IPv6 subnet prefixes. Identifier (0002), as specified in [10], for IPv6 subnet prefixes.
Instead of an addressPrefix element, the addressesOrRange element MAY Instead of an addressPrefix element, the addressesOrRange element MAY
contain an addressRange element for a range of subnet prefixes, if contain an addressRange element for a range of subnet prefixes, if
more than one prefix is authorized. The X.509 IP address extension more than one prefix is authorized. The X.509 IP address extension
MAY contain additional IPv6 subnet prefixes, expressed either as an MAY contain additional IPv6 subnet prefixes, expressed as either an
addressPrefix or an addressRange. addressPrefix or an addressRange.
A node receiving a Router Authorization Certificate MUST first check A node receiving a Router Authorization Certificate MUST first check
whether the certificate's signature was generated by the delegating whether the certificate's signature was generated by the delegating
authority. Then the client SHOULD check whether all the authority. Then the client SHOULD check whether all the
addressPrefix or addressRange entries in the router's certificate are addressPrefix or addressRange entries in the router's certificate are
contained within the address ranges in the delegating authority's contained within the address ranges in the delegating authority's
certificate, and whether the addressPrefix entries match any certificate, and whether the addressPrefix entries match any
addressPrefix entries in the delegating authority's certificate. If addressPrefix entries in the delegating authority's certificate. If
an addressPrefix or addressRange is not contained within the an addressPrefix or addressRange is not contained within the
delegating authority's subnet prefixes or ranges, the client MAY delegating authority's subnet prefixes or ranges, the client MAY
attempt to take an intersection of the ranges/subnet prefixes, and attempt to take an intersection of the ranges/subnet prefixes and to
use that intersection. If the resulting intersection is empty, the use that intersection. If the resulting intersection is empty, the
client MUST NOT accept the certificate. If the addressPrefix in the client MUST NOT accept the certificate. If the addressPrefix in the
certificate is missing or is the null prefix, ::/0, the parent prefix certificate is missing or is the null prefix, ::/0, the parent prefix
or range SHOULD be used. If there is no parent prefix or range, the or range SHOULD be used. If there is no parent prefix or range, the
subnet prefixes that the router advertises are said to be subnet prefixes that the router advertises are said to be
unconstrained (see Section 7.3). That is, the router is allowed to unconstrained (see Section 7.3). That is, the router is allowed to
advertise any prefix. advertise any prefix.
The above check SHOULD be done for all certificates in the path. If The above checks SHOULD be done for all certificates in the path. If
any of the checks fail, the client MUST NOT accept the certificate. any of the checks fail, the client MUST NOT accept the certificate.
The client also needs to perform validation of advertised subnet The client also has to perform validation of advertised subnet
prefixes as discussed in Section 7.3. prefixes as discussed in Section 7.3.
Hosts MUST check the subjectPublicKeyInfo field within the last Hosts MUST check the subjectPublicKeyInfo field within the last
certificate in the certificate path to ensure that only RSA public certificate in the certificate path to ensure that only RSA public
keys are used to attempt validation of router signatures, and MUST keys are used to attempt validation of router signatures. Hosts MUST
disregard the certificate for SEND if it does not contain an RSA key. disregard the certificate for SEND if it does not contain an RSA key.
Since it is possible that some public key certificates used with SEND As it is possible that some public key certificates used with SEND do
do not immediately contain the X.509 IP address extension element, an not immediately contain the X.509 IP address extension element, an
implementation MAY contain facilities that allow the prefix and range implementation MAY contain facilities that allow the prefix and range
checks to be relaxed. However, any such configuration options SHOULD checks to be relaxed. However, any such configuration options SHOULD
be off by default. That is, the system SHOULD have a default be switched off by default. The system SHOULD have a default
configuration that requires rigorous prefix and range checks. configuration that requires rigorous prefix and range checks.
The following is an example of a certification path. Suppose that The following is an example of a certification path. Suppose that
isp_group_example.net is the trust anchor. The host has this isp_group_example.net is the trust anchor. The host has this
certificate: certificate:
Certificate 1: Certificate 1:
Issuer: isp_group_example.net Issuer: isp_group_example.net
Validity: Jan 1, 2004 through Dec 31, 2004 Validity: Jan 1, 2004 through Dec 31, 2004
Subject: isp_group_example.net Subject: isp_group_example.net
skipping to change at page 31, line 30 skipping to change at page 28, line 30
Issuer: isp_foo_example.net Issuer: isp_foo_example.net
Validity: Jan 1, 2004 through Dec 31, 2004 Validity: Jan 1, 2004 through Dec 31, 2004
Subject: router_x.isp_foo_example.net Subject: router_x.isp_foo_example.net
Extensions: Extensions:
IP address delegation extension: IP address delegation extension:
Prefixes R1, ..., Rk Prefixes R1, ..., Rk
... possibly other extensions ... ... possibly other extensions ...
... other certificate parameters ... ... other certificate parameters ...
When processing the three certificates, the usual RFC 3280 [10] When the three certificates are processed, the usual RFC 3280 [7]
certificate path validation is performed. Note, however, that at the certificate path validation is performed. Note, however, that when a
time a node is checking certificates received from a router, it node checks certificates received from a router, it typically does
typically does not have a connection to the Internet yet, and so it not have a connection to the Internet yet, and so it is not possible
is not possible to perform an on-line Certificate Revocation List to perform an on-line Certificate Revocation List (CRL) check, if
(CRL) check if such a check is necessary. Until such a check is necessary. Until this check is performed, acceptance of the
performed, acceptance of the certificate MUST be considered certificate MUST be considered provisional, and the node MUST perform
provisional, and the node MUST perform a check as soon as it has a check as soon as it has established a connection with the Internet
established a connection with the Internet through the router. If the through the router. If the router has been compromised, it could
router has been compromised, it could interfere with the CRL check. interfere with the CRL check. Should performance of the CRL check be
Should performance of the CRL check be disrupted or should the check disrupted or should the check fail, the node SHOULD immediately stop
fail, the node SHOULD immediately stop using the router as a default using the router as a default and use another router on the link
and use another router on the link instead. instead.
In addition, the IP addresses in the delegation extension MUST be a In addition, the IP addresses in the delegation extension MUST be a
subset of the IP addresses in the delegation extension of the subset of the IP addresses in the delegation extension of the
issuer's certificate. So in this example, R1, ..., Rs must be a issuer's certificate. So in this example, R1, ..., Rs must be a
subset of Q1,...,Qr, and Q1,...,Qr must be a subset of P1,...,Pk. If subset of Q1,...,Qr, and Q1,...,Qr must be a subset of P1,...,Pk. If
the certification path is valid, then router_foo.isp_foo_example.com the certification path is valid, then router_foo.isp_foo_example.com
is authorized to route the prefixes R1,...,Rs. is authorized to route the prefixes R1,...,Rs.
6.3.2 Suitability of Standard Identity Certificates 6.3.2. Suitability of Standard Identity Certificates
Since deployment of the IP address extension is, itself, not common, As deployment of the IP address extension is, itself, not common, a
a network service provider MAY choose to deploy standard identity network service provider MAY choose to deploy standard identity
certificates on the router to supply the router's public key for certificates on the router to supply the router's public key for
signed Router Advertisements. signed Router Advertisements.
If there is no prefix information further up in the certification If there is no prefix information further up in the certification
path, a host interprets a standard identity certificate as allowing path, a host interprets a standard identity certificate as allowing
unconstrained prefix advertisements. unconstrained prefix advertisements.
If the other certificates do contain prefix information, a standard If the other certificates contain prefix information, a standard
identity certificate is interpreted as allowing those subnet identity certificate is interpreted as allowing those subnet
prefixes. prefixes.
6.4 Certificate Transport 6.4. Certificate Transport
The Certification Path Solicitation (CPS) message is sent by a host The Certification Path Solicitation (CPS) message is sent by a host
when it wishes to request a certification path between a router and when it wishes to request a certification path between a router and
one of the host's trust anchors. The Certification Path one of the host's trust anchors. The Certification Path
Advertisement (CPA) message is sent in reply to the CPS message. Advertisement (CPA) message is sent in reply to the CPS message.
These messages are separate from the rest of Neighbor and Router These messages are kept separate from the rest of Neighbor and Router
Discovery, in order to reduce the effect of the potentially Discovery to reduce the effect of the potentially voluminous
voluminous certification path information on other messages. certification path information on other messages.
The Authorization Delegation Discovery (ADD) process does not exclude The Authorization Delegation Discovery (ADD) process does not exclude
other forms of discovering certification paths. For instance, during other forms of discovering certification paths. For instance, during
fast movements mobile nodes may learn information - including the fast movements, mobile nodes may learn information (including the
certification paths - of the next router from a previous router, or certification paths) about the next router from a previous router, or
nodes may be preconfigured with certification paths from roaming nodes may be preconfigured with certification paths from roaming
partners. partners.
Where hosts themselves are certified by a trust anchor, these Where hosts themselves are certified by a trust anchor, these
messages MAY also optionally be used between hosts to acquire the messages MAY also optionally be used between hosts to acquire the
peer's certification path. However, the details of such usage are peer's certification path. However, the details of such usage are
beyond the scope of this specification. beyond the scope of this specification.
6.4.1 Certification Path Solicitation Message Format 6.4.1. Certification Path Solicitation Message Format
Hosts send Certification Path Solicitations in order to prompt Hosts send Certification Path Solicitations in order to prompt
routers to generate Certification Path Advertisements. routers to generate Certification Path Advertisements.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum | | Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Identifier | Component | | Identifier | Component |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options ... | Options ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
IP Fields: IP Fields:
Source Address Source Address
A link-local unicast address assigned to the sending interface, A link-local unicast address assigned to the sending interface,
or the unspecified address if no address is assigned to the or to the unspecified address if no address is assigned to the
sending interface. sending interface.
Destination Address Destination Address
Typically the All-Routers multicast address, the Solicited-Node Typically the All-Routers multicast address, the Solicited-Node
multicast address, or the address of the host's default router. multicast address, or the address of the host's default router.
Hop Limit Hop Limit
255 255
ICMP Fields: ICMP Fields:
Type Type
TBD <To be assigned by IANA for Certification Path 148
Solicitation>.
