--- 1/draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-04.txt	2010-03-09 02:11:06.000000000 +0100
+++ 2/draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-05.txt	2010-03-09 02:11:06.000000000 +0100
@@ -1,386 +1,329 @@
 Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr)                             Kong, D.
 Internet Draft                                                  Seo, K.
-Expires: May 2009                                              Kent, S.
-Intended Status: Informational                         BBN Technologies
-                                                          November 2008
+Expires: October 2010                                          Kent, S.
+Intended Status: BCP                                   BBN Technologies
+                                                          March 8, 2010
 
                               Template for an
         Internet Registry's Certification Practice Statement (CPS)
                         for the Resource PKI (RPKI)
-                      draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-04.txt
+                      draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-05.txt
 
 Status of this Memo
 
-   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that
-   any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is
-   aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she
-   becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of
-   BCP 79.
+   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
+   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
 
    Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
    Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
    other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
    Drafts.
 
    Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
    months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
    at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
    reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
 
    The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
    http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
 
    The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
    http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
 
-   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 31, 2009.
+   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 31, 2010.
 
 Abstract
 
    This document contains a template to be used for creating a
    Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry
    (e.g., NIR or RIR) that is part of the Resource Public Key
    Infrastructure (RPKI).
 
 Conventions used in this document
 
    The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
    "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
    document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].
 
 Table of Contents
 
-   Preface...........................................................8
-   1. Introduction...................................................9
-      1.1. Overview.................................................10
-      1.2. Document name and identification.........................11
-      1.3. PKI participants.........................................11
-         1.3.1. Certification authorities...........................11
-         1.3.2. Registration authorities............................11
-         1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................12
-         1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................12
-         1.3.5. Other participants..................................12
-      1.4. Certificate usage........................................12
-         1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................12
-         1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................13
-      1.5. Policy administration....................................13
-         1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............13
-         1.5.2. Contact person......................................13
-         1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy...13
-         1.5.4. CPS approval procedures.............................13
-      1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................13
-   2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................15
-      2.1. Repositories.............................................15
-      2.2. Publication of certification information.................15
-      2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication.........................15
-      2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................15
-   3. Identification And Authentication.............................16
-      3.1. Naming...................................................16
-         3.1.1. Types of names......................................16
-         3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................16
-         3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............16
-         3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........16
-         3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................16
-         3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.17
-      3.2. Initial identity validation..............................17
-         3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........17
-         3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............17
-         3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............17
+   Preface...........................................................7
+   1. Introduction...................................................8
+      1.1. Overview..................................................8
+      1.2. Document name and identification..........................9
+      1.3. PKI participants..........................................9
+         1.3.1. Certification authorities............................9
+         1.3.2. Registration authorities.............................9
+         1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................10
+         1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................10
+         1.3.5. Other participants..................................10
+      1.4. Certificate usage........................................10
+         1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................10
+         1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................10
+      1.5. Policy administration....................................11
+         1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............11
+         1.5.2. Contact person......................................11
+         1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy...11
+         1.5.4. CPS approval procedures.............................11
+      1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................11
+   2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................13
+      2.1. Repositories.............................................13
+      2.2. Publication of certification information.................13
+      2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication.........................13
+      2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................13
+   3. Identification And Authentication.............................15
+      3.1. Naming...................................................15
+         3.1.1. Types of names......................................15
+         3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................15
+         3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............15
+         3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........15
+         3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................15
+         3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.16
+      3.2. Initial identity validation..............................16
+         3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........16
+         3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............16
+         3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............16
          3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................17
-         3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................18
-         3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................18
+         3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................17
+         3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................17
 
-      3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....18
-         3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key18
+      3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....17
+         3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key17
          3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after
          revocation.................................................18
       3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.18
    4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............19
       4.1. Certificate Application..................................19
          4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............19
          4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............19
       4.2. Certificate application processing.......................19
          4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions
          ...........................................................19
          4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...19
          4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............20
       4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................20
          4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............20
          4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of
          certificate................................................20
+         4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
+         entities...................................................20
       4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................20
          4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........20
          4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............20
-      4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................21
+      4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................20
          4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........21
          4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......21
       4.6. Certificate renewal......................................21
          4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................21
-         4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................22
+         4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................21
          4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............22
          4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
          ...........................................................22
          4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal
          certificate................................................22
          4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....22
          4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
-         entities [OMITTED].........................................22
+         entities...................................................22
       4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................22
          4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................22
          4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...23
          4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........23
          4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
          ...........................................................23
          4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed
          certificate................................................23
          4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...24
          4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
-         entities [OMITTED].........................................24
+         entities...................................................24
+
       4.8. Certificate modification.................................24
          4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........24
          4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............24
-         4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........25
+         4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........24
          4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to
          subscriber.................................................25
          4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
          ...........................................................25
          4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...25
          4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
-         entities [OMITTED].........................................25
+         entities...................................................25
       4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................25
          4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................25
-         4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................26
+         4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................25
          4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................26
          4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................26
          4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation
          request....................................................26
          4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties.26
          4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................26
          4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................26
-         4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability
-         [OMITTED]..................................................27
-         4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED].27
-         4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available
-         [OMITTED]..................................................27
-         4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]...27
-         4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED].............27
-         4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]...............27
-         4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED].........27
-         4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]..............27
-      4.10. Certificate status services.............................27
-         4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]..............27
-         4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED].....................27
-         4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]........................27
-      4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]...........................27
-      4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED].......................27
-         4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]
-         ...........................................................27
-         4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and
-         practices [OMITTED]........................................27
-   5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls................28
-      5.1. Physical controls........................................28
-         5.1.1. Site location and construction......................28
-         5.1.2. Physical access.....................................28
-         5.1.3. Power and air conditioning..........................28
-         5.1.4. Water exposures.....................................28
-         5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection......................28
-         5.1.6. Media storage.......................................28
-         5.1.7. Waste disposal......................................28
-         5.1.8. Off-site backup.....................................28
-      5.2. Procedural controls......................................28
-         5.2.1. Trusted roles.......................................28
-         5.2.2. Number of persons required per task.................28
-         5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role.....28
-         5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties................28
-      5.3. Personnel controls.......................................28
+      4.10. Certificate status services.............................26
+   5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls................27
+      5.1. Physical controls........................................27
+         5.1.1. Site location and construction......................27
+         5.1.2. Physical access.....................................27
+         5.1.3. Power and air conditioning..........................27
+         5.1.4. Water exposures.....................................27
+         5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection......................27
+         5.1.6. Media storage.......................................27
+         5.1.7. Waste disposal......................................27
+         5.1.8. Off-site backup.....................................27
+      5.2. Procedural controls......................................27
+         5.2.1. Trusted roles.......................................27
+         5.2.2. Number of persons required per task.................27
+         5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role.....27
+         5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties................27
+      5.3. Personnel controls.......................................27
          5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
-         ...........................................................29
-         5.3.2. Background check procedures.........................29
-         5.3.3. Training requirements...............................29
-         5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements...............29
-         5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence.................29
-         5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions..................29
-         5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements.................29
-         5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel.................29
-      5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................29
-         5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................29
-         5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................29
-         5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................29
-         5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................30
-         5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................30
+         ...........................................................28
+         5.3.2. Background check procedures.........................28
+         5.3.3. Training requirements...............................28
+         5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements...............28
+         5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence.................28
+         5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions..................28
+         5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements.................28
+         5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel.................28
+      5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................28
+         5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................28
+         5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................28
+         5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................28
+         5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................29
+         5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................29
          5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external)
-         [OMITTED]..................................................30
-         5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....30
-         5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................30
-      5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................30
-         5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED].................30
-         5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]..............30
-         5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED].....................30
-         5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED].................30
-         5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED].30
-         5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external)
-         [OMITTED]..................................................30
-         5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information
-         [OMITTED]..................................................30
-      5.6. Key changeover...........................................30
-      5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............31
-         5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]31
-         5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are
-         corrupted [OMITTED]........................................31
-         5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]..31
-         5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster
-         [OMITTED]..................................................31
-      5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................31
-   6. Technical Security Controls...................................32
-      6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................32
-         6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................32
-         6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................32
-         6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........32
-         6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........32
-         6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................33
-         6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking33
-         6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)33
+         [OMITTED]..................................................29
+         5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....29
+         5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................29
+      5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................29
+      5.6. Key changeover...........................................29
+      5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............29
+      5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................29
+   6. Technical Security Controls...................................30
+      6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................30
+         6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................30
+         6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................30
+         6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........30
+         6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........30
+         6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................31
+         6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking31
+         6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)31
       6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
-      Controls......................................................33
-         6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........33
-         6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......33
-         6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................33
-         6.2.4. Private key backup..................................34
-         6.2.5. Private key archival................................34
+      Controls......................................................31
+         6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........31
+         6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......31
+         6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................31
+         6.2.4. Private key backup..................................32
+         6.2.5. Private key archival................................32
          6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic
-         module.....................................................34
-         6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module.........34
-         6.2.8. Method of activating private key....................34
-         6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key..................34
-         6.2.10. Method of destroying private key...................34
-         6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating........................34
-      6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................35
-         6.3.1. Public key archival.................................35
+         module.....................................................32
+         6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module.........32
+         6.2.8. Method of activating private key....................32
+         6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key..................32
+         6.2.10. Method of destroying private key...................32
+         6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating........................33
+      6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................33
+         6.3.1. Public key archival.................................33
          6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage
-         periods....................................................35
-      6.4. Activation data..........................................35
-         6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation.........35
-         6.4.2. Activation data protection..........................35
-         6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data....................35
-      6.5. Computer security controls...............................35
-         6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement....35
-         6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]..................36
-      6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................36
-         6.6.1. System development controls.........................36
-         6.6.2. Security management controls........................36
-         6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................36
-      6.7. Network security controls................................36
-      6.8. Time-stamping............................................36
-   7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................37
-      Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [draft-ietf-sidr-
-      res-certs-01].................................................37
-      7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]............................37
-         7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37
-         7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]....................37
-         7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]..............37
-         7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]................................37
-         7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]..........................37
-         7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]......37
-         7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED].....37
-         7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]....37
-         7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate
-         Policies extension [OMITTED]...............................37
-      7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]....................................37
-         7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37
-         7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]..............37
-      7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]...................................37
-         7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37
-         7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]...........................37
-   8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments........................38
-      8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment.................38
-      8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor......................38
-      8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity...............38
-      8.4. Topics covered by assessment.............................38
-      8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency..................38
-      8.6. Communication of results.................................38
-   9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................39
-      9.1. Fees.....................................................39
-         9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees................39
-         9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable).............39
-         9.1.3. Refund policy.......................................39
-      9.2. Financial responsibility.................................39
-         9.2.1. Insurance coverage..................................39
-         9.2.2. Other assets........................................39
-         9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities.....39
-      9.3. Confidentiality of business information..................39
-         9.3.1. Scope of confidential information...................39
+         periods....................................................33
+      6.4. Activation data..........................................33
+         6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation.........33
+         6.4.2. Activation data protection..........................33
+         6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data....................33
+      6.5. Computer security controls...............................33
+         6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement....33
+      6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................34
+         6.6.1. System development controls.........................34
+         6.6.2. Security management controls........................34
+         6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................34
+      6.7. Network security controls................................34
+      6.8. Time-stamping............................................34
+   7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................34
+   8. Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy].....34
+   8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments........................35
+      8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment.................35
+      8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor......................35
+      8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity...............35
+      8.4. Topics covered by assessment.............................35
+      8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency..................35
+      8.6. Communication of results.................................35
+   9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................36
+      9.1. Fees.....................................................36
+         9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees................36
+         9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable).............36
+         9.1.3. Refund policy.......................................36
+      9.2. Financial responsibility.................................36
+         9.2.1. Insurance coverage..................................36
+         9.2.2. Other assets........................................36
+         9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities.....36
+      9.3. Confidentiality of business information..................36
+         9.3.1. Scope of confidential information...................36
          9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
-         information................................................39
-         9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information..39
-      9.4. Privacy of personal information..........................39
-         9.4.1. Privacy plan........................................39
-         9.4.2. Information treated as private......................39
-         9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................39
-         9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......39
-         9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......39
+         information................................................36
+         9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information..36
+      9.4. Privacy of personal information..........................36
+         9.4.1. Privacy plan........................................36
+         9.4.2. Information treated as private......................36
+         9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................36
+         9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......36
+         9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......36
          9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative
-         process....................................................40
-         9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........40
-      9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............40
-      9.6. Representations and warranties...........................40
-         9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................40
-         9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........40
-         9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties........40
-         9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants
-         [OMITTED]..................................................40
-      9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................40
-      9.8. Limitations of liability.................................40
-      9.9. Indemnities..............................................40
-      9.10. Term and termination....................................40
-         9.10.1. Term...............................................40
-         9.10.2. Termination........................................40
-         9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................40
-      9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants.40
-      9.12. Amendments..............................................40
-         9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................40
-         9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................40
-         9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed
-         [OMITTED]..................................................40
-      9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................40
-      9.14. Governing law...........................................40
-      9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................40
-      9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................40
-         9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................41
-         9.16.2. Assignment.........................................41
-         9.16.3. Severability.......................................41
-         9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights).41
-         9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................41
-      9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]..............................41
-   10. Security Considerations......................................42
-   11. IANA Considerations..........................................42
-   12. Acknowledgments..............................................42
-   13. References...................................................42
-      13.1. Normative References....................................42
-      13.2. Informative References..................................43
-   Author's Addresses...............................................43
-   Intellectual Property Statement..................................44
-   Disclaimer of Validity...........................................45
-   Copyright Statement..............................................45
+         process....................................................36
+         9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........37
+      9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............37
+      9.6. Representations and warranties...........................37
+         9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................37
+         9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........37
+         9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties........37
+      9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................37
+      9.8. Limitations of liability.................................37
+      9.9. Indemnities..............................................37
+      9.10. Term and termination....................................37
+         9.10.1. Term...............................................37
+         9.10.2. Termination........................................37
+         9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................37
+
+      9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants.37
+      9.12. Amendments..............................................37
+         9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................37
+         9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................37
+      9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................37
+      9.14. Governing law...........................................37
+      9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................37
+      9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................37
+         9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................37
+         9.16.2. Assignment.........................................37
+         9.16.3. Severability.......................................37
+         9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights).38
+         9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................38
+   10. Security Considerations......................................39
+   11. IANA Considerations..........................................39
+   12. Acknowledgments..............................................39
+   13. References...................................................39
+      13.1. Normative References....................................39
+      13.2. Informative References..................................40
+   Author's Addresses...............................................40
+   Pre-5378 Material Disclaimer.....................................41
+   Copyright Statement..............................................41
 
