draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-10.txt		draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-11.txt
	Network Working Group R. Bush		Network Working Group R. Bush
	Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan		Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
	Intended status: Best Current Practice June 23, 2016		Intended status: Best Current Practice December 2, 2016
	Expires: December 25, 2016		Expires: June 5, 2017
	BGPsec Operational Considerations		BGPsec Operational Considerations
	draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-10		draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-11
	Abstract		Abstract
	Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many		Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many
	operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and		operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and
	present the most critical and universal. It is expected to evolve as		present the most critical and universal. It is expected to evolve as
	BGPsec is formalized and initially deployed.		BGPsec is formalized and initially deployed.
	Requirements Language		Requirements Language
	skipping to change at page 1, line 41 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 41 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on December 25, 2016.		This Internet-Draft will expire on June 5, 2017.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 28 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 28 ¶
	5. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		5. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	6. Considerations for Edge Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		6. Considerations for Edge Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	7. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		7. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	8. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		8. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	BGPsec, [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview], is a new protocol with many		BGPsec, [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol], is a new protocol with many
	operational considerations. It is expected to be deployed		operational considerations. It is expected to be deployed
	incrementally over a number of years. As core BGPsec-capable routers		incrementally over a number of years. As core BGPsec-capable routers
	may require large memory and/or modern CPUs, it is thought that		may require large memory and/or modern CPUs, it is thought that
	origin validation based on the RPKI, [RFC6811], will occur over the		origin validation based on the RPKI, [RFC6811], will occur over some
	next two to three years and that BGPsec will start to deploy well		years and that BGPsec will start to deploy after that.
	after that.
	BGPsec relies on widespread propagation of the Resource Public Key		BGPsec relies on widespread propagation of the Resource Public Key
	Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. How the RPKI is distributed and		Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. How the RPKI is distributed and
	maintained globally and within an operator's infrastructure may be		maintained globally and within an operator's infrastructure may be
	different for BGPsec than for origin validation.		different for BGPsec than for origin validation.
	BGPsec needs to be spoken only by an AS's eBGP speaking, AKA border,		BGPsec needs to be spoken only by an AS's eBGP speaking, AKA border,
	routers, and is designed so that it can be used to protect		routers, and is designed so that it can be used to protect
	announcements which are originated by resource constrained edge		announcements which are originated by resource constrained edge
	routers. This has special operational considerations.		routers. This has special operational considerations.
	skipping to change at page 3, line 46 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 46 ¶
	pre-provision each router's 'next' key in the RPKI so there is no		pre-provision each router's 'next' key in the RPKI so there is no
	propagation delay for provisioning the new key.		propagation delay for provisioning the new key.
	5. Within a Network		5. Within a Network
	BGPsec is spoken by edge routers in a network, those which border		BGPsec is spoken by edge routers in a network, those which border
	other networks/ASs.		other networks/ASs.
	In a fully BGPsec enabled AS, Route Reflectors MUST have BGPsec		In a fully BGPsec enabled AS, Route Reflectors MUST have BGPsec
	enabled if and only if there are eBGP speakers in their client cone,		enabled if and only if there are eBGP speakers in their client cone,
	i.e. an RR client or the transitive closure of their customers'		i.e. an RR client or the transitive closure of a client's customers'
	customers' customers' etc.		customers' customers' etc.
	A BGPsec capable router MAY use the data it receives to influence		A BGPsec capable router MAY use the data it receives to influence
	local policy within its network, see Section 7. In deployment this		local policy within its network, see Section 7. In deployment this
	policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, preferences, etc.		policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, preferences, etc.
	This allows a network to incrementally deploy BGPsec enabled border		This allows a network to incrementally deploy BGPsec enabled border
	routers.		routers.
	eBGP speakers which face more critical peers or up/downstreams would		eBGP speakers which face more critical peers or up/downstreams would
	skipping to change at page 4, line 22 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 22 ¶
	The operator should be aware that BGPsec, as any other policy change,		The operator should be aware that BGPsec, as any other policy change,
	can cause traffic shifts in their network. And, as with normal		can cause traffic shifts in their network. And, as with normal
	policy shift practice, a prudent operator has tools and methods to		policy shift practice, a prudent operator has tools and methods to
	predict, measure, modify, etc.		predict, measure, modify, etc.
	On the other hand, an operator wanting to monitor router loading,		On the other hand, an operator wanting to monitor router loading,
	shifts in traffic, etc. might deploy incrementally while watching		shifts in traffic, etc. might deploy incrementally while watching
	those and similar effects.		those and similar effects.
