draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-04.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-05.txt 
Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr) Kong, D. Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr) Kong, D.
Internet Draft Seo, K. Internet Draft Seo, K.
Expires: May 2009 Kent, S. Expires: October 2010 Kent, S.
Intended Status: Informational BBN Technologies Intended Status: BCP BBN Technologies
November 2008 March 8, 2010
Template for an Template for an
Internet Registry's Certification Practice Statement (CPS) Internet Registry's Certification Practice Statement (CPS)
for the Resource PKI (RPKI) for the Resource PKI (RPKI)
draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-04.txt draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-05.txt
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Abstract Abstract
This document contains a template to be used for creating a This document contains a template to be used for creating a
Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry
(e.g., NIR or RIR) that is part of the Resource Public Key (e.g., NIR or RIR) that is part of the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI). Infrastructure (RPKI).
Conventions used in this document Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].
Table of Contents Table of Contents
Preface...........................................................8 Preface...........................................................7
1. Introduction...................................................9 1. Introduction...................................................8
1.1. Overview.................................................10 1.1. Overview..................................................8
1.2. Document name and identification.........................11 1.2. Document name and identification..........................9
1.3. PKI participants.........................................11 1.3. PKI participants..........................................9
1.3.1. Certification authorities...........................11 1.3.1. Certification authorities............................9
1.3.2. Registration authorities............................11 1.3.2. Registration authorities.............................9
1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................12 1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................10
1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................12 1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................10
1.3.5. Other participants..................................12 1.3.5. Other participants..................................10
1.4. Certificate usage........................................12 1.4. Certificate usage........................................10
1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................12 1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................10
1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................13 1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................10
1.5. Policy administration....................................13 1.5. Policy administration....................................11
1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............13 1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............11
1.5.2. Contact person......................................13 1.5.2. Contact person......................................11
1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy...13 1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy...11
1.5.4. CPS approval procedures.............................13 1.5.4. CPS approval procedures.............................11
1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................13 1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................11
2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................15 2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................13
2.1. Repositories.............................................15 2.1. Repositories.............................................13
2.2. Publication of certification information.................15 2.2. Publication of certification information.................13
2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication.........................15 2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication.........................13
2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................15 2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................13
3. Identification And Authentication.............................16 3. Identification And Authentication.............................15
3.1. Naming...................................................16 3.1. Naming...................................................15
3.1.1. Types of names......................................16 3.1.1. Types of names......................................15
3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................16 3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................15
3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............16 3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............15
3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........16 3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........15
3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................16 3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................15
3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.17 3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.16
3.2. Initial identity validation..............................17 3.2. Initial identity validation..............................16
3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........17 3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........16
3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............17 3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............16
3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............17 3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............16
3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................17 3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................17
3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................18 3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................17
3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................18 3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................17
3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....18 3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....17
3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key18 3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key17
3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after 3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after
revocation.................................................18 revocation.................................................18
3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.18 3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.18
4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............19 4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............19
4.1. Certificate Application..................................19 4.1. Certificate Application..................................19
4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............19 4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............19
4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............19 4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............19
4.2. Certificate application processing.......................19 4.2. Certificate application processing.......................19
4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions 4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions
...........................................................19 ...........................................................19
4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...19 4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...19
4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............20 4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............20
4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................20 4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................20
4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............20 4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............20
4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of 4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of
certificate................................................20 certificate................................................20
4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities...................................................20
4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................20 4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................20
4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........20 4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........20
4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............20 4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............20
4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................21 4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................20
4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........21 4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........21
4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......21 4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......21
4.6. Certificate renewal......................................21 4.6. Certificate renewal......................................21
4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................21 4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................21
4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................22 4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................21
4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............22 4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............22
4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber 4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
...........................................................22 ...........................................................22
4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal 4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal
certificate................................................22 certificate................................................22
4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....22 4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....22
4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other 4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities [OMITTED].........................................22 entities...................................................22
4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................22 4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................22
4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................22 4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................22
4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...23 4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...23
4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........23 4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........23
4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber 4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
...........................................................23 ...........................................................23
4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed 4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed
certificate................................................23 certificate................................................23
4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...24 4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...24
4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other 4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities [OMITTED].........................................24 entities...................................................24
4.8. Certificate modification.................................24 4.8. Certificate modification.................................24
4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........24 4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........24
4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............24 4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............24
4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........25 4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........24
4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to 4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to
subscriber.................................................25 subscriber.................................................25
4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate 4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
...........................................................25 ...........................................................25
4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...25 4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...25
4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other 4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities [OMITTED].........................................25 entities...................................................25
4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................25 4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................25
4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................25 4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................25
4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................26 4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................25
4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................26 4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................26
4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................26 4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................26
4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation 4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation
request....................................................26 request....................................................26
4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties.26 4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties.26
4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................26 4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................26
4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................26 4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................26
4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability 4.10. Certificate status services.............................26
[OMITTED]..................................................27 5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls................27
4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED].27 5.1. Physical controls........................................27
4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available 5.1.1. Site location and construction......................27
[OMITTED]..................................................27 5.1.2. Physical access.....................................27
4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]...27 5.1.3. Power and air conditioning..........................27
4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED].............27 5.1.4. Water exposures.....................................27
4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]...............27 5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection......................27
4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED].........27 5.1.6. Media storage.......................................27
4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]..............27 5.1.7. Waste disposal......................................27
4.10. Certificate status services.............................27 5.1.8. Off-site backup.....................................27
4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]..............27 5.2. Procedural controls......................................27
4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED].....................27 5.2.1. Trusted roles.......................................27
4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]........................27 5.2.2. Number of persons required per task.................27
4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]...........................27 5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role.....27
4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED].......................27 5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties................27
4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED] 5.3. Personnel controls.......................................27
...........................................................27
4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and
practices [OMITTED]........................................27
5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls................28
5.1. Physical controls........................................28
5.1.1. Site location and construction......................28
5.1.2. Physical access.....................................28
5.1.3. Power and air conditioning..........................28
5.1.4. Water exposures.....................................28
5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection......................28
5.1.6. Media storage.......................................28
5.1.7. Waste disposal......................................28
5.1.8. Off-site backup.....................................28
5.2. Procedural controls......................................28
5.2.1. Trusted roles.......................................28
5.2.2. Number of persons required per task.................28
5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role.....28
5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties................28
5.3. Personnel controls.......................................28
5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements 5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
...........................................................29 ...........................................................28
5.3.2. Background check procedures.........................29 5.3.2. Background check procedures.........................28
5.3.3. Training requirements...............................29 5.3.3. Training requirements...............................28
5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements...............29 5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements...............28
5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence.................29 5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence.................28
5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions..................29 5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions..................28
5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements.................29 5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements.................28
5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel.................29 5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel.................28
5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................29 5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................28
5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................29 5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................28
5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................29 5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................28
5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................29 5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................28
5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................30 5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................29
5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................30 5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................29
5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) 5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external)
[OMITTED]..................................................30 [OMITTED]..................................................29
5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....30 5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....29
5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................30 5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................29
5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................30 5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................29
5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED].................30 5.6. Key changeover...........................................29
5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]..............30 5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............29
5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED].....................30 5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................29
5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED].................30 6. Technical Security Controls...................................30
5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED].30 6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................30
5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) 6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................30
[OMITTED]..................................................30 6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................30
5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information 6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........30
[OMITTED]..................................................30 6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........30
5.6. Key changeover...........................................30 6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................31
5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............31 6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking31
5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]31 6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)31
5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are
corrupted [OMITTED]........................................31
5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]..31
5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster
[OMITTED]..................................................31
5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................31
6. Technical Security Controls...................................32
6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................32
6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................32
6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................32
6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........32
6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........32
