draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-05.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-06.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: BCP May 24, 2012 Intended status: Best Current Practice July 3, 2015
Expires: November 25, 2012 Expires: January 4, 2016
BGPsec Operational Considerations BGPsec Operational Considerations
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-05 draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-06
Abstract Abstract
Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many
operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and
present them. It is expected to evolve as BGPsec is formalized and present the most critical and universal. It is expected to evolve as
initially deployed. BGPsec is formalized and initially deployed.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] only when they
appear in all upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed
case as English words, without normative meaning.
Status of this Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 25, 2012. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 4, 2016.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. AS/Router Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. AS/Router Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. Considerations for Edge Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6. Considerations for Edge Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
8. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
BGPsec is a new protocol with many operational considerations. It is BGPsec, [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview], is a new protocol with many
expected to be deployed incrementally over a number of years. As operational considerations. It is expected to be deployed
core BGPsec-capable routers may require large memory and/or modern incrementally over a number of years. As core BGPsec-capable routers
CPUs, it is thought that origin validation based on the RPKI will may require large memory and/or modern CPUs, it is thought that
occur over the next one to three years and that BGPsec will start to origin validation based on the RPKI, [RFC6811], will occur over the
deploy late in that window. next twp to three years and that BGPsec will start to deploy well
after that.
BGPsec relies on widespread propagation of the Resource Public Key BGPsec relies on widespread propagation of the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. How the RPKI is distributed and Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. How the RPKI is distributed and
maintained globally and within an operator's infrastructure may be maintained globally and within an operator's infrastructure may be
different for BGPsec than for origin validation. different for BGPsec than for origin validation.
BGPsec need be spoken only by an AS's eBGP speaking, AKA border, BGPsec need be spoken only by an AS's eBGP speaking, AKA border,
routers, and is designed so that it can be used to protect routers, and is designed so that it can be used to protect
announcements which are originated by small edge routers. This has announcements which are originated by small edge routers. This has
special operational considerations. special operational considerations.
Different prefixes have different timing and replay protection Different prefixes may have different timing and replay protection
considerations. considerations.
2. Suggested Reading 2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], BGPsec, It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], BGPsec,
[I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview], the RPKI, see [RFC6480], the RPKI [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview], the RPKI, see [RFC6480], the RPKI
Repository Structure, see [RFC6481], and ROAs, see [RFC6482]. Repository Structure, see [RFC6481], and ROAs, see [RFC6482].
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance
All non-ROA considerations in the section on RPKI Distribution and All non-ROA considerations in the section on RPKI Distribution and
Maintenance of [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-ops] apply. Maintenance of [RFC7115] apply.
4. AS/Router Certificates 4. AS/Router Certificates
As described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-rtr-keying] routers MAY be capable of As described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-rtr-keying] BGPsec-speaking routers
generating their own public/private key-pairs and having their are either capable of generating their own public/private key-pairs
certificates signed and published in the RPKI by the RPKI CA system, and having their certificates signed and published in the RPKI by the
and/or MAY be given public/private key-pairs by the operator. RPKI CA system, and/or are given public/private key-pairs by the
operator.
A site/operator MAY use a single certificate/key in all their A site/operator MAY use a single certificate/key in all their
routers, one certificate/key per router, or any granularity in routers, one certificate/key per router, or any granularity in
between. between.
A large operator, concerned that a compromise of one router's key A large operator, concerned that a compromise of one router's key
would make other routers vulnerable, MAY accept a more complex would make other routers vulnerable, may accept a more complex
certificate/key distribution burden to reduce this exposure. certificate/key distribution burden to reduce this exposure.
On the other extreme, an edge site with one or two routers MAY use a On the other extreme, an edge site with one or two routers may choose
single certificate/key. to use a single certificate/key.
A prudent operator will pre-provision each router's 'next' key in the In anticipation of possible key compromise, a prudent operator will
RPKI so that, in case of compromise of the current key, there is no pre-provision each router's 'next' key in the RPKI so there is no
propagation delay for provisioning the new key. propagation delay for provisioning the new key.
5. Within a Network 5. Within a Network
BGPsec is spoken by edge routers in a network, those which border BGPsec is spoken by edge routers in a network, those which border
other networks/ASs. other networks/ASs.
