draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-16.txt   rfc8207.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan Request for Comments: 8207 Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: Best Current Practice January 5, 2017 BCP: 211 September 2017
Expires: July 9, 2017 Category: Best Current Practice
ISSN: 2070-1721
BGPsec Operational Considerations BGPsec Operational Considerations
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops-16
Abstract Abstract
Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many Deployment of the BGPsec architecture and protocols has many
operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and
present the most critical and universal. It is expected to evolve as present the most critical and universal. Operational practices are
BGPsec is formalized and initially deployed. expected to evolve as BGPsec is formalized and initially deployed.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] only when they
appear in all upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed
case as English words, without normative meaning.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
BCPs is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 9, 2017. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8207.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. AS/Router Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. AS/Router Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Considerations for Edge Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6. Considerations for Edge Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Origin Validation based on the Resource Public Key Infrastructure Origin validation based on the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI), [RFC6811], is in its early phases. As BGPsec, (RPKI) [RFC6811] is in its early phases. As BGPsec [RFC8205] may
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] may require larger memory and/or more require larger memory and/or more modern CPUs, it expected to be
modern CPUs, it expected to be deployed incrementally over a longer deployed incrementally over a longer time span. BGPsec is a new
time span. BGPsec is a new protocol with many operational protocol with many operational considerations that this document
considerations which this document attempts to describe. As with attempts to describe. As with most operational practices, they will
most operational practices, this document will likely evolve. likely change over time.
BGPsec relies on widespread propagation of the RPKI [RFC6480]. How BGPsec relies on widespread propagation of the RPKI [RFC6480]. How
the RPKI is distributed and maintained globally and within an the RPKI is distributed and maintained globally and within an
operator's infrastructure may be different for BGPsec than for origin operator's infrastructure may be different for BGPsec than for origin
validation. validation.
BGPsec needs to be spoken only by an AS's eBGP-speaking border BGPsec needs to be spoken only by an Autonomous System's (AS's)
routers. It is designed so that it can be used to protect eBGP-speaking border routers. It is designed so that it can be used
announcements which are originated by resource constrained edge to protect announcements that are originated by resource-constrained
routers. This has special operational considerations, see Section 6. edge routers. This has special operational considerations, see
Section 6.
Different prefixes may have different timing and replay protection Different prefixes may have different timing and replay protection
considerations. considerations.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Suggested Reading 2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, see [RFC4271], BGPsec, It is assumed that the reader understands BGP [RFC4271], BGPsec
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol], the RPKI, see [RFC6480], the RPKI [RFC8205], the RPKI [RFC6480], the RPKI Repository Structure
Repository Structure, see [RFC6481], and Route Origin Authorizations [RFC6481], and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482].
(ROAs), see [RFC6482].
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance
The considerations for RPKI objects (Certificates, Certificate The considerations for RPKI objects (Certificates, Certificate
Revocation Lists (CRLs), manifests, Ghostbusters Records [RFC6481]), Revocation Lists (CRLs), manifests [RFC6481], and Ghostbusters
Trust Anchor Locators (TALs) [RFC7730], cache behaviours of Records [RFC6493]), Trust Anchor Locators (TALs) [RFC7730], cache
synchronisation and validation from the section on RPKI Distribution behaviors of synchronization, and validation from the section on RPKI
and Maintenance of [RFC7115] apply. Specific considerations relating Distribution and Maintenance of [RFC7115] apply. Specific
to ROA objects do not apply to this document. considerations relating to ROA objects do not apply to this document.
4. AS/Router Certificates 4. AS/Router Certificates
As described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-rtr-keying] BGPsec-speaking routers As described in [KEY], BGPsec-speaking routers are capable of
are capable of generating their own public/private key-pairs and generating their own public/private key-pairs and having their
having their certificates signed and published in the RPKI by the certificates signed and published in the RPKI by the RPKI
RPKI CA system, and/or are given public/private key-pairs by the Certification Authority (CA) system, and/or are given public/private
operator. key-pairs by the operator.
A site/operator may use a single certificate/key in all their A site/operator may use a single certificate/key in all their
routers, one certificate/key per router, or any granularity in routers, one certificate/key per router, or any granularity in
between. between.
