--- 1/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-03.txt 2012-03-13 00:14:19.470671639 +0100 +++ 2/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-04.txt 2012-03-13 00:14:19.486670892 +0100 @@ -1,18 +1,18 @@ Network Working Group R. Bush Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan -Intended status: BCP March 10, 2012 -Expires: September 11, 2012 +Intended status: BCP March 13, 2012 +Expires: September 14, 2012 BGPsec Operational Considerations - draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-03 + draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-04 Abstract Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and present them. It is expected to evolve as BGPsec is formalized and initially deployed. Requirements Language @@ -28,21 +28,21 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on September 11, 2012. + This Internet-Draft will expire on September 14, 2012. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents @@ -55,21 +55,21 @@ Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. AS/Router Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6. Considerations for Edge Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1. Introduction BGPsec is a new protocol with many operational considerations. It is expected to be deployed incrementally over a number of years. As @@ -134,40 +134,44 @@ local policy within its network, see Section 7. In deployment this policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, preferences, etc. This allows a network to incrementally deploy BGPsec capable border routers. eBGP speakers which face more critical peers or up/downstreams would be candidates for the earliest deployment. Both securing one's own announcements and validating received announcements should be considered in partial deployment. + On the other hand, an operator wanting to monitor router loading, + shifts in traffic, etc. will want to deploy incrementally while + watching those and similar effects. + As they are not signed, an eBGP listener SHOULD NOT strongly trust unsigned markings such as communities received across a trust boundary. 6. Considerations for Edge Sites An edge site which does not provide transit and trusts its upstream(s) SHOULD only originate a signed prefix announcement and need not validate received announcements. BGPsec protocol capability negotiation provides for a speaker signing the data it sends but being unable to accept signed data. Thus a smallish edge router may hold only its own signing key(s) and sign it's announcement but not receive signed announcements and therefore not need to deal with the majority of the RPKI. Thus such routers CPU, RAM, and crypto needs are trivial and additional hardware should not be needed. As the vast majority (84%) of ASs are stubs, and they announce the - majority of prefixes, this allows for simpler and cheaper early + majority of prefixes, this allows for simpler and less expensive incremental deployment. It may also mean that edge sites concerned with routing security will be attracted to upstreams which support BGPsec. 7. Routing Policy Unlike origin validation based on the RPKI, BGPsec marks a received announcement as Valid or Invalid, there is no NotFound state. How this is used in routing is up to the operator's local policy. See [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. @@ -189,21 +193,21 @@ Because of possible RPKI version skew, an AS Path which does not validate at router R0 might validate at R1. Therefore, signed paths that are invalid and yet propagated (because they are chosen as best path) SHOULD have their signatures kept intact and MUST be signed if sent to external BGPsec speakers. This implies that updates which a speaker judges to be invalid MAY be propagated to iBGP peers. Therefore, unless local policy ensures otherwise, a signed path learned via iBGP MAY be invalid. If needed, - the validation state SHOULD be signaled by normal local policy + the validation state should be signaled by normal local policy mechanisms such as communities or metrics. On the other hand, local policy on the eBGP edge might preclude iBGP or eBGP announcement of signed AS Paths which are invalid. A BGPsec speaker receiving a path SHOULD perform origin validation per [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. If it is known that a BGPsec neighbor is not a transparent route server, and the router provides a knob to disallow a received pCount @@ -268,22 +272,22 @@ draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-01 (work in progress), October 2011. [I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters] Bush, R., "The RPKI Ghostbusters Record", draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters-16 (work in progress), December 2011. [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-ops] Bush, R., "RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation", - draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-13 (work in progress), - November 2011. + draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-15 (work in progress), + March 2012. [I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview] Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC", draft-lepinski-bgpsec-overview-00 (work in progress), March 2011. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support