 Preface
 
    This document contains a template to be used for creating a
    Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry
    (e.g., an NIR or RIR) that is part of the Resource Public Key
    Infrastructure (RPKI).  The user of this document should
 
-     1. substitute a title page for page 1 saying, e.g., "<Name of
+     1. substitute a title page for page 1 saying, e.g., ''<Name of
         Registry> Certification Practice Statement for the Resource
-        Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)" with date, author, etc.
+        Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)'' with date, author, etc.
 
      2. delete this Preface
+
      3. fill in the information indicated below by <text in angle
         brackets>
 
      4. delete sections 10, 11, 12, 13.1, Acknowledgments, Author's
         Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of
         Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a
         reference section with just the references in 13.2
 
      5. update the table of contents to reflect the deletions and
         additions above.
@@ -381,654 +324,649 @@
         Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of
         Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a
         reference section with just the references in 13.2
 
      5. update the table of contents to reflect the deletions and
         additions above.
 
    Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
    number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this
    CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have
-   retained section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections,
-   in order to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme
-   employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are
-   included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant
-   sections are also marked [OMITTED]. There is a note to this effect
-   in the Introduction below.  This information should be left in the
-   CPS as an explanation to the user.
+   retained the section numbering scheme employed in the RFC to
+   facilitate comparison with the outline in the RFC. [There are 4 sub-
+   sections that I haven't removed yet due to Word problems.)
 
 1. Introduction
 
    This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of <Name
    of Registry>.  It describes the practices employed by the <Name of
-   Registry> Certification Authority (CA) in the Internet IP Address
-   and Autonomous System (AS) Number PKI.   These practices are defined
-   in accordance with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP,
-   [RFCxxxx]) of this PKI.
-
-   The Resource PKI is aimed at supporting verifiable attestations
-   about resource controls, e.g., for improved routing security. The
-   goal is that each entity that allocates IP addresses or AS numbers
-   to an entity will, in parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this
-   allocation. These certificates will enable verification that the
-   holder of the associated private key has been allocated the
-   resources indicated in the certificate, and is the current, unique
-   holder of these resources. The certificates and CRLs, in conjunction
-   with ancillary digitally signed data structures, will provide
-   critical inputs for routing security mechanisms, e.g., generation of
-   route filters by ISPs.
+   Registry> Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource Public Key
+   Infrastructure (RPKI).   These practices are defined in accordance
+   with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP, [RFCxxxx]) of
+   this PKI.
 
-   The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which
-   this CPS was created is that it does not purport to identify an
-   address space holder or AS number holder via the subject name
-   contained in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each
-   certificate issued under this policy is intended to enable an entity
-   to assert in a verifiable fashion, that it is the current holder of
-   an address block or an AS number, based on the current records of
-   the entity responsible for the resources in question. Verification
-   of the assertion is based on two criteria: the ability of the entity
-   to digitally sign data producing a signature that is verifiable
-   using the public key contained in the corresponding certificate, and
-   validation of that certificate in the context of this PKI. This PKI
-   is designed exclusively for use in support of validation of claims
-   related to address space and AS number holdings, with emphasis on
-   support of routing security mechanisms. Use of the certificates and
-   CRLs managed under this PKI for any other purpose is a violation of
-   this PKI's CP, and relying parties should reject such uses.
+   The RPKI is designed to support validation of claims by current
+   holders of Internet Number Resources (INRs, see definition in 1.7)
+   in accordance with the records of the organizations that act as CAs
+   in this PKI. The ability to verify such claims is essential to
+   ensuring the unique, unambiguous distribution of these resources
 
-   Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
-   number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this
-   CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have
-   retained section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections,
-   in order to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme
-   employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are
-   included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant
-   sections are also marked [OMITTED].
+   This PKI parallels the existing INR distribution hierarchy. These
+   resources are distributed by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
+   (IANA) to the Regional Internet Registries. In some regions,
+   National Internet Registries (NIRs) form a tier of the hierarchy
+   below the RIRs for internet number resource (INR) distribution. ISPs
+   and network subscribers form additional tiers below registries.
 
 1.1. Overview
 
    This CPS describes:
 
      . Participants
 
-     . Distribution of the certificates and CRLs
+     . Publication of the certificates and CRLs
 
      . How certificates are issued, managed, and revoked
 
      . Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.)
 
      . Key management
 
      . Audit procedures
 
      . Business and legal issues
 
-   The PKI encompasses several types of certificates:
+   This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see IETF
+   document draft-ietf-sidr-arch-xx [ARCH] for more details):
 
-  . CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks
-     and/or AS numbers, and for each address space (AS number) holder
+  . CA certificates for each organization distributing INRs and for
+     each subscriber (INR holder)
 
-  . End entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use in verifying
-     signatures of Route Origination Authorizations (ROAs) and other
-     (non-certificate/CRL) signed objects
+  . End entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use to validate
+     digital signatures on RPKI-signed objects (see definition in 1.7).
 
   . In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in
-     support of access control for the repository system
+     support of access control for the repository system as described
+     in 2.4.
 
 1.2. Document name and identification
 
-   The name of this document is "<Name of Registry>'s Certification
+   The name of this document is ''<Name of Registry>'s Certification
    Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
-   (RPKI)".
+   (RPKI)''.
 
 1.3. PKI participants
 
-   Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or
+   Note: In a PKI, the term ''subscriber'' refers to an individual or
    organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The
    term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
    qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
    the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
-   service from an LIR/ISP.  Thus, in this PKI, the term "subscriber"
-   can refer both to LIRs/ISPs, which can be subscribers of RIRs, NIRs,
-   and other LIRs, and also to organizations that are not ISPs, but
-   which are subscribers of ISPs in the networking sense of the term.
-   Also note that, for brevity, this document always refers to
-   subscribers as organizations, even though some subscribers are
-   individuals. When necessary, the phrase "network subscriber" is used
-   to refer to an organization that receives network services from an
-   LIR/ISP.
+   service from an ISP. In such cases the term ''network subscriber''
+   will be used. Also note that, for brevity, this document always
+   refers to PKI participants as organizations or entities, even though
+   some of them are individuals.
 