A large operator, concerned that a compromise of one router's key A large operator, concerned that a compromise of one router's key
would make other routers vulnerable, may deploy a more complex would make other routers vulnerable, may deploy a more complex
certificate/key distribution burden to reduce this exposure. certificate/key distribution burden to reduce this exposure.
At the other end of the spectrum, an edge site with one or two At the other end of the spectrum, an edge site with one or two
routers may choose to use a single certificate/key. routers may choose to use a single certificate/key.
In anticipation of possible key compromise, a prudent operator SHOULD In anticipation of possible key compromise, a prudent operator SHOULD
pre-provision each router's 'next' key in the RPKI so there is no pre-provision each router's 'next' key in the RPKI so that there is
propagation delay for provisioning the new key. no propagation delay for provisioning the new key.
5. Within a Network 5. Within a Network
BGPsec is spoken by edge routers in a network, those which border BGPsec is spoken by edge routers in a network, specifically those
other networks/ASs. that border other networks/ASes.
In an AS where edge routers speak BGPsec and therefore inject BGPsec In an AS where edge routers speak BGPsec and, therefore, inject
paths into the iBGP, Route Reflectors MUST have BGPsec enabled if and BGPsec paths into the iBGP (internal BGP), Route Reflectors (RRs)
only if there are eBGP speakers in their client cone, i.e. an RR MUST have BGPsec enabled if and only if there are eBGP (external BGP)
client or the transitive closure of a client's customers. speakers in their client cone, i.e., an RR client or the transitive
closure of a client's customers.
A BGPsec capable router MAY use the data it receives to influence A BGPsec-capable router MAY use the data it receives to influence
local policy within its network, see Section 7. In deployment this local policy within its network, see Section 7. In deployment, this
policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, preferences, etc. policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, preferences, etc.
This allows a network to incrementally deploy BGPsec enabled border This allows a network to incrementally deploy BGPsec-enabled border
routers. routers.
eBGP speakers which face more critical peers or up/downstreams would eBGP speakers that face more critical peers or upstreams or
be candidates for early deployment. Both securing one's own downstreams would be candidates for early deployment. Both securing
announcements and validating received announcements should be one's own announcements and validating received announcements should
considered in partial deployment. be considered in partial deployment.
An operator should be aware that BGPsec, as any other policy change, An operator should be aware that BGPsec, as any other policy change,
can cause traffic shifts in their network. And, as with normal can cause traffic shifts in their network. And, as with normal
policy shift practice, a prudent operator has tools and methods to policy shift practice, a prudent operator has the tools and methods
predict, measure, modify, etc. to predict, measure, modify, etc.
On the other hand, an operator wanting to monitor router loading, On the other hand, an operator wanting to monitor router loading,
shifts in traffic, etc. might deploy incrementally while watching shifts in traffic, etc., might deploy incrementally while watching
those and similar effects. those and similar effects.
BGPsec does not sign over communities, so they are not formally BGPsec does not sign over communities, so they are not formally
trustable. Additionally, outsourcing verification is not prudent trustable. Additionally, outsourcing verification is not a prudent
security practice. Therefore an eBGP listener SHOULD NOT strongly security practice. Therefore, an eBGP listener SHOULD NOT strongly
trust unsigned security signaling, such as communities, received trust unsigned security signaling, such as communities, received
across a trust boundary. across a trust boundary.
6. Considerations for Edge Sites 6. Considerations for Edge Sites
An edge site which does not provide transit and trusts its An edge site that does not provide transit and trusts its upstream(s)
upstream(s) may only originate a signed prefix announcement and not may only originate a signed prefix announcement and not validate
validate received announcements. received announcements.
An Operator might need to use hardware with limited resources. In An operator might need to use hardware with limited resources. In
such cases, BGPsec protocol capability negotiation allows for a such cases, BGPsec protocol capability negotiation allows for a
resource constrained edge router to hold only its own signing key(s) resource-constrained edge router to hold only its own signing key(s)
and sign its announcements, but not receive signed announcements. and sign its announcements, but not receive signed announcements.
Therefore, the router would not have to deal with the majority of the Therefore, the router would not have to deal with the majority of the
RPKI, potentially saving the need for additional hardware. RPKI, potentially saving the need for additional hardware.
