draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-01.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-02.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: BCP October 19, 2011 Intended status: BCP March 8, 2012
Expires: April 21, 2012 Expires: September 9, 2012
BGPsec Operational Considerations BGPsec Operational Considerations
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-01 draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-02
Abstract Abstract
Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many
operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and
present them. It is expected to evolve as BGPsec is formalized and present them. It is expected to evolve as BGPsec is formalized and
initially deployed. initially deployed.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 21, 2012. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 9, 2012.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. AS/Router Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. AS/Router Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Considerations for Edge Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6. Considerations for Edge Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. Beaconing Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
BGPsec is a new protocol with many operational considerations. It is BGPsec is a new protocol with many operational considerations. It is
expected to be deployed incrementally over a number of years. As expected to be deployed incrementally over a number of years. As
core BGPsec-capable routers may require large memory and crypto core BGPsec-capable routers may require large memory and/or modern
assist, it is thought that origin validation based on the RPKI will CPUs, it is thought that origin validation based on the RPKI will
occur over the next two to five years and that BGPsec will start to occur over the next one to three years and that BGPsec will start to
deploy late in that window. deploy late in that window.
BGPsec relies on widespread propagation of the Resource Public Key BGPsec relies on widespread propagation of the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]. How the RPKI is Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. How the RPKI is distributed and
distributed and maintained globally and within an operator's maintained globally and within an operator's infrastructure may be
infrastructure may be different for BGPsec than for origin different for BGPsec than for origin validation.
validation.
BGPsec need be spoken only by a AS's eBGP speaking, AKA border, BGPsec need be spoken only by an AS's eBGP speaking, AKA border,
routers, and is designed so that it can be used to protect routers, and is designed so that it can be used to protect
announcements which are originated by small edge routers, and this announcements which are originated by small edge routers. This has
has special operational considerations. special operational considerations.
Different prefixes have different timing and replay protection Different prefixes have different timing and replay protection
considerations. considerations.
2. Suggested Reading 2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], BGPsec, It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], BGPsec,
[I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview], the RPKI, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch], [I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview], the RPKI, see [RFC6480], the RPKI
the RPKI Repository Structure, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct], and Repository Structure, see [RFC6481], and ROAs, see [RFC6482].
ROAs, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format].
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance
The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates, CRLs, All non-ROA considerations in the section on RPKI Distribution and
manifests, ROAs, and Ghostbuster Records as described in Maintenance of [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] apply.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct]. Policies and considerations for RPKI
object generation and maintenance are discussed elsewhere.
A local valid cache containing all RPKI data may be gathered from the
global distributed database using the rsync protocol and a validation
tool such as rcynic.
Validated caches may also be created and maintained from other
validated caches. Network operators SHOULD take maximum advantage of
this feature to minimize load on the global distributed RPKI
database.
As RPKI-based origin validation relies on the availability of RPKI
data, operators SHOULD locate caches close to routers that require
these data and services. A router can peer with one or more nearby
caches.
For redundancy, a router SHOULD peer with more than one cache at the
same time. Peering with two or more, at least one local and others
remote, is recommended.
If an operator trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they SHOULD
also trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache, and SHOULD peer with
those caches. Note that this places an obligation on those upstreams
to maintain fresh and reliable caches.
A transit provider or a network with peers SHOULD validate NLRI in
announcements made by upstreams, downstreams, and peers. To minimize
impact on the global RPKI, they SHOULD fetch from and then revalidate
data from caches provided by their upstreams.
An environment where private address space is announced in eBGP the
operator MAY have private RPKI objects which cover these private
spaces. This will require a trust anchor created and owned by that
environment, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt].
4. AS/Router Certificates 4. AS/Router Certificates
As described in [I-D.ymbk-bgpsec-rtr-rekeying] routers MAY be capable
of generating their own public/private key-pairs and having their
certificates signed and published in the RPKI by the RPKI CA system,
and/or MAY be given public/private key-pairs by the operator.
A site/operator MAY use a single certificate/key in all their A site/operator MAY use a single certificate/key in all their
routers, one certificate/key per router, or any granularity in routers, one certificate/key per router, or any granularity in
between. between.