 1.3.1. Certification authorities
 
-   <Name of Registry> will operate two CAs for the RPKI: one is
-   designated "offline" and the other is designated "production." The
-   offline CA is the top level CA for the <Name of Registry> portion of
-   the RPKI. It provides a secure revocation and recovery capability in
-   case the production CA is compromised or becomes unavailable. Thus
-   this CA issues certificates only to instances of the production CA
-   and the CRLs it issues are used to revoke only a certificate issued
-   to that CA. The production CA is used to issue RPKI certificates to
-   <Name of Registry> members, to which address space or AS numbers
-   have been allocated.
+   <Describe the CAs that you will operate for the RPKI.  One approach
+   is to operate two CAs: one designated ''offline'' and the other
+   designated ''production.'' The offline CA is the top level CA for the
+   <Name of Registry> portion of the RPKI. It provides a secure
+   revocation and recovery capability in case the production CA is
+   compromised or becomes unavailable. Thus the offline CA issues
+   certificates only to instances of the production CA; and the CRLs it
+   issues are used to revoke only certificates issued to the production
+   CA. The production CA is used to issue RPKI certificates to <Name of
+   Registry> members, to whom INRs have been distributed. >
 
 1.3.2. Registration authorities
 
-   There is no registration authority (RA) for either the offline or
-   the production CA operating under this CPS. The former needs no RA
-   capability because it issues certificates only to the production CA.
-   The production CA relies upon certificates issued by the <Name of
-   Registry> Business PKI (BPKI) (see Section 3.2.6) to identify
-   individuals authorized to requests certificates under the RPKI.
-   <Name of Registry> already establishes a business relationship with
-   each subscriber (<Name of Registry> member) and assumes
-   responsibility for allocating and tracking the current allocation of
-   address space and AS numbers. Since <Name of Registry> operates the
-   BPKI CA, there is no distinct RA for the RPKI.
+   <Describe how the registration authority function is handled for the
+   CA(s) that you operate.  The RPKI does not require establishment or
+   use of a separate registration authority (RA) in conjunction with
+   the CA function. The RA function will be provided by the same entity
+   operating as a CA, e.g., entities listed in Section 1.3.1. An entity
+   acting as a CA in this PKI already has a formal relationship with
+   each organization to which it distributes INRs. These organizations
+   already perform the RA function implicitly since they already assume
+   responsibility for distributing INRs.>
 
 1.3.3. Subscribers
 
-   Two types of organizations receive allocations of IP addresses and
-   AS numbers from this CA and thus are subscribers in the PKI sense:
-   network subscribers and Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
-   <Additionally, this CA issues certificates to <Local/National>
-   Registries (choose the right term for this RIR, if either applies)
-   who, in turn, issue certificates to network subscribers or
-   LIRs/ISPs.>
+   Two types of organizations receive distributions of INRs from this
+   CA and thus are subscribers in the PKI sense: network subscribers
+   and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). <Additionally, this CA issues
+   certificates to <National> Registries, who, in turn, issue
+   certificates to network subscribers or ISPs.>
 
 1.3.4. Relying parties
 
-   Entities that need to validate claims of address space and/or AS
-   number current holdings are relying parties.  Thus, for example,
-   entities that make use of address and AS number allocation
-   certificates in support of improved routing security are relying
-   parties. Registries are relying parties because they transfer
-   resources between one another and thus will need to verify (cross)
-   certificates issued in conjunction with such transfers.  This
-   includes LIRs/ISPs, multi-homed organizations exchanging BGP [BGP4]
-   traffic with LIRs/ISPs, and subscribers who have received an
-   allocation of address space from one ISP or from a registry, but
-   want to authorize an (or another) LIR/ISP to originate routes to
-   this space.
-
-   To the extent that repositories make use of certificates for access
-   control - checking for authorization to upload certificate, CRL, and
-   ROA update packages -- they too act as relying parties.
+   Entities or individuals that act in reliance on certificates or
+   RPKI-signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties.
+   Relying parties may or may not be subscribers within this PKI. (See
+   section 1.7 for the definition of an RPKI-signed object.)
 
 1.3.5. Other participants
 
    <Name of Registry> will operate a repository that holds
-   certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI signed objects, e.g., ROAs.
+   certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI-signed objects.
 
 1.4. Certificate usage
 
 1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses
 
    The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization
-   in support of validation of claims of current holdings of address
-   space and/or AS numbers, e.g., for routing security. With regard to
-   routing security, an initial goal of this PKI is to allow the holder
-   of a set of address blocks to be able to declare, in a secure
-   fashion, the AS number of each entity that is authorized to
-   originate a route to these addresses, including the context of ISP
-   proxy aggregation. Additional uses of the PKI, consistent with the
-   basic goal cited above, are also permitted under this policy.
+   in support of validation of claims of current holdings of INRs.
 
-   Some of the certificates that may be issued under this hierarchy
-   could be used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g.,
-   access control for the repository system. Such uses also are
-   permitted under this policy.
+   Additional uses of the certificates, consistent with the basic goal
+   cited above, are also permitted under the RPKI certificate policy.
+
+   Some of the certificates that may be issued under this PKI could be
+   used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., access
+   control for the repository system as described in 2.4. Such uses
+   also are permitted under the RPKI certificate policy.
 
 1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses
 
    Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited.
 
 1.5. Policy administration
 
 1.5.1. Organization administering the document
 
-   This CPS is administered by <Name of Registry>
+   This CPS is administered by <Name of Registry>.
 
 1.5.2. Contact person
 
    <Insert Registry contact info here>
 
 1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy
 
    Not applicable.  Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
-   is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS
-   numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the
-   public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the
-   same organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence
-   they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding.
+   is attesting to the distribution of INRs to the holder of the
+   private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The
+   issuing organizations are the same organizations as the ones that
+   perform the distribution hence they are authoritative with respect
+   to the accuracy of this binding.
 
 1.5.4. CPS approval procedures
 
    Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
-   is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS
-   numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the
-   public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the
-   same organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence
-   they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding.
+   is attesting to the distribution of INRs to the holder of the
+   private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The
+   issuing organizations are the same organizations as the ones that
+   perform the distribution hence they are authoritative with respect
+   to the accuracy of this binding.
 
 1.6. Definitions and acronyms
 
-   BPKI - Business PKI: A BPKI is used by an RIR to identify members to
-         whom RPKI certificates can be issued.
+   BPKI - Business PKI. A BPKI is an optional additional PKI used by an
+         RIR to identify members to whom RPKI certificates can be
+         issued.
 
    CP -  Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that
          indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular
          community and/or class of applications with common security
          requirements.
 
    CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that
          specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs
          in issuing certificates.
 
-   ISP - Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing
-         and selling Internet services to other organizations.
+   Distribution of INRs -                             - A process of distribution of the INRs along
+         the respective number hierarchy. IANA distributes blocks of IP
+         addresses and Autonomous System Numbers to the five Regional
+         Internet Registries (RIRs). RIRs distribute smaller address
+         blocks and Autonomous System Numbers to organizations within
+         their service regions, who in turn distribute IP addresses to
+         their customers.
 
-   LIR - Local Internet Registry. This is an organization, typically a
-        network service provider, that sub-allocates the assignment of
-        IP addresses for a portion of the area covered by a Regional
-        (or National) Registry.
+   IANA -   Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. IANA is responsible
+         for global coordination of the Internet Protocol addressing
+         systems and Autonomous System (AS) numbers used for routing
+         internet traffic. IANA distributes INRs to Regional Internet
+         Registries (RIRs).
 
-   NIR - National Internet Registry. An NIR is an organization that
-         manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a
-         portion of the geopolitical area covered by a Regional
-         Registry. These form an optional second tier in the tree
-         scheme used to manage IP address and AS number allocation.
+   INRs - Internet Number Resources. INRs are number values for three
+         protocol parameter sets, namely:
+
+        . IP Version 4 addresses,
+
+        . IP version 6 addresses, and
+
+        . Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing, currently
+          Border Gateway Protocol-4 Autonomous System numbers.
+
+   ISP -            - Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing
+         and selling Internet services to other organizations.
+
+   NIR -            - National Internet Registry. An NIR is an organization that
+         manages the distribution of INRS for a portion of the
+         geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry. NIRs form an
+         optional second tier in the tree scheme used to manage INR
+         distribution.
 
    RIR - Regional Internet Registry.  An RIR is an organization that
-         manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a
-         specified geopolitical area.  At present, there are five RIRs:
-         ARIN (North America), RIPE NCC (Europe), APNIC (Asia -
-         Pacific), LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean), and AfriNIC
-         (Africa).
+         manages the distribution of INRs for a geopolitical area.
 
-   ROA - Route Origination Authorization.  This is a digitally signed
-         object that identifies a network operator, identified by an
-         AS, that is authorized to originate routes to a specified set
-         of address blocks.
+   RPKI-signed object -                           - An RPKI-signed object is a digitally signed
+         data object (other than a certificate or CRL) declared to be
+         such by a standards track RFC, and that can be validated using
+         certificates issued under this PKI. The content and format of
+         these data constructs depend on the context in which
+         validation of claims of current holdings of INRs takes place.
+         Examples of these objects are repository manifests and CRLs.
 
 2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities
 
 2.1. Repositories
 
-   As per the CP, certificates and CRLs, will be made available for
-   downloading by all network operators, to enable them to validate
-   this data for use in support of routing security.
+   As per the CP, certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects MUST be
+   made available for downloading by all relying parties to enable them
+   to validate this data.
 
    The <Name of Registry> RPKI CA will publish certificates, CRLs, and
-   other signed objects accessible via RSYNC at rpki.<Name of
-   Registry>.net.
+   RPKI-signed objects via a repository that is accessible via RSYNC at
+   rpki.<Name of Registry>.net.
 
