--- 1/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-00.txt 2011-10-20 01:14:05.190671864 +0200 +++ 2/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-01.txt 2011-10-20 01:14:05.210670919 +0200 @@ -1,18 +1,18 @@ Network Working Group R. Bush Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan -Intended status: BCP June 28, 2011 -Expires: December 30, 2011 +Intended status: BCP October 19, 2011 +Expires: April 21, 2012 BGPsec Operational Considerations - draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-00 + draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-01 Abstract Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and present them. It is expected to evolve as BGPsec is formalized and initially deployed. Requirements Language @@ -28,21 +28,21 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on December 30, 2011. + This Internet-Draft will expire on April 21, 2012. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents @@ -125,22 +125,23 @@ For redundancy, a router SHOULD peer with more than one cache at the same time. Peering with two or more, at least one local and others remote, is recommended. If an operator trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they SHOULD also trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache, and SHOULD peer with those caches. Note that this places an obligation on those upstreams to maintain fresh and reliable caches. A transit provider or a network with peers SHOULD validate NLRI in - announcements made by upstreams, downstreams, and peers. They still - SHOULD trust the caches provided by their upstreams. + announcements made by upstreams, downstreams, and peers. To minimize + impact on the global RPKI, they SHOULD fetch from and then revalidate + data from caches provided by their upstreams. An environment where private address space is announced in eBGP the operator MAY have private RPKI objects which cover these private spaces. This will require a trust anchor created and owned by that environment, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]. 4. AS/Router Certificates A site/operator MAY use a single certificate/key in all their routers, one certificate/key per router, or any granularity in @@ -270,20 +271,25 @@ otherwise, a signed path learned via iBGP MAY be invalid. If needed, the validation state SHOULD be signaled by normal local policy mechanisms such as communities or metrics. On the other hand, local policy on the eBGP edge might preclude iBGP or eBGP announcement of signed AS Paths which are invalid. If a BGPsec speaker receives an unsigned path, it SHOULD perform origin validation per [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. + If it is known that a BGPsec neighbor is not a transparent route + server, and the router provides a knob to disallow a received pCount + (prepend count, zero for transparent route servers) of zero, that + knob SHOULD be applied. + 9. Notes Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache or router may have different data about a particular prefix than another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the nature of distributed data with distributed caches. Operators who manage certificates SHOULD have RPKI Ghostbuster Records (see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters]), signed indirectly by End @@ -320,22 +326,22 @@ 13.1. Normative References [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-00 (work in progress), June 2011. [I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters] Bush, R., "The RPKI Ghostbusters Record", - draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters-03 (work in progress), - March 2011. + draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters-15 (work in progress), + October 2011. [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-12 (work in progress), May 2011. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. @@ -347,38 +353,38 @@ progress), May 2011. [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt] Reynolds, M. and S. Kent, "Local Trust Anchor Management for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure", draft-ietf-sidr-ltamgmt-02 (work in progress), June 2011. [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", - draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-01 (work in progress), - February 2011. + draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-02 (work in progress), + July 2011. [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure", - draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-08 (work in progress), - June 2011. + draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-09 (work in progress), + July 2011. [I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview] Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC", draft-lepinski-bgpsec-overview-00 (work in progress), March 2011. [I-D.ymbk-rfd-usable] Pelsser, C., Bush, R., Patel, K., Mohapatra, P., and O. Maennel, "Making Route Flap Damping Usable", - draft-ymbk-rfd-usable-00 (work in progress), March 2011. + draft-ymbk-rfd-usable-01 (work in progress), June 2011. [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. [RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010. Author's Address