As the vast majority of ASs are stubs, and they announce the majority As the vast majority of ASes are stubs, and they announce the
of prefixes, this allows for simpler and less expensive incremental majority of prefixes, this allows for simpler and less expensive
deployment. It may also mean that edge sites concerned with routing incremental deployment. It may also mean that edge sites concerned
security will be attracted to upstreams which support BGPsec. with routing security will be attracted to upstreams that support
BGPsec.
7. Routing Policy 7. Routing Policy
As BGPsec-signed paths cannot traverse non-BGPsec topology, partial
BGPsec deployment forms islands of assured paths. As islands grow to
touch each other, they become larger islands.
Unlike origin validation based on the RPKI, BGPsec marks a received Unlike origin validation based on the RPKI, BGPsec marks a received
announcement as Valid or Not Valid, there is no explicit NotFound announcement as Valid or Not Valid, there is no explicit NotFound
state. In some sense, an unsigned BGP4 path is the equivalent of state. In some sense, an unsigned BGP4 path is the equivalent of
NotFound. How this is used in routing is up to the operator's local NotFound. How this is used in routing is up to the operator's local
policy, similar to origin validation as in [RFC6811]. policy, similar to origin validation as in [RFC6811].
As BGPsec will be rolled out over years and does not allow for As BGPsec will be rolled out over years and does not allow for
intermediate non-signing edge routers, coverage will be spotty for a intermediate non-signing edge routers, coverage will be spotty for a
long time. This presents a dilemma; should a router evaluating an long time. This presents a dilemma; should a router evaluating an
inbound BGPsec_Path as Not Valid be very strict and discard it? On inbound BGPsec_PATH as Not Valid be very strict and discard it? On
the other hand, it might be the only path to that prefix, and a very the other hand, it might be the only path to that prefix, and a very
low local-preference would cause it to be used and propagated only if low local-preference would cause it to be used and propagated only if
there was no alternative. Either choice is reasonable, but we there was no alternative. Either choice is reasonable, but we
recommend dropping because of the next point. recommend dropping because of the next point.
Operators should be aware that accepting Not Valid announcements, no Operators should be aware that accepting Not Valid announcements, no
matter the local preference, will often be the equivalent of treating matter the local preference, will often be the equivalent of treating
them as fully Valid. Local preference affects only routes to the them as fully Valid. Local preference affects only routes to the
same set of destinations. Consider having a Valid announcement from same set of destinations. Consider having a Valid announcement from
neighbor V for prefix 10.0.0.0/16 and an Not Valid announcement for neighbor V for prefix 10.0.0.0/16 and a Not Valid announcement for
10.0.666.0/24 from neighbor I. If local policy on the router is not 10.0.666.0/24 from neighbor I. If local policy on the router is not
configured to discard the Not Valid announcement from I, then longest configured to discard the Not Valid announcement from I, then the
match forwarding will send packets to neighbor I no matter the value longest match forwarding will send packets to neighbor I no matter
of local preference. the value of local preference.
Validation of signed paths is usually deployed at the eBGP edge. Validation of signed paths is usually deployed at the eBGP edge.
Local policy on the eBGP edge MAY convey the validation state of a Local policy on the eBGP edge MAY convey the validation state of a
BGP signed path through normal local policy mechanisms, e.g. setting BGP-signed path through normal local policy mechanisms, e.g., setting
a BGP community for internal use, or modifying a metric value such as a BGP community for internal use, or modifying a metric value such as
local-preference or multi-exit discriminator (MED). Some may choose local-preference or Multi-Exit Discriminator (MED). Some may choose
to use the large Local-Pref hammer. Others may choose to let AS-Path to use the large Local-Pref hammer. Others may choose to let AS path
rule and set their internal metric, which comes after AS-Path in the rule and set their internal metric, which comes after AS path in the
BGP decision process. BGP decision process.
As the mildly stochastic timing of RPKI propagation may cause version As the mildly stochastic timing of RPKI propagation may cause version
skew across routers, an AS Path which does not validate at router R0 skew across routers, an AS Path that does not validate at router R0
might validate at R1. Therefore, signed paths that are Not Valid and might validate at R1. Therefore, signed paths that are Not Valid and
yet propagated (because they are chosen as best path) MUST NOT have yet propagated (because they are chosen as best path) MUST NOT have
signatures stripped and MUST be signed if sent to external BGPsec signatures stripped and MUST be signed if sent to external BGPsec
speakers. speakers.