6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................33
6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking33
6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)33
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering 6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
Controls......................................................33 Controls......................................................31
6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........33 6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........31
6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......33 6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......31
6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................33 6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................31
6.2.4. Private key backup..................................34 6.2.4. Private key backup..................................32
6.2.5. Private key archival................................34 6.2.5. Private key archival................................32
6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic 6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic
module.....................................................34 module.....................................................32
6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module.........34 6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module.........32
6.2.8. Method of activating private key....................34 6.2.8. Method of activating private key....................32
6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key..................34 6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key..................32
6.2.10. Method of destroying private key...................34 6.2.10. Method of destroying private key...................32
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating........................34 6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating........................33
6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................35 6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................33
6.3.1. Public key archival.................................35 6.3.1. Public key archival.................................33
6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage 6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage
periods....................................................35 periods....................................................33
6.4. Activation data..........................................35 6.4. Activation data..........................................33
6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation.........35 6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation.........33
6.4.2. Activation data protection..........................35 6.4.2. Activation data protection..........................33
6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data....................35 6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data....................33
6.5. Computer security controls...............................35 6.5. Computer security controls...............................33
6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement....35 6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement....33
6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]..................36 6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................34
6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................36 6.6.1. System development controls.........................34
6.6.1. System development controls.........................36 6.6.2. Security management controls........................34
6.6.2. Security management controls........................36 6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................34
6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................36 6.7. Network security controls................................34
6.7. Network security controls................................36 6.8. Time-stamping............................................34
6.8. Time-stamping............................................36 7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................34
7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................37 8. Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy].....34
Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [draft-ietf-sidr- 8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments........................35
res-certs-01].................................................37 8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment.................35
7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]............................37 8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor......................35
7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37 8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity...............35
7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]....................37 8.4. Topics covered by assessment.............................35
7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]..............37 8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency..................35
7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]................................37 8.6. Communication of results.................................35
7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]..........................37 9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................36
7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]......37 9.1. Fees.....................................................36
7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED].....37 9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees................36
7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]....37 9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable).............36
7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate 9.1.3. Refund policy.......................................36
Policies extension [OMITTED]...............................37 9.2. Financial responsibility.................................36
7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]....................................37 9.2.1. Insurance coverage..................................36
7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37 9.2.2. Other assets........................................36
7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]..............37 9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities.....36
7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]...................................37 9.3. Confidentiality of business information..................36
7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37 9.3.1. Scope of confidential information...................36
7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]...........................37
8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments........................38
8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment.................38
8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor......................38
8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity...............38
8.4. Topics covered by assessment.............................38
8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency..................38
8.6. Communication of results.................................38
9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................39
9.1. Fees.....................................................39
9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees................39
9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable).............39
9.1.3. Refund policy.......................................39
9.2. Financial responsibility.................................39
9.2.1. Insurance coverage..................................39
9.2.2. Other assets........................................39
9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities.....39
9.3. Confidentiality of business information..................39
9.3.1. Scope of confidential information...................39
9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential 9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
information................................................39 information................................................36
9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information..39 9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information..36
9.4. Privacy of personal information..........................39 9.4. Privacy of personal information..........................36
9.4.1. Privacy plan........................................39 9.4.1. Privacy plan........................................36
9.4.2. Information treated as private......................39 9.4.2. Information treated as private......................36
9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................39 9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................36
9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......39 9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......36
9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......39 9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......36
9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative 9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative
process....................................................40 process....................................................36
9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........40 9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........37
9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............40 9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............37
9.6. Representations and warranties...........................40 9.6. Representations and warranties...........................37
9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................40 9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................37
9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........40 9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........37
9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties........40 9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties........37
9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants 9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................37
[OMITTED]..................................................40 9.8. Limitations of liability.................................37
9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................40 9.9. Indemnities..............................................37
9.8. Limitations of liability.................................40 9.10. Term and termination....................................37
9.9. Indemnities..............................................40 9.10.1. Term...............................................37
9.10. Term and termination....................................40 9.10.2. Termination........................................37
9.10.1. Term...............................................40 9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................37
9.10.2. Termination........................................40
9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................40 9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants.37
9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants.40 9.12. Amendments..............................................37
9.12. Amendments..............................................40 9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................37
9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................40 9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................37
9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................40 9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................37
9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed 9.14. Governing law...........................................37
[OMITTED]..................................................40 9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................37
9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................40 9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................37
9.14. Governing law...........................................40 9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................37
9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................40 9.16.2. Assignment.........................................37
9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................40 9.16.3. Severability.......................................37
9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................41 9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights).38
9.16.2. Assignment.........................................41 9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................38
9.16.3. Severability.......................................41 10. Security Considerations......................................39
9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights).41 11. IANA Considerations..........................................39
9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................41 12. Acknowledgments..............................................39
9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]..............................41 13. References...................................................39
10. Security Considerations......................................42 13.1. Normative References....................................39
11. IANA Considerations..........................................42 13.2. Informative References..................................40
12. Acknowledgments..............................................42 Author's Addresses...............................................40
13. References...................................................42 Pre-5378 Material Disclaimer.....................................41
13.1. Normative References....................................42 Copyright Statement..............................................41
13.2. Informative References..................................43
Author's Addresses...............................................43
Intellectual Property Statement..................................44
Disclaimer of Validity...........................................45
Copyright Statement..............................................45
Preface Preface
This document contains a template to be used for creating a This document contains a template to be used for creating a
Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry
(e.g., an NIR or RIR) that is part of the Resource Public Key (e.g., an NIR or RIR) that is part of the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI). The user of this document should Infrastructure (RPKI). The user of this document should
1. substitute a title page for page 1 saying, e.g., "<Name of 1. substitute a title page for page 1 saying, e.g., ''<Name of
Registry> Certification Practice Statement for the Resource Registry> Certification Practice Statement for the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)" with date, author, etc. Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)'' with date, author, etc.
2. delete this Preface 2. delete this Preface
3. fill in the information indicated below by <text in angle 3. fill in the information indicated below by <text in angle
brackets> brackets>
4. delete sections 10, 11, 12, 13.1, Acknowledgments, Author's 4. delete sections 10, 11, 12, 13.1, Acknowledgments, Author's
Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of
Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a
reference section with just the references in 13.2 reference section with just the references in 13.2
5. update the table of contents to reflect the deletions and 5. update the table of contents to reflect the deletions and
additions above. additions above.
skipping to change at page 9, line 18 skipping to change at page 8, line 8
Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of
Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a
reference section with just the references in 13.2 reference section with just the references in 13.2
5. update the table of contents to reflect the deletions and 5. update the table of contents to reflect the deletions and
additions above. additions above.
Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this
CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have
retained section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections, retained the section numbering scheme employed in the RFC to
in order to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme facilitate comparison with the outline in the RFC. [There are 4 sub-
employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are sections that I haven't removed yet due to Word problems.)
included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant
sections are also marked [OMITTED]. There is a note to this effect
in the Introduction below. This information should be left in the
CPS as an explanation to the user.
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of <Name This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of <Name
of Registry>. It describes the practices employed by the <Name of of Registry>. It describes the practices employed by the <Name of
Registry> Certification Authority (CA) in the Internet IP Address Registry> Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource Public Key
and Autonomous System (AS) Number PKI. These practices are defined Infrastructure (RPKI). These practices are defined in accordance
in accordance with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP, with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP, [RFCxxxx]) of
[RFCxxxx]) of this PKI. this PKI.
The Resource PKI is aimed at supporting verifiable attestations
about resource controls, e.g., for improved routing security. The
goal is that each entity that allocates IP addresses or AS numbers
to an entity will, in parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this
allocation. These certificates will enable verification that the
holder of the associated private key has been allocated the
resources indicated in the certificate, and is the current, unique
holder of these resources. The certificates and CRLs, in conjunction
with ancillary digitally signed data structures, will provide
critical inputs for routing security mechanisms, e.g., generation of
route filters by ISPs.
The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which The RPKI is designed to support validation of claims by current
this CPS was created is that it does not purport to identify an holders of Internet Number Resources (INRs, see definition in 1.7)
address space holder or AS number holder via the subject name in accordance with the records of the organizations that act as CAs
contained in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each in this PKI. The ability to verify such claims is essential to
certificate issued under this policy is intended to enable an entity ensuring the unique, unambiguous distribution of these resources
to assert in a verifiable fashion, that it is the current holder of
an address block or an AS number, based on the current records of
the entity responsible for the resources in question. Verification
of the assertion is based on two criteria: the ability of the entity
to digitally sign data producing a signature that is verifiable
using the public key contained in the corresponding certificate, and
validation of that certificate in the context of this PKI. This PKI
is designed exclusively for use in support of validation of claims
related to address space and AS number holdings, with emphasis on
support of routing security mechanisms. Use of the certificates and
CRLs managed under this PKI for any other purpose is a violation of
this PKI's CP, and relying parties should reject such uses.
Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A This PKI parallels the existing INR distribution hierarchy. These
number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this resources are distributed by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have (IANA) to the Regional Internet Registries. In some regions,
retained section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections, National Internet Registries (NIRs) form a tier of the hierarchy
in order to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme below the RIRs for internet number resource (INR) distribution. ISPs
employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are and network subscribers form additional tiers below registries.
included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant
sections are also marked [OMITTED].
1.1. Overview 1.1. Overview
This CPS describes: This CPS describes:
. Participants . Participants
. Distribution of the certificates and CRLs . Publication of the certificates and CRLs
. How certificates are issued, managed, and revoked . How certificates are issued, managed, and revoked
. Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.) . Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.)
. Key management . Key management
. Audit procedures . Audit procedures
. Business and legal issues . Business and legal issues
The PKI encompasses several types of certificates: This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see IETF
document draft-ietf-sidr-arch-xx [ARCH] for more details):
. CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks . CA certificates for each organization distributing INRs and for
and/or AS numbers, and for each address space (AS number) holder each subscriber (INR holder)
. End entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use in verifying . End entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use to validate
signatures of Route Origination Authorizations (ROAs) and other digital signatures on RPKI-signed objects (see definition in 1.7).
(non-certificate/CRL) signed objects
. In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in . In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in
support of access control for the repository system support of access control for the repository system as described
in 2.4.
1.2. Document name and identification 1.2. Document name and identification
The name of this document is "<Name of Registry>'s Certification The name of this document is ''<Name of Registry>'s Certification
Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)". (RPKI)''.
1.3. PKI participants 1.3. PKI participants
Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or Note: In a PKI, the term ''subscriber'' refers to an individual or
organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The
term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
service from an LIR/ISP. Thus, in this PKI, the term "subscriber" service from an ISP. In such cases the term ''network subscriber''
can refer both to LIRs/ISPs, which can be subscribers of RIRs, NIRs, will be used. Also note that, for brevity, this document always
and other LIRs, and also to organizations that are not ISPs, but refers to PKI participants as organizations or entities, even though
which are subscribers of ISPs in the networking sense of the term. some of them are individuals.
Also note that, for brevity, this document always refers to
subscribers as organizations, even though some subscribers are
individuals. When necessary, the phrase "network subscriber" is used
to refer to an organization that receives network services from an
LIR/ISP.