 2.2. Publication of certification information
 
-   <Name of Registry> will upload certificates and CRLs issued by it to
-   a local repository system that operates as part of a world-wide
-   distributed system of repositories.
+   <Name of Registry> MUST publish certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed
+   objects issued by it to a local repository system that it operates
+   as part of a world-wide distributed system of repositories.
 
 2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication
 
    <Describe here your procedures for publication (via the repository)
-   of the certificates and CRLs that you issue. If you choose to
-   outsource publication of PKI data, you still need to provide this
-   information for relying parties.>
+   of the certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects that you issue. If
+   you choose to outsource publication of PKI data, you still need to
+   provide this information for relying parties. This should include
+   the period of time within which a certificate will be published
+   after he CA issues the certificate and the period of time within
+   which a CA will publish a CRL with an entry for a revoked
+   certificate after it revokes that certificate. >
 
-   As per the CP, the following standards exist for publication times
+   As per the CP, the following standard exists for publication times
    and frequency:
 
-   A certificate will be published within 24 hours after issuance.
-
-   The <Name of Registry> RPKI CA will publish its CRL prior to the
+   The <Name of Registry> RPKI CA MUST publish its CRL prior to the
    nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by
-   the CA. Within 24 hours of effecting revocation, the CA will publish
-   a CRL with an entry for the revoked certificate.
+   the CA.
 
 2.4. Access controls on repositories
 
    Access to the repository system, for modification of entries, must
    be controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data
-   (certificates, CRLs and ROAs) uploaded to a repository are digitally
-   signed. Updates to the repository system must be validated to ensure
-   that the data being added or replaced is authorized. This document
-   does not define the means by which updates are verified, but use of
-   the PKI itself to validate updates is anticipated.
+   (certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects) published to a
+   repository are digitally signed. RPKI items that <Name of Registry>
+   issues MUST be published to the repository that it runs by means not
+   accessible to the outside world. <If <Name of Registry> offers
+   repository services to its subscribers, then <describe here the
+   protocol(s) that you support for their publishing of signed
+   objects.>
 
 3. Identification And Authentication
 
 3.1. Naming
 
 3.1.1. Types of names
 
    The Subject of each certificate issued by this Registry is
-   identified by an X.500 Distinguished Name (DN). For certificates
-   issued to LIRs/ISPs and subscribers, the Subject will consist of a
-   single CN attribute with a value generated by the issuer. For
-   certificates issued to an NIR, the Subject will be the name of the
-   NIR.
+   identified by an X.500 Distinguished Name (DN). The distinguished
+   name will consist of a single Common Name (CN) attribute with a
+   value generated by <Name of Registry>. Optionally, the serialNumber
+   attribute may be included along with the common name (to form a
+   terminal relative distinguished name set), to distinguish among
+   successive instances of certificates associated with the same
+   entity.
 
 3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful
 
    The Subject name in each subscriber certificate will be unique
-   relative to all certificates issued by <Name of LIR/ISP> RPKI CA.
-   However, there is no guarantee that the subject name will be
-   globally unique in this PKI.
-
-   Note: The name of the holder of an address block or AS number need
-   not to be "meaningful" in the conventional, human-readable sense,
-   since certificates issued under this PKI are used for authorization
-   in support of routing security, not for identification
+   relative to all certificates issued by <Name of Registry>. However,
+   there is no guarantee that the subject name will be globally unique
+   in this PKI. Also, the name of the subscriber need not to be
+   ''meaningful'' in the conventional, human-readable sense.  The
+   certificates issued under this PKI are used for authorization in
+   support of applications that make use of attestations of Internet
+   resource holding, not for identification
 
 3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers
 
    Although Subject names in certificates issued by this registry need
-   not be meaningful, and may appear "random," anonymity is not a
+   not be meaningful, and may appear ''random,'' anonymity is not a
    function of this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature
    is provided.
 
 3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms
 
    None
 
 3.1.5. Uniqueness of names
 
    <Name of Registry> certifies Subject names that are unique among the
    certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these
    Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate
    certificate path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor
    enforced through technical means.
 
 3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks
 
    Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there
-   is no provision to recognize nor authenticate trademarks, service
+   is no provision to recognize or authenticate trademarks, service
    marks, etc.
 
 3.2. Initial identity validation
 
 3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key
 
-   <Name of Registry> accepts certificate requests via the protocol
-   described in [up/down]. This protocol makes use of the PKCS #10
-   format, as profiled in [RFCyyyy]. This request format requires that
-   the PKCS #10 request be signed using the (RSA) private key
-   corresponding to the public key in the certificate request. This
-   mechanism provides proof of possession by the requester.
+   <Describe the method whereby each subscriber will be required to
+   demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key
+   corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to <Name
+   of Registry's> issuing the certificate. One possible approach makes
+   use of the PKCS #10 format, as profiled in [RFCyyyy]. This request
+   format requires that the PKCS #10 request be signed using the (RSA)
+   private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate
+   request. This mechanism provides proof of possession by the
+   requester.>
 
 3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity
 
    Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the
-   organizational identity of resource holders, with the exception of
-   registries. However, certificates are issued to resource holders in
-   a fashion that preserves the accuracy of allocations as represented
-   in <Name of Registry> records. Specifically, a BPKI certificate used
-   to authenticate a certificate request serves as a link to the <Name
-   of Registry> member database that maintains the resource allocation
-   records. The certificate request is matched against the database
-   record for the member in question, and an RPKI certificate is issued
-   only if the resources requested are a subset of those held by the
-   member.
+   organizational identity of subscribers, with the exception of
+   registries. However, certificates are issued to subscribers in a
+   fashion that preserves the accuracy of distributions as represented
+   in <Name of Registry> records.
+
+   <Describe the method whereby this is accomplished.  For example, a
+   BPKI certificate could be used to authenticate a certificate request
+   that serves as a link to the <Name of Registry> subscriber database
+   that maintains the INR distribution records. The certificate request
+   could be matched against the database record for the subscriber in
+   question, and an RPKI certificate would be issued only if the INRs
+   requested were a subset of those held by the subscriber.>
 
 3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity
 
    Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual
-   identity of a resource holder. However, <Name of Registry> maintains
-   contact information for each resource holder in support of
-   certificate renewal, re-key, or revocation, via the BPKI.
+   identity of a subscriber. However, <Name of Registry> maintains
+   contact information for each subscriber in support of certificate
+   renewal, re-key, or revocation.
 
-   The <Name of Registry> BPKI (see Section 3.2.6) issues certificates
-   that are used to identify individuals who represent <Name of
-   Registry> members that are address space (or AS number) holders.
+   < Describe the procedures that MUST be used to identify at least one
+   individual as a representative of each subscriber. This is done in
+   support of issuance, renewal, and revocation of the certificate
+   issued to the organization. For example, one might say ''The <Name of
+   Registry> BPKI (see Section 3.2.6) issues certificates that MUST be
+   used to identify individuals who represent <Name of Registry>
+   subscribers.'' The procedures should be commensurate with those you
+   already employ in authenticating individuals as representatives for
+   INR holders. Note that this authentication is solely for use by you
+   in dealing with the organizations to which you distribute (or sub-
+   distribute) INRs, and thus must not be relied upon outside of this
+   CA-subscriber relationship>
 
 3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information
 
    No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued
-   under this certificate policy.
+   under this certificate policy except for SIA/AIA extensions.
 
 3.2.5. Validation of authority
 
-   Only an individual to whom a BPKI certificate (see Section 3.2.6)
-   has been issued may request issuance of an RPKI certificate. Each
-   certificate issuance request is verified using the BPKI.
+   <Describe what procedures that MUST be used to verify that an
+   individual claiming to represent a subscriber, is authorized to
+   represent that subscriber in this context. For example, one could
+   say, ''Only an individual to whom a BPKI certificate (see Section
+   3.2.6) has been issued may request issuance of an RPKI certificate.
+   Each certificate issuance request is verified using the BPKI.'' The
+   procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ as a
+   registry in authenticating individuals as representatives of
+   subscribers.>
 
 3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation
 
    The RPKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
-   other PKI. However, <Name of Registry> operates a BPKI [cps-
-   business-pki] that is used to authenticate members and to enable
-   them to manage their resource allocations. The Resource PKI relies
-   on this BPKI to authenticate Subscribers who make certificate
-   requests, revocation requests, etc.
+   other PKI. <If you operate a separate, additional PKI for business
+   purposes (BPKI), then describe (or reference) how the BPKI is used
+   to authenticate subscribers and to enable them to manage their
+   resource distributions.>
 
 3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests
 
 3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key
 
-   Routine re-key is effected via a Certificate Issuance Request
-   message as described in [up/down]. This digitally signed CMS message
-   is authenticated using a BPKI certificate associated with the
-   requester.
+   <Describe the conditions under which routine re-key is required and
+   the manner by which it is requested.  Describe the procedures that
+   MUST be used to ensure that a subscriber requesting routine re-key
+   is the legitimate holder of the certificate to be re-keyed. State
+   the approach for establishing PoP of the private key corresponding
+   to the new public key. If you operate a BPKI, describe how that BPKI
+   is used to authenticate routine re-key requests.>
 
 3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation
 
-   Re-key after revocation is effected via a Certificate Issuance
-   Request message as described in [up/down]. This digitally signed CMS
-   message is authenticated using a BPKI certificate associated with
-   the requester.
+   <Describe the procedures that MUST be used to ensure that an
+   organization requesting a re-key after revocation is the legitimate
+   holder of the INRs in the certificate being re-keyed. This should
+   also include the method employed for verifying PoP of the private
+   key corresponding to the new public key. If you operate a business-
+   based PKI, describe how that BPKI is used to authenticate re-key
+   requests and refer to 3.2.6. With respect to authentication of the
+   subscriber, the procedures should be commensurate with those you
+   already employ in the maintenance of INR distribution records.>
 
 3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request
 
-   An RPKI Subscriber makes an explicit revocation request using the
-   protocol defined in [up/down]. Revocation requests in this protocol
-   are digitally signed CMS messages, and are verified using a public
-   key bound to an authorized representative via the <Name of Registry>
-   BPKI.
+   <Describe the procedures that MUST be used by an RPKI subscriber to
+   make a revocation request.  Describe the manner by which it is
+   ensured that the subscriber requesting revocation is the subject of
+   the certificate (or an authorized representative thereof) to be
+   revoked. Note that there may be different procedures for the case
+   where the legitimate subject still possesses the original private
+   key as opposed to the case when it no longer has access to that key.
+   These procedures should be commensurate with those you already
+   employ in the maintenance of subscriber records.>
 
-   When a Subscriber requests an new resource allocation, an existing
-   resource certificate issued to the subscriber is NOT revoked, so
-   long as the set of resources allocated to the Subscriber did not
-   "shrink," i.e., the new resources are a superset of the old resource
-   set. However, if a new resource allocation results in "shrinkage" of
-   the set of resources allocated to a Subscriber, this triggers an
-   implicit revocation of the old resource certificate(s) associated
-   with that Subscriber.
+   Note that if a Subscriber requests a new INR distribution, an
+   existing RPKI certificate issued to the subscriber is NOT revoked,
+   so long as the set of INRs distributed to the subscriber did not
+   ''shrink,'' i.e., the new INRs are a superset of the old INR set.
+   However, if a new INR distribution results in ''shrinkage'' of the set
+   of INRs distributed to a subscriber, this triggers an implicit
+   revocation of the old RPKI certificate(s) associated with that
+   subscriber.
 