This implies that updates which a speaker judges to be Not Valid MAY This implies that updates which a speaker judges to be Not Valid MAY
be propagated to iBGP peers. Therefore, unless local policy ensures be propagated to iBGP peers. Therefore, unless local policy ensures
otherwise, a signed path learned via iBGP may be Not Valid. If otherwise, a signed path learned via iBGP may be Not Valid. If
needed, the validation state should be signaled by normal local needed, the validation state should be signaled by normal local
policy mechanisms such as communities or metrics. policy mechanisms such as communities or metrics.
On the other hand, local policy on the eBGP edge might preclude iBGP On the other hand, local policy on the eBGP edge might preclude iBGP
or eBGP announcement of signed AS Paths which are Not Valid. or eBGP announcement of signed AS Paths that are Not Valid.
A BGPsec speaker receiving a path SHOULD perform origin validation A BGPsec speaker receiving a path SHOULD perform origin validation
per [RFC6811] and [RFC7115]. per [RFC6811] and [RFC7115].
A route server is usually 'transparent', i.e. does not insert an AS A route server is usually 'transparent', i.e., does not insert an AS
into the path so as not to increase the AS hop count and thereby into the path so as not to increase the AS hop count, and thereby
affect downstream path choices. But, with BGPsec, a client router R affect downstream path choices. But, with BGPsec, a client router R
needs to be able to validate paths which are forward signed to R. needs to be able to validate paths that are forward signed to R. But
But the sending router can not generate signatures to all the the sending router cannot generate signatures to all the possible
possible clients. Therefore a BGPsec-aware route server needs to clients. Therefore, a BGPsec-aware route server needs to validate
validate the incoming BGPsec_Path, and to forward updates which can the incoming BGPsec_PATH and to forward updates that can be validated
be validated by clients which must therefore know the route server's by clients that must, therefore, know the route server's AS. This
AS. This implies that the route server creates signatures per client implies that the route server creates signatures per client including
including its own AS in the BGPsec_Path, forward signing to each its own AS in the BGPsec_PATH, forward signing to each client AS, see
client AS, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. The route server [RFC8205]. The route server uses a pCount of 0 to not increase the
uses pCount of zero to not increase the effective AS hop count, effective AS hop count, thereby retaining the intent of
thereby retaining the intent of 'transparency'. 'transparency'.
If it is known that a BGPsec neighbor is not a transparent route If it is known that a BGPsec neighbor is a transparent route server,
server, or is otherwise validly using pCount=0 (e,g, see or otherwise may validly use a pCount of 0 (e.g., see [RFC8206]), the
[I-D.ietf-sidr-as-migration]), and the router provides a knob to router SHOULD be configured to accept and process a received pCount
disallow a received pCount (of zero, that knob SHOULD be applied. of 0. Routers MUST disallow a pCount of 0 by default.
Routers should disallow pCount 0 by default.
To prevent exposure of the internals of BGP Confederations [RFC5065], To prevent exposure of the internals of the BGP confederations
a BGPsec speaker exporting to a non-member removes all intra- [RFC5065], a BGPsec speaker exporting to a non-member removes all
confederation Secure_Path segments. Therefore signing within the intra-confederation Secure_Path Segments. Therefore, signing within
confederation will not cause external confusion even if non-unique the confederation will not cause external confusion even if non-
private ASs are used. unique private ASes are used.
8. Notes 8. Notes
For protection from attacks replaying BGP data on the order of a day For protection from attacks replaying BGP data on the order of a day
or longer old, re-keying routers with new keys (previously) or longer old, rekeying routers with new keys (previously)
provisioned in the RPKI is sufficient. For one approach, see provisioned in the RPKI is sufficient. For one approach, see
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover] [ROLLOVER].
A router that once negotiated (and/or sent) BGPsec should not be A router that once negotiated (and/or sent) BGPsec should not be
expected to always do so. expected to always do so.
Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent Like the DNS, the Global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent
view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache
or router may have different data about a particular prefix or router or router may have different data about a particular prefix or router
than another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the than another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the
nature of distributed data with distributed caches. nature of distributed data with distributed caches.