Code Code
0 0
Checksum Checksum
The ICMP checksum [9]. The ICMP checksum [6].
Identifier Identifier
A 16-bit unsigned integer field, acting as an identifier to A 16-bit unsigned integer field, acting as an identifier to
help matching advertisements to solicitations. The Identifier help match advertisements to solicitations. The Identifier
field MUST NOT be zero, and its value SHOULD be randomly field MUST NOT be zero, and its value SHOULD be randomly
generated. This randomness does not need to be generated. This randomness does not have to be
cryptographically hard, since its purpose is only to avoid cryptographically hard, as its purpose is only to avoid
collisions. collisions.
Component Component
This 16-bit unsigned integer field is set to 65,535 if the This 16-bit unsigned integer field is set to 65,535 if the
sender desires to retrieve all certificates. Otherwise, it is sender seeks to retrieve all certificates. Otherwise, it is
set to the component identifier corresponding to the set to the component identifier corresponding to the
certificate that the receiver wants to retrieve (see Section certificate that the receiver wants to retrieve (see Sections
6.4.2 and Section 6.4.6). 6.4.2 and 6.4.6).
Valid Options: Valid Options:
Trust Anchor Trust Anchor
One or more trust anchors that the client is willing to accept. One or more trust anchors that the client is willing to accept.
The first (or only) Trust Anchor option MUST contain a DER The first (or only) Trust Anchor option MUST contain a DER
Encoded X.501 Name; see Section 6.4.3. If there is more than Encoded X.501 Name; see Section 6.4.3. If there is more than
one Trust Anchor option, the options past the first one may one Trust Anchor option, the options beyond the first may
contain any type of trust anchor. contain any type of trust anchor.
Future versions of this protocol may define new option types. Future versions of this protocol may define new option types.
Receivers MUST silently ignore any options they do not recognize Receivers MUST silently ignore any options they do not recognize
and continue processing the message. All included options MUST and continue processing the message. All included options MUST
have a length that is greater than zero. have a length greater than zero.
ICMP length (derived from the IP length) MUST be 8 or more octets. ICMP length (derived from the IP length) MUST be 8 or more octets.
6.4.2 Certification Path Advertisement Message Format 6.4.2. Certification Path Advertisement Message Format
Routers send out Certification Path Advertisement messages in Routers send out Certification Path Advertisement messages in
response to a Certification Path Solicitation. response to a Certification Path Solicitation.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum | | Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Identifier | All Components | | Identifier | All Components |
skipping to change at page 35, line 26 skipping to change at page 32, line 44
the link-scoped All-Nodes multicast address. the link-scoped All-Nodes multicast address.
Hop Limit Hop Limit
255 255
ICMP Fields: ICMP Fields:
Type Type
TBD <To be assigned by IANA for Certification Path 149
Advertisement>.
Code Code
0 0
Checksum Checksum
The ICMP checksum [9]. The ICMP checksum [6].
Identifier Identifier
A 16-bit unsigned integer field, acting as an identifier to A 16-bit unsigned integer field, acting as an identifier to
help matching advertisements to solicitations. The Identifier help match advertisements to solicitations. The Identifier
field MUST be zero for advertisements sent to the All-Nodes field MUST be zero for advertisements sent to the All-Nodes
multicast address and MUST NOT be zero for others. multicast address and MUST NOT be zero for others.
All Components All Components
A 16-bit unsigned integer field, used for informing the A 16-bit unsigned integer field, used to inform the receiver of
receiver how many certificates are in the entire path. the number of certificates in the entire path.
A single advertisement SHOULD be broken into separately sent A single advertisement SHOULD be broken into separately sent
components if there is more than one certificate in the path, components if there is more than one certificate in the path,
in order to avoid excessive fragmentation at the IP layer. in order to avoid excessive fragmentation at the IP layer.
Individual certificates in a path MAY be stored and used as Individual certificates in a path MAY be stored and used as
received before all the certificates have arrived; this makes received before all the certificates have arrived; this makes
the protocol slightly more reliable and less prone to the protocol slightly more reliable and less prone to Denial-
Denial-of-Service attacks. of-Service attacks.
Example packet lengths of Certification Path Advertisement Examples of packet lengths of Certification Path Advertisement
messages for typical certification paths are listed in Appendix messages for typical certification paths are listed in Appendix
C. C.
Component Component
A 16-bit unsigned integer field, used for informing the A 16-bit unsigned integer field, used to inform the receiver
receiver which certificate is being sent. which certificate is being sent.
The first message in a N-component advertisement has the The first message in an N-component advertisement has the
Component field set to N-1, the second set to N-2, and so on. Component field set to N-1, the second set to N-2, and so on.
Zero indicates that there are no more components coming in this A zero indicates that there are no more components coming in
advertisement. this advertisement.
The sending of path components SHOULD be ordered so that the The sending of path components SHOULD be ordered so that the
certificate after the trust anchor is sent first. Each certificate after the trust anchor is sent first. Each
certificate sent after the first can be verified with the certificate sent after the first can be verified with the
previously sent certificates. The certificate of the sender previously sent certificates. The certificate of the sender
comes last. The trust anchor certificate SHOULD NOT be sent. comes last. The trust anchor certificate SHOULD NOT be sent.
Reserved Reserved
An unused field. It MUST be initialized to zero by the sender An unused field. It MUST be initialized to zero by the sender
and MUST be ignored by the receiver. and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
Valid Options: Valid Options:
Certificate Certificate
One certificate is provided in each Certificate option, to One certificate is provided in each Certificate option to
establish part of a certification path to a trust anchor. establish part of a certification path to a trust anchor.
The certificate of the trust anchor itself SHOULD NOT be sent. The certificate of the trust anchor itself SHOULD NOT be sent.
Trust Anchor Trust Anchor
Zero or more Trust Anchor options may be included to help Zero or more Trust Anchor options may be included to help
receivers decide which advertisements are useful for them. If receivers decide which advertisements are useful for them. If
present, these options MUST appear in the first component of a present, these options MUST appear in the first component of a
multi-component advertisement. multi-component advertisement.
Future versions of this protocol may define new option types. Future versions of this protocol may define new option types.
Receivers MUST silently ignore any options they do not recognize Receivers MUST silently ignore any options they do not recognize
and continue processing the message. All included options MUST and continue processing the message. All included options MUST
have a length that is greater than zero. have a length that is greater than zero.
ICMP length (derived from the IP length) MUST be 8 or more octets. The ICMP length (derived from the IP length) MUST be 8 or more
octets.
6.4.3 Trust Anchor Option 6.4.3. Trust Anchor Option
The format of the Trust Anchor option is described in the following: The format of the Trust Anchor option is described in the following:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Name Type | Pad Length | | Type | Length | Name Type | Pad Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Name ... | | Name ... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ... Padding | | ... Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type Type
TBD <To be assigned by IANA for Trust Anchor>. 15
Length Length
The length of the option, (including the Type, Length, Name Type, The length of the option (including the Type, Length, Name Type,
Pad Length, and Name fields) in units of 8 octets. Pad Length, and Name fields), in units of 8 octets.
Name Type Name Type
The type of the name included in the Name field. This The type of the name included in the Name field. This
specification defines two legal values for this field: specification defines two legal values for this field:
1 DER Encoded X.501 Name 1 DER Encoded X.501 Name
2 FQDN 2 FQDN
Pad Length Pad Length
The number of padding octets beyond the end of the Name field but The number of padding octets beyond the end of the Name field but
within the length specified by the Length field. Padding octets within the length specified by the Length field. Padding octets
MUST be set to zero by senders and ignored by receivers. MUST be set to zero by senders and ignored by receivers.
Name Name
When the Name Type field is set to 1, the Name field contains a When the Name Type field is set to 1, the Name field contains a
DER encoded X.501 Name identifying the trust anchor. The value is DER encoded X.501 Name identifying the trust anchor. The value is
encoded as defined in [15] and [10]. encoded as defined in [12] and [7].
When the Name Type field is set to 2, the Name field contains a When the Name Type field is set to 2, the Name field contains a
Fully Qualified Domain Name of the trust anchor, for example, Fully Qualified Domain Name of the trust anchor; for example,
"trustanchor.example.com". The name is stored as a string, in the "trustanchor.example.com". The name is stored as a string, in the
DNS wire format, as specified in RFC 1034 [1]. Additionally, the DNS wire format, as specified in RFC 1034 [1]. Additionally, the
restrictions discussed in RFC 3280 [10] Section 4.2.1.7 apply. restrictions discussed in RFC 3280 [7], Section 4.2.1.7 apply.
In the FQDN case, the Name field is an "IDN-unaware domain name In the FQDN case, the Name field is an "IDN-unaware domain name
slot" as defined in [12]. That is, it can contain only ASCII slot", as defined in [9]. That is, it can contain only ASCII
characters. An implementation MAY support internationalized characters. An implementation MAY support internationalized
domain names (IDNs) using the ToASCII operation; see [12] for more domain names (IDNs) using the ToASCII operation; see [9] for more
information. information.
All systems MUST support the DER Encoded X.501 Name. All systems MUST support the DER Encoded X.501 Name.
Implementations MAY support the FQDN name type. Implementations MAY support the FQDN name type.
Padding Padding
A variable length field making the option length a multiple of 8, A variable-length field making the option length a multiple of 8,
beginning after the previous field ends, and continuing to the end beginning after the previous field ends and continuing to the end
of the option, as specified by the Length field. of the option, as specified by the Length field.
6.4.4 Certificate Option 6.4.4. Certificate Option
The format of the certificate option is described in the following: The format of the certificate option is described in the following:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Cert Type | Reserved | | Type | Length | Cert Type | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Certificate ... | Certificate ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ... Padding | | ... Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type Type
TBD <To be assigned by IANA for Certificate>. 16
Length Length
The length of the option, (including the Type, Length, Cert Type, The length of the option (including the Type, Length, Cert Type,
Pad Length, and Certificate fields) in units of 8 octets. Pad Length, and Certificate fields), in units of 8 octets.
Cert Type Cert Type
The type of the certificate included in the Certificate field. The type of the certificate included in the Certificate field.
