--- 1/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-02.txt 2012-03-10 07:13:56.510670914 +0100 +++ 2/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-03.txt 2012-03-10 07:13:56.526671062 +0100 @@ -1,18 +1,18 @@ Network Working Group R. Bush Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan -Intended status: BCP March 8, 2012 -Expires: September 9, 2012 +Intended status: BCP March 10, 2012 +Expires: September 11, 2012 BGPsec Operational Considerations - draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-02 + draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-03 Abstract Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and present them. It is expected to evolve as BGPsec is formalized and initially deployed. Requirements Language @@ -28,21 +28,21 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on September 9, 2012. + This Internet-Draft will expire on September 11, 2012. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents @@ -59,21 +59,21 @@ 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. AS/Router Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6. Considerations for Edge Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1. Introduction BGPsec is a new protocol with many operational considerations. It is expected to be deployed incrementally over a number of years. As core BGPsec-capable routers may require large memory and/or modern CPUs, it is thought that origin validation based on the RPKI will occur over the next one to three years and that BGPsec will start to deploy late in that window. @@ -93,21 +93,21 @@ 2. Suggested Reading It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], BGPsec, [I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview], the RPKI, see [RFC6480], the RPKI Repository Structure, see [RFC6481], and ROAs, see [RFC6482]. 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance All non-ROA considerations in the section on RPKI Distribution and - Maintenance of [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] apply. + Maintenance of [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-ops] apply. 4. AS/Router Certificates As described in [I-D.ymbk-bgpsec-rtr-rekeying] routers MAY be capable of generating their own public/private key-pairs and having their certificates signed and published in the RPKI by the RPKI CA system, and/or MAY be given public/private key-pairs by the operator. A site/operator MAY use a single certificate/key in all their routers, one certificate/key per router, or any granularity in @@ -119,23 +119,23 @@ On the other extreme, an edge site with one or two routers MAY use a single certificate/key. 5. Within a Network BGPsec is spoken by edge routers in a network, those which border other networks/ASs. In a fully BGPsec enabled AS, Route Reflectors MUST have BGPsec - enabled if and only if there are eBGP speakers in their client cone - (the transitive closure of their customers' customers' customers' - ...). + enabled if and only if there are eBGP speakers in their client cone, + i.e. an RR client or the transitive closure of their customers' + customers' customers' .... A BGPsec capable router MAY use the data it receives to influence local policy within its network, see Section 7. In deployment this policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, preferences, etc. This allows a network to incrementally deploy BGPsec capable border routers. eBGP speakers which face more critical peers or up/downstreams would be candidates for the earliest deployment. Both securing one's own announcements and validating received announcements should be @@ -226,20 +226,25 @@ view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache or router may have different data about a particular prefix than another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the nature of distributed data with distributed caches. Operators who manage certificates SHOULD have RPKI Ghostbuster Records (see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters]), signed indirectly by End Entity certificates, for those certificates on which others' routing depends for certificate and/or ROA validation. + Operators should be aware of impending algorithm transitions, which + will be rare and slow-paced, see see + [I-D.ietf-sidr-algorithm-agility]. They should work with their + vendors to ensure support for new algorithms. + As a router must evaluate certificates and ROAs which are time dependent, routers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of approximately an hour. If a router has reason to believe its clock is seriously incorrect, e.g. it has a time earlier than 2011, it SHOULD NOT attempt to validate incoming updates. It SHOULD defer validation until it believes it is within reasonable time tolerance. Servers should provide time service, such as [RFC5905], to client @@ -261,40 +266,50 @@ [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-01 (work in progress), October 2011. [I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters] Bush, R., "The RPKI Ghostbusters Record", draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters-16 (work in progress), December 2011. + [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-ops] + Bush, R., "RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation", + draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-13 (work in progress), + November 2011. + [I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview] Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC", draft-lepinski-bgpsec-overview-00 (work in progress), March 2011. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, February 2012. [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012. 11.2. Informative References + [I-D.ietf-sidr-algorithm-agility] + Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility + Procedure for RPKI.", draft-ietf-sidr-algorithm-agility-05 + (work in progress), January 2012. + [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-03 (work in progress), October 2011. [I-D.rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover] Gagliano, R., Patel, K., and B. Weis, "BGPSEC router key roll-over as an alternative to beaconing", draft-rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-00 (work in progress),