 4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements
 
 4.1. Certificate Application
 
 4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application
 
-   The following entities may submit a certificate application to this
-   CA:
-
-     o <Insert if appropriate: "Any NIR or LIR/ISP operating in the
-        geopolitical region served by this registry">
-
-     o Any entity that holds AS numbers or address space assigned by
-        this registry
+   Any subscriber who holds INRs distributed by this registry may
+   submit a certificate application to this CA.
 
 4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities
 
-   <Name of Registry> members who are resource holders are enrolled in
-   the <Name of Registry> BPKI via the process described in
-   [operations-business-pki]. Only a member who holds a certificate
-   issued under the BPKI is eligible to make an RPKI certificate
-   request.
+   <Describe your enrollment process for issuing certificates both for
+   initial deployment of the PKI and as an ongoing process. Note that
+   most of the certificates in this PKI are issued as part of your
+   normal business practices, as an adjunct to INR distribution, and
+   thus a separate application to request a certificate may not be
+   necessary.  If so, reference should be made to where these practices
+   are documented.>
 
 4.2. Certificate application processing
 
-   <A/An Name of Registry> resource holder requests a certificate via a
-   Certificate Issuance Request message [up/down], which is
-   authenticated via the digital signature on the CMS envelope. The
-   certificate used to authenticate the message is issued under the
-   <Name of Registry> BPKI. <Name of Registry> processes the resource
-   request as described in [up/down]. The Certificate Issuance Response
-   message [up/down] either provides the certificate to the Subscriber,
-   or provides a response indicating why the request was not fulfilled.
+   <Describe the certificate request/response processing that you will
+   employ.  You should make use of existing standards for certificate
+   application processing.  Relevant standards include RFC 4210,
+   Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management
+   Protocol (CMP), RFC 2797, Certificate Management Messages over CMS,
+   and RSA Labs standards PKCS #7 and PKCS #10. >
 
 4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions
 
-   The <Name of Registry> BPKI is used to identify <A/An Name of
-   Registry> member representative applying for a certificate via a
-   certificate issuance request in the up/down protocol. See the <Name
-   of Registry> BPKI CPS for additional details [cp-business-pki].
+   <Describe your practices for identification and authentication of
+   certificate applicants.  Often, existing practices employed by you
+   to identify and authenticate organizations can be used as the basis
+   for issuance of certificates to these subscribers.  Reference can be
+   made to documentation of such existing practices.>
 
 4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications
 
-   The Certificate Issuance Response message [up/down] either provides
-   the certificate to the Subscriber, or provides a response indicating
-   why the request was not fulfilled. <Describe your practices for
-   approval or rejection of applications and refer to documentation of
-   existing business practices relevant to this process.  Note that
-   according to the CP, certificate applications will be approved based
-   on the normal business practices of the entity operating the CA,
-   based on the CA's records of address space and AS number holders.
-   Also, each CA will verify that the requester holds the corresponding
-   private key for the public key that will be bound to the certificate
-   the CA issues to the requester.>
+   <Describe your practices for approval or rejection of applications
+   and refer to documentation of existing business practices relevant
+   to this process.  Note that according to the CP, certificate
+   applications will be approved based on the normal business practices
+   of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's records of
+   subscribers. The CP also says that each CA will follow the
+   procedures specified in 3.2.1 to verify that the requester holds the
+   private key corresponding to the public key that will be bound to
+   the certificate the CA issues to the requester.>
 
 4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications
 
-   <You may declare here your expected time frame for processing
-   certificate applications.>
+   <Specify here your expected time frame for processing certificate
+   applications.>
 
 4.3. Certificate issuance
 
 4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance
 
-   A Subscriber generates a draft certificate using the PKCS #10
-   format, as profiled in [RFCyyyy]. This draft certificate is
-   encapsulated in a CMS message, signed by the requester, and
-   submitted as a Certificate Issuance Request as described in
-   [up/down]. The CA verifies the request message as described in
-   [up/down] and generates a Certificate Issuance Response message.
-   That message either contains the requested certificate, or provides
-   a response indicating why the request was not fulfilled.
+   <Describe in this section your procedures for issuance and
+   publication of a certificate.>
 
 4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate
 
-   A Subscriber is notified of the issuance of a new certificate by the
-   Certificate Issuance Response message.
+   <Name of registry> MUST notify the subscriber when the certificate
+   is published. <Describe here any other entities that will be
+   notified when a new certificate is published.>
 
 4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
-[OMITTED]
+
+   <Describe here any other entities that will be notified when a new
+   certificate is published.>
 
 4.4. Certificate acceptance
 
 4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance
 
-   When a certificate is issued, the RPKI CA will place it in the
-   repository. A subject is deemed to have accepted a certificate
-   issued by this CA unless the subject explicitly requests revocation
-   of the certificate after publication in the <Name of Registry> RPKI
-   repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3
+   When a certificate is issued, the CA MUST publish it to the
+   repository and notify the subscriber.  This will be done without
+   subscriber review and acceptance.
 
 4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA
 
-   Certificates will be published in the Repository system within 1
-   business day of being issued by this CA.
+   Certificates MUST be published in the RPKI distributed repository
+   system via publication of the certificate at <name of Registry>'s
+   repository publication. This will be done within <specify the
+   timeframe within which the certificate will be placed in the
+   repository and the subscriber will be notified>. <Describe your
+   procedures for publication of the certificate.>
 
 4.5. Key pair and certificate usage
 
    A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below.
 
 4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage
 
-   The certificates issued by this registry to resource holders are CA
+   The certificates issued by <name of registry> to subscribers are CA
    certificates. The private key associated with each of these
    certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and
-   CRLs. A subscriber will issue certificates to any organizations to
-   which it allocates resources and one or more EE certificates for use
-   in verifying signatures on ROAs signed by the subscriber. <If
-   appropriate, add "Subscribers that are NIRs issue certificates to
-   organizations to which they have allocated address space or AS
-   numbers.  Subscribers that are LIRs issue certificates to
-   organizations to which they have allocated address space.">
-   Subscribers also will issue certificates to operators in support of
-   repository access control.
+   CRLs. A subscriber may in turn issue certificates to any
+   organizations to which it distributes INRs and may issue one or more
+   EE certificates for use in verifying signatures on RPKI-signed
+   objects signed by the subscriber. Subscribers also will issue
+   certificates to operators in support of repository access control.
 
 4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage
 
-   The primary relying parties in this PKI are LIRs/ISPs, who will use
-   RPKI EE certificates to verify ROAs and other signed objects, e.g.,
-   in support of generating route filters.
+   The primary relying parties in this PKI are organizations who will
+   use RPKI EE certificates to verify RPKI-signed objects. Repositories
+   will use operator certificates to verify the authorization of
+   entities to engage in repository maintenance activities, and thus
+   repositories represent a secondary type of relying party.
 
 4.6. Certificate renewal
 
 4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal
 
-   As per the CP, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on
+   As per the CP, a certificate MUST be processed for renewal based on
    its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate
    Subject. The request may be implicit, a side effect of renewing its
    resource holding agreement, or may be explicit. If <Name of
    Registry> initiates the renewal process based on the certificate
-   expiration date, then <Name of Registry> will notify the resource
-   holder <insert the period of advance warning, e.g., "2 weeks in
-   advance of the expiration date", or the general policy, e.g., "in
-   conjunction with notification of service expiration".>  The validity
-   interval of the new (renewed) certificate will overlap that of the
-   previous certificate by <insert length of overlap period, e.g., 1
-   week>, to ensure uninterrupted coverage.
+   expiration date, then <Name of Registry> will notify the subscriber
+   <insert the period of advance warning, e.g., ''2 weeks in advance of
+   the expiration date'', or the general policy, e.g., ''in conjunction
+   with notification of service expiration''.>  The validity interval of
+   the new (renewed) certificate will overlap that of the previous
+   certificate by <insert length of overlap period, e.g., 1 week>, to
+   ensure uninterrupted coverage.
 
    Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the
    previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
    compromised.  If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
    Section 4.7 will apply.
 