This specification defines only one legal value for this field: This specification defines only one legal value for this field:
1 X.509v3 Certificate, as specified below 1 X.509v3 Certificate, as specified below
Reserved Reserved
An 8-bit field reserved for future use. The value MUST be An 8-bit field reserved for future use. The value MUST be
initialized to zero by the sender, and MUST be ignored by the initialized to zero by the sender and MUST be ignored by the
receiver. receiver.
Certificate Certificate
When the Cert Type field is set to 1, the Certificate field When the Cert Type field is set to 1, the Certificate field
contains an X.509v3 certificate [10], as described in Section contains an X.509v3 certificate [7], as described in Section
6.3.1. 6.3.1.
Padding Padding
A variable length field making the option length a multiple of 8, A variable length field making the option length a multiple of 8,
beginning after the ASN.1 encoding of the previous field [10, 15] beginning after the ASN.1 encoding of the previous field [7, 15]
ends, and continuing to the end of the option, as specified by the ends and continuing to the end of the option, as specified by the
Length field. Length field.
6.4.5 Processing Rules for Routers 6.4.5. Processing Rules for Routers
A router MUST silently discard any received Certification Path A router MUST silently discard any received Certification Path
Solicitation messages that do not conform to the message format Solicitation messages that do not conform to the message format
defined in Section 6.4.1. The contents of the Reserved field, and of defined in Section 6.4.1. The contents of the Reserved field and of
any unrecognized options, MUST be ignored. Future, any unrecognized options MUST be ignored. Future, backward-
backward-compatible changes to the protocol may specify the contents compatible changes to the protocol may specify the contents of the
of the Reserved field or add new options; backward-incompatible Reserved field or add new options; backward-incompatible changes may
changes may use different Code values. The contents of any defined use different Code values. The contents of any defined options that
options that are not specified to be used with Router Solicitation are not specified to be used with Router Solicitation messages MUST
messages MUST be ignored and the packet processed in the normal be ignored, and the packet processed in the normal manner. The only
manner. The only defined option that may appear is the Trust Anchor defined option that may appear is the Trust Anchor option. A
option. A solicitation that passes the validity checks is called a solicitation that passes the validity checks is called a "valid
"valid solicitation". solicitation".
Routers SHOULD send advertisements in response to valid solicitations Routers SHOULD send advertisements in response to valid solicitations
received on an advertising interface. If the source address in the received on an advertising interface. If the source address in the
solicitation was the unspecified address, the router MUST send the solicitation was the unspecified address, the router MUST send the
response to the link-scoped All-Nodes multicast address. If the response to the link-scoped All-Nodes multicast address. If the
source address was a unicast address, the router MUST send the source address was a unicast address, the router MUST send the
response to the Solicited-Node multicast address corresponding to the response to the Solicited-Node multicast address corresponding to the
source address, except when under load, as specified below. Routers source address, except when under load, as specified below. Routers
SHOULD NOT send Certification Path Advertisements more than SHOULD NOT send Certification Path Advertisements more than
MAX_CPA_RATE times within a second. When there are more MAX_CPA_RATE times within a second. When there are more
solicitations, the router SHOULD send the response to the All-Nodes solicitations, the router SHOULD send the response to the All-Nodes
multicast address regardless of the source address that appeared in multicast address regardless of the source address that appeared in
the solicitation. the solicitation.
In an advertisement, the router SHOULD include suitable Certificate In an advertisement, the router SHOULD include suitable Certificate
options so that a certification path to the solicited trust anchor options so that a certification path can be established to the
can be established (or a part of it, if the Component field in the solicited trust anchor (or a part of it, if the Component field in
solicitation is not equal to 65,535). Note also that a single the solicitation is not equal to 65,535). Note also that a single
advertisement is broken into separately sent components and ordered advertisement is broken into separately sent components and ordered
in a particular way (see Section 6.4.2) when there is more than one in a particular way (see Section 6.4.2) when there is more than one
certificate in the path. certificate in the path.
The anchor is identified by the Trust Anchor option. If the Trust The anchor is identified by the Trust Anchor option. If the Trust
Anchor option is represented as a DER Encoded X.501 Name, then the Anchor option is represented as a DER Encoded X.501 Name, then the
Name must be equal to the Subject field in the anchor's certificate. Name must be equal to the Subject field in the anchor's certificate.
If the Trust Anchor option is represented as an FQDN, the FQDN must If the Trust Anchor option is represented as an FQDN, the FQDN must
be equal to an FQDN in the subjectAltName field of the anchor's be equal to an FQDN in the subjectAltName field of the anchor's
certificate. The router SHOULD include the Trust Anchor option(s) in certificate. The router SHOULD include the Trust Anchor option(s) in
the advertisement for which the certification path was found. the advertisement for which the certification path was found.
If the router is unable to find a path to the requested anchor, it If the router is unable to find a path to the requested anchor, it
SHOULD send an advertisement without any certificates. In this case SHOULD send an advertisement without any certificates. In this case,
the router SHOULD include the Trust Anchor options which were the router SHOULD include the Trust Anchor options that were
solicited. solicited.
6.4.6 Processing Rules for Hosts 6.4.6. Processing Rules for Hosts
A host MUST silently discard any received Certification Path A host MUST silently discard any received Certification Path
Advertisement messages that do not conform to the message format Advertisement messages that do not conform to the message format
defined in Section 6.4.2. The contents of the Reserved field, and of defined in Section 6.4.2. The contents of the Reserved field, and of
any unrecognized options, MUST be ignored. Future, any unrecognized options, MUST be ignored. Future, backward-
backward-compatible changes to the protocol MAY specify the contents compatible changes to the protocol MAY specify the contents of the
of the Reserved field or add new options; backward-incompatible Reserved field or add new options; backward-incompatible changes MUST
changes MUST use different Code values. The contents of any defined use different Code values. The contents of any defined options not
options that are not specified to be used with Certification Path specified to be used with Certification Path Advertisement messages
Advertisement messages MUST be ignored and the packet processed in MUST be ignored, and the packet processed in the normal manner. The
the normal manner. The only defined options that may appear are the only defined options that may appear are the Certificate and Trust
Certificate and Trust Anchor options. An advertisement that passes Anchor options. An advertisement that passes the validity checks is
the validity checks is called a "valid advertisement". called a "valid advertisement".
Hosts SHOULD store certification paths retrieved in Certification Hosts SHOULD store certification paths retrieved in Certification
Path Discovery messages if they start from an anchor trusted by the Path Discovery messages if they start from an anchor trusted by the
host. The certification paths MUST be verified, as defined in Section host. The certification paths MUST be verified, as defined in
6.3, before storing them. Routers send the certificates one by one, Section 6.3, before storing them. Routers send the certificates one
starting from the trust anchor end of the path. by one, starting from the trust anchor end of the path.
Note: except for temporary purposes to allow for message loss and Note: Except to allow for message loss and reordering for temporary
reordering, hosts might not store certificates received in a purposes, hosts might not store certificates received in a
Certification Path Advertisement unless they contain a certificate Certification Path Advertisement unless they contain a certificate
which can be immediately verified either to the trust anchor or to a that can be immediately verified either to the trust anchor or to a
certificate that has been verified earlier. This measure is to certificate that has been verified earlier. This measure is intended
prevent Denial-of-Service attacks, whereby an attacker floods a host to prevent Denial-of-Service attacks, whereby an attacker floods a
with certificates that the host cannot validate and overwhelms memory host with certificates that the host cannot validate and overwhelms
for certificate storage. memory for certificate storage.
Note that caching this information and the implied verification Note that caching this information, and the implied verification
results between network attachments for use over multiple attachments results between network attachments for use over multiple attachments
to the network can help improve performance. But periodic certificate to the network, can help improve performance. But periodic
revocation checks are still needed even with cached results, to make certificate revocation checks are still needed, even with cached
sure that the certificates are still valid. results, to make sure that the certificates are still valid.
The host has a need to retrieve a certification path when a Router The host SHOULD retrieve a certification path when a Router
Advertisement has been received with a public key that is not Advertisement has been received with a public key that is not
available from a certificate in the hosts' cache of certificates, or available from a certificate in the hosts' cache, or when there is no
there is no certification path to the one of the host's trust certification path to one of the host's trust anchors. In these
anchors. In these situations, the host MAY send a Certification Path situations, the host MAY send a Certification Path Solicitation
Solicitation message to retrieve the path. If there is no response message to retrieve the path. If there is no response within
within CPS_RETRY seconds, the message should be retried. The wait CPS_RETRY seconds, the message should be retried. The wait interval
interval for each subsequent retransmission MUST exponentially for each subsequent retransmission MUST exponentially increase,
increase, doubling each time. If there is no response after doubling each time. If there is no response after CPS_RETRY_MAX
CPS_RETRY_MAX seconds, the host abandons the certification path seconds, the host abandons the certification path retrieval process.
retrieval process. If the host receives only a part of a If the host receives only a part of a certification path within
certification path within CPS_RETRY_FRAGMENTS seconds of receiving CPS_RETRY_FRAGMENTS seconds of receiving the first part, it MAY in
the first part, it MAY in addition transmit a Certification Path addition transmit a Certification Path Solicitation message with the
Solicitation message with the Component field set to a value not Component field set to a value not equal to 65,535. This message can
equal to 65,535. This message can be retransmitted using the same be retransmitted by using the same process as for the initial
process as in the initial message. If there are multiple missing message. If there are multiple missing certificates, additional CPS
certificates, additional such CPS messages can be sent after getting messages can be sent after getting a response to first one. However,
a response to first one. However, the complete retrieval process may the complete retrieval process may last at most CPS_RETRY_MAX
last at most CPS_RETRY_MAX seconds. seconds.
Certification Path Solicitations SHOULD NOT be sent if the host has a Certification Path Solicitations SHOULD NOT be sent if the host has a
currently valid certification path from a reachable router to a trust currently valid certification path from a reachable router to a trust
anchor. anchor.
When soliciting certificates for a router, a host MUST send When soliciting certificates for a router, a host MUST send
Certification Path Solicitations either to the All-Routers multicast Certification Path Solicitations either to the All-Routers multicast
address, if it has not selected a default router yet, or to the address, if it has not selected a default router yet, or to the
default router's IP address, if a default router has already been default router's IP address, if a default router has already been
selected. selected.