1.3.1. Certification authorities 1.3.1. Certification authorities
<Name of Registry> will operate two CAs for the RPKI: one is <Describe the CAs that you will operate for the RPKI. One approach
designated "offline" and the other is designated "production." The is to operate two CAs: one designated ''offline'' and the other
offline CA is the top level CA for the <Name of Registry> portion of designated ''production.'' The offline CA is the top level CA for the
the RPKI. It provides a secure revocation and recovery capability in <Name of Registry> portion of the RPKI. It provides a secure
case the production CA is compromised or becomes unavailable. Thus revocation and recovery capability in case the production CA is
this CA issues certificates only to instances of the production CA compromised or becomes unavailable. Thus the offline CA issues
and the CRLs it issues are used to revoke only a certificate issued certificates only to instances of the production CA; and the CRLs it
to that CA. The production CA is used to issue RPKI certificates to issues are used to revoke only certificates issued to the production
<Name of Registry> members, to which address space or AS numbers CA. The production CA is used to issue RPKI certificates to <Name of
have been allocated. Registry> members, to whom INRs have been distributed. >
1.3.2. Registration authorities 1.3.2. Registration authorities
There is no registration authority (RA) for either the offline or <Describe how the registration authority function is handled for the
the production CA operating under this CPS. The former needs no RA CA(s) that you operate. The RPKI does not require establishment or
capability because it issues certificates only to the production CA. use of a separate registration authority (RA) in conjunction with
The production CA relies upon certificates issued by the <Name of the CA function. The RA function will be provided by the same entity
Registry> Business PKI (BPKI) (see Section 3.2.6) to identify operating as a CA, e.g., entities listed in Section 1.3.1. An entity
individuals authorized to requests certificates under the RPKI. acting as a CA in this PKI already has a formal relationship with
<Name of Registry> already establishes a business relationship with each organization to which it distributes INRs. These organizations
each subscriber (<Name of Registry> member) and assumes already perform the RA function implicitly since they already assume
responsibility for allocating and tracking the current allocation of responsibility for distributing INRs.>
address space and AS numbers. Since <Name of Registry> operates the
BPKI CA, there is no distinct RA for the RPKI.
1.3.3. Subscribers 1.3.3. Subscribers
Two types of organizations receive allocations of IP addresses and Two types of organizations receive distributions of INRs from this
AS numbers from this CA and thus are subscribers in the PKI sense: CA and thus are subscribers in the PKI sense: network subscribers
network subscribers and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). <Additionally, this CA issues
<Additionally, this CA issues certificates to <Local/National> certificates to <National> Registries, who, in turn, issue
Registries (choose the right term for this RIR, if either applies) certificates to network subscribers or ISPs.>
who, in turn, issue certificates to network subscribers or
LIRs/ISPs.>
1.3.4. Relying parties 1.3.4. Relying parties
Entities that need to validate claims of address space and/or AS Entities or individuals that act in reliance on certificates or
number current holdings are relying parties. Thus, for example, RPKI-signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties.
entities that make use of address and AS number allocation Relying parties may or may not be subscribers within this PKI. (See
certificates in support of improved routing security are relying section 1.7 for the definition of an RPKI-signed object.)
parties. Registries are relying parties because they transfer
resources between one another and thus will need to verify (cross)
certificates issued in conjunction with such transfers. This
includes LIRs/ISPs, multi-homed organizations exchanging BGP [BGP4]
traffic with LIRs/ISPs, and subscribers who have received an
allocation of address space from one ISP or from a registry, but
want to authorize an (or another) LIR/ISP to originate routes to
this space.
To the extent that repositories make use of certificates for access
control - checking for authorization to upload certificate, CRL, and
ROA update packages -- they too act as relying parties.
1.3.5. Other participants 1.3.5. Other participants
<Name of Registry> will operate a repository that holds <Name of Registry> will operate a repository that holds
certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI signed objects, e.g., ROAs. certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI-signed objects.
1.4. Certificate usage 1.4. Certificate usage
1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses 1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses
The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization
in support of validation of claims of current holdings of address in support of validation of claims of current holdings of INRs.
space and/or AS numbers, e.g., for routing security. With regard to
routing security, an initial goal of this PKI is to allow the holder
of a set of address blocks to be able to declare, in a secure
fashion, the AS number of each entity that is authorized to
originate a route to these addresses, including the context of ISP
proxy aggregation. Additional uses of the PKI, consistent with the
basic goal cited above, are also permitted under this policy.
Some of the certificates that may be issued under this hierarchy Additional uses of the certificates, consistent with the basic goal
could be used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., cited above, are also permitted under the RPKI certificate policy.
access control for the repository system. Such uses also are
permitted under this policy. Some of the certificates that may be issued under this PKI could be
used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., access
control for the repository system as described in 2.4. Such uses
also are permitted under the RPKI certificate policy.
1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses 1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses
Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited. Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited.
1.5. Policy administration 1.5. Policy administration
1.5.1. Organization administering the document 1.5.1. Organization administering the document
This CPS is administered by <Name of Registry> This CPS is administered by <Name of Registry>.
1.5.2. Contact person 1.5.2. Contact person
<Insert Registry contact info here> <Insert Registry contact info here>
1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy 1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy
Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS is attesting to the distribution of INRs to the holder of the
numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The
public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the issuing organizations are the same organizations as the ones that
same organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence perform the distribution hence they are authoritative with respect
they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding. to the accuracy of this binding.
1.5.4. CPS approval procedures 1.5.4. CPS approval procedures
Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS is attesting to the distribution of INRs to the holder of the
numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The
public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the issuing organizations are the same organizations as the ones that
same organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence perform the distribution hence they are authoritative with respect
they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding. to the accuracy of this binding.
1.6. Definitions and acronyms 1.6. Definitions and acronyms
BPKI - Business PKI: A BPKI is used by an RIR to identify members to BPKI - Business PKI. A BPKI is an optional additional PKI used by an
whom RPKI certificates can be issued. RIR to identify members to whom RPKI certificates can be
issued.
CP - Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that CP - Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that
indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular
community and/or class of applications with common security community and/or class of applications with common security
requirements. requirements.
CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that
specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs
in issuing certificates. in issuing certificates.
ISP - Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing Distribution of INRs - - A process of distribution of the INRs along
and selling Internet services to other organizations. the respective number hierarchy. IANA distributes blocks of IP
addresses and Autonomous System Numbers to the five Regional
Internet Registries (RIRs). RIRs distribute smaller address
blocks and Autonomous System Numbers to organizations within
their service regions, who in turn distribute IP addresses to
their customers.
LIR - Local Internet Registry. This is an organization, typically a IANA - Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. IANA is responsible
network service provider, that sub-allocates the assignment of for global coordination of the Internet Protocol addressing
IP addresses for a portion of the area covered by a Regional systems and Autonomous System (AS) numbers used for routing
(or National) Registry. internet traffic. IANA distributes INRs to Regional Internet
Registries (RIRs).
NIR - National Internet Registry. An NIR is an organization that INRs - Internet Number Resources. INRs are number values for three
manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a protocol parameter sets, namely:
portion of the geopolitical area covered by a Regional
Registry. These form an optional second tier in the tree . IP Version 4 addresses,
scheme used to manage IP address and AS number allocation.
. IP version 6 addresses, and
. Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing, currently
Border Gateway Protocol-4 Autonomous System numbers.
ISP - - Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing
and selling Internet services to other organizations.
NIR - - National Internet Registry. An NIR is an organization that
manages the distribution of INRS for a portion of the
geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry. NIRs form an
optional second tier in the tree scheme used to manage INR
distribution.
RIR - Regional Internet Registry. An RIR is an organization that RIR - Regional Internet Registry. An RIR is an organization that
manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a manages the distribution of INRs for a geopolitical area.
specified geopolitical area. At present, there are five RIRs:
ARIN (North America), RIPE NCC (Europe), APNIC (Asia -
Pacific), LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean), and AfriNIC
(Africa).
ROA - Route Origination Authorization. This is a digitally signed RPKI-signed object - - An RPKI-signed object is a digitally signed
object that identifies a network operator, identified by an data object (other than a certificate or CRL) declared to be
AS, that is authorized to originate routes to a specified set such by a standards track RFC, and that can be validated using
of address blocks. certificates issued under this PKI. The content and format of
these data constructs depend on the context in which
validation of claims of current holdings of INRs takes place.
Examples of these objects are repository manifests and CRLs.
2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities 2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities
2.1. Repositories 2.1. Repositories
As per the CP, certificates and CRLs, will be made available for As per the CP, certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects MUST be
downloading by all network operators, to enable them to validate made available for downloading by all relying parties to enable them
this data for use in support of routing security. to validate this data.
The <Name of Registry> RPKI CA will publish certificates, CRLs, and The <Name of Registry> RPKI CA will publish certificates, CRLs, and
other signed objects accessible via RSYNC at rpki.<Name of RPKI-signed objects via a repository that is accessible via RSYNC at
Registry>.net. rpki.<Name of Registry>.net.
2.2. Publication of certification information 2.2. Publication of certification information
<Name of Registry> will upload certificates and CRLs issued by it to <Name of Registry> MUST publish certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed
a local repository system that operates as part of a world-wide objects issued by it to a local repository system that it operates
distributed system of repositories. as part of a world-wide distributed system of repositories.
2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication 2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication
<Describe here your procedures for publication (via the repository) <Describe here your procedures for publication (via the repository)
of the certificates and CRLs that you issue. If you choose to of the certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects that you issue. If
outsource publication of PKI data, you still need to provide this you choose to outsource publication of PKI data, you still need to
information for relying parties.> provide this information for relying parties. This should include
the period of time within which a certificate will be published
after he CA issues the certificate and the period of time within
which a CA will publish a CRL with an entry for a revoked
certificate after it revokes that certificate. >
As per the CP, the following standards exist for publication times As per the CP, the following standard exists for publication times
and frequency: and frequency:
A certificate will be published within 24 hours after issuance. The <Name of Registry> RPKI CA MUST publish its CRL prior to the
The <Name of Registry> RPKI CA will publish its CRL prior to the
nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by
the CA. Within 24 hours of effecting revocation, the CA will publish the CA.
a CRL with an entry for the revoked certificate.
2.4. Access controls on repositories 2.4. Access controls on repositories
Access to the repository system, for modification of entries, must Access to the repository system, for modification of entries, must
be controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data be controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data
(certificates, CRLs and ROAs) uploaded to a repository are digitally (certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects) published to a
signed. Updates to the repository system must be validated to ensure repository are digitally signed. RPKI items that <Name of Registry>
that the data being added or replaced is authorized. This document issues MUST be published to the repository that it runs by means not
does not define the means by which updates are verified, but use of accessible to the outside world. <If <Name of Registry> offers
the PKI itself to validate updates is anticipated. repository services to its subscribers, then <describe here the
protocol(s) that you support for their publishing of signed
objects.>
3. Identification And Authentication 3. Identification And Authentication
3.1. Naming 3.1. Naming
3.1.1. Types of names 3.1.1. Types of names
The Subject of each certificate issued by this Registry is The Subject of each certificate issued by this Registry is
identified by an X.500 Distinguished Name (DN). For certificates identified by an X.500 Distinguished Name (DN). The distinguished
issued to LIRs/ISPs and subscribers, the Subject will consist of a name will consist of a single Common Name (CN) attribute with a
single CN attribute with a value generated by the issuer. For value generated by <Name of Registry>. Optionally, the serialNumber
certificates issued to an NIR, the Subject will be the name of the attribute may be included along with the common name (to form a
NIR. terminal relative distinguished name set), to distinguish among
successive instances of certificates associated with the same
entity.