 4.6.2. Who may request renewal
 
-   The certificate holder or <Name of Registry> may initiate the
-   renewal process. For the case of the certificate holder, only an
-   individual to whom a BPKI certificate (see Section 3.2.6) has been
-   issued may request renewal of an RPKI certificate. Each certificate
-   issuance request is verified using the BPKI.
+   The subscriber or <Name of Registry> may initiate the renewal
+   process. <For the case of the subscriber, describe the procedures
+   that will be used to ensure that the requester is the legitimate
+   holder of the INRs in the certificate being renewed. This should
+   also include the method employed for verifying PoP of the private
+   key corresponding to the public key in the certificate being renewed
+   or the new public key if the public key is being changed.  With
+   respect to authentication of the subscriber, the procedures should
+   be commensurate with those you already employ in the maintenance of
+   INR distribution records. If you operate a BPKI for this, describe
+   how that business-based PKI is used to authenticate re-newal
+   requests and refer to 3.2.6.>
 
 4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests
 
-   A Subscriber requests certificate renewal by sending a Certificate
-   Issuance Request message [up/down].
+   <Describe your procedures for handling certificate renewal requests.
+   This must include verification that the requester is the subscriber
+   or is authorized by the subscriber and that the certificate in
+   question has not been revoked.>
 
 4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
 
-   A Subscriber is notified of the issuance of a new certificate via
-   the Certificate Issuance Response message, if the Subscriber
-   initiated the renewal. If <Name of Registry> initiated the renewal
-   process, the Subscriber is notified by the posting of the renewed
-   certificate in the <Name of Registry> repository. A Subscriber can
-   discover a certificate renewed by <Name of Registry> through use of
-   the List message [up/down].
+   <Name of Registry> MUST notify the subscriber when the certificate
+   is published. <Describe your procedure for notification of new
+   certificate issuance to the subscriber. This should be consistent
+   with 4.3.2.>
 
 4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate
 
-   When a renewal certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the
-   repository. A Subscriber is deemed to have accepted a certificate
-   unless the subscriber explicitly requests revocation of the
-   certificate after publication in the <Name of Registry> RPKI
-   repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3.
+   When a renewal certificate is issued, <Name of Registry> MUST
+   publish it to the repository and notify the subscriber. This will be
+   done without subscriber review and acceptance.
 
 4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA
 
-   <Name of Registry> will publish a renewal certificate in the <Name
-   of Registry> RPKI repository within 1 business day after issuance of
-   the renewed certificate.
+   <Describe your policy and procedures for publication of a renewal
+   certificate. This should be consistent with 4.4.2.>
 
 4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
-[OMITTED]
+
+   <List here any other entities (besides the subscriber) who will be
+   notified when a renewed certificate is issued.>
 
 4.7. Certificate re-key
 
 4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key
 
    As per the CP, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when
-   requested, based on:
+   required, based on:
 
   (1) knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
      private key, or
 
   (2) the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated
      key pair
 
    If a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the
    replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a
    new key, unless the subscriber requests a re-key at the same time.
@@ -1036,229 +974,191 @@
    If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
    certificate will be revoked.
 
    Section 5.6 of the Certificate Policy notes that when a CA signs a
    certificate, the signing key should have a validity period that
    exceeds the validity period of the certificate.  This places
    additional constraints on when a CA should request a re-key.
 
 4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key
 
-   The holder of the certificate may request a re-key. In addition,
-   <Name of Registry> may initiate a re-key based on a verified
-   compromise report. If the Subscriber (certificate Subject) requests
-   the rekey, authentication is effected using the <Name of Registry>
-   BPKI. <Describe how a compromise report received from other than a
-   subscriber is verified.>
+   Only the subscriber may request a re-key. In addition, <Name of
+   Registry> may initiate a re-key based on a verified compromise
+   report. <If the subscriber (certificate Subject) requests the rekey,
+   describe how authentication is effected, e.g., using the <Name of
+   Registry> BPKI. Describe how a compromise report received from other
+   than a subscriber is verified.>
 
 4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests
 
-   A Subscriber requests a re-key of a certificate by issuing a
-   Certificate Issuance Request message in which the resources are ones
-   that the Subscriber already holds, but a new public key is provided
-   in the PKCS #10 portion of the request.
+   <Describe your process for handling re-keying requests.  As per the
+   CP, this should be consistent with the process described in Section
+   4.3.  So reference can be made to that section.>
 
 4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
 
-   A Subscriber is notified of the issuance of a re-keyed certificate
-   via the Certificate Issuance Response message.
+   <Describe your policy regarding notifying the subscriber re:
+   availability of the new re-keyed certificate.  This should be
+   consistent with the notification process for any new certificate
+   issuance (see section 4.3.2).>
 
 4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate
 
-   When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the
-   repository. A subject is deemed to have accepted a certificate
-   issued by this CA unless the subject explicitly requests revocation
-   of the certificate after publication in the <Name of Registry> RPKI
-   repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3.
+   When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will publish it in the
+   repository and notify the subscriber.  This will be done without
+   subscriber review and acceptance.
 
 4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA
 
-   A re-keyed certificate will be published in the Repository system
-   within 1 business day of being issued by this CA.
+   <Describe your policy regarding publication of the new certificate.
+   This should be consistent with the publication process for any new
+   certificate (see section 4.4.2).>
 
 4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
-[OMITTED]
+
+   <List here any entities (other than the subscriber) who will be
+   notified when a re-keyed certificate is issued.>
 
 4.8. Certificate modification
 
 4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification
 
    As per the CP, modification of a certificate occurs to implement
    changes to the RFC 3779 extension values in a certificate.  A
    subscriber can request a certificate modification when this
-   information in a currently valid certificate has changed, as a
-   result of changes in the resource holdings of the subscriber. The
-   request may be implicit, a side effect of the allocation of
-   additional resources, or may be explicit.  A subscriber also may
-   request that its existing set of resources be redistributed among
-   multiple certificates. This example of certificate modification is
-   effected through issuance of new certificates, and revocation of the
-   previous certificates.
+   information in a currently valid certificate has changed as a result
+   of changes in the INR holdings of the subscriber.
 
-   If a subscriber is to be allocated address space or AS numbers in
-   addition to a current allocation, and if the subscriber does not
+   If INRs are to be distributed to a subscriber and the INRs are in
+   addition to a current distribution, and if the subscriber does not
    request that a new certificate be issued containing only these
-   resources, then this is accomplished through a certificate
-   modification. When a certificate modification is approved, a new
-   certificate is issued.  The new certificate will contain the same
-   public key and the same expiration date as the original certificate,
-   but with the incidental information corrected and/or the address
-   space and AS allocations expanded. When previously allocated address
-   space or AS numbers are to be removed from a certificate, then the
-   old certificate MUST be revoked and a new certificate (reflecting
-   the new allocation) issued.
+   additional resources, then this is accomplished through a
+   certificate modification. When a certificate modification is
+   approved, a new certificate is issued.  The new certificate will
+   contain the same public key and the same expiration date as the
+   original certificate, but with the incidental information corrected
+   and/or the INR distribution expanded. When previously distributed
+   INRs are to be removed from a certificate, then the old certificate
+   MUST be revoked and a new certificate (reflecting the new
+   distribution) issued.
 
 4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification
 
-   The certificate holder or <Name of Registry> may initiate the
-   certificate modification process. If a certificate holder requests
-   the modification, the request is authenticated using the <Name of
-   Registry> BPKI, as described in [up/down]. <Name of Registry> will
-   modify a certificate, and revoke the old certificate, if, for
-   example, a Subscriber fails to renew membership in a timely fashion.
+   The subscriber or <Name of Registry> may initiate the certificate
+   modification process. <For the case of the subscriber, state here
+   what steps will be taken to verify the identity and authorization of
+   the entity requesting the modification.>
 
 4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests
 
-   A certificate can be modified (other than for re-key) only by the
-   addition or removal or resources. A Subscriber requests certificate
-   modification by submitting a Certificate Issuance Request. If the
-   request contains values for AS and/or (IPv4 or IPv6) address
-   resource sets that the Subscriber already holds, but which are
-   different from those in the currently issued certificates, the
-   request is interpreted as a request for certificate modification.
+   <Describe your procedures for verification of the modification
+   request and procedures for the issuance of a new certificate.  These
+   should be consistent with the processes described in Sections 4.2
+   and 4.3.1.>
 
 4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to subscriber
 
-   A Subscriber is notified of the issuance of a modified certificate
-   by the publication of the certificate in the <Name of Registry> RPKI
-   repository system.
+   <Describe your procedure for notifying the subscriber about the
+   issuance of a modified certificate.  This should be consistent with
+   the notification process for any new certificate (see section
+   4.3.2).>
 
 4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
 
-   When a modified certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the
-   repository and notify the subscriber. A subject is deemed to have
-   accepted the modified certificate unless the subject explicitly
-   requests revocation of the certificate after publication in the
-   <Name of Registry> RPKI repository system, as described in Section
-   4.9.3.
+   When a modified certificate is issued, the <Name of Registry> will
+   publish in the repository and notify the subscriber. This will be
+   done without subscriber review and acceptance.
 
 4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA
 
-   A modified certificate will be published in the <Name of Registry>
-   RPKI Repository system within 1 business day of being issued by this
-   CA.
+   <Describe your procedure for publication of a modified certificate.
+   This should be consistent with the publication process for any new
+   certificate (see section 4.4.2).>
 
 4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
-[OMITTED]
+
+   <List here any entities (other than the subscriber) who will be
+   notified when a modified certificate is issued.>
 
 4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension
 
 4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation
 
    As per the CP, certificates can be revoked for several reasons.
    Either <Name of Registry> or the subject may choose to end the
    relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to
-   revoke the certificate. If one or more of the resources bound to the
+   revoke the certificate. If one or more of the INRs bound to the
    public key in the certificate are no longer associated with the
    subject, that too constitutes a basis for revocation.  A certificate
    also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key
    corresponding to the public key in the certificate.  Finally, a
-   certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by
-   that certificate.
+   certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by the
+   private key associated with that certificate.
 
 4.9.2. Who can request revocation
 
-   The certificate holder or <Name of Registry> may request a
-   revocation. A Subscriber requests certificate revocation using the
-   Certificate Revocation Request message described in [up/down].
+   The subscriber or <Name of Registry> may request a revocation. <For
+   the case of the subscriber, describe what steps will be taken to
+   verify the identity and authorization of the entity requesting the
+   revocation.>
 
 4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request
 
-   A Subscriber requests certificate revocation using the Certificate
-   Revocation Request message described in [up/down]. The Certificate
-   Revocation Response message confirms receipt of the revocation
-   request by <Name of Registry>, and indicates that <Name of Registry>
-   will include the revoked certificate in a CRL.
+   <Describe your process for handling a certificate revocation
+   request.  This should include:
+
+   o  Procedure to be used by the subscriber to request a revocation
+
+   o  Procedure for notification of the subscriber when the revocation
+   is initiated by <Name of ISP>.>
 
 4.9.4. Revocation request grace period
 
-   A Subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the
+   A subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the
    need for revocation has been identified.
 
 4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request
 
    <Describe your policy on the time period within which you will
    process a revocation request.>
 
 4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties
 
    As per the CP, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and
    checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the
    certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate.
 
