draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-08.txt		draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-09.txt
	Network Working Group R. Bush		Network Working Group R. Bush
	Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan		Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
	Intended status: Best Current Practice June 6, 2016		Intended status: Best Current Practice June 16, 2016
	Expires: December 8, 2016		Expires: December 18, 2016
	BGPsec Operational Considerations		BGPsec Operational Considerations
	draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-08		draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-09
	Abstract		Abstract
	Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many		Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many
	operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and		operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and
	present the most critical and universal. It is expected to evolve as		present the most critical and universal. It is expected to evolve as
	BGPsec is formalized and initially deployed.		BGPsec is formalized and initially deployed.
	Requirements Language		Requirements Language
	skipping to change at page 1, line 41 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 41 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on December 8, 2016.		This Internet-Draft will expire on December 18, 2016.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 20 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 20 ¶
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	4. AS/Router Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		4. AS/Router Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	5. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		5. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	6. Considerations for Edge Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		6. Considerations for Edge Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	7. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		7. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	8. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		8. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	BGPsec, [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview], is a new protocol with many		BGPsec, [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview], is a new protocol with many
	operational considerations. It is expected to be deployed		operational considerations. It is expected to be deployed
	incrementally over a number of years. As core BGPsec-capable routers		incrementally over a number of years. As core BGPsec-capable routers
	may require large memory and/or modern CPUs, it is thought that		may require large memory and/or modern CPUs, it is thought that
	origin validation based on the RPKI, [RFC6811], will occur over the		origin validation based on the RPKI, [RFC6811], will occur over the
	next twp to three years and that BGPsec will start to deploy well		next two to three years and that BGPsec will start to deploy well
	after that.		after that.
	BGPsec relies on widespread propagation of the Resource Public Key		BGPsec relies on widespread propagation of the Resource Public Key
	Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. How the RPKI is distributed and		Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. How the RPKI is distributed and
	maintained globally and within an operator's infrastructure may be		maintained globally and within an operator's infrastructure may be
	different for BGPsec than for origin validation.		different for BGPsec than for origin validation.
	BGPsec need be spoken only by an AS's eBGP speaking, AKA border,		BGPsec need be spoken only by an AS's eBGP speaking, AKA border,
	routers, and is designed so that it can be used to protect		routers, and is designed so that it can be used to protect
	announcements which are originated by small edge routers. This has		announcements which are originated by small edge routers. This has
	skipping to change at page 4, line 34 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 34 ¶
	received across a trust boundary.		received across a trust boundary.
	6. Considerations for Edge Sites		6. Considerations for Edge Sites
	An edge site which does not provide transit and trusts its		An edge site which does not provide transit and trusts its
	upstream(s) SHOULD only originate a signed prefix announcement and		upstream(s) SHOULD only originate a signed prefix announcement and
	need not validate received announcements.		need not validate received announcements.
	BGPsec protocol capability negotiation provides for a speaker signing		BGPsec protocol capability negotiation provides for a speaker signing
	the data it sends without being able to accept signed data. Thus a		the data it sends without being able to accept signed data. Thus a
	smallish edge router may hold only its own signing key(s), sign it's		smallish edge router may hold only its own signing key(s), sign its
	announcements, but not receive signed announcements and therefore not		announcements, but not receive signed announcements and therefore not
	need to deal with the majority of the RPKI. Thus such routers CPU,		need to deal with the majority of the RPKI. Thus such routers CPU,
	RAM, and crypto needs are trivial and additional hardware should not		RAM, and crypto needs are trivial and additional hardware should not
	be needed.		be needed.
			Operators might need to use hardware with limited resources. In such
			cases, BGPsec protocol capability negotiation allows for a resource
			constrained edge router to hold only its own signing key(s) and sign
			its announcements, but not receive signed announcements. Therefore,
			the router would not have to deal with the majority of the RPKI,
			potentially saving the need for additional hardware.
	As the vast majority (84%) of ASs are stubs, and they announce the		As the vast majority (84%) of ASs are stubs, and they announce the
	majority of prefixes, this allows for simpler and less expensive		majority of prefixes, this allows for simpler and less expensive
	incremental deployment. It may also mean that edge sites concerned		incremental deployment. It may also mean that edge sites concerned
	with routing security will be attracted to upstreams which support		with routing security will be attracted to upstreams which support
	BGPsec.		BGPsec.
	7. Routing Policy		7. Routing Policy
	Unlike origin validation based on the RPKI, BGPsec marks a received		Unlike origin validation based on the RPKI, BGPsec marks a received
	announcement as Valid or Invalid, there is no explicit NotFound		announcement as Valid or Invalid, there is no explicit NotFound
	skipping to change at page 6, line 36 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 46 ¶
	or router may have different data about a particular prefix or router		or router may have different data about a particular prefix or router
	than another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the		than another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the
	nature of distributed data with distributed caches.		nature of distributed data with distributed caches.
	Operators who manage certificates SHOULD have RPKI GhostBuster		Operators who manage certificates SHOULD have RPKI GhostBuster
	Records (see [RFC6493]), signed indirectly by End Entity		Records (see [RFC6493]), signed indirectly by End Entity
	certificates, for those certificates on which others' routing depends		certificates, for those certificates on which others' routing depends
	for certificate and/or ROA validation.		for certificate and/or ROA validation.
	Operators should be aware of impending algorithm transitions, which		Operators should be aware of impending algorithm transitions, which
	will be rare and slow-paced, see see [RFC6916]. They should work		will be rare and slow-paced, see [RFC6916]. They should work with
	with their vendors to ensure support for new algorithms.		their vendors to ensure support for new algorithms.
	As a router must evaluate certificates and ROAs which are time		As a router must evaluate certificates and ROAs which are time
	dependent, routers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of		dependent, routers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of
	approximately an hour.		approximately an hour.
	If a router has reason to believe its clock is seriously incorrect,		If a router has reason to believe its clock is seriously incorrect,
	e.g. it has a time earlier than 2011, it SHOULD NOT attempt to		e.g. it has a time earlier than 2011, it SHOULD NOT attempt to
	validate incoming updates. It SHOULD defer validation until it		validate incoming updates. It SHOULD defer validation until it
	believes it is within reasonable time tolerance.		believes it is within reasonable time tolerance.
End of changes. 9 change blocks.
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