draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-00.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-01.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: BCP June 28, 2011 Intended status: BCP October 19, 2011
Expires: December 30, 2011 Expires: April 21, 2012
BGPsec Operational Considerations BGPsec Operational Considerations
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-00 draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-01
Abstract Abstract
Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many
operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and
present them. It is expected to evolve as BGPsec is formalized and present them. It is expected to evolve as BGPsec is formalized and
initially deployed. initially deployed.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
skipping to change at page 1, line 39 skipping to change at page 1, line 39
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 30, 2011. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 21, 2012.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 4, line 20 skipping to change at page 4, line 20
For redundancy, a router SHOULD peer with more than one cache at the For redundancy, a router SHOULD peer with more than one cache at the
same time. Peering with two or more, at least one local and others same time. Peering with two or more, at least one local and others
remote, is recommended. remote, is recommended.
If an operator trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they SHOULD If an operator trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they SHOULD
also trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache, and SHOULD peer with also trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache, and SHOULD peer with
those caches. Note that this places an obligation on those upstreams those caches. Note that this places an obligation on those upstreams
to maintain fresh and reliable caches. to maintain fresh and reliable caches.
A transit provider or a network with peers SHOULD validate NLRI in A transit provider or a network with peers SHOULD validate NLRI in
announcements made by upstreams, downstreams, and peers. They still announcements made by upstreams, downstreams, and peers. To minimize
SHOULD trust the caches provided by their upstreams. impact on the global RPKI, they SHOULD fetch from and then revalidate
data from caches provided by their upstreams.
An environment where private address space is announced in eBGP the An environment where private address space is announced in eBGP the
operator MAY have private RPKI objects which cover these private operator MAY have private RPKI objects which cover these private
spaces. This will require a trust anchor created and owned by that spaces. This will require a trust anchor created and owned by that
environment, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]. environment, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt].
4. AS/Router Certificates 4. AS/Router Certificates
A site/operator MAY use a single certificate/key in all their A site/operator MAY use a single certificate/key in all their
routers, one certificate/key per router, or any granularity in routers, one certificate/key per router, or any granularity in
skipping to change at page 7, line 25 skipping to change at page 7, line 25
otherwise, a signed path learned via iBGP MAY be invalid. If needed, otherwise, a signed path learned via iBGP MAY be invalid. If needed,
the validation state SHOULD be signaled by normal local policy the validation state SHOULD be signaled by normal local policy
mechanisms such as communities or metrics. mechanisms such as communities or metrics.
On the other hand, local policy on the eBGP edge might preclude iBGP On the other hand, local policy on the eBGP edge might preclude iBGP
or eBGP announcement of signed AS Paths which are invalid. or eBGP announcement of signed AS Paths which are invalid.
If a BGPsec speaker receives an unsigned path, it SHOULD perform If a BGPsec speaker receives an unsigned path, it SHOULD perform
origin validation per [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. origin validation per [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate].
If it is known that a BGPsec neighbor is not a transparent route
server, and the router provides a knob to disallow a received pCount
(prepend count, zero for transparent route servers) of zero, that
knob SHOULD be applied.
9. Notes 9. Notes
Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent
view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache
or router may have different data about a particular prefix than or router may have different data about a particular prefix than
another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the
nature of distributed data with distributed caches. nature of distributed data with distributed caches.
Operators who manage certificates SHOULD have RPKI Ghostbuster Operators who manage certificates SHOULD have RPKI Ghostbuster
Records (see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters]), signed indirectly by End Records (see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters]), signed indirectly by End
skipping to change at page 8, line 30 skipping to change at page 8, line 33
13.1. Normative References 13.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]
Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification", Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification",
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-00 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-00 (work in progress),
June 2011. June 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters] [I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters]
Bush, R., "The RPKI Ghostbusters Record", Bush, R., "The RPKI Ghostbusters Record",
draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters-03 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters-15 (work in progress),
March 2011. October 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format] [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]
Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", Origin Authorizations (ROAs)",
draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-12 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-12 (work in progress),
May 2011. May 2011.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
skipping to change at page 9, line 11 skipping to change at page 9, line 15
progress), May 2011. progress), May 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt] [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]
Reynolds, M. and S. Kent, "Local Trust Anchor Management Reynolds, M. and S. Kent, "Local Trust Anchor Management
for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure", for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure",
draft-ietf-sidr-ltamgmt-02 (work in progress), June 2011. draft-ietf-sidr-ltamgmt-02 (work in progress), June 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]
Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation",
draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-01 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-02 (work in progress),
February 2011. July 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct] [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct]
Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", Resource Certificate Repository Structure",
draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-08 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-09 (work in progress),
June 2011. July 2011.
[I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview] [I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview]
Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC", Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC",
draft-lepinski-bgpsec-overview-00 (work in progress), draft-lepinski-bgpsec-overview-00 (work in progress),
March 2011. March 2011.
[I-D.ymbk-rfd-usable] [I-D.ymbk-rfd-usable]
Pelsser, C., Bush, R., Patel, K., Mohapatra, P., and O. Pelsser, C., Bush, R., Patel, K., Mohapatra, P., and O.
Maennel, "Making Route Flap Damping Usable", Maennel, "Making Route Flap Damping Usable",
draft-ymbk-rfd-usable-00 (work in progress), March 2011. draft-ymbk-rfd-usable-01 (work in progress), June 2011.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network [RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network
Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010. Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.
Author's Address Author's Address
 End of changes. 9 change blocks. 
13 lines changed or deleted 19 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.41. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/