 4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency
 
-   The <Name of Registry> RPKI production CA will publish CRLs
-   approximately every 24 hours. The <Name of Registry> RPKI offline CA
-   will publish CRLs on a monthly basis. Each CRL will carry a
-   nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL will be published at or
-   before that time.  <Name of Registry> will set the
-   nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the
-   next scheduled CRL will be issued.
+   <State the CRL issuance frequency for the CRLs that you publish.>
+   Each CRL will carry a nextScheduledUpdate value; and a new CRL will
+   be published at or before that time.  <Name of Registry> will set
+   the nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when
+   the next scheduled CRL will be issued.
 
 4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs
 
-   A CRL will be posted to the repository system with minimal delay
-   after generation.
-
-4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED]
-
-4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED]
-
-4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED]
-
-4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]
-
-4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED]
-
-4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]
-
-4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED]
-
-4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]
+   A CRL will be published to the repository system within <state the
+   maximum latency> after generation.
 
 4.10. Certificate status services
 
-   <Name of Registry> does not support OCSP. <Name of Registry> issues
-   CRLs.
-
-4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]
-
-4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED]
-
-4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]
-
-4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]
-
-4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED]
-
-4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]
+   <Name of Registry> does not support OCSP or SCVP. <Name of Registry>
+   issues CRLs.
 
-4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices
-[OMITTED]
-5. Facility, Management, And Operational Controls
+5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls
 
 5.1. Physical controls
 
    <As per the CP, describe the physical controls that you employ for
    certificate management. These should be commensurate to those used
-   in the management of address space and AS number allocation.>
+   in the management of INR distribution.>
 
 5.1.1. Site location and construction
 
 5.1.2. Physical access
 
 5.1.3. Power and air conditioning
 
 5.1.4. Water exposures
 
 5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection
@@ -1266,56 +1166,58 @@
 5.1.6. Media storage
 
 5.1.7. Waste disposal
 
 5.1.8. Off-site backup
 
 5.2. Procedural controls
 
    <As per the CP, describe the procedural security controls that you
    employ for certificate management.  These should be commensurate to
-   those used in the management of address space and AS number
-   allocation.>
+   those used in the management of INR distribution.>
 
 5.2.1. Trusted roles
 
 5.2.2. Number of persons required per task
 
 5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role
 
 5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties
 
 5.3. Personnel controls
 
    <As per the CP, describe the personnel security controls that you
    employ for individuals associated with certificate management. These
-   should be commensurate to those used in the management of address
-   space and AS number allocation.>
+   should be commensurate to those used in the management of INR
+   distribution.>
 
 5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
 
 5.3.2. Background check procedures
 
 5.3.3. Training requirements
 
 5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements
 
 5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence
 
 5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions
 
 5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements
 
 5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel
 
 5.4. Audit logging procedures
 
+   <As per the CP, describe in the following sections the details of
+   how you implement audit logging.>
+
 5.4.1. Types of events recorded
 
    Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the
    certification authority computing equipment.  Audit records will
    include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
    content data relating to the event.  Auditable events include:
 
    Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)
 
    Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate requests,
@@ -1328,21 +1230,21 @@
    Any attempts to change or delete audit data
 
    <List here any additional types of events that will be audited.>
 
 5.4.2. Frequency of processing log
 
    <Describe your procedures for review of audit logs.>
 
 5.4.3. Retention period for audit log
 
-   <Describe your polices for retention of audit logs.>
+   <Describe your policies for retention of audit logs.>
 
 5.4.4. Protection of audit log
 
    <Describe your policies for protection of the audit logs.>
 
 5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures
 
    <Describe your policies for backup of the audit logs.>
 
 5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]
@@ -1351,175 +1253,159 @@
 
 5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments
 
    <Describe any vulnerability assessments that you will apply (or have
    already applied) to the PKI subsystems.  This should include whether
    such assessments have taken place and any procedures or plans to
    perform or repeat/reassess vulnerabilities in the future.>
 
 5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]
 
-5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED]
-
-5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]
-
-5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED]
-
-5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED]
-
-5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED]
-
-5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) [OMITTED]
-
-5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information [OMITTED]
-
 5.6. Key changeover
 
    The <Name of Registry> CA certificate will contain a validity period
-   that encompasses that of all certificates verifiable using this CA
-   certificate.  To support this, <Name of Registry> will create a new
-   signature key pair, and acquire and publish a new certificate
-   containing the public key of the pair, <specify here the minimum
-   amount of lead time, e.g.,  "a minimum of 6 months"> in advance of
-   the scheduled change of the current signature key pair.
+   that is at least as long as that of any certificate being issued
+   under that certificate.  When <Name of Registry> CA wishes to change
+   keys, <Name of Registry> will create a new signature key pair, and
+   acquire and publish a new certificate containing the public key of
+   the pair, <specify here the minimum amount of lead time, e.g.,  ''a
+   minimum of 6 months''> in advance of the scheduled change of the
+   current signature key pair.
 
 5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]
 
-5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]
-
-5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted
-[OMITTED]
-
-5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]
-
-5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster [OMITTED]
-
 5.8. CA or RA termination
 
-   <Describe the fallback policy for management of your CA's IP address
-   space and AS number allocations in case of its own termination.>
+   <Describe your policy for management of your CA's INR distributions
+   in case of its own termination.>
 
 6. Technical Security Controls
 
    This section describes the security controls used by <Name of
    Registry>.
 
 6.1. Key pair generation and installation
 
 6.1.1. Key pair generation
 
    <Describe the procedures that will be used to generate the CA key
-   pair, and, if applicable, key pairs for network subscribers.  In
-   most instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the
-   subscriber, i.e., the organization receiving the allocation of
-   address space or AS numbers.  However, your procedures may include
-   one for generating key pairs on behalf of your subscribers if they
-   so request. (This might be done for subscribers who do not have the
-   ability to perform key generation in a secure fashion or who want a
-   registry to provide backup for the subscriber private key.) Since
-   the keys used in this PKI are not for non-repudiation purposes,
-   generation of key pairs by CAs does not inherently undermine the
-   security of the PKI. >
+   pair, and, if applicable, key pairs for subscribers.  In most
+   instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the subscriber,
+   i.e., the organization receiving the distribution of INRs.  However,
+   your procedures may include one for generating key pairs on behalf
+   of your subscribers if they so request. (This might be done for
+   subscribers who do not have the ability to perform key generation in
+   a secure fashion or who want a registry to provide backup for the
+   subscriber private key.) Since the keys used in this PKI are not for
+   non-repudiation purposes, generation of key pairs by CAs does not
+   inherently undermine the security of the PKI.>
 
 6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber
 
    <If the procedures in 6.1.1 include providing key pair generation
    services for subscribers, describe the means by which private keys
    are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion. Otherwise say this
    is not applicable.>
 
 6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer
 
-   Subscribers deliver public keys to the <Name of Registry> RPKI CA by
-   use of the up/down protocol as described in [up/down].
+   <Describe the procedures that will be used to deliver a subscriber's
+   public keys to the <Name of Registry> RPKI CA.  These procedures
+   should ensure that the public key has not been altered during
+   transit and that the subscriber possesses the private key
+   corresponding to the transferred public key. >
 
 6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties
 
-   CA public keys for all entities other than RIRs are contained in
-   certificates issued by other CAs. These certificates plus
-   certificates used to represent inter-RIR transfers of address space
-   or AS numbers will be published via a repository system. Relying
-   parties will download these certificates from this system. Public
-   key values and associated data for the trust anchors (RIRs) will be
-   distributed out of band, e.g., embedded in path validation software
-   that will be made available to the Internet community.
+   CA public keys for all entities (other than trust anchors) are
+   contained in certificates issued by other CAs and MUST be published
+   to the RPKI repository system. Relying parties MUST download these
+   certificates from this system. Public key values and associated data
+   for (putative) trust anchors MUST be distributed out of band and
+   accepted by relying parties on the basis of locally-defined
+   criteria, e.g., embedded in path validation software that will be
+   made available to the Internet community.
 
 6.1.5. Key sizes
 
-   For the <Name of Registry> offline CA'sand production CA's
-   certificates, the RSA key size will be 2048 bits. For subscriber
-   certificates, the RSA keys will be <insert key size -- e.g., 2048 or
-   1024 bits. If NIR key size is larger than LIR/ISP/subscriber key
-   size, describe each independently.>
+   The key sizes used in this PKI are as specified in RFC ZZZZ
+   [RFCzzzz]. <Describe any deviations from this statement.>
 
 6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking
 
-   The RSA algorithm [RSA] is used in this PKI with the public exponent
-   (e) F4 (65,537).
+   The public key algorithms and parameters used in this PKI are as
+   specified in RFC ZZZZ [RFCzzzz]. <Describe any deviations from this
+   statement.>
 
    <If the procedures in 6.1.1 include subscriber key pair generation,
-   insert here text specifying that the subscriber is responsible for
-   performing checks on the quality of its key pair and saying that
-   <Name of Registry> is not responsible for performing such checks for
-   subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the CA for checking
-   the quality of these subscriber key pairs.>
+   EITHER insert here text specifying that the subscriber is
+   responsible for performing checks on the quality of its key pair and
+   saying that <Name of Registry> is not responsible for performing
+   such checks for subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the
+   CA for checking the quality of these subscriber key pairs.>
 
 6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)
 
-   The Key usage extension bit values will be consistent with RFC 3280.
+   The Key usage extension bit values will be consistent with RFC 5280.
    For <Name of Registry>'s CA certificates, the keyCertSign and
    cRLSign bits will be set TRUE. All other bits (including
    digitalSignature) will be set FALSE, and the extension will be
-   marked critical.
+   marked critical. <Specify whether end entity certificates (e.g.,
+   issued by the CA for its operators) will include this extension and
+   if so, the appropriate bit values as per RFC 5280.>
 
 6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
      Controls
 
 6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls
 
-   The <Name of Registry> RPKI CA employs a cryptographic module
-   evaluated under FIPS 140-2, at level 3 [FIPS].
+   The <Name of Registry> CA employs a cryptographic module evaluated
+   under FIPS 140-2/3, at level 3 [FIPS].
 
