--- 1/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-06.txt 2015-12-15 01:15:13.813547128 -0800 +++ 2/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-07.txt 2015-12-15 01:15:13.833547614 -0800 @@ -1,18 +1,18 @@ Network Working Group R. Bush Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan -Intended status: Best Current Practice July 3, 2015 -Expires: January 4, 2016 +Intended status: Best Current Practice December 15, 2015 +Expires: June 17, 2016 BGPsec Operational Considerations - draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-06 + draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-07 Abstract Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and present the most critical and universal. It is expected to evolve as BGPsec is formalized and initially deployed. Requirements Language @@ -30,21 +30,21 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on January 4, 2016. + This Internet-Draft will expire on June 17, 2016. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents @@ -57,25 +57,26 @@ Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. AS/Router Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6. Considerations for Edge Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1. Introduction BGPsec, [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview], is a new protocol with many operational considerations. It is expected to be deployed incrementally over a number of years. As core BGPsec-capable routers may require large memory and/or modern CPUs, it is thought that origin validation based on the RPKI, [RFC6811], will occur over the next twp to three years and that BGPsec will start to deploy well @@ -226,20 +227,29 @@ otherwise, a signed path learned via iBGP MAY be Invalid. If needed, the validation state should be signaled by normal local policy mechanisms such as communities or metrics. On the other hand, local policy on the eBGP edge might preclude iBGP or eBGP announcement of signed AS Paths which are Invalid. A BGPsec speaker receiving a path SHOULD perform origin validation per [RFC6811] and [RFC7115]. + A route server is usually 'transparent', most importantly not + inserting its own AS into the AS_Path, to not lengthen the AS hop + count and thereby reduce the likelihood of best path selection. See + 2.2.2 of [I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server]. A BGPsec-aware route + server needs to validate the incoming BGPSEC_Path, and to forward + updates which can be validated by clients which know the route + server's AS. The route server uses pCount of zero to not increase + the effective AS hop count. + If it is known that a BGPsec neighbor is not a transparent route server, and the router provides a knob to disallow a received pCount (prepend count, zero for transparent route servers) of zero, that knob SHOULD be applied. Routers should default to this knob disallowing pCount 0. To prevent exposure of the internals of BGP Confederations [RFC5065], a BGPsec speaker which is a Member-AS of a Confederation MUST NOT sign updates sent to another Member-AS of the same Confederation. @@ -279,23 +289,28 @@ 9. Security Considerations The major security considerations for the BGPsec protocol are described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. 10. IANA Considerations This document has no IANA Considerations. -11. References +11. Acknowledgments -11.1. Normative References + The author wishes to thank the BGPsec design group, Thomas King, and + Arnold Nipper. + +12. References + +12.1. Normative References [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview] Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview-02 (work in progress), May 2012. [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification", draft-ietf- sidr-bgpsec-protocol-07 (work in progress), February 2013. @@ -309,24 +324,30 @@ Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, February 2012. [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012. [RFC6493] Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, February 2012. [RFC7115] Bush, R., "Origin Validation Operation Based on the - Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185, RFC - 7115, January 2014. + Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185, + RFC 7115, DOI 10.17487/RFC7115, January 2014, + . -11.2. Informative References +12.2. Informative References + + [I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server] + Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker, + "Internet Exchange Route Server", draft-ietf-idr-ix-bgp- + route-server-02 (work in progress), February 2013. [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover] Gagliano, R., Patel, K., and B. Weis, "BGPSEC router key rollover as an alternative to beaconing", draft-ietf-sidr- bgpsec-rollover-01 (work in progress), October 2012. [I-D.ietf-sidr-rtr-keying] Turner, S., Patel, K., and R. Bush, "Router Keying for BGPsec", draft-ietf-sidr-rtr-keying-01 (work in progress), February 2013. @@ -340,21 +361,22 @@ [RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010. [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, January 2013. [RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure - (RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, April 2013. + (RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, DOI 10.17487/RFC6916, April + 2013, . Author's Address Randy Bush Internet Initiative Japan 5147 Crystal Springs Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 US Email: randy@psg.com