3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful 3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful
The Subject name in each subscriber certificate will be unique The Subject name in each subscriber certificate will be unique
relative to all certificates issued by <Name of LIR/ISP> RPKI CA. relative to all certificates issued by <Name of Registry>. However,
However, there is no guarantee that the subject name will be there is no guarantee that the subject name will be globally unique
globally unique in this PKI. in this PKI. Also, the name of the subscriber need not to be
''meaningful'' in the conventional, human-readable sense. The
Note: The name of the holder of an address block or AS number need certificates issued under this PKI are used for authorization in
not to be "meaningful" in the conventional, human-readable sense, support of applications that make use of attestations of Internet
since certificates issued under this PKI are used for authorization resource holding, not for identification
in support of routing security, not for identification
3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers 3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers
Although Subject names in certificates issued by this registry need Although Subject names in certificates issued by this registry need
not be meaningful, and may appear "random," anonymity is not a not be meaningful, and may appear ''random,'' anonymity is not a
function of this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature function of this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature
is provided. is provided.
3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms 3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms
None None
3.1.5. Uniqueness of names 3.1.5. Uniqueness of names
<Name of Registry> certifies Subject names that are unique among the <Name of Registry> certifies Subject names that are unique among the
certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these
Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate
certificate path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor certificate path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor
enforced through technical means. enforced through technical means.
3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks 3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks
Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there
is no provision to recognize nor authenticate trademarks, service is no provision to recognize or authenticate trademarks, service
marks, etc. marks, etc.
3.2. Initial identity validation 3.2. Initial identity validation
3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key 3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key
<Name of Registry> accepts certificate requests via the protocol <Describe the method whereby each subscriber will be required to
described in [up/down]. This protocol makes use of the PKCS #10 demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key
format, as profiled in [RFCyyyy]. This request format requires that corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to <Name
the PKCS #10 request be signed using the (RSA) private key of Registry's> issuing the certificate. One possible approach makes
corresponding to the public key in the certificate request. This use of the PKCS #10 format, as profiled in [RFCyyyy]. This request
mechanism provides proof of possession by the requester. format requires that the PKCS #10 request be signed using the (RSA)
private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate
request. This mechanism provides proof of possession by the
requester.>
3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity 3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity
Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the
organizational identity of resource holders, with the exception of organizational identity of subscribers, with the exception of
registries. However, certificates are issued to resource holders in registries. However, certificates are issued to subscribers in a
a fashion that preserves the accuracy of allocations as represented fashion that preserves the accuracy of distributions as represented
in <Name of Registry> records. Specifically, a BPKI certificate used in <Name of Registry> records.
to authenticate a certificate request serves as a link to the <Name
of Registry> member database that maintains the resource allocation <Describe the method whereby this is accomplished. For example, a
records. The certificate request is matched against the database BPKI certificate could be used to authenticate a certificate request
record for the member in question, and an RPKI certificate is issued that serves as a link to the <Name of Registry> subscriber database
only if the resources requested are a subset of those held by the that maintains the INR distribution records. The certificate request
member. could be matched against the database record for the subscriber in
question, and an RPKI certificate would be issued only if the INRs
requested were a subset of those held by the subscriber.>
3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity 3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity
Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual
identity of a resource holder. However, <Name of Registry> maintains identity of a subscriber. However, <Name of Registry> maintains
contact information for each resource holder in support of contact information for each subscriber in support of certificate
certificate renewal, re-key, or revocation, via the BPKI. renewal, re-key, or revocation.
The <Name of Registry> BPKI (see Section 3.2.6) issues certificates < Describe the procedures that MUST be used to identify at least one
that are used to identify individuals who represent <Name of individual as a representative of each subscriber. This is done in
Registry> members that are address space (or AS number) holders. support of issuance, renewal, and revocation of the certificate
issued to the organization. For example, one might say ''The <Name of
Registry> BPKI (see Section 3.2.6) issues certificates that MUST be
used to identify individuals who represent <Name of Registry>
subscribers.'' The procedures should be commensurate with those you
already employ in authenticating individuals as representatives for
INR holders. Note that this authentication is solely for use by you
in dealing with the organizations to which you distribute (or sub-
distribute) INRs, and thus must not be relied upon outside of this
CA-subscriber relationship>
3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information 3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information
No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued
under this certificate policy. under this certificate policy except for SIA/AIA extensions.
3.2.5. Validation of authority 3.2.5. Validation of authority
Only an individual to whom a BPKI certificate (see Section 3.2.6) <Describe what procedures that MUST be used to verify that an
has been issued may request issuance of an RPKI certificate. Each individual claiming to represent a subscriber, is authorized to
certificate issuance request is verified using the BPKI. represent that subscriber in this context. For example, one could
say, ''Only an individual to whom a BPKI certificate (see Section
3.2.6) has been issued may request issuance of an RPKI certificate.
Each certificate issuance request is verified using the BPKI.'' The
procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ as a
registry in authenticating individuals as representatives of
subscribers.>
3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation 3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation
The RPKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any The RPKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
other PKI. However, <Name of Registry> operates a BPKI [cps- other PKI. <If you operate a separate, additional PKI for business
business-pki] that is used to authenticate members and to enable purposes (BPKI), then describe (or reference) how the BPKI is used
them to manage their resource allocations. The Resource PKI relies to authenticate subscribers and to enable them to manage their
on this BPKI to authenticate Subscribers who make certificate resource distributions.>
requests, revocation requests, etc.
3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests 3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests
3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key 3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key
Routine re-key is effected via a Certificate Issuance Request <Describe the conditions under which routine re-key is required and
message as described in [up/down]. This digitally signed CMS message the manner by which it is requested. Describe the procedures that
is authenticated using a BPKI certificate associated with the MUST be used to ensure that a subscriber requesting routine re-key
requester. is the legitimate holder of the certificate to be re-keyed. State
the approach for establishing PoP of the private key corresponding
to the new public key. If you operate a BPKI, describe how that BPKI
is used to authenticate routine re-key requests.>
3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation 3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation
Re-key after revocation is effected via a Certificate Issuance <Describe the procedures that MUST be used to ensure that an
Request message as described in [up/down]. This digitally signed CMS organization requesting a re-key after revocation is the legitimate
message is authenticated using a BPKI certificate associated with holder of the INRs in the certificate being re-keyed. This should
the requester. also include the method employed for verifying PoP of the private
key corresponding to the new public key. If you operate a business-
based PKI, describe how that BPKI is used to authenticate re-key
requests and refer to 3.2.6. With respect to authentication of the
subscriber, the procedures should be commensurate with those you
already employ in the maintenance of INR distribution records.>
3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request 3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request
An RPKI Subscriber makes an explicit revocation request using the <Describe the procedures that MUST be used by an RPKI subscriber to
protocol defined in [up/down]. Revocation requests in this protocol make a revocation request. Describe the manner by which it is
are digitally signed CMS messages, and are verified using a public ensured that the subscriber requesting revocation is the subject of
key bound to an authorized representative via the <Name of Registry> the certificate (or an authorized representative thereof) to be
BPKI. revoked. Note that there may be different procedures for the case
where the legitimate subject still possesses the original private
key as opposed to the case when it no longer has access to that key.
These procedures should be commensurate with those you already
employ in the maintenance of subscriber records.>
When a Subscriber requests an new resource allocation, an existing Note that if a Subscriber requests a new INR distribution, an
resource certificate issued to the subscriber is NOT revoked, so existing RPKI certificate issued to the subscriber is NOT revoked,
long as the set of resources allocated to the Subscriber did not so long as the set of INRs distributed to the subscriber did not
"shrink," i.e., the new resources are a superset of the old resource ''shrink,'' i.e., the new INRs are a superset of the old INR set.
set. However, if a new resource allocation results in "shrinkage" of However, if a new INR distribution results in ''shrinkage'' of the set
the set of resources allocated to a Subscriber, this triggers an of INRs distributed to a subscriber, this triggers an implicit
implicit revocation of the old resource certificate(s) associated revocation of the old RPKI certificate(s) associated with that
with that Subscriber. subscriber.
4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements 4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements
4.1. Certificate Application 4.1. Certificate Application
4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application 4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application
The following entities may submit a certificate application to this Any subscriber who holds INRs distributed by this registry may
CA: submit a certificate application to this CA.
o <Insert if appropriate: "Any NIR or LIR/ISP operating in the
geopolitical region served by this registry">
o Any entity that holds AS numbers or address space assigned by
this registry
4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities 4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities
<Name of Registry> members who are resource holders are enrolled in <Describe your enrollment process for issuing certificates both for
the <Name of Registry> BPKI via the process described in initial deployment of the PKI and as an ongoing process. Note that
[operations-business-pki]. Only a member who holds a certificate most of the certificates in this PKI are issued as part of your
issued under the BPKI is eligible to make an RPKI certificate normal business practices, as an adjunct to INR distribution, and
request. thus a separate application to request a certificate may not be
necessary. If so, reference should be made to where these practices
are documented.>
4.2. Certificate application processing 4.2. Certificate application processing
<A/An Name of Registry> resource holder requests a certificate via a <Describe the certificate request/response processing that you will
Certificate Issuance Request message [up/down], which is employ. You should make use of existing standards for certificate
authenticated via the digital signature on the CMS envelope. The application processing. Relevant standards include RFC 4210,
certificate used to authenticate the message is issued under the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management
<Name of Registry> BPKI. <Name of Registry> processes the resource Protocol (CMP), RFC 2797, Certificate Management Messages over CMS,
request as described in [up/down]. The Certificate Issuance Response and RSA Labs standards PKCS #7 and PKCS #10. >
message [up/down] either provides the certificate to the Subscriber,
or provides a response indicating why the request was not fulfilled.