If two hosts want to establish trust with the CPS and CPA messages, If two hosts want to establish trust with the CPS and CPA messages,
the CPS message SHOULD be sent to the Solicited-Node multicast the CPS message SHOULD be sent to the Solicited-Node multicast
address of the receiver. The advertisements SHOULD be sent as address of the receiver. The advertisements SHOULD be sent as
specified above for routers. However, the exact details are outside specified above for routers. However, the exact details are outside
the scope of this specification. the scope of this specification.
When processing possible advertisements sent as responses to a When processing possible advertisements sent as responses to a
solicitation, the host MAY prefer to process first those solicitation, the host MAY prefer to process those advertisements
advertisements with the same Identifier field value as in the with the same Identifier field value as that of the solicitation
solicitation. This makes Denial-of-Service attacks against the first. This makes Denial-of-Service attacks against the mechanism
mechanism harder (see Section 9.3). harder (see Section 9.3).
6.5 Configuration 6.5. Configuration
End hosts are configured with a set of trust anchors for the purposes End hosts are configured with a set of trust anchors in order to
of protecting Router Discovery. A trust anchor configuration consists protect Router Discovery. A trust anchor configuration consists of
of the following items: the following items:
o A public key signature algorithm and associated public key, which o A public key signature algorithm and associated public key, which
may optionally include parameters. may optionally include parameters.
o A name as described in Section 6.4.3. o A name as described in Section 6.4.3.
o An optional public key identifier. o An optional public key identifier.
o An optional list of address ranges for which the trust anchor is o An optional list of address ranges for which the trust anchor is
authorized. authorized.
If the host has been configured to use SEND, it SHOULD possess the If the host has been configured to use SEND, it SHOULD possess the
above information for at least one trust anchor. above information for at least one trust anchor.
Routers are configured with a collection of certification paths and a Routers are configured with a collection of certification paths and a
collection of certified keys and the certificates containing them, collection of certificates containing certified keys, down to the key
down to the key and certificate for the router itself. Certified keys and certificate for the router itself. Certified keys are required
are required for routers in order that a certification path can be for routers so that a certification path can be established between
established between the router's certificate and the public key of a the router's certificate and the public key of a trust anchor.
trust anchor.
If the router has been configured to use SEND, it should be If the router has been configured to use SEND, it should be
configured with its own key pair and certificate, and at least one configured with its own key pair and certificate, and with at least
certification path. one certification path.
7. Addressing 7. Addressing
7.1 CGAs 7.1. CGAs
By default, a SEND-enabled node SHOULD use only CGAs for its own By default, a SEND-enabled node SHOULD use only CGAs for its own
addresses. Other types of addresses MAY be used in testing, addresses. Other types of addresses MAY be used in testing, in
diagnostics or for other purposes. However, this document does not diagnostics, or for other purposes. However, this document does not
describe how to choose between different types of addresses for describe how to choose between different types of addresses for
different communications. A dynamic selection can be provided by an different communications. A dynamic selection can be provided by an
API, such as the one defined in [24]. API, such as the one defined in [21].
7.2 Redirect Addresses 7.2. Redirect Addresses
If the Target Address and Destination Address fields in the ICMP If the Target Address and Destination Address fields in the ICMP
Redirect message are equal, then this message is used to inform hosts Redirect message are equal, then this message is used to inform hosts
that a destination is in fact a neighbor. In this case the receiver that a destination is, in fact, a neighbor. In this case, the
MUST verify that the given address falls within the range defined by receiver MUST verify that the given address falls within the range
the router's certificate. Redirect messages failing this check MUST defined by the router's certificate. Redirect messages failing this
be treated as unsecured, as described in Section 7.3. check MUST be treated as unsecured, as described in Section 7.3.
Note that base NDP rules prevent a host from accepting a Redirect Note that base NDP rules prevent a host from accepting a Redirect
message from a router that the host is not using to reach the message from a router that the host is not using to reach the
destination mentioned in the redirect. This prevents an attacker from destination mentioned in the redirect. This prevents an attacker
tricking a node into redirecting traffic when the attacker is not the from tricking a node into redirecting traffic when the attacker is
default router. not the default router.
7.3 Advertised Subnet Prefixes 7.3. Advertised Subnet Prefixes
The router's certificate defines the address range(s) that it is The router's certificate defines the address range(s) that it is
allowed to advertise securely. A router MAY, however, advertise a allowed to advertise securely. A router MAY, however, advertise a
combination of certified and uncertified subnet prefixes. Uncertified combination of certified and uncertified subnet prefixes.
subnet prefixes are treated as unsecured, i.e., processed in the same Uncertified subnet prefixes are treated as unsecured (i.e., processed
way as unsecured router advertisements sent by non-SEND routers. The in the same way as unsecured router advertisements sent by non-SEND
processing of unsecured messages is specified in Section 8. Note that routers). The processing of unsecured messages is specified in
SEND nodes that do not attempt to interoperate with non-SEND nodes Section 8. Note that SEND nodes that do not attempt to interoperate
MAY simply discard the unsecured information. with non-SEND nodes MAY simply discard the unsecured information.
Certified subnet prefixes fall into the following two categories: Certified subnet prefixes fall into the following two categories:
Constrained Constrained
If the network operator wants to constrain which routers are If the network operator wants to constrain which routers are
allowed to route particular subnet prefixes, routers should be allowed to route particular subnet prefixes, routers should be
configured with certificates having subnet prefixes listed in the configured with certificates having subnet prefixes listed in the
prefix extension. Routers so configured SHOULD advertise the prefix extension. These routers SHOULD advertise the subnet
subnet prefixes which they are certified to route, or a subset prefixes that they are certified to route, or a subset thereof.
thereof.
Unconstrained Unconstrained
Network operators that do not want to constrain routers this way Network operators that do not want to constrain routers this way
should configure routers with certificates containing either the should configure routers with certificates containing either the
null prefix or no prefix extension at all. null prefix or no prefix extension at all.
Upon processing a Prefix Information option within a Router Upon processing a Prefix Information option within a Router
Advertisement, nodes SHOULD verify that the prefix specified in this Advertisement, nodes SHOULD verify that the prefix specified in this
option falls within the range defined by the certificate, if the option falls within the range defined by the certificate, if the
certificate contains a prefix extension. Options failing this check certificate contains a prefix extension. Options failing this check
are treated as containing uncertified subnet prefixes. are treated as containing uncertified subnet prefixes.
Nodes SHOULD use one of the certified subnet prefixes for stateless Nodes SHOULD use one of the certified subnet prefixes for stateless
autoconfiguration. If none of the advertised subnet prefixes match, autoconfiguration. If none of the advertised subnet prefixes match,
the host SHOULD use a different advertising router as its default the host SHOULD use a different advertising router as its default
router, if available. If the node is performing stateful router, if one is available. If the node is performing stateful
autoconfiguration, it SHOULD check the address provided by the DHCP autoconfiguration, it SHOULD check the address provided by the DHCP
server against the certified subnet prefixes and SHOULD NOT use the server against the certified subnet prefixes and SHOULD NOT use the
address if the prefix is not certified. address if the prefix is not certified.
7.4 Limitations 7.4. Limitations
This specification does not address the protection of NDP packets for This specification does not address the protection of NDP packets for
nodes that are configured with a static address (e.g., PREFIX::1). nodes configured with a static address (e.g., PREFIX::1). Future
Future certification path-based authorization specifications are certification path-based authorization specifications are needed for
needed for such nodes. This specification also does not apply to these nodes. This specification also does not apply to addresses
addresses generated by the IPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration generated by the IPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration from a
using other fixed forms of interface identifiers (such as EUI-64) as fixed interface identifiers (such as EUI-64).
a basis.
It is outside the scope of this specification to describe the use of It is outside the scope of this specification to describe the use of
trust anchor authorization between nodes with dynamically changing trust anchor authorization between nodes with dynamically changing
addresses. Such dynamically changing addresses may be the result of addresses. These addresses may be the result of stateful or
stateful or stateless address autoconfiguration, or through the use stateless address autoconfiguration, or may have resulted from the
of RFC 3041 [20] addresses. If the CGA method is not used, nodes are use of RFC 3041 [17] addresses. If the CGA method is not used, nodes
required to exchange certification paths that terminate in a are required to exchange certification paths that terminate in a
certificate authorizing a node to use an IP address having a certificate authorizing a node to use an IP address having a
particular interface identifier. This specification does not specify particular interface identifier. This specification does not specify
the format of such certificates, since there are currently only a few the format of these certificates, as there are currently only a few
cases where such certificates are provided by the link layer and it cases where they are provided by the link layer, and it is up to the
is up to the link layer to provide certification for the interface link layer to provide certification for the interface identifier.
identifier. This may be the subject of a future specification. It This may be the subject of a future specification. It is also
is also outside the scope of this specification to describe how outside the scope of this specification to describe how stateful
stateful address autoconfiguration works with the CGA method. address autoconfiguration works with the CGA method.
The Target Address in Neighbor Advertisement is required to be equal The Target Address in Neighbor Advertisement is required to be equal
to the source address of the packet, except in the case of proxy to the source address of the packet, except in proxy Neighbor
Neighbor Discovery. Proxy Neighbor Discovery is not supported by this Discovery, which is not supported by this specification.
specification.
8. Transition Issues 8. Transition Issues
During the transition to secured links or as a policy consideration, During the transition to secured links, or as a policy consideration,
network operators may want to run a particular link with a mixture of network operators may want to run a particular link with a mixture of
nodes accepting secured and unsecured messages. Nodes that support nodes accepting secured and unsecured messages. Nodes that support
SEND SHOULD support the use of secured and unsecured NDP messages at SEND SHOULD support the use of secured and unsecured NDP messages at
the same time. the same time.
In a mixed environment, SEND nodes receive both secured and unsecured In a mixed environment, SEND nodes receive both secured and unsecured
messages but give priority to secured ones. Here, the "secured" messages but give priority to secured ones. Here, the "secured"
messages are ones that contain a valid signature option, as specified messages are those that contain a valid signature option, as
above, and "unsecured" messages are ones that contain no signature specified above, and "unsecured" messages are those that contain no
option. signature option.