A large operator, concerned that a compromise of one router's key A large operator, concerned that a compromise of one router's key
would make many routers vulnerable, MAY accept a more complex would make other routers vulnerable, MAY accept a more complex
certificate/key distribution burden to reduce this exposure. certificate/key distribution burden to reduce this exposure.
On the other extreme, an edge site with one or two routers MAY use a On the other extreme, an edge site with one or two routers MAY use a
single certificate/key. single certificate/key.
Routers MAY be capable of generating their own keys and having their
certificates signed and published in the RPKI by their NOC. This
would mean that a router's private key need never leave the router.
5. Within a Network 5. Within a Network
BGPsec is spoken by edge routers in a network, those which border BGPsec is spoken by edge routers in a network, those which border
other networks/ASs. other networks/ASs.
In a fully BGPsec enabled AS, Route Reflectors MUST have BGPsec In a fully BGPsec enabled AS, Route Reflectors MUST have BGPsec
enabled if and only if there are eBGP speakers in their client cone. enabled if and only if there are eBGP speakers in their client cone
(the transitive closure of their customers' customers' customers'
...).
A BGPsec capable router MAY use the data it receives to influence A BGPsec capable router MAY use the data it receives to influence
local policy within its network, see Section 8. In deployment this local policy within its network, see Section 7. In deployment this
policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, preferences, etc. policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, preferences, etc.
This allows a network to incrementally deploy BGPsec capable border This allows a network to incrementally deploy BGPsec capable border
routers. routers.
eBGP speakers which face more critical peers or up/downstreams would eBGP speakers which face more critical peers or up/downstreams would
be candidates for the earliest deployment. Both securing one's own be candidates for the earliest deployment. Both securing one's own
announcements and validating received announcements should be announcements and validating received announcements should be
considered in partial deployment. considered in partial deployment.
An eBGP listener MUST NOT trust non-BGPsec markings such as As they are not signed, an eBGP listener SHOULD NOT strongly trust
communities received across a trust boundary. unsigned markings such as communities received across a trust
boundary.
6. Considerations for Edge Sites 6. Considerations for Edge Sites
An edge site which does not provide transit and trusts its An edge site which does not provide transit and trusts its
upstream(s) SHOULD only originate a signed prefix announcement and upstream(s) SHOULD only originate a signed prefix announcement and
need not validate received announcements. need not validate received announcements.
BGPsec protocol capability negotiation provides for a speaker signing BGPsec protocol capability negotiation provides for a speaker signing
the data it sends but being unable to accept signed data. Thus a the data it sends but being unable to accept signed data. Thus a
smallish edge router may hold only its own signing key(s) and sign smallish edge router may hold only its own signing key(s) and sign
it's announcement but not receive signed announcements and therefore it's announcement but not receive signed announcements and therefore
not need to deal with the majority of the RPKI. not need to deal with the majority of the RPKI. Thus such routers
CPU, RAM, and crypto needs are trivial and additional hardware should
not be needed.
As the vast majority (84%) of ASs are stubs, and they announce the As the vast majority (84%) of ASs are stubs, and they announce the
majority of prefixes, this allows for simpler and cheaper early majority of prefixes, this allows for simpler and cheaper early
incremental deployment. It may also mean that edge sites concerned incremental deployment. It may also mean that edge sites concerned
with routing security will be attracted to upstreams which support with routing security will be attracted to upstreams which support
BGPsec. BGPsec.
7. Beaconing Considerations 7. Routing Policy
The BGPsec protocol attempts to reduce exposure to replay attacks by
allowing the route originator to sign an announcement with a validity
period and re-announce well within that period.
This re-announcement is termed 'beaconing'. All timing values are,
of course, jittered.
It is only the originator of an NLRI which signs the announcement
with a validity period.
To reduce vulnerability to a lost beacon announcement, a router
SHOULD beacon at a rate somewhat greater than half the signature
validity period it uses.
As beaconing places a load on the entire global routing system,
careful thought MUST be given to any need to beacon frequently. This
would be based on a conservative estimation of the vulnerability to a
replay attack.