Operators who manage certificates SHOULD have RPKI GhostBuster Operators who manage certificates SHOULD have RPKI Ghostbuster
Records (see [RFC6493]), signed indirectly by End Entity Records (see [RFC6493]), signed indirectly by end entity
certificates, for those certificates on which others' routing depends certificates, for those certificates on which others' routing depends
for certificate and/or ROA validation. for certificate and/or ROA validation.
Operators should be aware of impending algorithm transitions, which Operators should be aware of impending algorithm transitions, which
will be rare and slow-paced, see [RFC6916]. They should work with will be rare and slow-paced, see [RFC6916]. They should work with
their vendors to ensure support for new algorithms. their vendors to ensure support for new algorithms.
As a router must evaluate certificates and ROAs which are time As a router must evaluate certificates and ROAs that are time
dependent, routers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of dependent, routers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of
approximately an hour. The common approach is for operators to approximately an hour. The common approach is for operators to
deploy servers that provide time service, such as [RFC5905], to deploy servers that provide time service, such as [RFC5905], to
client routers. client routers.
If a router has reason to believe its clock is seriously incorrect, If a router has reason to believe its clock is seriously incorrect,
e.g. it has a time earlier than 2011, it SHOULD NOT attempt to e.g., it has a time earlier than 2011, it SHOULD NOT attempt to
validate incoming updates. It SHOULD defer validation until it validate incoming updates. It SHOULD defer validation until it
believes it is within reasonable time tolerance. believes it is within reasonable time tolerance.
9. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
This document describes operational considerations for the deployment This document describes operational considerations for the deployment
of BGPsec. The security considerations for BGPsec are described in of BGPsec. The security considerations for BGPsec are described in
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. [RFC8205].
10. IANA Considerations 10. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA Considerations. This document does not require any IANA actions.
11. Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank Thomas King, Arnold Nipper, and Alvaro
Retana, and the BGPsec design group.
12. References
12.1. Normative References 11. References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] 11.1. Normative References
Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification", draft-ietf-
sidr-bgpsec-protocol-07 (work in progress), February 2013.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6493] Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6493] Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, February 2012. Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, DOI 10.17487/RFC6493,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6493>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, January Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
2013. DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC7115] Bush, R., "Origin Validation Operation Based on the [RFC7115] Bush, R., "Origin Validation Operation Based on the
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185, Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185,
RFC 7115, DOI 10.17487/RFC7115, January 2014, RFC 7115, DOI 10.17487/RFC7115, January 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7115>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7115>.
[RFC7730] Huston, G., Weiler, S., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent, [RFC7730] Huston, G., Weiler, S., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent,
"Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor "Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor
Locator", RFC 7730, DOI 10.17487/RFC7730, January 2016, Locator", RFC 7730, DOI 10.17487/RFC7730, January 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7730>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7730>.
12.2. Informative References [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-as-migration] [RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
George, W. and S. Murphy, "BGPSec Considerations for AS Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
Migration", draft-ietf-sidr-as-migration-06 (work in 2017, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.
progress), December 2016.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover] 11.2. Informative References
Gagliano, R., Patel, K., and B. Weis, "BGPSEC router key
rollover as an alternative to beaconing", draft-ietf-sidr-
bgpsec-rollover-01 (work in progress), October 2012.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rtr-keying] [KEY] Bush, R., Turner, S., and K. Patel, "Router Keying for
Turner, S., Patel, K., and R. Bush, "Router Keying for BGPsec", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-sidr-rtr-keying-13,
BGPsec", draft-ietf-sidr-rtr-keying-01 (work in progress), April 2017.
February 2013.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC5065] Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous [RFC5065] Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous
System Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065, August 2007. System Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5065, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5065>.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network [RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010. Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
February 2012. DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012. Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility [RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility
Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, DOI 10.17487/RFC6916, April (RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, DOI 10.17487/RFC6916, April
2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6916>. 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6916>.
[RFC8206] George, W. and S. Murphy, "BGPsec Considerations for
Autonomous System (AS) Migration", RFC 8206,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8206, September 2017,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8206>.
[ROLLOVER] Weis, B., Gagliano, R., and K. Patel, "BGPsec Router
Certificate Rollover", Work in Progess,
draft-ietf-sidrops-bgpsec-rollover-02, August 2017.
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Thomas King, Arnold Nipper, Alvaro Retana,
and the BGPsec design group.
Author's Address Author's Address
Randy Bush Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs 5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
US United States of America
Email: randy@psg.com Email: randy@psg.com
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