	As they are not formally verifiable, an eBGP listener SHOULD NOT		BGPsec does not sign over communities, so they are not formally
	strongly trust unsigned security markings such as communities		trustable. Additionally, outsourcing verification is not prudent
	received across a trust boundary.		security practice. Therefore an eBGP listener SHOULD NOT strongly
			trust unsigned security signaling, such as communities, received
			across a trust boundary.
	6. Considerations for Edge Sites		6. Considerations for Edge Sites
	An edge site which does not provide transit and trusts its		An edge site which does not provide transit and trusts its
	upstream(s) SHOULD only originate a signed prefix announcement and		upstream(s) SHOULD only originate a signed prefix announcement and
	need not validate received announcements.		need not validate received announcements.
	Operators might need to use hardware with limited resources. In such		Operators might need to use hardware with limited resources. In such
	cases, BGPsec protocol capability negotiation allows for a resource		cases, BGPsec protocol capability negotiation allows for a resource
	constrained edge router to hold only its own signing key(s) and sign		constrained edge router to hold only its own signing key(s) and sign
	skipping to change at page 5, line 7 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 9 ¶
	7. Routing Policy		7. Routing Policy
	Unlike origin validation based on the RPKI, BGPsec marks a received		Unlike origin validation based on the RPKI, BGPsec marks a received
	announcement as Valid or Not Valid, there is no explicit NotFound		announcement as Valid or Not Valid, there is no explicit NotFound
	state. In some sense, an unsigned BGP4 path is the equivalent of		state. In some sense, an unsigned BGP4 path is the equivalent of
	NotFound. How this is used in routing is up to the operator's local		NotFound. How this is used in routing is up to the operator's local
	policy, similar to origin validation as in [RFC6811].		policy, similar to origin validation as in [RFC6811].
	As BGPsec will be rolled out over years and does not allow for		As BGPsec will be rolled out over years and does not allow for
	intermediate non-signing edge routers, coverage will be spotty for a		intermediate non-signing edge routers, coverage will be spotty for a
	long time. Hence a normal operator's policy SHOULD NOT be overly		long time. This presents a dilemma; should a router evaluating an
	strict, perhaps preferring Valid paths and giving very low		inbound BGPsec_Path as Not Valid be very strict and discard it? On
	preference, but still using, Not Valid paths.		the other hand, it might be the only path to that prefix, and a very
			low local-preference would cause it to be used and propagated only if
			there was no alternative. Either choice is reasonable, but we
			recommend dropping because of the next point.
	Operators should be aware that accepting Not Valid announcements, no		Operators should be aware that accepting Not Valid announcements, no
	matter the local preference, will often be the equivalent of treating		matter the local preference, will often be the equivalent of treating
	them as fully Valid. Local preference affects only routes to the		them as fully Valid. Local preference affects only routes to the
	same set of destinations. Consider having a Valid announcement from		same set of destinations. Consider having a Valid announcement from
	neighbor V for prefix 10.0.0.0/16 and an Not Valid announcement for		neighbor V for prefix 10.0.0.0/16 and an Not Valid announcement for
	10.0.666.0/24 from neighbor I. If local policy on the router is not		10.0.666.0/24 from neighbor I. If local policy on the router is not
	configured to discard the Not Valid announcement from I, then longest		configured to discard the Not Valid announcement from I, then longest
	match forwarding will send packets to neighbor I no matter the value		match forwarding will send packets to neighbor I no matter the value
	of local preference.		of local preference.
	skipping to change at page 5, line 33 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 38 ¶
	Local policy on the eBGP edge MAY convey the validation state of a		Local policy on the eBGP edge MAY convey the validation state of a
	BGP signed path through normal local policy mechanisms, e.g. setting		BGP signed path through normal local policy mechanisms, e.g. setting
	a BGP community for internal use, or modifying a metric value such as		a BGP community for internal use, or modifying a metric value such as
	local-preference or MED. Some may choose to use the large Local-Pref		local-preference or MED. Some may choose to use the large Local-Pref
	hammer. Others may choose to let AS-Path rule and set their internal		hammer. Others may choose to let AS-Path rule and set their internal
	metric, which comes after AS-Path in the BGP decision process.		metric, which comes after AS-Path in the BGP decision process.