A SEND node SHOULD have a configuration option that causes it to A SEND node SHOULD have a configuration option that causes it to
ignore all unsecured Neighbor Solicitation and Advertisement, Router ignore all unsecured Neighbor Solicitation and Advertisement, Router
Solicitation and Advertisement, and Redirect messages. This can be Solicitation and Advertisement, and Redirect messages. This can be
used to enforce SEND-only networks. The default for this used to enforce SEND-only networks. The default for this
configuration option SHOULD be that both secured and unsecured configuration option SHOULD be that both secured and unsecured
messages are allowed. messages are allowed.
A SEND node MAY also have a configuration option that causes it to A SEND node MAY also have a configuration option whereby it disables
disable the use of SEND completely, even for the messages it sends the use of SEND completely, even for the messages it sends itself.
itself. The default for this configuration option SHOULD be off; that This configuration option SHOULD be switched off by default; that is,
is, that SEND is used. Plain (non-SEND) NDP nodes will obviously send SEND is used. Plain (non-SEND) NDP nodes will obviously send only
only unsecured messages. Per RFC 2461 [7], such nodes will ignore unsecured messages. Per RFC 2461 [4], such nodes will ignore the
the unknown options and will treat secured messages in the same way unknown options and will treat secured messages in the same way that
as they treat unsecured ones. Secured and unsecured nodes share the they treat unsecured ones. Secured and unsecured nodes share the
same network resources, such as subnet prefixes and address spaces. same network resources, such as subnet prefixes and address spaces.
SEND nodes configured to use SEND at least in their own messages SEND nodes configured to use SEND at least in their own messages
behave in a mixed environment as is explained below. behave in a mixed environment as explained below.
SEND adheres to the rules defined for the base NDP protocol with the SEND adheres to the rules defined for the base NDP protocol, with the
following exceptions: following exceptions:
o All solicitations sent by a SEND node MUST be secured. o All solicitations sent by a SEND node MUST be secured.
o Unsolicited advertisements sent by a SEND node MUST be secured. o Unsolicited advertisements sent by a SEND node MUST be secured.
o A SEND node MUST send a secured advertisement in response to a o A SEND node MUST send a secured advertisement in response to a
secured solicitation. Advertisements sent in response to an secured solicitation. Advertisements sent in response to an
unsecured solicitation MUST be secured as well, but MUST NOT unsecured solicitation MUST be secured as well, but MUST NOT
contain the Nonce option. contain the Nonce option.
o A SEND node that uses the CGA authorization method for protecting o A SEND node that uses the CGA authorization method to protect
Neighbor Solicitations SHOULD perform Duplicate Address Detection Neighbor Solicitations SHOULD perform Duplicate Address Detection
as follows. If Duplicate Address Detection indicates the as follows. If Duplicate Address Detection indicates that the
tentative address is already in use, generate a new tentative CGA. tentative address is already in use, the node generates a new
If after 3 consecutive attempts no non-unique address was tentative CGA. If after three consecutive attempts no non-unique
generated, log a system error and give up attempting to generate address is generated, it logs a system error and gives up
an address for that interface. attempting to generate an address for that interface.
When performing Duplicate Address Detection for the first When performing Duplicate Address Detection for the first
tentative address, accept both secured and unsecured Neighbor tentative address, the node accepts both secured and unsecured
Advertisements and Solicitations received as response to the Neighbor Advertisements and Solicitations received in response to
Neighbor Solicitations. When performing Duplicate Address the Neighbor Solicitations. When performing Duplicate Address
Detection for the second or third tentative address, ignore Detection for the second or third tentative address, it ignores
unsecured Neighbor Advertisements and Solicitations. (The security unsecured Neighbor Advertisements and Solicitations. (The
implications of this are discussed in Section 9.2.3 and [14].) security implications of this are discussed in Section 9.2.3 and
in [11].)
o The node MAY have a configuration option that causes it to ignore o The node MAY have a configuration option whereby it ignores
unsecured advertisements even when performing Duplicate Address unsecured advertisements, even when performing Duplicate Address
Detection for the first tentative address. This configuration Detection for the first tentative address. This configuration
option SHOULD be disabled by default. This is a recovery option SHOULD be disabled by default. This is a recovery
mechanism, in case attacks against the first address become mechanism for cases in which attacks against the first address
common. become common.
o The Neighbor Cache, Prefix List and Default Router list entries o The Neighbor Cache, Prefix List, and Default Router list entries
MUST have a secured/unsecured flag that indicates whether the MUST have a secured/unsecured flag that indicates whether the
message that caused the creation or last update of the entry was message that caused the creation or last update of the entry was
secured or unsecured. Received unsecured messages MUST NOT cause secured or unsecured. Received unsecured messages MUST NOT cause
changes to existing secured entries in the Neighbor Cache, Prefix changes to existing secured entries in the Neighbor Cache, Prefix
List or Default Router List. The Neighbor Cache SHOULD implement a List, or Default Router List. Received secured messages MUST
flag on entries indicating whether the entry is secured. Received cause an update of the matching entries, which MUST be flagged as
secured messages MUST cause an update of the matching entries and secured.
flagging of them as secured.
o Neighbor Solicitations for the purpose of Neighbor Unreachabilty o Neighbor Solicitations for the purpose of Neighbor Unreachability
Detection (NUD) MUST be sent to that neighbor's solicited-nodes Detection (NUD) MUST be sent to that neighbor's solicited-nodes
multicast address, if the entry is not secured with SEND. multicast address if the entry is not secured with SEND.
Upper layer confirmations on unsecured neighbor cache entries Upper layer confirmations on unsecured neighbor cache entries
SHOULD NOT update neighbor cache state from STALE to REACHABLE on SHOULD NOT update neighbor cache state from STALE to REACHABLE on
a SEND node, if the neighbour cache entry has never previously a SEND node if the neighbor cache entry has never previously been
been REACHABLE. This ensures that if an entry spoofing a valid REACHABLE. This ensures that if an entry spoofing a valid SEND
SEND host is created by a non-SEND attacker without being host is created by a non-SEND attacker without being solicited,
solicited, NUD will be done within 5 seconds of use of the entry NUD will be done with the entry for data transmission within five
for data transmission. seconds of use.
As a result, in mixed mode attackers can take over a Neighbor As a result, in mixed mode, attackers can take over a Neighbor
Cache entry of a SEND node for a longer time only if (a) the SEND Cache entry of a SEND node for a longer time only if (a) the SEND
node was not communicating with the victim node so that there is node was not communicating with the victim node, so that there is
no secure entry for it and (b) the SEND node is not currently on no secure entry for it, and (b) the SEND node is not currently on
the link (or is unable to respond). the link (or is unable to respond).
o The conceptual sending algorithm is modified so that an unsecured o The conceptual sending algorithm is modified so that an unsecured
router is selected only if there is no reachable SEND router for router is selected only if there is no reachable SEND router for
the prefix. That is, the algorithm for selecting a default router the prefix. That is, the algorithm for selecting a default router
favors reachable SEND routers over reachable non-SEND ones. favors reachable SEND routers over reachable non-SEND ones.
o A node MAY adopt a router sending unsecured messages, or a router o A node MAY adopt a router sending unsecured messages, or a router
for which secured messages have been received, but for which full for which secured messages have been received but for which full
security checks have not yet been completed, while security security checks have not yet been completed, while security
checking is underway. Security checks in this case include checking is underway. Security checks in this case include
certification path solicitation, certificate verification, CRL certification path solicitation, certificate verification, CRL
checks, and RA signature checks. A node MAY also adopt a router checks, and RA signature checks. A node MAY also adopt a router
sending unsecured messages if a router known to be secured becomes sending unsecured messages if a router known to be secured becomes
unreachable, but SHOULD attempt to find a router known to be unreachable, but because the unreachability may be the result of
secured as soon as possible, since the unreachability may be the an attack it SHOULD attempt to find a router known to be secured
result of an attack. Note that while this can speed up attachment as soon as possible. Note that although this can speed up
to a new network, accepting a router sending unsecured messages or attachment to a new network, accepting a router that is sending
for which security checks are not complete opens the node to unsecured messages or for which security checks are not complete
possible attacks, and nodes that choose to accept such routers do opens the node to possible attacks. Nodes that choose to accept
so at their own risk. The node SHOULD in any case prefer a router such routers do so at their own risk. The node SHOULD, in any
known to be secure as soon as one is available with completed case, prefer a router known to be secure as soon as one is made
security checks. available with completed security checks.
9. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
9.1 Threats to the Local Link Not Covered by SEND 9.1. Threats to the Local Link Not Covered by SEND
SEND does not provide confidentiality for NDP communications. SEND does not provide confidentiality for NDP communications.
SEND does not compensate for an unsecured link layer. For instance, SEND does not compensate for an unsecured link layer. For instance,
there is no assurance that payload packets actually come from the there is no assurance that payload packets actually come from the
same peer against which the NDP was run. same peer against which the NDP was run.
There may be no cryptographic binding in SEND between the link layer There may not be cryptographic binding in SEND between the link layer
frame address and the IPv6 address. On an unsecured link layer that frame address and the IPv6 address. An unsecured link layer could
allows nodes to spoof the link layer address of other nodes, an allow nodes to spoof the link layer address of other nodes. An
attacker could disrupt IP service by sending out a Neighbor attacker could disrupt IP service by sending out a Neighbor
Advertisement with the link layer source address on the frame being Advertisement on an unsecured link layer, with the link layer source
the source address of a victim, a valid CGA address and a valid address on the frame set as the source address of a victim, a valid
signature corresponding to itself, and a Target Link-layer Address CGA address and a valid signature corresponding to itself, and a
extension corresponding to the victim. The attacker could then Target Link-layer Address extension corresponding to the victim. The
proceed to cause a traffic stream to bombard the victim in a DoS attacker could then make a traffic stream bombard the victim in a DoS
attack. This attack cannot be prevented just by securing the link attack. This cannot be prevented just by securing the link layer.
layer.