4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions 4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions
The <Name of Registry> BPKI is used to identify <A/An Name of <Describe your practices for identification and authentication of
Registry> member representative applying for a certificate via a certificate applicants. Often, existing practices employed by you
certificate issuance request in the up/down protocol. See the <Name to identify and authenticate organizations can be used as the basis
of Registry> BPKI CPS for additional details [cp-business-pki]. for issuance of certificates to these subscribers. Reference can be
made to documentation of such existing practices.>
4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications 4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications
The Certificate Issuance Response message [up/down] either provides <Describe your practices for approval or rejection of applications
the certificate to the Subscriber, or provides a response indicating and refer to documentation of existing business practices relevant
why the request was not fulfilled. <Describe your practices for to this process. Note that according to the CP, certificate
approval or rejection of applications and refer to documentation of applications will be approved based on the normal business practices
existing business practices relevant to this process. Note that of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's records of
according to the CP, certificate applications will be approved based subscribers. The CP also says that each CA will follow the
on the normal business practices of the entity operating the CA, procedures specified in 3.2.1 to verify that the requester holds the
based on the CA's records of address space and AS number holders. private key corresponding to the public key that will be bound to
Also, each CA will verify that the requester holds the corresponding the certificate the CA issues to the requester.>
private key for the public key that will be bound to the certificate
the CA issues to the requester.>
4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications 4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications
<You may declare here your expected time frame for processing <Specify here your expected time frame for processing certificate
certificate applications.> applications.>
4.3. Certificate issuance 4.3. Certificate issuance
4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance 4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance
A Subscriber generates a draft certificate using the PKCS #10 <Describe in this section your procedures for issuance and
format, as profiled in [RFCyyyy]. This draft certificate is publication of a certificate.>
encapsulated in a CMS message, signed by the requester, and
submitted as a Certificate Issuance Request as described in
[up/down]. The CA verifies the request message as described in
[up/down] and generates a Certificate Issuance Response message.
That message either contains the requested certificate, or provides
a response indicating why the request was not fulfilled.
4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate 4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate
A Subscriber is notified of the issuance of a new certificate by the <Name of registry> MUST notify the subscriber when the certificate
Certificate Issuance Response message. is published. <Describe here any other entities that will be
notified when a new certificate is published.>
4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities 4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]
<Describe here any other entities that will be notified when a new
certificate is published.>
4.4. Certificate acceptance 4.4. Certificate acceptance
4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance 4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance
When a certificate is issued, the RPKI CA will place it in the When a certificate is issued, the CA MUST publish it to the
repository. A subject is deemed to have accepted a certificate repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without
issued by this CA unless the subject explicitly requests revocation subscriber review and acceptance.
of the certificate after publication in the <Name of Registry> RPKI
repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3
4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA 4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA
Certificates will be published in the Repository system within 1 Certificates MUST be published in the RPKI distributed repository
business day of being issued by this CA. system via publication of the certificate at <name of Registry>'s
repository publication. This will be done within <specify the
timeframe within which the certificate will be placed in the
repository and the subscriber will be notified>. <Describe your
procedures for publication of the certificate.>
4.5. Key pair and certificate usage 4.5. Key pair and certificate usage
A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below. A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below.
4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage 4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage
The certificates issued by this registry to resource holders are CA The certificates issued by <name of registry> to subscribers are CA
certificates. The private key associated with each of these certificates. The private key associated with each of these
certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and
CRLs. A subscriber will issue certificates to any organizations to CRLs. A subscriber may in turn issue certificates to any
which it allocates resources and one or more EE certificates for use organizations to which it distributes INRs and may issue one or more
in verifying signatures on ROAs signed by the subscriber. <If EE certificates for use in verifying signatures on RPKI-signed
appropriate, add "Subscribers that are NIRs issue certificates to objects signed by the subscriber. Subscribers also will issue
organizations to which they have allocated address space or AS certificates to operators in support of repository access control.
numbers. Subscribers that are LIRs issue certificates to
organizations to which they have allocated address space.">
Subscribers also will issue certificates to operators in support of
repository access control.
4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage 4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage
The primary relying parties in this PKI are LIRs/ISPs, who will use The primary relying parties in this PKI are organizations who will
RPKI EE certificates to verify ROAs and other signed objects, e.g., use RPKI EE certificates to verify RPKI-signed objects. Repositories
in support of generating route filters. will use operator certificates to verify the authorization of
entities to engage in repository maintenance activities, and thus
repositories represent a secondary type of relying party.
4.6. Certificate renewal 4.6. Certificate renewal
4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal 4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal
As per the CP, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on As per the CP, a certificate MUST be processed for renewal based on
its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate
Subject. The request may be implicit, a side effect of renewing its Subject. The request may be implicit, a side effect of renewing its
resource holding agreement, or may be explicit. If <Name of resource holding agreement, or may be explicit. If <Name of
Registry> initiates the renewal process based on the certificate Registry> initiates the renewal process based on the certificate
expiration date, then <Name of Registry> will notify the resource expiration date, then <Name of Registry> will notify the subscriber
holder <insert the period of advance warning, e.g., "2 weeks in <insert the period of advance warning, e.g., ''2 weeks in advance of
advance of the expiration date", or the general policy, e.g., "in the expiration date'', or the general policy, e.g., ''in conjunction
conjunction with notification of service expiration".> The validity with notification of service expiration''.> The validity interval of
interval of the new (renewed) certificate will overlap that of the the new (renewed) certificate will overlap that of the previous
previous certificate by <insert length of overlap period, e.g., 1 certificate by <insert length of overlap period, e.g., 1 week>, to
week>, to ensure uninterrupted coverage. ensure uninterrupted coverage.
Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the
previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
compromised. If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of compromised. If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
Section 4.7 will apply. Section 4.7 will apply.
4.6.2. Who may request renewal 4.6.2. Who may request renewal
The certificate holder or <Name of Registry> may initiate the The subscriber or <Name of Registry> may initiate the renewal
renewal process. For the case of the certificate holder, only an process. <For the case of the subscriber, describe the procedures
individual to whom a BPKI certificate (see Section 3.2.6) has been that will be used to ensure that the requester is the legitimate
issued may request renewal of an RPKI certificate. Each certificate holder of the INRs in the certificate being renewed. This should
issuance request is verified using the BPKI. also include the method employed for verifying PoP of the private
key corresponding to the public key in the certificate being renewed
or the new public key if the public key is being changed. With
respect to authentication of the subscriber, the procedures should
be commensurate with those you already employ in the maintenance of
INR distribution records. If you operate a BPKI for this, describe
how that business-based PKI is used to authenticate re-newal
requests and refer to 3.2.6.>
4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests 4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests
A Subscriber requests certificate renewal by sending a Certificate <Describe your procedures for handling certificate renewal requests.
Issuance Request message [up/down]. This must include verification that the requester is the subscriber
or is authorized by the subscriber and that the certificate in
question has not been revoked.>
4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber 4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
A Subscriber is notified of the issuance of a new certificate via <Name of Registry> MUST notify the subscriber when the certificate
the Certificate Issuance Response message, if the Subscriber is published. <Describe your procedure for notification of new
initiated the renewal. If <Name of Registry> initiated the renewal certificate issuance to the subscriber. This should be consistent
process, the Subscriber is notified by the posting of the renewed with 4.3.2.>
certificate in the <Name of Registry> repository. A Subscriber can
discover a certificate renewed by <Name of Registry> through use of
the List message [up/down].
4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate 4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate
When a renewal certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the When a renewal certificate is issued, <Name of Registry> MUST
repository. A Subscriber is deemed to have accepted a certificate publish it to the repository and notify the subscriber. This will be
unless the subscriber explicitly requests revocation of the done without subscriber review and acceptance.
certificate after publication in the <Name of Registry> RPKI
repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3.
4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA 4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA
<Name of Registry> will publish a renewal certificate in the <Name <Describe your policy and procedures for publication of a renewal
of Registry> RPKI repository within 1 business day after issuance of certificate. This should be consistent with 4.4.2.>
the renewed certificate.
4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities 4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]
<List here any other entities (besides the subscriber) who will be
notified when a renewed certificate is issued.>
4.7. Certificate re-key 4.7. Certificate re-key
4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key 4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key
As per the CP, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when As per the CP, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when
requested, based on: required, based on:
(1) knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated (1) knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
private key, or private key, or
(2) the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated (2) the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated
key pair key pair
If a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the If a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the
replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a
new key, unless the subscriber requests a re-key at the same time. new key, unless the subscriber requests a re-key at the same time.
skipping to change at page 23, line 25 skipping to change at page 23, line 25
If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
certificate will be revoked. certificate will be revoked.
Section 5.6 of the Certificate Policy notes that when a CA signs a Section 5.6 of the Certificate Policy notes that when a CA signs a
certificate, the signing key should have a validity period that certificate, the signing key should have a validity period that
exceeds the validity period of the certificate. This places exceeds the validity period of the certificate. This places
additional constraints on when a CA should request a re-key. additional constraints on when a CA should request a re-key.