In a fully BGPsec enabled AS, Route Reflectors MUST have BGPsec In a fully BGPsec enabled AS, Route Reflectors MUST have BGPsec
enabled if and only if there are eBGP speakers in their client cone, enabled if and only if there are eBGP speakers in their client cone,
i.e. an RR client or the transitive closure of their customers' i.e. an RR client or the transitive closure of their customers'
customers' customers' .... customers' customers' ....
A BGPsec capable router MAY use the data it receives to influence A BGPsec capable router MAY use the data it receives to influence
local policy within its network, see Section 7. In deployment this local policy within its network, see Section 7. In deployment this
policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, preferences, etc. policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, preferences, etc.
This allows a network to incrementally deploy BGPsec capable border
This allows a network to incrementally deploy BGPsec enabled border
routers. routers.
eBGP speakers which face more critical peers or up/downstreams would eBGP speakers which face more critical peers or up/downstreams would
be candidates for the earliest deployment. Both securing one's own be candidates for early deployment. Both securing one's own
announcements and validating received announcements should be announcements and validating received announcements should be
considered in partial deployment. considered in partial deployment.
The operator should be aware that BGPsec, as any other policy change, The operator should be aware that BGPsec, as any other policy change,
can cause traffic shifts in their network. And, as with normal can cause traffic shifts in their network. And, as with normal
policy shift practice, a prudent operator has tools and methods to policy shift practice, a prudent operator has tools and methods to
predict, measure, modify, etc. predict, measure, modify, etc.
On the other hand, an operator wanting to monitor router loading, On the other hand, an operator wanting to monitor router loading,
shifts in traffic, etc. will want to deploy incrementally while shifts in traffic, etc. might deploy incrementally while watching
watching those and similar effects. those and similar effects.
As they are not signed, an eBGP listener SHOULD NOT strongly trust As they are not formally verifiable, an eBGP listener SHOULD NOT
unsigned markings such as communities received across a trust strongly trust unsigned security markings such as communities
boundary. received across a trust boundary.
6. Considerations for Edge Sites 6. Considerations for Edge Sites
An edge site which does not provide transit and trusts its An edge site which does not provide transit and trusts its
upstream(s) SHOULD only originate a signed prefix announcement and upstream(s) SHOULD only originate a signed prefix announcement and
need not validate received announcements. need not validate received announcements.
BGPsec protocol capability negotiation provides for a speaker signing BGPsec protocol capability negotiation provides for a speaker signing
the data it sends but being unable to accept signed data. Thus a the data it sends without being able to accept signed data. Thus a
smallish edge router may hold only its own signing key(s) and sign smallish edge router may hold only its own signing key(s), sign it's
it's announcement but not receive signed announcements and therefore announcements, but not receive signed announcements and therefore not
not need to deal with the majority of the RPKI. Thus such routers need to deal with the majority of the RPKI. Thus such routers CPU,
CPU, RAM, and crypto needs are trivial and additional hardware should RAM, and crypto needs are trivial and additional hardware should not
not be needed. be needed.
As the vast majority (84%) of ASs are stubs, and they announce the As the vast majority (84%) of ASs are stubs, and they announce the
majority of prefixes, this allows for simpler and less expensive majority of prefixes, this allows for simpler and less expensive
incremental deployment. It may also mean that edge sites concerned incremental deployment. It may also mean that edge sites concerned
with routing security will be attracted to upstreams which support with routing security will be attracted to upstreams which support
BGPsec. BGPsec.
7. Routing Policy 7. Routing Policy
Unlike origin validation based on the RPKI, BGPsec marks a received Unlike origin validation based on the RPKI, BGPsec marks a received
announcement as Valid or Invalid, there is no NotFound state. How announcement as Valid or Invalid, there is no explicit NotFound
this is used in routing is up to the operator's local policy. See state. In some sense, an unsigned BGP4 path is the equivalent of
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. NotFound. How this is used in routing is up to the operator's local
policy. See [RFC6811].