Even on a secured link layer, SEND does not require that the Even on a secured link layer, SEND does not require that the
addresses on the link layer and Neighbor Advertisements correspond to addresses on the link layer and Neighbor Advertisements correspond.
each other. However, it is RECOMMENDED that such checks be performed However, performing these checks is RECOMMENDED if the link layer
if the link layer technology permits. technology permits.
Prior to participating in Neighbor Discovery and Duplicate Address Prior to participating in Neighbor Discovery and Duplicate Address
Detection, nodes must subscribe to the link-scoped All-Nodes Detection, nodes must subscribe to the link-scoped All-Nodes
Multicast Group and the Solicited-Node Multicast Group for the Multicast Group and the Solicited-Node Multicast Group for the
address that they are claiming for their addresses; RFC 2461 [7]. address that they are claiming as their addresses; RFC 2461 [4].
Subscribing to a multicast group requires that the nodes use MLD Subscribing to a multicast group requires that the nodes use MLD
[19]. MLD contains no provision for security. An attacker could [16]. MLD contains no provision for security. An attacker could
send an MLD Done message to unsubscribe a victim from the send an MLD Done message to unsubscribe a victim from the Solicited-
Solicited-Node Multicast address. However, the victim should be able Node Multicast address. However, the victim should be able to detect
to detect such an attack because the router sends a this attack because the router sends a Multicast-Address-Specific
Multicast-Address-Specific Query to determine whether any listeners Query to determine whether any listeners are still on the address, at
are still on the address, at which point the victim can respond to which point the victim can respond to avoid being dropped from the
avoid being dropped from the group. This technique will work if the group. This technique will work if the router on the link has not
router on the link has not been compromised. Other attacks using MLD been compromised. Other attacks using MLD are possible, but they
are possible, but they primarily lead to extraneous (but not primarily lead to extraneous (but not necessarily overwhelming)
overwhelming) traffic. traffic.
9.2 How SEND Counters Threats to NDP 9.2. How SEND Counters Threats to NDP
The SEND protocol is designed to counter the threats to NDP, as The SEND protocol is designed to counter the threats to NDP, as
outlined in [25]. The following subsections contain a regression of outlined in [22]. The following subsections contain a regression of
the SEND protocol against the threats, to illustrate what aspects of the SEND protocol against the threats, to illustrate which aspects of
the protocol counter each threat. the protocol counter each threat.
9.2.1 Neighbor Solicitation/Advertisement Spoofing 9.2.1. Neighbor Solicitation/Advertisement Spoofing
This threat is defined in Section 4.1.1 of [25]. The threat is that This threat is defined in Section 4.1.1 of [22]. The threat is that
a spoofed message may cause a false entry in a node's Neighbor Cache. a spoofed message may cause a false entry in a node's Neighbor Cache.
There are two cases: There are two cases:
1. Entries made as a side effect of a Neighbor Solicitation or 1. Entries made as a side effect of a Neighbor Solicitation or Router
Router Solicitation. A router receiving a Router Solicitation Solicitation. A router receiving a Router Solicitation with a
with a Target Link-Layer Address extension and the IPv6 source Target Link-Layer Address extension and the IPv6 source address
address not equal to the unspecified address inserts an entry for unequal to the unspecified address inserts an entry for the IPv6
the IPv6 address into its Neighbor Cache. Also, a node performing address into its Neighbor Cache. Also, a node performing
Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) that receives a Neighbor Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) that receives a Neighbor
Solicitation for the same address regards the situation as a Solicitation for the same address regards the situation as a
collision and ceases to solicit for the address. collision and ceases to solicit for the address.
In either case, SEND counters these treats by requiring the RSA In either case, SEND counters these threats by requiring that the
Signature and CGA options to be present in such solicitations. RSA Signature and CGA options be present in these solicitations.
SEND nodes can send Router Solicitation messages with a CGA SEND nodes can send Router Solicitation messages with a CGA source
source address and a CGA option, which the router can verify, so address and a CGA option, which the router can verify, so that the
the Neighbor Cache binding is correct. If a SEND node must send Neighbor Cache binding is correct. If a SEND node must send a
a Router Solicitation with the unspecified address, the router Router Solicitation with the unspecified address, the router will
will not update its Neighbor Cache, as per base NDP. not update its Neighbor Cache, as per base NDP.
2. Entries made as a result of a Neighbor Advertisement message. 2. Entries made as a result of a Neighbor Advertisement message.
SEND counters this threat by requiring the RSA Signature and CGA SEND counters this threat by requiring that the RSA Signature and
options to be present in these advertisements. CGA options be present in these advertisements.
See also Section 9.2.5, below, for discussion about replay protection Also see Section 9.2.5, below, for discussion about replay protection
and timestamps. and timestamps.
9.2.2 Neighbor Unreachability Detection Failure 9.2.2. Neighbor Unreachability Detection Failure
This attack is described in Section 4.1.2 of [25]. SEND counters This attack is described in Section 4.1.2 of [22]. SEND counters it
this attack by requiring a node responding to Neighbor Solicitations by requiring that a node responding to Neighbor Solicitations sent as
sent as NUD probes to include an RSA Signature option and proof of NUD probes include an RSA Signature option and proof of authorization
authorization to use the interface identifier in the address being to use the interface identifier in the address being probed. If
probed. If these prerequisites are not met, the node performing NUD these prerequisites are not met, the node performing NUD discards the
discards the responses. responses.
9.2.3 Duplicate Address Detection DoS Attack 9.2.3. Duplicate Address Detection DoS Attack
This attack is described in Section 4.1.3 of [25]. SEND counters This attack is described in Section 4.1.3 of [22]. SEND counters
this attack by requiring the Neighbor Advertisements sent as this attack by requiring that the Neighbor Advertisements sent as
responses to DAD to include an RSA Signature option and proof of responses to DAD include an RSA Signature option and proof of
authorization to use the interface identifier in the address being authorization to use the interface identifier in the address being
tested. If these prerequisites are not met, the node performing DAD tested. If these prerequisites are not met, the node performing DAD
discards the responses. discards the responses.
When a SEND node is performing DAD, it may listen for address When a SEND node performs DAD, it may listen for address collisions
collisions from non-SEND nodes for the first address it generates, from non-SEND nodes for the first address it generates, but not for
but not for new attempts. This protects the SEND node from DAD DoS new attempts. This protects the SEND node from DAD DoS attacks by
attacks by non-SEND nodes or attackers simulating non-SEND nodes, at non-SEND nodes or attackers simulating non-SEND nodes, at the cost of
the cost of a potential address collision between a SEND node and a a potential address collision between a SEND node and a non-SEND
non-SEND node. The probability and effects of such an address node. The probability and effects of such an address collision are
collision are discussed in [14]. discussed in [11].
9.2.4 Router Solicitation and Advertisement Attacks 9.2.4. Router Solicitation and Advertisement Attacks
These attacks are described in Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.4, 4.2.5, 4.2.6, These attacks are described in Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.4, 4.2.5, 4.2.6,
and 4.2.7 of [25]. SEND counters these attacks by requiring Router and 4.2.7 of [22]. SEND counters them by requiring that Router
Advertisements to contain an RSA Signature option, and that the Advertisements contain an RSA Signature option, and that the
signature is calculated using the public key of a node that can prove signature is calculated by using the public key of a node that can
its authorization to route the subnet subnet prefixes contained in prove its authorization to route the subnet prefixes contained in any
any Prefix Information Options. The router proves its authorization Prefix Information Options. The router proves its authorization by
by showing a certificate containing the specific prefix or the showing a certificate containing the specific prefix or an indication
indication that the router is allowed to route any prefix. A Router that the router is allowed to route any prefix. A Router
Advertisement without these protections is discarded. Advertisement without these protections is discarded.
SEND does not protect against brute force attacks on the router, such SEND does not protect against brute force attacks on the router, such
as DoS attacks, or compromise of the router, as described in Sections as DoS attacks, or against compromise of the router, as described in
4.4.2 and 4.4.3 of [25]. Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 of [22].
9.2.5 Replay Attacks 9.2.5. Replay Attacks
This attack is described in Section 4.3.1 of [25]. SEND protects This attack is described in Section 4.3.1 of [22]. SEND protects
against attacks in Router Solicitation/Router Advertisement and against attacks in Router Solicitation/Router Advertisement and
Neighbor Solicitation/Neighbor Advertisement transactions by Neighbor Solicitation/Neighbor Advertisement transactions by
including a Nonce option in the solicitation and requiring the including a Nonce option in the solicitation and requiring that the
advertisement to include a matching option. Together with the advertisement include a matching option. Together with the
signatures this forms a challenge-response protocol. signatures, this forms a challenge-response protocol.
SEND protects against attacks from unsolicited messages such as SEND protects against attacks from unsolicited messages such as
Neighbor Advertisements, Router Advertisements, and Redirects by Neighbor Advertisements, Router Advertisements, and Redirects by
including a Timestamp option. The following security issues are including a Timestamp option. The following security issues are
relevant only for unsolicited messages: relevant only for unsolicited messages:
o A window of vulnerability for replay attacks exists until the o A window of vulnerability for replay attacks exists until the
timestamp expires. timestamp expires.
However, such vulnerabilities are only useful for attackers if the However, such vulnerabilities are only useful for attackers if the
advertised parameters change during the window. While some advertised parameters change during the window. Although some
parameters (such as the remaining lifetime of a prefix) change parameters (such as the remaining lifetime of a prefix) change
often, radical changes typically happen only in the context of often, radical changes typically happen only in the context of
some special case, such as switching to a new link layer address some special case, such as switching to a new link layer address
due to a broken interface adapter. due to a broken interface adapter.
SEND nodes are also protected against replay attacks as long as SEND nodes are also protected against replay attacks as long as
they cache the state created by the message containing the they cache the state created by the message containing the
timestamp. The cached state allows the node to protect itself timestamp. The cached state allows the node to protect itself
against replayed messages. However, once the node flushes the against replayed messages. However, once the node flushes the
state for whatever reason, an attacker can re-create the state by state for whatever reason, an attacker can re-create the state by
replaying an old message while the timestamp is still valid. replaying an old message while the timestamp is still valid.
