draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-08.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-09.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: Best Current Practice June 6, 2016 Intended status: Best Current Practice June 16, 2016
Expires: December 8, 2016 Expires: December 18, 2016
BGPsec Operational Considerations BGPsec Operational Considerations
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-08 draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-09
Abstract Abstract
Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many
operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and
present the most critical and universal. It is expected to evolve as present the most critical and universal. It is expected to evolve as
BGPsec is formalized and initially deployed. BGPsec is formalized and initially deployed.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 8, 2016. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 18, 2016.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. AS/Router Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. AS/Router Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. Considerations for Edge Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6. Considerations for Edge Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
BGPsec, [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview], is a new protocol with many BGPsec, [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview], is a new protocol with many
operational considerations. It is expected to be deployed operational considerations. It is expected to be deployed
incrementally over a number of years. As core BGPsec-capable routers incrementally over a number of years. As core BGPsec-capable routers
may require large memory and/or modern CPUs, it is thought that may require large memory and/or modern CPUs, it is thought that
origin validation based on the RPKI, [RFC6811], will occur over the origin validation based on the RPKI, [RFC6811], will occur over the
next twp to three years and that BGPsec will start to deploy well next two to three years and that BGPsec will start to deploy well
after that. after that.
BGPsec relies on widespread propagation of the Resource Public Key BGPsec relies on widespread propagation of the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. How the RPKI is distributed and Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. How the RPKI is distributed and
maintained globally and within an operator's infrastructure may be maintained globally and within an operator's infrastructure may be
different for BGPsec than for origin validation. different for BGPsec than for origin validation.
BGPsec need be spoken only by an AS's eBGP speaking, AKA border, BGPsec need be spoken only by an AS's eBGP speaking, AKA border,
routers, and is designed so that it can be used to protect routers, and is designed so that it can be used to protect
announcements which are originated by small edge routers. This has announcements which are originated by small edge routers. This has
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received across a trust boundary. received across a trust boundary.
6. Considerations for Edge Sites 6. Considerations for Edge Sites
An edge site which does not provide transit and trusts its An edge site which does not provide transit and trusts its
upstream(s) SHOULD only originate a signed prefix announcement and upstream(s) SHOULD only originate a signed prefix announcement and
need not validate received announcements. need not validate received announcements.
BGPsec protocol capability negotiation provides for a speaker signing BGPsec protocol capability negotiation provides for a speaker signing
the data it sends without being able to accept signed data. Thus a the data it sends without being able to accept signed data. Thus a
smallish edge router may hold only its own signing key(s), sign it's smallish edge router may hold only its own signing key(s), sign its
announcements, but not receive signed announcements and therefore not announcements, but not receive signed announcements and therefore not
need to deal with the majority of the RPKI. Thus such routers CPU, need to deal with the majority of the RPKI. Thus such routers CPU,
RAM, and crypto needs are trivial and additional hardware should not RAM, and crypto needs are trivial and additional hardware should not
be needed. be needed.
Operators might need to use hardware with limited resources. In such
cases, BGPsec protocol capability negotiation allows for a resource
constrained edge router to hold only its own signing key(s) and sign
its announcements, but not receive signed announcements. Therefore,
the router would not have to deal with the majority of the RPKI,
potentially saving the need for additional hardware.
As the vast majority (84%) of ASs are stubs, and they announce the As the vast majority (84%) of ASs are stubs, and they announce the
majority of prefixes, this allows for simpler and less expensive majority of prefixes, this allows for simpler and less expensive
incremental deployment. It may also mean that edge sites concerned incremental deployment. It may also mean that edge sites concerned
with routing security will be attracted to upstreams which support with routing security will be attracted to upstreams which support
BGPsec. BGPsec.
7. Routing Policy 7. Routing Policy
Unlike origin validation based on the RPKI, BGPsec marks a received Unlike origin validation based on the RPKI, BGPsec marks a received
announcement as Valid or Invalid, there is no explicit NotFound announcement as Valid or Invalid, there is no explicit NotFound
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or router may have different data about a particular prefix or router or router may have different data about a particular prefix or router
than another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the than another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the
nature of distributed data with distributed caches. nature of distributed data with distributed caches.
Operators who manage certificates SHOULD have RPKI GhostBuster Operators who manage certificates SHOULD have RPKI GhostBuster
Records (see [RFC6493]), signed indirectly by End Entity Records (see [RFC6493]), signed indirectly by End Entity
certificates, for those certificates on which others' routing depends certificates, for those certificates on which others' routing depends
for certificate and/or ROA validation. for certificate and/or ROA validation.
Operators should be aware of impending algorithm transitions, which Operators should be aware of impending algorithm transitions, which
will be rare and slow-paced, see see [RFC6916]. They should work will be rare and slow-paced, see [RFC6916]. They should work with
with their vendors to ensure support for new algorithms. their vendors to ensure support for new algorithms.
As a router must evaluate certificates and ROAs which are time As a router must evaluate certificates and ROAs which are time
dependent, routers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of dependent, routers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of
approximately an hour. approximately an hour.
If a router has reason to believe its clock is seriously incorrect, If a router has reason to believe its clock is seriously incorrect,
e.g. it has a time earlier than 2011, it SHOULD NOT attempt to e.g. it has a time earlier than 2011, it SHOULD NOT attempt to
validate incoming updates. It SHOULD defer validation until it validate incoming updates. It SHOULD defer validation until it
believes it is within reasonable time tolerance. believes it is within reasonable time tolerance.
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