draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-02.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-03.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: BCP March 8, 2012 Intended status: BCP March 10, 2012
Expires: September 9, 2012 Expires: September 11, 2012
BGPsec Operational Considerations BGPsec Operational Considerations
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-02 draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-03
Abstract Abstract
Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many
operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and
present them. It is expected to evolve as BGPsec is formalized and present them. It is expected to evolve as BGPsec is formalized and
initially deployed. initially deployed.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 9, 2012. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 11, 2012.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. AS/Router Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. AS/Router Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Considerations for Edge Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6. Considerations for Edge Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
BGPsec is a new protocol with many operational considerations. It is BGPsec is a new protocol with many operational considerations. It is
expected to be deployed incrementally over a number of years. As expected to be deployed incrementally over a number of years. As
core BGPsec-capable routers may require large memory and/or modern core BGPsec-capable routers may require large memory and/or modern
CPUs, it is thought that origin validation based on the RPKI will CPUs, it is thought that origin validation based on the RPKI will
occur over the next one to three years and that BGPsec will start to occur over the next one to three years and that BGPsec will start to
deploy late in that window. deploy late in that window.
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2. Suggested Reading 2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], BGPsec, It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], BGPsec,
[I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview], the RPKI, see [RFC6480], the RPKI [I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview], the RPKI, see [RFC6480], the RPKI
Repository Structure, see [RFC6481], and ROAs, see [RFC6482]. Repository Structure, see [RFC6481], and ROAs, see [RFC6482].
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance
All non-ROA considerations in the section on RPKI Distribution and All non-ROA considerations in the section on RPKI Distribution and
Maintenance of [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] apply. Maintenance of [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-ops] apply.
4. AS/Router Certificates 4. AS/Router Certificates
As described in [I-D.ymbk-bgpsec-rtr-rekeying] routers MAY be capable As described in [I-D.ymbk-bgpsec-rtr-rekeying] routers MAY be capable
of generating their own public/private key-pairs and having their of generating their own public/private key-pairs and having their
certificates signed and published in the RPKI by the RPKI CA system, certificates signed and published in the RPKI by the RPKI CA system,
and/or MAY be given public/private key-pairs by the operator. and/or MAY be given public/private key-pairs by the operator.
A site/operator MAY use a single certificate/key in all their A site/operator MAY use a single certificate/key in all their
routers, one certificate/key per router, or any granularity in routers, one certificate/key per router, or any granularity in
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On the other extreme, an edge site with one or two routers MAY use a On the other extreme, an edge site with one or two routers MAY use a
single certificate/key. single certificate/key.
5. Within a Network 5. Within a Network
BGPsec is spoken by edge routers in a network, those which border BGPsec is spoken by edge routers in a network, those which border
other networks/ASs. other networks/ASs.
In a fully BGPsec enabled AS, Route Reflectors MUST have BGPsec In a fully BGPsec enabled AS, Route Reflectors MUST have BGPsec
enabled if and only if there are eBGP speakers in their client cone enabled if and only if there are eBGP speakers in their client cone,
(the transitive closure of their customers' customers' customers' i.e. an RR client or the transitive closure of their customers'
...). customers' customers' ....
A BGPsec capable router MAY use the data it receives to influence A BGPsec capable router MAY use the data it receives to influence
local policy within its network, see Section 7. In deployment this local policy within its network, see Section 7. In deployment this
policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, preferences, etc. policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, preferences, etc.
This allows a network to incrementally deploy BGPsec capable border This allows a network to incrementally deploy BGPsec capable border
routers. routers.
eBGP speakers which face more critical peers or up/downstreams would eBGP speakers which face more critical peers or up/downstreams would
be candidates for the earliest deployment. Both securing one's own be candidates for the earliest deployment. Both securing one's own
announcements and validating received announcements should be announcements and validating received announcements should be
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view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache
or router may have different data about a particular prefix than or router may have different data about a particular prefix than
another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the
nature of distributed data with distributed caches. nature of distributed data with distributed caches.
Operators who manage certificates SHOULD have RPKI Ghostbuster Operators who manage certificates SHOULD have RPKI Ghostbuster
Records (see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters]), signed indirectly by End Records (see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters]), signed indirectly by End
Entity certificates, for those certificates on which others' routing Entity certificates, for those certificates on which others' routing
depends for certificate and/or ROA validation. depends for certificate and/or ROA validation.
Operators should be aware of impending algorithm transitions, which
will be rare and slow-paced, see see
[I-D.ietf-sidr-algorithm-agility]. They should work with their
vendors to ensure support for new algorithms.
As a router must evaluate certificates and ROAs which are time As a router must evaluate certificates and ROAs which are time
dependent, routers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of dependent, routers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of
approximately an hour. approximately an hour.
If a router has reason to believe its clock is seriously incorrect, If a router has reason to believe its clock is seriously incorrect,
e.g. it has a time earlier than 2011, it SHOULD NOT attempt to e.g. it has a time earlier than 2011, it SHOULD NOT attempt to
validate incoming updates. It SHOULD defer validation until it validate incoming updates. It SHOULD defer validation until it
believes it is within reasonable time tolerance. believes it is within reasonable time tolerance.
Servers should provide time service, such as [RFC5905], to client Servers should provide time service, such as [RFC5905], to client
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[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]
Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification", Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification",
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-01 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-01 (work in progress),
October 2011. October 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters] [I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters]
Bush, R., "The RPKI Ghostbusters Record", Bush, R., "The RPKI Ghostbusters Record",
draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters-16 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters-16 (work in progress),
December 2011. December 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-ops]
Bush, R., "RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation",
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-13 (work in progress),
November 2011.
[I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview] [I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview]
Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC", Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC",
draft-lepinski-bgpsec-overview-00 (work in progress), draft-lepinski-bgpsec-overview-00 (work in progress),
March 2011. March 2011.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
February 2012. February 2012.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012. Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.
11.2. Informative References 11.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-algorithm-agility]
Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility
Procedure for RPKI.", draft-ietf-sidr-algorithm-agility-05
(work in progress), January 2012.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]
Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation",
draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-03 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-03 (work in progress),
October 2011. October 2011.
[I-D.rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover] [I-D.rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover]
Gagliano, R., Patel, K., and B. Weis, "BGPSEC router key Gagliano, R., Patel, K., and B. Weis, "BGPSEC router key
roll-over as an alternative to beaconing", roll-over as an alternative to beaconing",
draft-rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-00 (work in progress), draft-rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-00 (work in progress),
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