Beacon timing and signature validity periods SHOULD be as follows:
The Exemplary Citizen: Prefix originators who are not overly
concerned about replay attacks might announce with a signature
validity of multiple weeks and beacon one third of the validity
period.
Normal Prefix: Most prefixes SHOULD announce with a signature
validity of a week and beacon every three days.
Critical Prefix: Of course, we all think what we do is critical.
But prefixes of top level DNS servers, and RPKI publication points
are actually critical to large swaths of the Internet and are
therefore tempting targets for replay attacks. It is suggested
that the beaconing of these prefixes SHOULD be two to four hours,
with a signature validity of six to twelve hours.
Note that this may incur route flap damping (RFD) with current
default but deprecated RFD parameters, see [I-D.ymbk-rfd-usable].
8. Routing Policy
Unlike origin validation based on the RPKI, BGPsec marks a received Unlike origin validation based on the RPKI, BGPsec marks a received
announcement as Valid or Invalid, there is no NotFound state. How announcement as Valid or Invalid, there is no NotFound state. How
this is used in routing is up to the operator's local policy. See this is used in routing is up to the operator's local policy. See
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate].
As BGPsec will be rolled out over years and does not allow for As BGPsec will be rolled out over years and does not allow for
intermediate non-signing edge routers, coverage will be spotty for a intermediate non-signing edge routers, coverage will be spotty for a
long time. Hence a normal operator's policy SHOULD NOT be overly long time. Hence a normal operator's policy SHOULD NOT be overly
strict, perhaps preferring valid announcements and giving very low strict, perhaps preferring valid announcements and giving very low
skipping to change at page 7, line 10 skipping to change at page 5, line 33
Local policy on the eBGP edge MAY convey the validation state of a Local policy on the eBGP edge MAY convey the validation state of a
BGP signed path through normal local policy mechanisms, e.g. setting BGP signed path through normal local policy mechanisms, e.g. setting
a BGP community, or modifying a metric value such as local-preference a BGP community, or modifying a metric value such as local-preference
or MED. Some MAY choose to use the large Local-Pref hammer. Others or MED. Some MAY choose to use the large Local-Pref hammer. Others
MAY choose to let AS-Path rule and set their internal metric, which MAY choose to let AS-Path rule and set their internal metric, which
comes after AS-Path in the BGP decision process. comes after AS-Path in the BGP decision process.
Because of possible RPKI version skew, an AS Path which does not Because of possible RPKI version skew, an AS Path which does not
validate at router R0 might validate at R1. Therefore, signed paths validate at router R0 might validate at R1. Therefore, signed paths
that are invalid and yet propagated SHOULD have their signatures kept that are invalid and yet propagated (because they are chosen as best
intact and should be signed if sent to external BGPsec speakers. path) SHOULD have their signatures kept intact and MUST be signed if
sent to external BGPsec speakers.
This implies that updates which a speaker judges to be invalid MAY be This implies that updates which a speaker judges to be invalid MAY be
propagated to iBGP peers. Therefore, unless local policy ensures propagated to iBGP peers. Therefore, unless local policy ensures
otherwise, a signed path learned via iBGP MAY be invalid. If needed, otherwise, a signed path learned via iBGP MAY be invalid. If needed,
the validation state SHOULD be signaled by normal local policy the validation state SHOULD be signaled by normal local policy
mechanisms such as communities or metrics. mechanisms such as communities or metrics.
On the other hand, local policy on the eBGP edge might preclude iBGP On the other hand, local policy on the eBGP edge might preclude iBGP
or eBGP announcement of signed AS Paths which are invalid. or eBGP announcement of signed AS Paths which are invalid.
If a BGPsec speaker receives an unsigned path, it SHOULD perform A BGPsec speaker receiving a path SHOULD perform origin validation
origin validation per [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. per [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate].
If it is known that a BGPsec neighbor is not a transparent route If it is known that a BGPsec neighbor is not a transparent route
server, and the router provides a knob to disallow a received pCount server, and the router provides a knob to disallow a received pCount
(prepend count, zero for transparent route servers) of zero, that (prepend count, zero for transparent route servers) of zero, that
knob SHOULD be applied. knob SHOULD be applied. Routers should default to this knob
disallowing pCount 0.