 6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control
 
-   There will be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m>
-   multi-person control.
+   <If you choose to use multi-person controls to constrain access to
+   your CA's private keys, then insert the following text. ''There will
+   be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m> multi-person
+   control.''>
 
 6.2.3. Private key escrow
 
    No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI.
 
 6.2.4. Private key backup
 
    <Describe the procedures used for backing up your CA's private key.
    The following aspects should be included. (1) The copying should be
    done under the same multi-party control as is used for controlling
    the original private key.  (2) At least one copy should be kept at
    an off-site location for disaster recovery purposes.>
 
 6.2.5. Private key archival
 
    See sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4
 
 6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module
 
-   The private keys for <Name of Registry>'s offline CA and production
-   CA will be generated by the cryptographic module specified in 6.2.1.
+   The private keys for <Name of Registry>'s production CA < if
+   appropriate, change ''production CA'' to ''production and offline CAs''>
+   MUST be generated by the cryptographic module specified in 6.2.1.
    The private keys will never leave the module except in encrypted
    form for backup and/or transfer to a new module.
 
 6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module
 
-   The private keys for <Name of Registry>'s CA will be stored in the
-   cryptographic module and will be protected from unauthorized use in
-   accordance with the FIPS 140-2 requirements applicable to the
-   module. (See [FIPS])
+   The private key for <Name of Registry>'s production CA <if
+   appropriate, change ''production CA'' to ''production and offline CAs''>
+   MUST be stored in the cryptographic module and will be protected
+   from unauthorized use in accordance with the FIPS 140-2/3
+   requirements applicable to the module. (See [FIPS])
 
 6.2.8. Method of activating private key
 
    <Describe the mechanisms and data used to activate your CA's private
    key.>
 
 6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key
 
    The cryptographic module, when activated, will not be left
    unattended.  After use, it will be deactivated by <Describe the
@@ -1528,170 +1414,124 @@
 
 6.2.10. Method of destroying private key
 
    <Describe the method used for destroying your CA's private key,
    e.g., when it is superseded.  This will depend on the particular
    module.>
 
 6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating
 
    The cryptographic module used by the <Name of Registry> production
-   CA will be certified FIPS 140-2, at level 3 [FIPS].
+   CA will be certified FIPS 140-2/3, at level 3 [FIPS].
 
 6.3. Other aspects of key pair management
 
 6.3.1. Public key archival
 
    Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
    to archive public keys.
 
 6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods
 
    The <Name of Registry> CA's key pair will have a validity interval
-   of <insert number of years - Registry key pairs and certificates
+   of <insert number of years -                                   - Registry key pairs and certificates
    should have long validity intervals, e.g., 10 years, to minimize the
    disruption caused by key changeover for top tier CAs.>
 
 6.4. Activation data
 
 6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation
 
    <Describe how activation data for your CA will be generated.>
 
 6.4.2. Activation data protection
 
    Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by
    <Describe your procedures here>.
 
 6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data
 
    <Add here any details you wish to provide with regard to the
-   activation data for your CA. If there are none, say "None.">
+   activation data for your CA. If there are none, say ''None.''>
 
 6.5. Computer security controls
 
 6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement
 
    <Describe your security requirements for the computers used to
    support this PKI, e.g., requirements for authenticated logins, audit
    capabilities, etc.  These requirements should be commensurate with
-   those used for the computers used for managing allocation of IP
-   addresses and AS numbers.>
-
-6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]
+   those used for the computers used for managing distribution of
+   INRs.>
 
 6.6. Life cycle technical controls
 
 6.6.1. System development controls
 
    <Describe any system development controls that you will apply to the
    PKI systems, e.g., use of Trusted System Development Methodology
    (TSDM) Level 2.>
 
 6.6.2. Security management controls
 
    <Describe the security management controls that will be used for the
-   software and equipment employed by the CA.  These security measures
-   should be commensurate with those used for the systems used by the
-   CAs for managing and allocating RPKI resources.>
+   RPKI software and equipment employed by the CA.  These security
+   measures should be commensurate with those used for the systems used
+   by the CAs for managing and distributing INRs.>
 
 6.6.3. Life cycle security controls
 
-   <Describe how the equipment (hardware and software) used for PKI
+   <Describe how the equipment (hardware and software) used for RPKI
    functions will be procured, installed, maintained, and updated.
    This should be done in a fashion commensurate with the way in which
-   equipment for the management and allocation of IP address space and
-   AS numbers is handled. >
+   equipment for the management and distribution of INRs is handled. >
 
 6.7. Network security controls
 
    <Describe the network security controls that will be used for CA
    operation.  These should be commensurate with the network security
-   controls employed for the computers used for managing allocation of
-   IP addresses and AS numbers.>
+   controls employed for the computers used for managing distribution
+   of INRs.>
 
 6.8. Time-stamping
 
-   The PKI in question does not make use of time stamping.
+   The RPKI does not make use of time stamping.
 
 7. Certificate and CRL Profiles
 
-   Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy].
-
-7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]
-
-7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]
-
-7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]
-
-7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED]
-
-7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED]
-
-7.1.2.3. Optional certificate extensions [OMITTED]
-
-7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]
-
-7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]
-
-7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]
-
-7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]
-
-7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED]
-
-7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]
-
-7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies
-extension [OMITTED]
-
-7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]
-
-7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]
-
-7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]
-
-7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED]
-
-7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED]
-
-7.2.2.3. Optional CRL extensions [OMITTED]
-
-7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]
-
-7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]
+8. Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy].
 
-7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]
-8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments
+Compliance Audit and Other Assessments
 
    <List here any audit and other assessments used to ensure the
-   security of the administration of IP addresses and AS numbers. These
-   are sufficient for the PKI systems.>
+   security of the administration of INRs. These are sufficient for the
+   RPKI systems.>
 
 8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment
 
 8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor
 
 8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity
 
 8.4. Topics covered by assessment
 
 8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency
 
 8.6. Communication of results
 9. Other Business And Legal Matters
 
    <The sections below are optional. Fill them in as appropriate for
-   your organization. Note that the manner in which you manage your
-   business and legal matters for this PKI should be commensurate with
-   the way in which you manage business and legal matters for the
-   allocation of RPKI resources.>
+   your organization. The CP says that CAs should cover 9.1 to 9.11 and
+   9.13 to 9.17 although not every CA will choose to do so. Note that
+   the manner in which you manage your business and legal matters for
+   this PKI should be commensurate with the way in which you manage
+   business and legal matters for the distribution of INRs.>
 
 9.1. Fees
 
 9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees
 
 9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable)
 
 9.1.3. Refund policy
 
 9.2. Financial responsibility
@@ -1714,36 +1554,34 @@
 
 9.4.1. Privacy plan
 
 9.4.2. Information treated as private
 
 9.4.3. Information not deemed private
 
 9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information
 
 9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information
-9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process
 
+9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process
 9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances
 
 9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable)
 
 9.6. Representations and warranties
 
 9.6.1. CA representations and warranties
 
 9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties
 
 9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties
 
-9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants [OMITTED]
-
 9.7. Disclaimers of warranties
 
 9.8. Limitations of liability
 
 9.9. Indemnities
 
 9.10. Term and termination
 
 9.10.1. Term
 
@@ -1752,40 +1590,36 @@
 9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival
 
 9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants
 
 9.12. Amendments
 
 9.12.1. Procedure for amendment
 
 9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period
 
-9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED]
-
 9.13. Dispute resolution provisions
 
 9.14. Governing law
 
 9.15. Compliance with applicable law
 
 9.16. Miscellaneous provisions
+
 9.16.1. Entire agreement
 
 9.16.2. Assignment
 
 9.16.3. Severability
-
 9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)
 
 9.16.5. Force Majeure
-
-9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]
 10. Security Considerations
 
    The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied
    in a certificate depends on several factors.  These factors can
    include the practices followed by the certification authority (CA)
    in authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy,
    procedures, and technical security controls, including the scope of
    the subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the
    private key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms
    and conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of
@@ -1804,59 +1638,54 @@
    the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and
    relying party systems.
 
 11. IANA Considerations
 
    None.
 
 12. Acknowledgments
 
    The authors would like to thank Geoff Huston for reviewing this
-   document and Matt Lepinski for his help with the formatting.
+   document, Matt Lepinski for his help with the formatting, and Ron
+   Watro for assistance with editing.
 
 13. References
 
 13.1. Normative References
 
    [RFC2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
          Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
 
-   [RFC3280]   Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W., Solo, D., "Internet
+   [RFC3280]   Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W., Solo, D., ''Internet
          X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
-         Revocation List (CRL) Profile", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
+         Revocation List (CRL) Profile,'' BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
 
-   [RFCxxxx]   Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S., "Certificate
-         Policy for the Resource PKI (RPKI)", work in progress.
+   [RFCxxxx]   Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S.,
+         ''Certificate Policy for the Resource PKI (RPKI),'' work in
+         progress.
 
-   [RFCyyyy]   Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for
-         X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", work in progress.
+   [RFCyyyy]   Huston, G., Michaelson, G., Loomans, R., ''A Profile for
+         X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates,'' work in progress.
 
-   [up/down]   Houston, G., Loomis, R., Ellacott, B.,  Austein, R., "A
-         Protocol for Provisioning Resource Certificates", work in
+   [RFCzzzz]   Huston, G., ''A Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
+         use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure,''  work in
          progress.
 
 13.2. Informative References
 
    [BGP4]   Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors),  A Border Gateway Protocol 4
          (BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995.
 
-   [cps-business-pki]   <Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for
-         this registry's business PKI -- to be filled in>
-
-   [FIPS]   Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2
-         (FIPS PUB 140-2), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic
+   [FIPS]   Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3
+         (FIPS-140-3), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic
          Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National
-         Institute of Standards and Technology, May 25, 2001.
-
-   [operations-business-pki]  <Document or pointer to document
-         describing the operations of this registry's business PKI --
-         to be filled in>
+         Institute of Standards and Technology, work in progress.
 
    [RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method for
          obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems.
          Commun. ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126.
 
 Author's Addresses
 
    Stephen Kent
    BBN Technologies
    10 Moulton Street
@@ -1876,52 +1705,38 @@
 
    Karen Seo
    BBN Technologies
    10 Moulton Street
    Cambridge MA 02138
    USA
 
    Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
    Email: kseo@bbn.com
 
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