--- 1/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-04.txt 2012-05-28 12:14:52.089427501 +0200 +++ 2/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-05.txt 2012-05-28 12:14:52.105427887 +0200 @@ -1,18 +1,18 @@ Network Working Group R. Bush Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan -Intended status: BCP March 13, 2012 -Expires: September 14, 2012 +Intended status: BCP May 24, 2012 +Expires: November 25, 2012 BGPsec Operational Considerations - draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-04 + draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-05 Abstract Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and present them. It is expected to evolve as BGPsec is formalized and initially deployed. Requirements Language @@ -28,21 +28,21 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on September 14, 2012. + This Internet-Draft will expire on November 25, 2012. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents @@ -52,29 +52,29 @@ the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. AS/Router Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 6. Considerations for Edge Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 6. Considerations for Edge Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1. Introduction BGPsec is a new protocol with many operational considerations. It is expected to be deployed incrementally over a number of years. As core BGPsec-capable routers may require large memory and/or modern CPUs, it is thought that origin validation based on the RPKI will occur over the next one to three years and that BGPsec will start to deploy late in that window. @@ -97,36 +97,40 @@ [I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview], the RPKI, see [RFC6480], the RPKI Repository Structure, see [RFC6481], and ROAs, see [RFC6482]. 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance All non-ROA considerations in the section on RPKI Distribution and Maintenance of [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-ops] apply. 4. AS/Router Certificates - As described in [I-D.ymbk-bgpsec-rtr-rekeying] routers MAY be capable - of generating their own public/private key-pairs and having their + As described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-rtr-keying] routers MAY be capable of + generating their own public/private key-pairs and having their certificates signed and published in the RPKI by the RPKI CA system, and/or MAY be given public/private key-pairs by the operator. A site/operator MAY use a single certificate/key in all their routers, one certificate/key per router, or any granularity in between. A large operator, concerned that a compromise of one router's key would make other routers vulnerable, MAY accept a more complex certificate/key distribution burden to reduce this exposure. On the other extreme, an edge site with one or two routers MAY use a single certificate/key. + A prudent operator will pre-provision each router's 'next' key in the + RPKI so that, in case of compromise of the current key, there is no + propagation delay for provisioning the new key. + 5. Within a Network BGPsec is spoken by edge routers in a network, those which border other networks/ASs. In a fully BGPsec enabled AS, Route Reflectors MUST have BGPsec enabled if and only if there are eBGP speakers in their client cone, i.e. an RR client or the transitive closure of their customers' customers' customers' .... @@ -134,20 +138,25 @@ local policy within its network, see Section 7. In deployment this policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, preferences, etc. This allows a network to incrementally deploy BGPsec capable border routers. eBGP speakers which face more critical peers or up/downstreams would be candidates for the earliest deployment. Both securing one's own announcements and validating received announcements should be considered in partial deployment. + The operator should be aware that BGPsec, as any other policy change, + can cause traffic shifts in their network. And, as with normal + policy shift practice, a prudent operator has tools and methods to + predict, measure, modify, etc. + On the other hand, an operator wanting to monitor router loading, shifts in traffic, etc. will want to deploy incrementally while watching those and similar effects. As they are not signed, an eBGP listener SHOULD NOT strongly trust unsigned markings such as communities received across a trust boundary. 6. Considerations for Edge Sites @@ -175,20 +184,29 @@ announcement as Valid or Invalid, there is no NotFound state. How this is used in routing is up to the operator's local policy. See [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. As BGPsec will be rolled out over years and does not allow for intermediate non-signing edge routers, coverage will be spotty for a long time. Hence a normal operator's policy SHOULD NOT be overly strict, perhaps preferring valid announcements and giving very low preference, but still using, invalid announcements. + Operators should be aware that accepting Invalid announcements, no + matter how de-preffed, will often be the equivalent of treating them + as fully Valid. Consider having a Valid announcement from neighbor V + for prefix 10.0.0.0/16 and an Invalid announcement for 10.0.666.0/24 + from neighbor I. If local policy on the router is not configured to + discard the Invalid announcement from I, then longest match + forwarding will send packets to neighbor I no matter the value of + local preference. + A BGPsec speaker validates signed paths at the eBGP edge. Local policy on the eBGP edge MAY convey the validation state of a BGP signed path through normal local policy mechanisms, e.g. setting a BGP community, or modifying a metric value such as local-preference or MED. Some MAY choose to use the large Local-Pref hammer. Others MAY choose to let AS-Path rule and set their internal metric, which comes after AS-Path in the BGP decision process. Because of possible RPKI version skew, an AS Path which does not @@ -262,22 +280,22 @@ 10. IANA Considerations This document has no IANA Considerations. 11. References 11.1. Normative References [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification", - draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-01 (work in progress), - October 2011. + draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-03 (work in progress), + May 2012. [I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters] Bush, R., "The RPKI Ghostbusters Record", draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters-16 (work in progress), December 2011. [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-ops] Bush, R., "RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation", draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-15 (work in progress), March 2012. @@ -303,34 +321,34 @@ 11.2. Informative References [I-D.ietf-sidr-algorithm-agility] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility Procedure for RPKI.", draft-ietf-sidr-algorithm-agility-05 (work in progress), January 2012. [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", - draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-03 (work in progress), - October 2011. + draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-05 (work in progress), + April 2012. + + [I-D.ietf-sidr-rtr-keying] + Turner, S., Patel, K., and R. Bush, "Router Keying for + BGPsec", draft-ietf-sidr-rtr-keying-00 (work in progress), + May 2012. [I-D.rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover] Gagliano, R., Patel, K., and B. Weis, "BGPSEC router key roll-over as an alternative to beaconing", draft-rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-00 (work in progress), March 2012. - [I-D.ymbk-bgpsec-rtr-rekeying] - Turner, S., Patel, K., and R. Bush, "Router Keying for - BGPsec", draft-ymbk-bgpsec-rtr-rekeying-00 (work in - progress), March 2012. - [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. [RFC5065] Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous System Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065, August 2007. [RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.