Since most SEND nodes are likely to use fairly coarse grained Because most SEND nodes are likely to use fairly coarse-grained
timestamps, as explained in Section 5.3.1, this may affect some timestamps, as explained in Section 5.3.1, this may affect some
nodes. nodes.
o Attacks against time synchronization protocols such as NTP [26] o Attacks against time synchronization protocols such as NTP [23]
may cause SEND nodes to have an incorrect timestamp value. This may cause SEND nodes to have an incorrect timestamp value. This
can be used to launch replay attacks even outside the normal can be used to launch replay attacks, even outside the normal
window of vulnerability. To protect against such attacks, it is window of vulnerability. To protect against these attacks, it is
recommended that SEND nodes keep independently maintained clocks, recommended that SEND nodes keep independently maintained clocks
or apply suitable security measures for the time synchronization or apply suitable security measures for the time synchronization
protocols. protocols.
9.2.6 Neighbor Discovery DoS Attack 9.2.6. Neighbor Discovery DoS Attack
This attack is described in Section 4.3.2 of [25]. In this attack, This attack is described in Section 4.3.2 of [22]. In it, the
the attacker bombards the router with packets for fictitious attacker bombards the router with packets for fictitious addresses on
addresses on the link, causing the router to busy itself with the link, causing the router to busy itself by performing Neighbor
performing Neighbor Solicitations for addresses that do not exist. Solicitations for addresses that do not exist. SEND does not address
SEND does not address this threat because it can be addressed by this threat because it can be addressed by techniques such as rate
techniques such as rate limiting Neighbor Solicitations, restricting limiting Neighbor Solicitations, restricting the amount of state
the amount of state reserved for unresolved solicitations, and clever reserved for unresolved solicitations, and clever cache management.
cache management. These are all techniques involved in implementing These are all techniques involved in implementing Neighbor Discovery
Neighbor Discovery on the router. on the router.
9.3 Attacks against SEND Itself 9.3. Attacks against SEND Itself
The CGAs have a 59-bit hash value. The security of the CGA mechanism The CGAs have a 59-bit hash value. The security of the CGA mechanism
has been discussed in [14]. has been discussed in [11].
Some Denial-of-Service attacks against NDP and SEND itself remain. Some Denial-of-Service attacks remain against NDP and SEND itself.
For instance, an attacker may try to produce a very high number of For instance, an attacker may try to produce a very high number of
packets that a victim host or router has to verify using asymmetric packets that a victim host or router has to verify by using
methods. While safeguards are required to prevent an excessive use asymmetric methods. Although safeguards are required to prevent an
of resources, this can still render SEND non-operational. excessive use of resources, this can still render SEND non-
operational.
When CGA protection is used, SEND deals with the DoS attacks using When CGA protection is used, SEND deals with the DoS attacks by using
the verification process described in Section 5.2.2. In this process, the verification process described in Section 5.2.2. In this
a simple hash verification of the CGA property of the address is process, a simple hash verification of the CGA property of the
performed before performing the more expensive signature address is performed before the more expensive signature
verification. However, even if the CGA verification succeeds, no verification. However, even if the CGA verification succeeds, no
claims about the validity of the message can be made, until the claims about the validity of the message can be made until the
signature has been checked. signature has been checked.
When trust anchors and certificates are used for address validation When trust anchors and certificates are used for address validation
in SEND, the defenses are not quite as effective. Implementations in SEND, the defenses are not quite as effective. Implementations
SHOULD track the resources devoted to the processing of packets SHOULD track the resources devoted to the processing of packets
received with the RSA Signature option, and start selectively received with the RSA Signature option and start selectively
discarding packets if too many resources are spent. Implementations discarding packets if too many resources are spent. Implementations
MAY also first discard packets that are not protected with CGA. MAY also first discard packets that are not protected with CGA.
The Authorization Delegation Discovery process may also be vulnerable The Authorization Delegation Discovery process may also be vulnerable
to Denial-of-Service attacks. An attack may target a router by to Denial-of-Service attacks. An attack may target a router by
requesting a large number of certification paths to be discovered for requesting that a large number of certification paths be discovered
different trust anchors. Routers SHOULD defend against such attacks for different trust anchors. Routers SHOULD defend against such
by caching discovered information (including negative responses) and attacks by caching discovered information (including negative
by limiting the number of different discovery processes in which they responses) and by limiting the number of different discovery
engage. processes in which they engage.
Attackers may also target hosts by sending a large number of Attackers may also target hosts by sending a large number of
unnecessary certification paths, forcing hosts to spend useless unnecessary certification paths, forcing hosts to spend useless
memory and verification resources for them. Hosts can defend against memory and verification resources on them. Hosts can defend against
such attacks by limiting the amount of resources devoted to the such attacks by limiting the amount of resources devoted to the
certification paths and their verification. Hosts SHOULD also certification paths and their verification. Hosts SHOULD also
prioritize advertisements sent as a response to solicitations the prioritize advertisements sent as a response to solicitations the
hosts have sent above unsolicited advertisements. hosts have sent about unsolicited advertisements.
10. Protocol Values 10. Protocol Values
10.1 Constants 10.1. Constants
Host constants: Host constants:
CPS_RETRY 1 second CPS_RETRY 1 second
CPS_RETRY_FRAGMENTS 2 seconds CPS_RETRY_FRAGMENTS 2 seconds
CPS_RETRY_MAX 15 seconds CPS_RETRY_MAX 15 seconds
Router constants: Router constants:
MAX_CPA_RATE 10 times per second MAX_CPA_RATE 10 times per second
10.2 Variables 10.2. Variables
TIMESTAMP_DELTA 300 seconds (5 minutes) TIMESTAMP_DELTA 300 seconds (5 minutes)
TIMESTAMP_FUZZ 1 second TIMESTAMP_FUZZ 1 second
TIMESTAMP_DRIFT 1 % (0.01) TIMESTAMP_DRIFT 1 % (0.01)
11. IANA Considerations 11. IANA Considerations
This document defines two new ICMP message types, used in This document defines two new ICMP message types, used in
Authorization Delegation Discovery. These messages must be assigned Authorization Delegation Discovery. These messages must be assigned
ICMPv6 type numbers from the informational message range: ICMPv6 type numbers from the informational message range:
o The Certification Path Solicitation message, described in Section o The Certification Path Solicitation message (148), described in
6.4.1. Section 6.4.1.
o The Certification Path Advertisement message, described in Section o The Certification Path Advertisement message (149), described in
6.4.2. Section 6.4.2.
This document defines six new Neighbor Discovery Protocol [7] This document defines six new Neighbor Discovery Protocol [4]
options, which must be assigned Option Type values within the option options, which must be assigned Option Type values within the option
numbering space for Neighbor Discovery Protocol messages: numbering space for Neighbor Discovery Protocol messages:
o The CGA option, described in Section 5.1. o The CGA option (11), described in Section 5.1.
o The RSA Signature option, described in Section 5.2. o The RSA Signature option (12), described in Section 5.2.
o The Timestamp option, described in Section 5.3.1. o The Timestamp option (13), described in Section 5.3.1.
o The Nonce option, described in Section 5.3.2. o The Nonce option (14), described in Section 5.3.2.
o The Trust Anchor option, described in Section 6.4.3. o The Trust Anchor option (15), described in Section 6.4.3.
o The Certificate option, described in Section 6.4.4. o The Certificate option (16), described in Section 6.4.4.
This document defines a new 128-bit value under the CGA Message Type This document defines a new 128-bit value under the CGA Message Type
[14] namespace, 0x086F CA5E 10B2 00C9 9C8C E001 6427 7C08. [11] namespace, 0x086F CA5E 10B2 00C9 9C8C E001 6427 7C08.
This document defines a new name space for the Name Type field in the This document defines a new name space for the Name Type field in the
Trust Anchor option. Future values of this field can be allocated Trust Anchor option. Future values of this field can be allocated by
using Standards Action [6]. The current values for this field are: using Standards Action [3]. The current values for this field are
1 DER Encoded X.501 Name 1 DER Encoded X.501 Name
2 FQDN 2 FQDN
Another new name space is allocated for the Cert Type field in the Another new name space is allocated for the Cert Type field in the
Certificate option. Future values of this field can be allocated Certificate option. Future values of this field can be allocated by
using Standards Action [6]. The current values for this field are: using Standards Action [3]. The current values for this field are
1 X.509v3 Certificate 1 X.509v3 Certificate
Normative References 12. References
12.1. Normative References
[1] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", STD [1] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", STD
13, RFC 1034, November 1987. 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[2] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement [2] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[3] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the [3] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
[4] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header", RFC 2402,
November 1998.
[5] Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation
for ISAKMP", RFC 2407, November 1998.
[6] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, October Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, October
1998. 1998.
[7] Narten, T., Nordmark, E. and W. Simpson, "Neighbor Discovery [4] Narten, T., Nordmark, E. and W. Simpson, "Neighbor Discovery
for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 2461, December 1998. for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 2461, December 1998.
[8] Thomson, S. and T. Narten, "IPv6 Stateless Address [5] Thomson, S. and T. Narten, "IPv6 Stateless Address
Autoconfiguration", RFC 2462, December 1998. Autoconfiguration", RFC 2462, December 1998.
[9] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Internet Control Message Protocol [6] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Internet Control Message Protocol
(ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification", RFC 2463, December 1998. Specification", RFC 2463, December 1998.
[10] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W. and D. Solo, "Internet X.509 [7] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W. and D. Solo, "Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, April 2002. Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, April 2002.
[11] Farrell, S. and R. Housley, "An Internet Attribute Certificate [8] Farrell, S. and R. Housley, "An Internet Attribute Certificate
Profile for Authorization", RFC 3281, April 2002. Profile for Authorization", RFC 3281, April 2002.
[12] Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P. and A. Costello, "Internationalizing [9] Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P. and A. Costello, "Internationalizing
Domain Names in Applications (IDNA)", RFC 3490, March 2003. Domain Names in Applications (IDNA)", RFC 3490, March 2003.
[13] Lynn, C., Kent, S. and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP [10] Lynn, C., Kent, S. and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
draft-ietf-pkix-x509-ipaddr-as-extn-03 (work in progress),
September 2003.
