draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-05.txt		draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-06.txt
	Network Working Group R. Bush		Network Working Group R. Bush
	Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan		Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
	Intended status: BCP May 24, 2012		Intended status: Best Current Practice July 3, 2015
	Expires: November 25, 2012		Expires: January 4, 2016
	BGPsec Operational Considerations		BGPsec Operational Considerations
	draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-05		draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-06
	Abstract		Abstract
	Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many		Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many
	operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and		operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and
	present them. It is expected to evolve as BGPsec is formalized and		present the most critical and universal. It is expected to evolve as
	initially deployed.		BGPsec is formalized and initially deployed.
	Requirements Language		Requirements Language
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
	document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].		be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] only when they
			appear in all upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed
			case as English words, without normative meaning.
	Status of this Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on November 25, 2012.		This Internet-Draft will expire on January 4, 2016.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
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	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	4. AS/Router Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		4. AS/Router Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	5. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		5. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	6. Considerations for Edge Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		6. Considerations for Edge Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	7. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		7. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	8. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		8. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	BGPsec is a new protocol with many operational considerations. It is		BGPsec, [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview], is a new protocol with many
	expected to be deployed incrementally over a number of years. As		operational considerations. It is expected to be deployed
	core BGPsec-capable routers may require large memory and/or modern		incrementally over a number of years. As core BGPsec-capable routers
	CPUs, it is thought that origin validation based on the RPKI will		may require large memory and/or modern CPUs, it is thought that
	occur over the next one to three years and that BGPsec will start to		origin validation based on the RPKI, [RFC6811], will occur over the
	deploy late in that window.		next twp to three years and that BGPsec will start to deploy well
			after that.
	BGPsec relies on widespread propagation of the Resource Public Key		BGPsec relies on widespread propagation of the Resource Public Key
	Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. How the RPKI is distributed and		Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. How the RPKI is distributed and
	maintained globally and within an operator's infrastructure may be		maintained globally and within an operator's infrastructure may be
	different for BGPsec than for origin validation.		different for BGPsec than for origin validation.
	BGPsec need be spoken only by an AS's eBGP speaking, AKA border,		BGPsec need be spoken only by an AS's eBGP speaking, AKA border,
	routers, and is designed so that it can be used to protect		routers, and is designed so that it can be used to protect
	announcements which are originated by small edge routers. This has		announcements which are originated by small edge routers. This has
	special operational considerations.		special operational considerations.
	Different prefixes have different timing and replay protection		Different prefixes may have different timing and replay protection
	considerations.		considerations.
	2. Suggested Reading		2. Suggested Reading
	It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], BGPsec,		It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], BGPsec,
	[I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview], the RPKI, see [RFC6480], the RPKI		[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview], the RPKI, see [RFC6480], the RPKI
	Repository Structure, see [RFC6481], and ROAs, see [RFC6482].		Repository Structure, see [RFC6481], and ROAs, see [RFC6482].
	3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance		3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance
	All non-ROA considerations in the section on RPKI Distribution and		All non-ROA considerations in the section on RPKI Distribution and
	Maintenance of [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-ops] apply.		Maintenance of [RFC7115] apply.
	4. AS/Router Certificates		4. AS/Router Certificates
	As described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-rtr-keying] routers MAY be capable of		As described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-rtr-keying] BGPsec-speaking routers
	generating their own public/private key-pairs and having their		are either capable of generating their own public/private key-pairs
	certificates signed and published in the RPKI by the RPKI CA system,		and having their certificates signed and published in the RPKI by the
	and/or MAY be given public/private key-pairs by the operator.		RPKI CA system, and/or are given public/private key-pairs by the
			operator.
	A site/operator MAY use a single certificate/key in all their		A site/operator MAY use a single certificate/key in all their
	routers, one certificate/key per router, or any granularity in		routers, one certificate/key per router, or any granularity in
	between.		between.
	A large operator, concerned that a compromise of one router's key		A large operator, concerned that a compromise of one router's key
	would make other routers vulnerable, MAY accept a more complex		would make other routers vulnerable, may accept a more complex
	certificate/key distribution burden to reduce this exposure.		certificate/key distribution burden to reduce this exposure.
	On the other extreme, an edge site with one or two routers MAY use a		On the other extreme, an edge site with one or two routers may choose
	single certificate/key.		to use a single certificate/key.
	A prudent operator will pre-provision each router's 'next' key in the		In anticipation of possible key compromise, a prudent operator will
	RPKI so that, in case of compromise of the current key, there is no		pre-provision each router's 'next' key in the RPKI so there is no
	propagation delay for provisioning the new key.		propagation delay for provisioning the new key.
