--- 1/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-15.txt	2017-01-05 06:13:28.578839221 -0800
+++ 2/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-16.txt	2017-01-05 06:13:28.602839780 -0800
@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
 
 Network Working Group                                            R. Bush
 Internet-Draft                                 Internet Initiative Japan
 Intended status: Best Current Practice                   January 5, 2017
 Expires: July 9, 2017
 
                    BGPsec Operational Considerations
-                     draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-15
+                     draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-16
 
 Abstract
 
    Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many
    operational considerations.  This document attempts to collect and
    present the most critical and universal.  It is expected to evolve as
    BGPsec is formalized and initially deployed.
 
 Requirements Language
 
@@ -99,21 +99,21 @@
 
    It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, see [RFC4271], BGPsec,
    [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol], the RPKI, see [RFC6480], the RPKI
    Repository Structure, see [RFC6481], and Route Origin Authorizations
    (ROAs), see [RFC6482].
 
 3.  RPKI Distribution and Maintenance
 
    The considerations for RPKI objects (Certificates, Certificate
    Revocation Lists (CRLs), manifests, Ghostbusters Records [RFC6481]),
-   Trust Anchor Locators (TALs) [RFC6490], cache behaviours of
+   Trust Anchor Locators (TALs) [RFC7730], cache behaviours of
    synchronisation and validation from the section on RPKI Distribution
    and Maintenance of [RFC7115] apply.  Specific considerations relating
    to ROA objects do not apply to this document.
 
 4.  AS/Router Certificates
 
    As described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-rtr-keying] BGPsec-speaking routers
    are capable of generating their own public/private key-pairs and
    having their certificates signed and published in the RPKI by the
    RPKI CA system, and/or are given public/private key-pairs by the
@@ -325,36 +325,37 @@
 
 12.1.  Normative References
 
    [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]
               Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification", draft-ietf-
               sidr-bgpsec-protocol-07 (work in progress), February 2013.
 
    [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
               Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
 
-   [RFC6490]  Huston, G., Weiler, S., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent,
-              "Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor
-              Locator", RFC 6490, February 2012.
-
    [RFC6493]  Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
               Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, February 2012.
 
    [RFC6811]  Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
               Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, January
               2013.
 
    [RFC7115]  Bush, R., "Origin Validation Operation Based on the
               Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185,
               RFC 7115, DOI 10.17487/RFC7115, January 2014,
               <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7115>.
 
+   [RFC7730]  Huston, G., Weiler, S., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent,
+              "Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor
+              Locator", RFC 7730, DOI 10.17487/RFC7730, January 2016,
+              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7730>.
+
 12.2.  Informative References
 
    [I-D.ietf-sidr-as-migration]
               George, W. and S. Murphy, "BGPSec Considerations for AS
               Migration", draft-ietf-sidr-as-migration-06 (work in
               progress), December 2016.
 
    [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover]
               Gagliano, R., Patel, K., and B. Weis, "BGPSEC router key
               rollover as an alternative to beaconing", draft-ietf-sidr-