[14] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)", [11] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)", RFC
draft-ietf-send-cga-06 (work in progress), April 2004. 3972, March 2005.
[15] International Telecommunications Union, "Information Technology [12] International Telecommunications Union, "Information Technology
- ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules
(BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, July 2002. Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, July 2002.
[16] RSA Laboratories, "RSA Encryption Standard, Version 2.1", PKCS [13] RSA Laboratories, "RSA Encryption Standard, Version 2.1", PKCS
1, November 2002. 1, November 2002.
[17] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash [14] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash
Standard", FIPS PUB 180-1, April 1995, <http:// Standard", FIPS PUB 180-1, April 1995,
www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip180-1.htm>. <http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip180-1.htm>.
Informative References 12.2. Informative References
[18] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)", [15] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
RFC 2409, November 1998. RFC 2409, November 1998.
[19] Deering, S., Fenner, W. and B. Haberman, "Multicast Listener [16] Deering, S., Fenner, W. and B. Haberman, "Multicast Listener
Discovery (MLD) for IPv6", RFC 2710, October 1999. Discovery (MLD) for IPv6", RFC 2710, October 1999.
[20] Narten, T. and R. Draves, "Privacy Extensions for Stateless [17] Narten, T. and R. Draves, "Privacy Extensions for Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 3041, January 2001. Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 3041, January 2001.
[21] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C. and M. [18] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C. and M.
Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6
(DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003. (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.
[22] Arkko, J., "Effects of ICMPv6 on IKE and IPsec Policies", [19] Arkko, J., "Effects of ICMPv6 on IKE and IPsec Policies", Work
draft-arkko-icmpv6-ike-effects-02 (work in progress), March in Progress, March 2003.
2003.
[23] Arkko, J., "Manual SA Configuration for IPv6 Link Local [20] Arkko, J., "Manual SA Configuration for IPv6 Link Local
Messages", draft-arkko-manual-icmpv6-sas-01 (work in progress), Messages", Work in Progress, June 2002.
June 2002.
[24] Nordmark, E., Chakrabarti, S. and J. Laganier, "IPv6 Socket API [21] Nordmark, E., Chakrabarti, S. and J. Laganier, "IPv6 Socket API
for Address Selection", draft-chakrabarti-ipv6-addrselect-02 for Address Selection", Work in Progress, October 2003.
(work in progress), October 2003.
[25] Nikander, P., Kempf, J. and E. Nordmark, "IPv6 Neighbor [22] Nikander, P., Kempf, J., and E. Nordmark, "IPv6 Neighbor
Discovery trust models and threats", draft-ietf-send-psreq-04 Discovery (ND) Trust Models and Threats", RFC 3756, May 2004.
(work in progress), October 2003.
[26] Bishop, M., "A Security Analysis of the NTP Protocol", Sixth [23] Bishop, M., "A Security Analysis of the NTP Protocol", Sixth
Annual Computer Security Conference Proceedings, December 1990. Annual Computer Security Conference Proceedings, December 1990.
Appendix A. Contributors and Acknowledgments
Tuomas Aura contributed the transition mechanism specification in
Section 8. Jonathan Trostle contributed the certification path
example in Section 6.3.1. Bill Sommerfeld was involved with much of
the early design work.
The authors would also like to thank Tuomas Aura, Bill Sommerfeld,
Erik Nordmark, Gabriel Montenegro, Pasi Eronen, Greg Daley, Jon Wood,
Julien Laganier, Francis Dupont, Pekka Savola, Wenxiao He, Valtteri
Niemi, Mike Roe, Russ Housley, Thomas Narten, and Steven Bellovin for
interesting discussions in this problem space and for feedback
regarding the SEND protocol.
Appendix B. Cache Management
In this section, we outline a cache management algorithm that allows
a node to remain partially functional even under a cache-filling DoS
attack. This appendix is informational, and real implementations
SHOULD use different algorithms in order to avoid the dangers of a
mono-cultural code.
There are at least two distinct cache-related attack scenarios:
1. There are a number of nodes on a link, and someone launches a
cache filling attack. The goal here is to make sure that the
nodes can continue to communicate even if the attack is going on.
2. There is already a cache-filling attack going on, and a new node
arrives to the link. The goal here is to make it possible for the
new node to become attached to the network, in spite of the
attack.
As the intent is to limit the damage to existing, valid cache
entries, it is clearly better to be very selective in throwing out
entries. Reducing the timestamp Delta value is very discriminatory
against nodes with a large clock difference, as an attacker can
reduce its clock difference arbitrarily. Throwing out old entries
just because their clock difference is large therefore seems like a
bad approach.
It is reasonable to have separate cache spaces for new and old
entries, where when under attack, the newly cached entries would be
more readily dropped. One could track traffic and only allow
reasonable new entries that receive genuine traffic to be converted
into old cache entries. Although such a scheme can make attacks
harder, it will not fully prevent them. For example, an attacker
could send a little traffic (i.e., a ping or TCP syn) after each NS
to trick the victim into promoting its cache entry to the old cache.
To counter this, the node can be more intelligent in keeping its
cache entries than it would be just by having a black/white old/new
boundary.
Distinction of the Sec parameter from the CGA Parameters when forcing
cache entries out -- by keeping entries with larger Sec parameters
preferentially -- also appears to be a possible approach, as CGAs
with higher Sec parameters are harder to spoof.
Appendix C. Message Size When Carrying Certificates
In one example scenario using SEND, an Authorization Delegation
Discovery test run was made with a certification path length of 4.
Three certificates are sent by using Certification Path Advertisement
messages, as the trust anchor's certificate is already known by both
parties. With a key length of 1024 bits, the certificate lengths in
the test run ranged from 864 to 888 bytes; the variation is due to
the differences in the certificate issuer names and address prefix
extensions. The different certificates had between 1 and 4 address
prefix extensions.
The three Certification Path Advertisement messages ranged from 1050
to 1,066 bytes on an Ethernet link layer. The certificate itself
accounts for the bulk of the packet. The rest is the trust anchor
option, ICMP header, IPv6 header, and link layer header.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Jari Arkko Jari Arkko
Ericsson Ericsson
Jorvas 02420 Jorvas 02420
Finland Finland
EMail: jari.arkko@ericsson.com EMail: jari.arkko@ericsson.com
James Kempf James Kempf
DoCoMo Communications Labs USA DoCoMo Communications Labs USA
181 Metro Drive 181 Metro Drive
San Jose, CA 94043 San Jose, CA 94043
USA USA
EMail: kempf@docomolabs-usa.com EMail: kempf@docomolabs-usa.com
Bill Sommerfeld
Sun Microsystems
1 Network Drive UBUR02-212
Burlington, MA 01803
USA
EMail: sommerfeld@east.sun.com
Brian Zill Brian Zill
Microsoft Microsoft Research
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
USA USA
EMail: bzill@microsoft.com EMail: bzill@microsoft.com
Pekka Nikander Pekka Nikander
Ericsson Ericsson
Jorvas 02420 Jorvas 02420
Finland Finland
EMail: Pekka.Nikander@nomadiclab.com EMail: Pekka.Nikander@nomadiclab.com
Appendix A. Contributors and Acknowledgments Full Copyright Statement
Tuomas Aura contributed the transition mechanism specification in
Section 8. Jonathan Trostle contributed the certification path
example in Section 6.3.1.
The authors would also like to thank Tuomas Aura, Erik Nordmark,
Gabriel Montenegro, Pasi Eronen, Greg Daley, Jon Wood, Julien
Laganier, Francis Dupont, Pekka Savola, Wenxiao He, Valtteri Niemi,
Mike Roe, Russ Housley, Thomas Narten, and Steven Bellovin for
interesting discussions in this problem space and feedback regarding
the SEND protocol.
Appendix B. Cache Management
In this section we outline a cache management algorithm that allows a
node to remain partially functional even under a cache filling DoS
attack. This appendix is informational, and real implementations
SHOULD use different algorithms in order to avoid the dangers of
mono-cultural code.
There are at least two distinct cache related attack scenarios:
1. There are a number of nodes on a link, and someone launches a
cache filling attack. The goal here is to make sure that the
nodes can continue to communicate even if the attack is going on.
2. There is already a cache filling attack going on, and a new node
arrives to the link. The goal here is to make it possible for
the new node to become attached to the network, in spite of the
attack.
Since the intent is to limit the damage to existing, valid cache
entries, it is clearly better to be very selective in how to throw
out entries. Reducing the timestamp Delta value is very
discriminatory against those nodes that have a large clock
difference, since an attacker can reduce its clock difference
arbitrarily. Throwing out old entries just because their clock
difference is large therefore seems like a bad approach.
A reasonable idea seems to be to have a separate cache space for new
entries and old entries, and under an attack more eagerly drop new
cache entries than old ones. One could track traffic, and only allow
those new entries that receive genuine traffic to be converted into
old cache entries. While such a scheme can make attacks harder, it
will not fully prevent them. For example, an attacker could send a
little traffic (i.e. a ping or TCP syn) after each NS to trick the
victim into promoting its cache entry to the old cache. To counter
this, the node can be more intelligent in keeping its cache entries,
and not just have a black/white old/new boundary.
Consideration of the Sec parameter from the CGA Parameters when
forcing cache entries out - by keeping entries with larger Sec
parameters preferentially - also appears to be a possible approach,
since CGAs with higher Sec parameters are harder to spoof.
Appendix C. Message Size When Carrying Certificates Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
In one example scenario using SEND, an Authorization Delegation This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
Discovery test run was made using a certification path length of contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
four. Three certificates are sent using Certification Path retain all their rights.
Advertisement messages, since the trust anchor's certificate is
already known by both parties. With a key length of 1024 bits, the
certificate lengths in the test run ranged from 864 to 888 bytes; the
variation is due to the differences in the certificate issuer names
and address prefix extensions. The different certificates had between
one to four address prefix extensions.
The three Certification Path Advertisement messages ranged from 1050 This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
to 1066 bytes on an Ethernet link layer. The certificate itself "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
accounts for the bulk of the packet. The rest is the trust anchor OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
option, ICMP header, IPv6 header, and link layer header. ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
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