4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key 4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key
The holder of the certificate may request a re-key. In addition, Only the subscriber may request a re-key. In addition, <Name of
<Name of Registry> may initiate a re-key based on a verified Registry> may initiate a re-key based on a verified compromise
compromise report. If the Subscriber (certificate Subject) requests report. <If the subscriber (certificate Subject) requests the rekey,
the rekey, authentication is effected using the <Name of Registry> describe how authentication is effected, e.g., using the <Name of
BPKI. <Describe how a compromise report received from other than a Registry> BPKI. Describe how a compromise report received from other
subscriber is verified.> than a subscriber is verified.>
4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests 4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests
A Subscriber requests a re-key of a certificate by issuing a <Describe your process for handling re-keying requests. As per the
Certificate Issuance Request message in which the resources are ones CP, this should be consistent with the process described in Section
that the Subscriber already holds, but a new public key is provided 4.3. So reference can be made to that section.>
in the PKCS #10 portion of the request.
4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber 4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
A Subscriber is notified of the issuance of a re-keyed certificate <Describe your policy regarding notifying the subscriber re:
via the Certificate Issuance Response message. availability of the new re-keyed certificate. This should be
consistent with the notification process for any new certificate
issuance (see section 4.3.2).>
4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate 4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate
When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will publish it in the
repository. A subject is deemed to have accepted a certificate repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without
issued by this CA unless the subject explicitly requests revocation subscriber review and acceptance.
of the certificate after publication in the <Name of Registry> RPKI
repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3.
4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA 4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA
A re-keyed certificate will be published in the Repository system <Describe your policy regarding publication of the new certificate.
within 1 business day of being issued by this CA. This should be consistent with the publication process for any new
certificate (see section 4.4.2).>
4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities 4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]
<List here any entities (other than the subscriber) who will be
notified when a re-keyed certificate is issued.>
4.8. Certificate modification 4.8. Certificate modification
4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification 4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification
As per the CP, modification of a certificate occurs to implement As per the CP, modification of a certificate occurs to implement
changes to the RFC 3779 extension values in a certificate. A changes to the RFC 3779 extension values in a certificate. A
subscriber can request a certificate modification when this subscriber can request a certificate modification when this
information in a currently valid certificate has changed, as a information in a currently valid certificate has changed as a result
result of changes in the resource holdings of the subscriber. The of changes in the INR holdings of the subscriber.
request may be implicit, a side effect of the allocation of
additional resources, or may be explicit. A subscriber also may
request that its existing set of resources be redistributed among
multiple certificates. This example of certificate modification is
effected through issuance of new certificates, and revocation of the
previous certificates.
If a subscriber is to be allocated address space or AS numbers in If INRs are to be distributed to a subscriber and the INRs are in
addition to a current allocation, and if the subscriber does not addition to a current distribution, and if the subscriber does not
request that a new certificate be issued containing only these request that a new certificate be issued containing only these
resources, then this is accomplished through a certificate additional resources, then this is accomplished through a
modification. When a certificate modification is approved, a new certificate modification. When a certificate modification is
certificate is issued. The new certificate will contain the same approved, a new certificate is issued. The new certificate will
public key and the same expiration date as the original certificate, contain the same public key and the same expiration date as the
but with the incidental information corrected and/or the address original certificate, but with the incidental information corrected
space and AS allocations expanded. When previously allocated address and/or the INR distribution expanded. When previously distributed
space or AS numbers are to be removed from a certificate, then the INRs are to be removed from a certificate, then the old certificate
old certificate MUST be revoked and a new certificate (reflecting MUST be revoked and a new certificate (reflecting the new
the new allocation) issued. distribution) issued.
4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification 4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification
The certificate holder or <Name of Registry> may initiate the The subscriber or <Name of Registry> may initiate the certificate
certificate modification process. If a certificate holder requests modification process. <For the case of the subscriber, state here
the modification, the request is authenticated using the <Name of what steps will be taken to verify the identity and authorization of
Registry> BPKI, as described in [up/down]. <Name of Registry> will the entity requesting the modification.>
modify a certificate, and revoke the old certificate, if, for
example, a Subscriber fails to renew membership in a timely fashion.
4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests 4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests
A certificate can be modified (other than for re-key) only by the <Describe your procedures for verification of the modification
addition or removal or resources. A Subscriber requests certificate request and procedures for the issuance of a new certificate. These
modification by submitting a Certificate Issuance Request. If the should be consistent with the processes described in Sections 4.2
request contains values for AS and/or (IPv4 or IPv6) address and 4.3.1.>
resource sets that the Subscriber already holds, but which are
different from those in the currently issued certificates, the
request is interpreted as a request for certificate modification.
4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to subscriber 4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to subscriber
A Subscriber is notified of the issuance of a modified certificate <Describe your procedure for notifying the subscriber about the
by the publication of the certificate in the <Name of Registry> RPKI issuance of a modified certificate. This should be consistent with
repository system. the notification process for any new certificate (see section
4.3.2).>
4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate 4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
When a modified certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the When a modified certificate is issued, the <Name of Registry> will
repository and notify the subscriber. A subject is deemed to have publish in the repository and notify the subscriber. This will be
accepted the modified certificate unless the subject explicitly done without subscriber review and acceptance.
requests revocation of the certificate after publication in the
<Name of Registry> RPKI repository system, as described in Section
4.9.3.
4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA 4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA
A modified certificate will be published in the <Name of Registry> <Describe your procedure for publication of a modified certificate.
RPKI Repository system within 1 business day of being issued by this This should be consistent with the publication process for any new
CA. certificate (see section 4.4.2).>
4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities 4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]
<List here any entities (other than the subscriber) who will be
notified when a modified certificate is issued.>
4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension 4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension
4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation 4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation
As per the CP, certificates can be revoked for several reasons. As per the CP, certificates can be revoked for several reasons.
Either <Name of Registry> or the subject may choose to end the Either <Name of Registry> or the subject may choose to end the
relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to
revoke the certificate. If one or more of the resources bound to the revoke the certificate. If one or more of the INRs bound to the
public key in the certificate are no longer associated with the public key in the certificate are no longer associated with the
subject, that too constitutes a basis for revocation. A certificate subject, that too constitutes a basis for revocation. A certificate
also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate. Finally, a corresponding to the public key in the certificate. Finally, a
certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by the
that certificate. private key associated with that certificate.
4.9.2. Who can request revocation 4.9.2. Who can request revocation
The certificate holder or <Name of Registry> may request a The subscriber or <Name of Registry> may request a revocation. <For
revocation. A Subscriber requests certificate revocation using the the case of the subscriber, describe what steps will be taken to
Certificate Revocation Request message described in [up/down]. verify the identity and authorization of the entity requesting the
revocation.>
4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request 4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request
A Subscriber requests certificate revocation using the Certificate <Describe your process for handling a certificate revocation
Revocation Request message described in [up/down]. The Certificate request. This should include:
Revocation Response message confirms receipt of the revocation
request by <Name of Registry>, and indicates that <Name of Registry> o Procedure to be used by the subscriber to request a revocation
will include the revoked certificate in a CRL.
o Procedure for notification of the subscriber when the revocation
is initiated by <Name of ISP>.>
4.9.4. Revocation request grace period 4.9.4. Revocation request grace period
A Subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the A subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the
need for revocation has been identified. need for revocation has been identified.
4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request 4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request
<Describe your policy on the time period within which you will <Describe your policy on the time period within which you will
process a revocation request.> process a revocation request.>
4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties 4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties
As per the CP, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and As per the CP, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and
checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the
certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate. certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate.
4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency 4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency
The <Name of Registry> RPKI production CA will publish CRLs <State the CRL issuance frequency for the CRLs that you publish.>
approximately every 24 hours. The <Name of Registry> RPKI offline CA Each CRL will carry a nextScheduledUpdate value; and a new CRL will
will publish CRLs on a monthly basis. Each CRL will carry a be published at or before that time. <Name of Registry> will set
nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL will be published at or the nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when
before that time. <Name of Registry> will set the the next scheduled CRL will be issued.
nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the
next scheduled CRL will be issued.
4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs 4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs
A CRL will be posted to the repository system with minimal delay A CRL will be published to the repository system within <state the
after generation. maximum latency> after generation.
4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED]
4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED]
4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED]
4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]
4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED]
4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]
4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED]
4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]
4.10. Certificate status services 4.10. Certificate status services
<Name of Registry> does not support OCSP. <Name of Registry> issues <Name of Registry> does not support OCSP or SCVP. <Name of Registry>
CRLs. issues CRLs.