	5. Within a Network		5. Within a Network
	BGPsec is spoken by edge routers in a network, those which border		BGPsec is spoken by edge routers in a network, those which border
	other networks/ASs.		other networks/ASs.
	In a fully BGPsec enabled AS, Route Reflectors MUST have BGPsec		In a fully BGPsec enabled AS, Route Reflectors MUST have BGPsec
	enabled if and only if there are eBGP speakers in their client cone,		enabled if and only if there are eBGP speakers in their client cone,
	i.e. an RR client or the transitive closure of their customers'		i.e. an RR client or the transitive closure of their customers'
	customers' customers' ....		customers' customers' ....
	A BGPsec capable router MAY use the data it receives to influence		A BGPsec capable router MAY use the data it receives to influence
	local policy within its network, see Section 7. In deployment this		local policy within its network, see Section 7. In deployment this
	policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, preferences, etc.		policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, preferences, etc.
	This allows a network to incrementally deploy BGPsec capable border
			This allows a network to incrementally deploy BGPsec enabled border
	routers.		routers.
	eBGP speakers which face more critical peers or up/downstreams would		eBGP speakers which face more critical peers or up/downstreams would
	be candidates for the earliest deployment. Both securing one's own		be candidates for early deployment. Both securing one's own
	announcements and validating received announcements should be		announcements and validating received announcements should be
	considered in partial deployment.		considered in partial deployment.
	The operator should be aware that BGPsec, as any other policy change,		The operator should be aware that BGPsec, as any other policy change,
	can cause traffic shifts in their network. And, as with normal		can cause traffic shifts in their network. And, as with normal
	policy shift practice, a prudent operator has tools and methods to		policy shift practice, a prudent operator has tools and methods to
	predict, measure, modify, etc.		predict, measure, modify, etc.
	On the other hand, an operator wanting to monitor router loading,		On the other hand, an operator wanting to monitor router loading,
	shifts in traffic, etc. will want to deploy incrementally while		shifts in traffic, etc. might deploy incrementally while watching
	watching those and similar effects.		those and similar effects.
	As they are not signed, an eBGP listener SHOULD NOT strongly trust		As they are not formally verifiable, an eBGP listener SHOULD NOT
	unsigned markings such as communities received across a trust		strongly trust unsigned security markings such as communities
	boundary.		received across a trust boundary.
	6. Considerations for Edge Sites		6. Considerations for Edge Sites
	An edge site which does not provide transit and trusts its		An edge site which does not provide transit and trusts its
	upstream(s) SHOULD only originate a signed prefix announcement and		upstream(s) SHOULD only originate a signed prefix announcement and
	need not validate received announcements.		need not validate received announcements.
	BGPsec protocol capability negotiation provides for a speaker signing		BGPsec protocol capability negotiation provides for a speaker signing
	the data it sends but being unable to accept signed data. Thus a		the data it sends without being able to accept signed data. Thus a
	smallish edge router may hold only its own signing key(s) and sign		smallish edge router may hold only its own signing key(s), sign it's
	it's announcement but not receive signed announcements and therefore		announcements, but not receive signed announcements and therefore not
	not need to deal with the majority of the RPKI. Thus such routers		need to deal with the majority of the RPKI. Thus such routers CPU,
	CPU, RAM, and crypto needs are trivial and additional hardware should		RAM, and crypto needs are trivial and additional hardware should not
	not be needed.		be needed.
	As the vast majority (84%) of ASs are stubs, and they announce the		As the vast majority (84%) of ASs are stubs, and they announce the
	majority of prefixes, this allows for simpler and less expensive		majority of prefixes, this allows for simpler and less expensive
	incremental deployment. It may also mean that edge sites concerned		incremental deployment. It may also mean that edge sites concerned
	with routing security will be attracted to upstreams which support		with routing security will be attracted to upstreams which support
	BGPsec.		BGPsec.
	7. Routing Policy		7. Routing Policy
	Unlike origin validation based on the RPKI, BGPsec marks a received		Unlike origin validation based on the RPKI, BGPsec marks a received
	announcement as Valid or Invalid, there is no NotFound state. How		announcement as Valid or Invalid, there is no explicit NotFound
	this is used in routing is up to the operator's local policy. See		state. In some sense, an unsigned BGP4 path is the equivalent of
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate].		NotFound. How this is used in routing is up to the operator's local
			policy. See [RFC6811].
	As BGPsec will be rolled out over years and does not allow for		As BGPsec will be rolled out over years and does not allow for
	intermediate non-signing edge routers, coverage will be spotty for a		intermediate non-signing edge routers, coverage will be spotty for a
	long time. Hence a normal operator's policy SHOULD NOT be overly		long time. Hence a normal operator's policy SHOULD NOT be overly
	strict, perhaps preferring valid announcements and giving very low		strict, perhaps preferring Valid paths and giving very low
	preference, but still using, invalid announcements.		preference, but still using, Invalid paths.