	Because of possible RPKI version skew, an AS Path which does not		Because of possible RPKI version skew, an AS Path which does not
	validate at router R0 might validate at R1. Therefore, signed paths		validate at router R0 might validate at R1. Therefore, signed paths
	that are Not Valid and yet propagated (because they are chosen as		that are Not Valid and yet propagated (because they are chosen as
	best path) SHOULD have their signatures kept intact and MUST be		best path) should have their signatures left intact and MUST be
	signed if sent to external BGPsec speakers.		signed if sent to external BGPsec speakers.
	This implies that updates which a speaker judges to be Not Valid MAY		This implies that updates which a speaker judges to be Not Valid MAY
	be propagated to iBGP peers. Therefore, unless local policy ensures		be propagated to iBGP peers. Therefore, unless local policy ensures
	otherwise, a signed path learned via iBGP MAY be Not Valid. If		otherwise, a signed path learned via iBGP MAY be Not Valid. If
	needed, the validation state should be signaled by normal local		needed, the validation state should be signaled by normal local
	policy mechanisms such as communities or metrics.		policy mechanisms such as communities or metrics.
	On the other hand, local policy on the eBGP edge might preclude iBGP		On the other hand, local policy on the eBGP edge might preclude iBGP
	or eBGP announcement of signed AS Paths which are Not Valid.		or eBGP announcement of signed AS Paths which are Not Valid.
	A BGPsec speaker receiving a path SHOULD perform origin validation		A BGPsec speaker receiving a path SHOULD perform origin validation
	per [RFC6811] and [RFC7115].		per [RFC6811] and [RFC7115].
	A route server is usually 'transparent'. To operate transparently in		A route server is usually 'transparent', i.e. does not insert an AS
	an environment in which the route server connects BGPsec-enabled		into the path so as not to increase the AS hop count and thereby
	peers, the route server MUST run BGPsec as well. A BGPsec-aware		affect downstream path choices. But, with BGPsec, a client router R
	route server needs to validate the incoming BGPsec_Path, and to		needs to be able to validate paths which are forward signed to R.
	forward updates which can be validated by clients which know the		But the sending router can not generate signatures to all the
	route server's AS. This implies that the route server creates		possible clients. Therefore a BGPsec-aware route server needs to
	signatures per client including its own AS in the BGPsec_Path and the		validate the incoming BGPsec_Path, and to forward updates which can
	target ASes, see 2.2.2 of [I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server]. The		be validated by clients which must therefore know the route server's
	route server uses pCount of zero to not increase the effective AS hop		AS. This implies that the route server creates signatures per client
	count.		including its own AS in the BGPsec_Path, forward signing to each
			client AS, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. The route server
			uses pCount of zero to not increase the effective AS hop count,
			thereby retaining the intent of 'transparency'.
	If it is known that a BGPsec neighbor is not a transparent route		If it is known that a BGPsec neighbor is not a transparent route
	server, and the router provides a knob to disallow a received pCount		server, or is otherwise validly using pCount=0 (e,g, see
	(prepend count, zero for transparent route servers) of zero, that		[I-D.ietf-sidr-as-migration]), and the router provides a knob to
	knob SHOULD be applied. Routers should disallow pCount 0 by default.		disallow a received pCount (of zero, that knob SHOULD be applied.
			Routers should disallow pCount 0 by default.
	To prevent exposure of the internals of BGP Confederations [RFC5065],		To prevent exposure of the internals of BGP Confederations [RFC5065],
	a BGPsec speaker which is a Member-AS of a Confederation MUST NOT		a BGPsec speaker which is a Member-AS of a Confederation MUST NOT
	sign updates sent to another Member-AS of the same Confederation.		sign updates sent to another Member-AS of the same Confederation.
	8. Notes		8. Notes
	For protection from attacks replaying BGP data on the order of a day		For protection from attacks replaying BGP data on the order of a day
	or longer old, re-keying routers with new keys (previously)		or longer old, re-keying routers with new keys (previously)
	provisioned in the RPKI is sufficient. For one approach, see		provisioned in the RPKI is sufficient. For one approach, see
	skipping to change at page 6, line 43 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 4 ¶
	Records (see [RFC6493]), signed indirectly by End Entity		Records (see [RFC6493]), signed indirectly by End Entity
	certificates, for those certificates on which others' routing depends		certificates, for those certificates on which others' routing depends
	for certificate and/or ROA validation.		for certificate and/or ROA validation.
	Operators should be aware of impending algorithm transitions, which		Operators should be aware of impending algorithm transitions, which
	will be rare and slow-paced, see [RFC6916]. They should work with		will be rare and slow-paced, see [RFC6916]. They should work with
	their vendors to ensure support for new algorithms.		their vendors to ensure support for new algorithms.