As BGPsec will be rolled out over years and does not allow for As BGPsec will be rolled out over years and does not allow for
intermediate non-signing edge routers, coverage will be spotty for a intermediate non-signing edge routers, coverage will be spotty for a
long time. Hence a normal operator's policy SHOULD NOT be overly long time. Hence a normal operator's policy SHOULD NOT be overly
strict, perhaps preferring valid announcements and giving very low strict, perhaps preferring Valid paths and giving very low
preference, but still using, invalid announcements. preference, but still using, Invalid paths.
Operators should be aware that accepting Invalid announcements, no Operators should be aware that accepting Invalid announcements, no
matter how de-preffed, will often be the equivalent of treating them matter how de-preffed, will often be the equivalent of treating them
as fully Valid. Consider having a Valid announcement from neighbor V as fully Valid. Consider having a Valid announcement from neighbor V
for prefix 10.0.0.0/16 and an Invalid announcement for 10.0.666.0/24 for prefix 10.0.0.0/16 and an Invalid announcement for 10.0.666.0/24
from neighbor I. If local policy on the router is not configured to from neighbor I. If local policy on the router is not configured to
discard the Invalid announcement from I, then longest match discard the Invalid announcement from I, then longest match
forwarding will send packets to neighbor I no matter the value of forwarding will send packets to neighbor I no matter the value of
local preference. local preference.
A BGPsec speaker validates signed paths at the eBGP edge. A BGPsec speaker validates signed paths at the eBGP edge.
Local policy on the eBGP edge MAY convey the validation state of a Local policy on the eBGP edge MAY convey the validation state of a
BGP signed path through normal local policy mechanisms, e.g. setting BGP signed path through normal local policy mechanisms, e.g. setting
a BGP community, or modifying a metric value such as local-preference a BGP community for internal use, or modifying a metric value such as
or MED. Some MAY choose to use the large Local-Pref hammer. Others local-preference or MED. Some may choose to use the large Local-Pref
MAY choose to let AS-Path rule and set their internal metric, which hammer. Others may choose to let AS-Path rule and set their internal
comes after AS-Path in the BGP decision process. metric, which comes after AS-Path in the BGP decision process.
Because of possible RPKI version skew, an AS Path which does not Because of possible RPKI version skew, an AS Path which does not
validate at router R0 might validate at R1. Therefore, signed paths validate at router R0 might validate at R1. Therefore, signed paths
that are invalid and yet propagated (because they are chosen as best that are Invalid and yet propagated (because they are chosen as best
path) SHOULD have their signatures kept intact and MUST be signed if path) SHOULD have their signatures kept intact and MUST be signed if
sent to external BGPsec speakers. sent to external BGPsec speakers.
This implies that updates which a speaker judges to be invalid MAY be This implies that updates which a speaker judges to be Invalid MAY be
propagated to iBGP peers. Therefore, unless local policy ensures propagated to iBGP peers. Therefore, unless local policy ensures
otherwise, a signed path learned via iBGP MAY be invalid. If needed, otherwise, a signed path learned via iBGP MAY be Invalid. If needed,
the validation state should be signaled by normal local policy the validation state should be signaled by normal local policy
mechanisms such as communities or metrics. mechanisms such as communities or metrics.
On the other hand, local policy on the eBGP edge might preclude iBGP On the other hand, local policy on the eBGP edge might preclude iBGP
or eBGP announcement of signed AS Paths which are invalid. or eBGP announcement of signed AS Paths which are Invalid.
A BGPsec speaker receiving a path SHOULD perform origin validation A BGPsec speaker receiving a path SHOULD perform origin validation
per [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. per [RFC6811] and [RFC7115].
If it is known that a BGPsec neighbor is not a transparent route If it is known that a BGPsec neighbor is not a transparent route
server, and the router provides a knob to disallow a received pCount server, and the router provides a knob to disallow a received pCount
(prepend count, zero for transparent route servers) of zero, that (prepend count, zero for transparent route servers) of zero, that
knob SHOULD be applied. Routers should default to this knob knob SHOULD be applied. Routers should default to this knob
disallowing pCount 0. disallowing pCount 0.
To prevent exposure of the internals of BGP Confederations [RFC5065], To prevent exposure of the internals of BGP Confederations [RFC5065],
a BGPsec speaker which is a Member-AS of a Confederation MUST NOT a BGPsec speaker which is a Member-AS of a Confederation MUST NOT
sign updates sent to another Member-AS of the same Confederation. sign updates sent to another Member-AS of the same Confederation.