9. Notes To prevent exposure of the internals of BGP Confederations [RFC5065],
a BGPsec speaker which is a Member-AS of a Confederation MUST NOT
sign updates sent to another Member-AS of the same Confederation.
8. Notes
For protection from attacks replaying BGP data on the order of a day
or longer old, re-keying routers with new keys (previously)
provisioned in the RPKI is sufficient. For one procedure, see
[I-D.rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover]
Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent
view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache
or router may have different data about a particular prefix than or router may have different data about a particular prefix than
another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the
nature of distributed data with distributed caches. nature of distributed data with distributed caches.
Operators who manage certificates SHOULD have RPKI Ghostbuster Operators who manage certificates SHOULD have RPKI Ghostbuster
Records (see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters]), signed indirectly by End Records (see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters]), signed indirectly by End
Entity certificates, for those certificates on which others' routing Entity certificates, for those certificates on which others' routing
depends for certificate and/or ROA validation. depends for certificate and/or ROA validation.
As a router must evaluate certificates and ROAs which are time As a router must evaluate certificates and ROAs which are time
dependent, routers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of dependent, routers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of
approximately an hour. approximately an hour.
If a router has reason to believe its clock is seriouly incorrect, If a router has reason to believe its clock is seriously incorrect,
e.g. it has a time earlier than 2011, it SHOULD NOT attempt to e.g. it has a time earlier than 2011, it SHOULD NOT attempt to
validate incoming updates. It SHOULD defer validation until it validate incoming updates. It SHOULD defer validation until it
believes it is within reasonable time tolerance. believes it is within reasonable time tolerance.
Servers should provide time service, such as NTP [RFC5905], to client Servers should provide time service, such as [RFC5905], to client
routers. routers.
10. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
BGPsec is all about security, routing security. The major security The major security considerations for the BGPsec protocol are
considerations for the protocol are described in described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol].
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol].
11. IANA Considerations 10. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA Considerations. This document has no IANA Considerations.
12. Acknowledgments 11. References
The author wishes to thank the BGPsec design team.
13. References
13.1. Normative References 11.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]
Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification", Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification",
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-00 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-01 (work in progress),
June 2011. October 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters] [I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters]
Bush, R., "The RPKI Ghostbusters Record", Bush, R., "The RPKI Ghostbusters Record",
draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters-15 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters-16 (work in progress),
October 2011. December 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format] [I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview]
Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC",
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", draft-lepinski-bgpsec-overview-00 (work in progress),
draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-12 (work in progress), March 2011.
May 2011.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
13.2. Informative References [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-13 (work in February 2012.
progress), May 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt] [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Reynolds, M. and S. Kent, "Local Trust Anchor Management Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.
for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure",
draft-ietf-sidr-ltamgmt-02 (work in progress), June 2011. 11.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]
Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation",
draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-02 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-03 (work in progress),
July 2011. October 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct]
Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure",
draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-09 (work in progress),
July 2011.
[I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview] [I-D.rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover]
Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC", Gagliano, R., Patel, K., and B. Weis, "BGPSEC router key
draft-lepinski-bgpsec-overview-00 (work in progress), roll-over as an alternative to beaconing",
March 2011. draft-rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-00 (work in progress),
March 2012.
[I-D.ymbk-rfd-usable] [I-D.ymbk-bgpsec-rtr-rekeying]
Pelsser, C., Bush, R., Patel, K., Mohapatra, P., and O. Turner, S., Patel, K., and R. Bush, "Router Keying for
Maennel, "Making Route Flap Damping Usable", BGPsec", draft-ymbk-bgpsec-rtr-rekeying-00 (work in
draft-ymbk-rfd-usable-01 (work in progress), June 2011. progress), March 2012.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[RFC5065] Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous
System Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065, August 2007.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network [RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network
Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010. Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.
Author's Address Author's Address
Randy Bush Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs 5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
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