	As a router must evaluate certificates and ROAs which are time		As a router must evaluate certificates and ROAs which are time
	dependent, routers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of		dependent, routers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of
	approximately an hour.		approximately an hour. The common approach is for operators to
			deploy servers that provide time service, such as [RFC5905], to
			client routers.
	If a router has reason to believe its clock is seriously incorrect,		If a router has reason to believe its clock is seriously incorrect,
	e.g. it has a time earlier than 2011, it SHOULD NOT attempt to		e.g. it has a time earlier than 2011, it SHOULD NOT attempt to
	validate incoming updates. It SHOULD defer validation until it		validate incoming updates. It SHOULD defer validation until it
	believes it is within reasonable time tolerance.		believes it is within reasonable time tolerance.
	Operators should deploy servers that provide time service, such as
	[RFC5905], to client routers.
	9. Security Considerations		9. Security Considerations
	The major security considerations for the BGPsec protocol are		This document describes operational considerations for the deployment
	described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol].		of BGPsec. The security considerations for BGPsec are described in
			[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol].
	10. IANA Considerations		10. IANA Considerations
	This document has no IANA Considerations.		This document has no IANA Considerations.
	11. Acknowledgments		11. Acknowledgments
	The author wishes to thank the BGPsec design group, Thomas King, and		The author wishes to thank the BGPsec design group, Thomas King,
	Arnold Nipper.		Arnold Nipper, and Alvaro Retana.
	12. References		12. References
	12.1. Normative References		12.1. Normative References
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview]
	Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC",
	draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview-02 (work in progress), May
	2012.
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]		[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]
	Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification", draft-ietf-		Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification", draft-ietf-
	sidr-bgpsec-protocol-07 (work in progress), February 2013.		sidr-bgpsec-protocol-07 (work in progress), February 2013.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
	[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
	Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
	[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
	Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
	February 2012.
	[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
	Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.
	[RFC6493] Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)		[RFC6493] Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
	Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, February 2012.		Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, February 2012.
			[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
			Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, January
			2013.
	[RFC7115] Bush, R., "Origin Validation Operation Based on the		[RFC7115] Bush, R., "Origin Validation Operation Based on the
	Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185,		Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185,
	RFC 7115, DOI 10.17487/RFC7115, January 2014,		RFC 7115, DOI 10.17487/RFC7115, January 2014,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7115>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7115>.
	12.2. Informative References		12.2. Informative References
	[I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server]		[I-D.ietf-sidr-as-migration]
	Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker,		George, W. and S. Murphy, "BGPSec Considerations for AS
	"Internet Exchange Route Server", draft-ietf-idr-ix-bgp-		Migration", draft-ietf-sidr-as-migration-05 (work in
	route-server-02 (work in progress), February 2013.		progress), April 2016.
			[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview]
			Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC",
			draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview-02 (work in progress), May
			2012.
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover]		[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover]
	Gagliano, R., Patel, K., and B. Weis, "BGPSEC router key		Gagliano, R., Patel, K., and B. Weis, "BGPSEC router key
	rollover as an alternative to beaconing", draft-ietf-sidr-		rollover as an alternative to beaconing", draft-ietf-sidr-
	bgpsec-rollover-01 (work in progress), October 2012.		bgpsec-rollover-01 (work in progress), October 2012.
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-rtr-keying]		[I-D.ietf-sidr-rtr-keying]
	Turner, S., Patel, K., and R. Bush, "Router Keying for		Turner, S., Patel, K., and R. Bush, "Router Keying for
	BGPsec", draft-ietf-sidr-rtr-keying-01 (work in progress),		BGPsec", draft-ietf-sidr-rtr-keying-01 (work in progress),
	February 2013.		February 2013.
	skipping to change at page 8, line 32 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 37 ¶
	[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway		[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
	Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.		Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
	[RFC5065] Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous		[RFC5065] Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous
	System Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065, August 2007.		System Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065, August 2007.
	[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network		[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network
	Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms		Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
	Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.		Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.
	[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.		[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
	Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, January		Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
	2013.
			[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
			Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
			February 2012.
			[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
			Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.
	[RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility		[RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility
	Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure		Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
	(RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, DOI 10.17487/RFC6916, April		(RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, DOI 10.17487/RFC6916, April
	2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6916>.		2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6916>.
	Author's Address		Author's Address
	Randy Bush		Randy Bush
	Internet Initiative Japan		Internet Initiative Japan
End of changes. 21 change blocks.
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