	Operators should be aware that accepting Invalid announcements, no		Operators should be aware that accepting Invalid announcements, no
	matter how de-preffed, will often be the equivalent of treating them		matter how de-preffed, will often be the equivalent of treating them
	as fully Valid. Consider having a Valid announcement from neighbor V		as fully Valid. Consider having a Valid announcement from neighbor V
	for prefix 10.0.0.0/16 and an Invalid announcement for 10.0.666.0/24		for prefix 10.0.0.0/16 and an Invalid announcement for 10.0.666.0/24
	from neighbor I. If local policy on the router is not configured to		from neighbor I. If local policy on the router is not configured to
	discard the Invalid announcement from I, then longest match		discard the Invalid announcement from I, then longest match
	forwarding will send packets to neighbor I no matter the value of		forwarding will send packets to neighbor I no matter the value of
	local preference.		local preference.
	A BGPsec speaker validates signed paths at the eBGP edge.		A BGPsec speaker validates signed paths at the eBGP edge.
	Local policy on the eBGP edge MAY convey the validation state of a		Local policy on the eBGP edge MAY convey the validation state of a
	BGP signed path through normal local policy mechanisms, e.g. setting		BGP signed path through normal local policy mechanisms, e.g. setting
	a BGP community, or modifying a metric value such as local-preference		a BGP community for internal use, or modifying a metric value such as
	or MED. Some MAY choose to use the large Local-Pref hammer. Others		local-preference or MED. Some may choose to use the large Local-Pref
	MAY choose to let AS-Path rule and set their internal metric, which		hammer. Others may choose to let AS-Path rule and set their internal
	comes after AS-Path in the BGP decision process.		metric, which comes after AS-Path in the BGP decision process.
	Because of possible RPKI version skew, an AS Path which does not		Because of possible RPKI version skew, an AS Path which does not
	validate at router R0 might validate at R1. Therefore, signed paths		validate at router R0 might validate at R1. Therefore, signed paths
	that are invalid and yet propagated (because they are chosen as best		that are Invalid and yet propagated (because they are chosen as best
	path) SHOULD have their signatures kept intact and MUST be signed if		path) SHOULD have their signatures kept intact and MUST be signed if
	sent to external BGPsec speakers.		sent to external BGPsec speakers.
	This implies that updates which a speaker judges to be invalid MAY be		This implies that updates which a speaker judges to be Invalid MAY be
	propagated to iBGP peers. Therefore, unless local policy ensures		propagated to iBGP peers. Therefore, unless local policy ensures
	otherwise, a signed path learned via iBGP MAY be invalid. If needed,		otherwise, a signed path learned via iBGP MAY be Invalid. If needed,
	the validation state should be signaled by normal local policy		the validation state should be signaled by normal local policy
	mechanisms such as communities or metrics.		mechanisms such as communities or metrics.
	On the other hand, local policy on the eBGP edge might preclude iBGP		On the other hand, local policy on the eBGP edge might preclude iBGP
	or eBGP announcement of signed AS Paths which are invalid.		or eBGP announcement of signed AS Paths which are Invalid.
	A BGPsec speaker receiving a path SHOULD perform origin validation		A BGPsec speaker receiving a path SHOULD perform origin validation
	per [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate].		per [RFC6811] and [RFC7115].
	If it is known that a BGPsec neighbor is not a transparent route		If it is known that a BGPsec neighbor is not a transparent route
	server, and the router provides a knob to disallow a received pCount		server, and the router provides a knob to disallow a received pCount
	(prepend count, zero for transparent route servers) of zero, that		(prepend count, zero for transparent route servers) of zero, that
	knob SHOULD be applied. Routers should default to this knob		knob SHOULD be applied. Routers should default to this knob
	disallowing pCount 0.		disallowing pCount 0.
	To prevent exposure of the internals of BGP Confederations [RFC5065],		To prevent exposure of the internals of BGP Confederations [RFC5065],
	a BGPsec speaker which is a Member-AS of a Confederation MUST NOT		a BGPsec speaker which is a Member-AS of a Confederation MUST NOT
	sign updates sent to another Member-AS of the same Confederation.		sign updates sent to another Member-AS of the same Confederation.
	8. Notes		8. Notes
	For protection from attacks replaying BGP data on the order of a day		For protection from attacks replaying BGP data on the order of a day
	or longer old, re-keying routers with new keys (previously)		or longer old, re-keying routers with new keys (previously)
	provisioned in the RPKI is sufficient. For one procedure, see		provisioned in the RPKI is sufficient. For one approach, see
	[I-D.rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover]		[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover]
	Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent		Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent
	view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache		view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache
	or router may have different data about a particular prefix than		or router may have different data about a particular prefix or router
	another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the		than another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the
	nature of distributed data with distributed caches.		nature of distributed data with distributed caches.