8. Notes 8. Notes
For protection from attacks replaying BGP data on the order of a day For protection from attacks replaying BGP data on the order of a day
or longer old, re-keying routers with new keys (previously) or longer old, re-keying routers with new keys (previously)
provisioned in the RPKI is sufficient. For one procedure, see provisioned in the RPKI is sufficient. For one approach, see
[I-D.rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover]
Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent
view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache
or router may have different data about a particular prefix than or router may have different data about a particular prefix or router
another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the than another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the
nature of distributed data with distributed caches. nature of distributed data with distributed caches.
Operators who manage certificates SHOULD have RPKI Ghostbuster Operators who manage certificates SHOULD have RPKI GhostBuster
Records (see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters]), signed indirectly by End Records (see [RFC6493]), signed indirectly by End Entity
Entity certificates, for those certificates on which others' routing certificates, for those certificates on which others' routing depends
depends for certificate and/or ROA validation. for certificate and/or ROA validation.
Operators should be aware of impending algorithm transitions, which Operators should be aware of impending algorithm transitions, which
will be rare and slow-paced, see see will be rare and slow-paced, see see [RFC6916]. They should work
[I-D.ietf-sidr-algorithm-agility]. They should work with their with their vendors to ensure support for new algorithms.
vendors to ensure support for new algorithms.
As a router must evaluate certificates and ROAs which are time As a router must evaluate certificates and ROAs which are time
dependent, routers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of dependent, routers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of
approximately an hour. approximately an hour.
If a router has reason to believe its clock is seriously incorrect, If a router has reason to believe its clock is seriously incorrect,
e.g. it has a time earlier than 2011, it SHOULD NOT attempt to e.g. it has a time earlier than 2011, it SHOULD NOT attempt to
validate incoming updates. It SHOULD defer validation until it validate incoming updates. It SHOULD defer validation until it
believes it is within reasonable time tolerance. believes it is within reasonable time tolerance.
skipping to change at page 7, line 37 skipping to change at page 7, line 9
described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol].
10. IANA Considerations 10. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA Considerations. This document has no IANA Considerations.
11. References 11. References
11.1. Normative References 11.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview]
Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification",
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-03 (work in progress),
May 2012.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters]
Bush, R., "The RPKI Ghostbusters Record",
draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters-16 (work in progress),
December 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-ops]
Bush, R., "RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation",
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-15 (work in progress),
March 2012.
[I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview]
Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC", Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC",
draft-lepinski-bgpsec-overview-00 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview-02 (work in progress), May
March 2011. 2012.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]
Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification", draft-ietf-
sidr-bgpsec-protocol-07 (work in progress), February 2013.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
February 2012. February 2012.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012. Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.
11.2. Informative References [RFC6493] Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, February 2012.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-algorithm-agility] [RFC7115] Bush, R., "Origin Validation Operation Based on the
Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185, RFC
Procedure for RPKI.", draft-ietf-sidr-algorithm-agility-05 7115, January 2014.
(work in progress), January 2012.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] 11.2. Informative References
Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover]
draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-05 (work in progress), Gagliano, R., Patel, K., and B. Weis, "BGPSEC router key
April 2012. rollover as an alternative to beaconing", draft-ietf-sidr-
bgpsec-rollover-01 (work in progress), October 2012.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rtr-keying] [I-D.ietf-sidr-rtr-keying]
Turner, S., Patel, K., and R. Bush, "Router Keying for Turner, S., Patel, K., and R. Bush, "Router Keying for
BGPsec", draft-ietf-sidr-rtr-keying-00 (work in progress), BGPsec", draft-ietf-sidr-rtr-keying-01 (work in progress),
May 2012. February 2013.
[I-D.rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover]
Gagliano, R., Patel, K., and B. Weis, "BGPSEC router key
roll-over as an alternative to beaconing",
draft-rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-00 (work in progress),
March 2012.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[RFC5065] Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous [RFC5065] Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous
System Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065, August 2007. System Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065, August 2007.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network [RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network
Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010. Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, January
2013.
[RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility
Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, April 2013.
Author's Address Author's Address
Randy Bush Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs 5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
US US
Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1
Email: randy@psg.com Email: randy@psg.com
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