4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]
4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED]
4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]
4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]
4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED]
4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]
4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices 5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls
[OMITTED]
5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls
5.1. Physical controls 5.1. Physical controls
<As per the CP, describe the physical controls that you employ for <As per the CP, describe the physical controls that you employ for
certificate management. These should be commensurate to those used certificate management. These should be commensurate to those used
in the management of address space and AS number allocation.> in the management of INR distribution.>
5.1.1. Site location and construction 5.1.1. Site location and construction
5.1.2. Physical access 5.1.2. Physical access
5.1.3. Power and air conditioning 5.1.3. Power and air conditioning
5.1.4. Water exposures 5.1.4. Water exposures
5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection 5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection
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5.1.6. Media storage 5.1.6. Media storage
5.1.7. Waste disposal 5.1.7. Waste disposal
5.1.8. Off-site backup 5.1.8. Off-site backup
5.2. Procedural controls 5.2. Procedural controls
<As per the CP, describe the procedural security controls that you <As per the CP, describe the procedural security controls that you
employ for certificate management. These should be commensurate to employ for certificate management. These should be commensurate to
those used in the management of address space and AS number those used in the management of INR distribution.>
allocation.>
5.2.1. Trusted roles 5.2.1. Trusted roles
5.2.2. Number of persons required per task 5.2.2. Number of persons required per task
5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role 5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role
5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties 5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties
5.3. Personnel controls 5.3. Personnel controls
<As per the CP, describe the personnel security controls that you <As per the CP, describe the personnel security controls that you
employ for individuals associated with certificate management. These employ for individuals associated with certificate management. These
should be commensurate to those used in the management of address should be commensurate to those used in the management of INR
space and AS number allocation.> distribution.>
5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements 5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
5.3.2. Background check procedures 5.3.2. Background check procedures
5.3.3. Training requirements 5.3.3. Training requirements
5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements 5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements
5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence 5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence
5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions 5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions
5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements 5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements
5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel 5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel
5.4. Audit logging procedures 5.4. Audit logging procedures
<As per the CP, describe in the following sections the details of
how you implement audit logging.>
5.4.1. Types of events recorded 5.4.1. Types of events recorded
Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the
certification authority computing equipment. Audit records will certification authority computing equipment. Audit records will
include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
content data relating to the event. Auditable events include: content data relating to the event. Auditable events include:
Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout) Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)
Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate requests, Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate requests,
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Any attempts to change or delete audit data Any attempts to change or delete audit data
<List here any additional types of events that will be audited.> <List here any additional types of events that will be audited.>
5.4.2. Frequency of processing log 5.4.2. Frequency of processing log
<Describe your procedures for review of audit logs.> <Describe your procedures for review of audit logs.>
5.4.3. Retention period for audit log 5.4.3. Retention period for audit log
<Describe your polices for retention of audit logs.> <Describe your policies for retention of audit logs.>
5.4.4. Protection of audit log 5.4.4. Protection of audit log
<Describe your policies for protection of the audit logs.> <Describe your policies for protection of the audit logs.>
5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures 5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures
<Describe your policies for backup of the audit logs.> <Describe your policies for backup of the audit logs.>
5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED] 5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]
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5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments 5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments
<Describe any vulnerability assessments that you will apply (or have <Describe any vulnerability assessments that you will apply (or have
already applied) to the PKI subsystems. This should include whether already applied) to the PKI subsystems. This should include whether
such assessments have taken place and any procedures or plans to such assessments have taken place and any procedures or plans to
perform or repeat/reassess vulnerabilities in the future.> perform or repeat/reassess vulnerabilities in the future.>
5.5. Records archival [OMITTED] 5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]
5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED]
5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]
5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED]
5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED]
5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED]
5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) [OMITTED]
5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information [OMITTED]
5.6. Key changeover 5.6. Key changeover
The <Name of Registry> CA certificate will contain a validity period The <Name of Registry> CA certificate will contain a validity period
that encompasses that of all certificates verifiable using this CA that is at least as long as that of any certificate being issued
certificate. To support this, <Name of Registry> will create a new under that certificate. When <Name of Registry> CA wishes to change
signature key pair, and acquire and publish a new certificate keys, <Name of Registry> will create a new signature key pair, and
containing the public key of the pair, <specify here the minimum acquire and publish a new certificate containing the public key of
amount of lead time, e.g., "a minimum of 6 months"> in advance of the pair, <specify here the minimum amount of lead time, e.g., ''a
the scheduled change of the current signature key pair. minimum of 6 months''> in advance of the scheduled change of the
current signature key pair.
5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED] 5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]
5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]
5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted
[OMITTED]
5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]
5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster [OMITTED]
5.8. CA or RA termination 5.8. CA or RA termination
<Describe the fallback policy for management of your CA's IP address <Describe your policy for management of your CA's INR distributions
space and AS number allocations in case of its own termination.> in case of its own termination.>
6. Technical Security Controls 6. Technical Security Controls
This section describes the security controls used by <Name of This section describes the security controls used by <Name of
Registry>. Registry>.
6.1. Key pair generation and installation 6.1. Key pair generation and installation
6.1.1. Key pair generation 6.1.1. Key pair generation
<Describe the procedures that will be used to generate the CA key <Describe the procedures that will be used to generate the CA key
pair, and, if applicable, key pairs for network subscribers. In pair, and, if applicable, key pairs for subscribers. In most
most instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the subscriber,
subscriber, i.e., the organization receiving the allocation of i.e., the organization receiving the distribution of INRs. However,
address space or AS numbers. However, your procedures may include your procedures may include one for generating key pairs on behalf
one for generating key pairs on behalf of your subscribers if they of your subscribers if they so request. (This might be done for
so request. (This might be done for subscribers who do not have the subscribers who do not have the ability to perform key generation in
ability to perform key generation in a secure fashion or who want a a secure fashion or who want a registry to provide backup for the
registry to provide backup for the subscriber private key.) Since subscriber private key.) Since the keys used in this PKI are not for
the keys used in this PKI are not for non-repudiation purposes, non-repudiation purposes, generation of key pairs by CAs does not
generation of key pairs by CAs does not inherently undermine the inherently undermine the security of the PKI.>
security of the PKI. >
6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber 6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber
<If the procedures in 6.1.1 include providing key pair generation <If the procedures in 6.1.1 include providing key pair generation
services for subscribers, describe the means by which private keys services for subscribers, describe the means by which private keys
are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion. Otherwise say this are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion. Otherwise say this
is not applicable.> is not applicable.>
6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer 6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer
Subscribers deliver public keys to the <Name of Registry> RPKI CA by <Describe the procedures that will be used to deliver a subscriber's
use of the up/down protocol as described in [up/down]. public keys to the <Name of Registry> RPKI CA. These procedures
should ensure that the public key has not been altered during
transit and that the subscriber possesses the private key
corresponding to the transferred public key. >
6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties 6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties
CA public keys for all entities other than RIRs are contained in CA public keys for all entities (other than trust anchors) are
certificates issued by other CAs. These certificates plus contained in certificates issued by other CAs and MUST be published
certificates used to represent inter-RIR transfers of address space to the RPKI repository system. Relying parties MUST download these
or AS numbers will be published via a repository system. Relying certificates from this system. Public key values and associated data
parties will download these certificates from this system. Public for (putative) trust anchors MUST be distributed out of band and
key values and associated data for the trust anchors (RIRs) will be accepted by relying parties on the basis of locally-defined
distributed out of band, e.g., embedded in path validation software criteria, e.g., embedded in path validation software that will be
that will be made available to the Internet community. made available to the Internet community.
6.1.5. Key sizes 6.1.5. Key sizes
For the <Name of Registry> offline CA'sand production CA's The key sizes used in this PKI are as specified in RFC ZZZZ
certificates, the RSA key size will be 2048 bits. For subscriber [RFCzzzz]. <Describe any deviations from this statement.>
certificates, the RSA keys will be <insert key size -- e.g., 2048 or
1024 bits. If NIR key size is larger than LIR/ISP/subscriber key
size, describe each independently.>
6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking 6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking
The RSA algorithm [RSA] is used in this PKI with the public exponent The public key algorithms and parameters used in this PKI are as
(e) F4 (65,537). specified in RFC ZZZZ [RFCzzzz]. <Describe any deviations from this
statement.>
<If the procedures in 6.1.1 include subscriber key pair generation, <If the procedures in 6.1.1 include subscriber key pair generation,
insert here text specifying that the subscriber is responsible for EITHER insert here text specifying that the subscriber is
performing checks on the quality of its key pair and saying that responsible for performing checks on the quality of its key pair and
<Name of Registry> is not responsible for performing such checks for saying that <Name of Registry> is not responsible for performing
subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the CA for checking such checks for subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the
the quality of these subscriber key pairs.> CA for checking the quality of these subscriber key pairs.>
6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field) 6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)
The Key usage extension bit values will be consistent with RFC 3280. The Key usage extension bit values will be consistent with RFC 5280.
For <Name of Registry>'s CA certificates, the keyCertSign and For <Name of Registry>'s CA certificates, the keyCertSign and
cRLSign bits will be set TRUE. All other bits (including cRLSign bits will be set TRUE. All other bits (including
digitalSignature) will be set FALSE, and the extension will be digitalSignature) will be set FALSE, and the extension will be
marked critical. marked critical. <Specify whether end entity certificates (e.g.,
issued by the CA for its operators) will include this extension and
if so, the appropriate bit values as per RFC 5280.>
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering 6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
Controls Controls
6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls 6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls
The <Name of Registry> RPKI CA employs a cryptographic module The <Name of Registry> CA employs a cryptographic module evaluated
evaluated under FIPS 140-2, at level 3 [FIPS]. under FIPS 140-2/3, at level 3 [FIPS].
6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control 6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control
There will be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m> <If you choose to use multi-person controls to constrain access to
multi-person control. your CA's private keys, then insert the following text. ''There will
be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m> multi-person
control.''>
6.2.3. Private key escrow 6.2.3. Private key escrow
No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI. No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI.
6.2.4. Private key backup 6.2.4. Private key backup
<Describe the procedures used for backing up your CA's private key. <Describe the procedures used for backing up your CA's private key.
The following aspects should be included. (1) The copying should be The following aspects should be included. (1) The copying should be
done under the same multi-party control as is used for controlling done under the same multi-party control as is used for controlling
the original private key. (2) At least one copy should be kept at the original private key. (2) At least one copy should be kept at
an off-site location for disaster recovery purposes.> an off-site location for disaster recovery purposes.>
6.2.5. Private key archival 6.2.5. Private key archival
See sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 See sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4
6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module 6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module
The private keys for <Name of Registry>'s offline CA and production The private keys for <Name of Registry>'s production CA < if
CA will be generated by the cryptographic module specified in 6.2.1. appropriate, change ''production CA'' to ''production and offline CAs''>
MUST be generated by the cryptographic module specified in 6.2.1.
The private keys will never leave the module except in encrypted The private keys will never leave the module except in encrypted
form for backup and/or transfer to a new module. form for backup and/or transfer to a new module.