	Operators who manage certificates SHOULD have RPKI Ghostbuster		Operators who manage certificates SHOULD have RPKI GhostBuster
	Records (see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters]), signed indirectly by End		Records (see [RFC6493]), signed indirectly by End Entity
	Entity certificates, for those certificates on which others' routing		certificates, for those certificates on which others' routing depends
	depends for certificate and/or ROA validation.		for certificate and/or ROA validation.
	Operators should be aware of impending algorithm transitions, which		Operators should be aware of impending algorithm transitions, which
	will be rare and slow-paced, see see		will be rare and slow-paced, see see [RFC6916]. They should work
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-algorithm-agility]. They should work with their		with their vendors to ensure support for new algorithms.
	vendors to ensure support for new algorithms.
	As a router must evaluate certificates and ROAs which are time		As a router must evaluate certificates and ROAs which are time
	dependent, routers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of		dependent, routers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of
	approximately an hour.		approximately an hour.
	If a router has reason to believe its clock is seriously incorrect,		If a router has reason to believe its clock is seriously incorrect,
	e.g. it has a time earlier than 2011, it SHOULD NOT attempt to		e.g. it has a time earlier than 2011, it SHOULD NOT attempt to
	validate incoming updates. It SHOULD defer validation until it		validate incoming updates. It SHOULD defer validation until it
	believes it is within reasonable time tolerance.		believes it is within reasonable time tolerance.
	skipping to change at page 7, line 37		skipping to change at page 7, line 9
	described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol].		described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol].
	10. IANA Considerations		10. IANA Considerations
	This document has no IANA Considerations.		This document has no IANA Considerations.
	11. References		11. References
	11.1. Normative References		11.1. Normative References
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]		[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview]
	Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification",
	draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-03 (work in progress),
	May 2012.
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters]
	Bush, R., "The RPKI Ghostbusters Record",
	draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters-16 (work in progress),
	December 2011.
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-ops]
	Bush, R., "RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation",
	draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-15 (work in progress),
	March 2012.
	[I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview]
	Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC",		Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC",
	draft-lepinski-bgpsec-overview-00 (work in progress),		draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview-02 (work in progress), May
	March 2011.		2012.
			[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]
			Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification", draft-ietf-
			sidr-bgpsec-protocol-07 (work in progress), February 2013.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
	[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support		[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
	Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.		Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
	[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for		[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
	Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,		Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
	February 2012.		February 2012.
	[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route		[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
	Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.		Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.
	11.2. Informative References		[RFC6493] Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
			Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, February 2012.
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-algorithm-agility]		[RFC7115] Bush, R., "Origin Validation Operation Based on the
	Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility		Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185, RFC
	Procedure for RPKI.", draft-ietf-sidr-algorithm-agility-05		7115, January 2014.
	(work in progress), January 2012.
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]		11.2. Informative References
	Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
	Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation",		[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover]
	draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-05 (work in progress),		Gagliano, R., Patel, K., and B. Weis, "BGPSEC router key
	April 2012.		rollover as an alternative to beaconing", draft-ietf-sidr-
			bgpsec-rollover-01 (work in progress), October 2012.
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-rtr-keying]		[I-D.ietf-sidr-rtr-keying]
	Turner, S., Patel, K., and R. Bush, "Router Keying for		Turner, S., Patel, K., and R. Bush, "Router Keying for
	BGPsec", draft-ietf-sidr-rtr-keying-00 (work in progress),		BGPsec", draft-ietf-sidr-rtr-keying-01 (work in progress),
	May 2012.		February 2013.
	[I-D.rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover]
	Gagliano, R., Patel, K., and B. Weis, "BGPSEC router key
	roll-over as an alternative to beaconing",
	draft-rogaglia-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-00 (work in progress),
	March 2012.
	[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway		[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
	Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.		Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
	[RFC5065] Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous		[RFC5065] Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous
	System Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065, August 2007.		System Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065, August 2007.
	[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network		[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network
	Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms		Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
	Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.		Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.
			[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
			Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, January
			2013.
			[RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility
			Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
			(RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, April 2013.
	Author's Address		Author's Address
	Randy Bush		Randy Bush
	Internet Initiative Japan		Internet Initiative Japan
	5147 Crystal Springs		5147 Crystal Springs
	Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110		Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
	US		US
	Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1
	Email: randy@psg.com		Email: randy@psg.com
End of changes. 42 change blocks.
	119 lines changed or deleted		115 lines changed or added
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