6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module 6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module
The private keys for <Name of Registry>'s CA will be stored in the The private key for <Name of Registry>'s production CA <if
cryptographic module and will be protected from unauthorized use in appropriate, change ''production CA'' to ''production and offline CAs''>
accordance with the FIPS 140-2 requirements applicable to the MUST be stored in the cryptographic module and will be protected
module. (See [FIPS]) from unauthorized use in accordance with the FIPS 140-2/3
requirements applicable to the module. (See [FIPS])
6.2.8. Method of activating private key 6.2.8. Method of activating private key
<Describe the mechanisms and data used to activate your CA's private <Describe the mechanisms and data used to activate your CA's private
key.> key.>
6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key 6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key
The cryptographic module, when activated, will not be left The cryptographic module, when activated, will not be left
unattended. After use, it will be deactivated by <Describe the unattended. After use, it will be deactivated by <Describe the
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6.2.10. Method of destroying private key 6.2.10. Method of destroying private key
<Describe the method used for destroying your CA's private key, <Describe the method used for destroying your CA's private key,
e.g., when it is superseded. This will depend on the particular e.g., when it is superseded. This will depend on the particular
module.> module.>
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating 6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating
The cryptographic module used by the <Name of Registry> production The cryptographic module used by the <Name of Registry> production
CA will be certified FIPS 140-2, at level 3 [FIPS]. CA will be certified FIPS 140-2/3, at level 3 [FIPS].
6.3. Other aspects of key pair management 6.3. Other aspects of key pair management
6.3.1. Public key archival 6.3.1. Public key archival
Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
to archive public keys. to archive public keys.
6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods 6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods
The <Name of Registry> CA's key pair will have a validity interval The <Name of Registry> CA's key pair will have a validity interval
of <insert number of years - Registry key pairs and certificates of <insert number of years - - Registry key pairs and certificates
should have long validity intervals, e.g., 10 years, to minimize the should have long validity intervals, e.g., 10 years, to minimize the
disruption caused by key changeover for top tier CAs.> disruption caused by key changeover for top tier CAs.>
6.4. Activation data 6.4. Activation data
6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation 6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation
<Describe how activation data for your CA will be generated.> <Describe how activation data for your CA will be generated.>
6.4.2. Activation data protection 6.4.2. Activation data protection
Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by
<Describe your procedures here>. <Describe your procedures here>.
6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data 6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data
<Add here any details you wish to provide with regard to the <Add here any details you wish to provide with regard to the
activation data for your CA. If there are none, say "None."> activation data for your CA. If there are none, say ''None.''>
6.5. Computer security controls 6.5. Computer security controls
6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement 6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement
<Describe your security requirements for the computers used to <Describe your security requirements for the computers used to
support this PKI, e.g., requirements for authenticated logins, audit support this PKI, e.g., requirements for authenticated logins, audit
capabilities, etc. These requirements should be commensurate with capabilities, etc. These requirements should be commensurate with
those used for the computers used for managing allocation of IP those used for the computers used for managing distribution of
addresses and AS numbers.> INRs.>
6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]
6.6. Life cycle technical controls 6.6. Life cycle technical controls
6.6.1. System development controls 6.6.1. System development controls
<Describe any system development controls that you will apply to the <Describe any system development controls that you will apply to the
PKI systems, e.g., use of Trusted System Development Methodology PKI systems, e.g., use of Trusted System Development Methodology
(TSDM) Level 2.> (TSDM) Level 2.>
6.6.2. Security management controls 6.6.2. Security management controls
<Describe the security management controls that will be used for the <Describe the security management controls that will be used for the
software and equipment employed by the CA. These security measures RPKI software and equipment employed by the CA. These security
should be commensurate with those used for the systems used by the measures should be commensurate with those used for the systems used
CAs for managing and allocating RPKI resources.> by the CAs for managing and distributing INRs.>
6.6.3. Life cycle security controls 6.6.3. Life cycle security controls
<Describe how the equipment (hardware and software) used for PKI <Describe how the equipment (hardware and software) used for RPKI
functions will be procured, installed, maintained, and updated. functions will be procured, installed, maintained, and updated.
This should be done in a fashion commensurate with the way in which This should be done in a fashion commensurate with the way in which
equipment for the management and allocation of IP address space and equipment for the management and distribution of INRs is handled. >
AS numbers is handled. >
6.7. Network security controls 6.7. Network security controls
<Describe the network security controls that will be used for CA <Describe the network security controls that will be used for CA
operation. These should be commensurate with the network security operation. These should be commensurate with the network security
controls employed for the computers used for managing allocation of controls employed for the computers used for managing distribution
IP addresses and AS numbers.> of INRs.>
6.8. Time-stamping 6.8. Time-stamping
The PKI in question does not make use of time stamping. The RPKI does not make use of time stamping.
7. Certificate and CRL Profiles 7. Certificate and CRL Profiles
Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy]. 8. Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy].
7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]
7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]
7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]
7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED]
7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED]
7.1.2.3. Optional certificate extensions [OMITTED]
7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]
7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]
7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]
7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]
7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED]
7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]
7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies
extension [OMITTED]
7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]
7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]
7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]
7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED]
7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED]
7.2.2.3. Optional CRL extensions [OMITTED]
7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]
7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]
7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED] Compliance Audit and Other Assessments
8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments
<List here any audit and other assessments used to ensure the <List here any audit and other assessments used to ensure the
security of the administration of IP addresses and AS numbers. These security of the administration of INRs. These are sufficient for the
are sufficient for the PKI systems.> RPKI systems.>
8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment 8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment
8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor 8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor
8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity 8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity
8.4. Topics covered by assessment 8.4. Topics covered by assessment
8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency 8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency
8.6. Communication of results 8.6. Communication of results
9. Other Business And Legal Matters 9. Other Business And Legal Matters
<The sections below are optional. Fill them in as appropriate for <The sections below are optional. Fill them in as appropriate for
your organization. Note that the manner in which you manage your your organization. The CP says that CAs should cover 9.1 to 9.11 and
business and legal matters for this PKI should be commensurate with 9.13 to 9.17 although not every CA will choose to do so. Note that
the way in which you manage business and legal matters for the the manner in which you manage your business and legal matters for
allocation of RPKI resources.> this PKI should be commensurate with the way in which you manage
business and legal matters for the distribution of INRs.>
9.1. Fees 9.1. Fees
9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees 9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees
9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable) 9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable)
9.1.3. Refund policy 9.1.3. Refund policy
9.2. Financial responsibility 9.2. Financial responsibility
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9.4.1. Privacy plan 9.4.1. Privacy plan
9.4.2. Information treated as private 9.4.2. Information treated as private
9.4.3. Information not deemed private 9.4.3. Information not deemed private
9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information 9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information
9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information 9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information
9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process
9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process
9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances 9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances
9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable) 9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable)
9.6. Representations and warranties 9.6. Representations and warranties
9.6.1. CA representations and warranties 9.6.1. CA representations and warranties
9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties 9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties
9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties 9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties
9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants [OMITTED]
9.7. Disclaimers of warranties 9.7. Disclaimers of warranties
9.8. Limitations of liability 9.8. Limitations of liability
9.9. Indemnities 9.9. Indemnities
9.10. Term and termination 9.10. Term and termination
9.10.1. Term 9.10.1. Term
skipping to change at page 40, line 42 skipping to change at page 37, line 38
9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival 9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival
9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants 9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants
9.12. Amendments 9.12. Amendments
9.12.1. Procedure for amendment 9.12.1. Procedure for amendment
9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period 9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period
9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED]
9.13. Dispute resolution provisions 9.13. Dispute resolution provisions
9.14. Governing law 9.14. Governing law
9.15. Compliance with applicable law 9.15. Compliance with applicable law
9.16. Miscellaneous provisions 9.16. Miscellaneous provisions
9.16.1. Entire agreement 9.16.1. Entire agreement
9.16.2. Assignment 9.16.2. Assignment
9.16.3. Severability 9.16.3. Severability
9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights) 9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)
9.16.5. Force Majeure 9.16.5. Force Majeure
9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]
10. Security Considerations 10. Security Considerations
The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied
in a certificate depends on several factors. These factors can in a certificate depends on several factors. These factors can
include the practices followed by the certification authority (CA) include the practices followed by the certification authority (CA)
in authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy, in authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy,
procedures, and technical security controls, including the scope of procedures, and technical security controls, including the scope of
the subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the the subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the
private key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms private key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms
and conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of and conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of
skipping to change at page 42, line 36 skipping to change at page 39, line 36
the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and
relying party systems. relying party systems.
11. IANA Considerations 11. IANA Considerations
None. None.
12. Acknowledgments 12. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Geoff Huston for reviewing this The authors would like to thank Geoff Huston for reviewing this
document and Matt Lepinski for his help with the formatting. document, Matt Lepinski for his help with the formatting, and Ron
Watro for assistance with editing.
13. References 13. References
13.1. Normative References 13.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W., Solo, D., "Internet [RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W., Solo, D., ''Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Revocation List (CRL) Profile,'' BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFCxxxx] Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S., "Certificate [RFCxxxx] Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S.,
Policy for the Resource PKI (RPKI)", work in progress. ''Certificate Policy for the Resource PKI (RPKI),'' work in
progress.
[RFCyyyy] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for [RFCyyyy] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., Loomans, R., ''A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", work in progress. X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates,'' work in progress.
[up/down] Houston, G., Loomis, R., Ellacott, B., Austein, R., "A [RFCzzzz] Huston, G., ''A Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
Protocol for Provisioning Resource Certificates", work in use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure,'' work in
progress. progress.
13.2. Informative References 13.2. Informative References
[BGP4] Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors), A Border Gateway Protocol 4 [BGP4] Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors), A Border Gateway Protocol 4
(BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995. (BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995.
[cps-business-pki] <Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for [FIPS] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3
this registry's business PKI -- to be filled in> (FIPS-140-3), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic
[FIPS] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2
(FIPS PUB 140-2), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National
Institute of Standards and Technology, May 25, 2001. Institute of Standards and Technology, work in progress.
[operations-business-pki] <Document or pointer to document
describing the operations of this registry's business PKI --
to be filled in>
[RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method for [RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method for
obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems.
Commun. ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126. Commun. ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126.
Author's Addresses Author's Addresses
Stephen Kent Stephen Kent
BBN Technologies BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street 10 Moulton Street
skipping to change at page 44, line 25 skipping to change at page 41, line 25
Karen Seo Karen Seo
BBN Technologies BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street 10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138 Cambridge MA 02138
USA USA
Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152 Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
Email: kseo@bbn.com Email: kseo@bbn.com
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