wdiff draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-04.txt draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-05.txt

Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr) Kong, D.
Internet Draft Seo, K.
Expires: May 2009 October 2010 Kent, S.
Intended Status: Informational BCP BBN Technologies
November 2008
March 8, 2010

Template for an
Internet Registry's Certification Practice Statement (CPS)
for the Resource PKI (RPKI)
draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-04.txt
draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-05.txt

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Abstract

This document contains a template to be used for creating a
Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry
(e.g., NIR or RIR) that is part of the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI).

Conventions used in this document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].

Table of Contents

Preface...........................................................8

Preface...........................................................7
1. Introduction...................................................9 Introduction...................................................8
1.1. Overview.................................................10 Overview..................................................8
1.2. Document name and identification.........................11 identification..........................9
1.3. PKI participants.........................................11 participants..........................................9
1.3.1. Certification authorities...........................11 authorities............................9
1.3.2. Registration authorities............................11 authorities.............................9
1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................12 Subscribers.........................................10
1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................12 parties.....................................10
1.3.5. Other participants..................................12 participants..................................10
1.4. Certificate usage........................................12 usage........................................10
1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................12 uses........................10
1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................13 uses.........................10
1.5. Policy administration....................................13 administration....................................11
1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............13 document.............11
1.5.2. Contact person......................................13 person......................................11
1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy...13 policy...11
1.5.4. CPS approval procedures.............................13 procedures.............................11
1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................13 acronyms.................................11
2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................15 Responsibilities...................13
2.1. Repositories.............................................15 Repositories.............................................13
2.2. Publication of certification information.................15 information.................13
2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication.........................15 Publication.........................13
2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................15 repositories..........................13
3. Identification And Authentication.............................16 Authentication.............................15
3.1. Naming...................................................16 Naming...................................................15
3.1.1. Types of names......................................16 names......................................15
3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................16 meaningful.....................15
3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............16 subscribers............15
3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........16 forms...........15
3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................16 names.................................15
3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.17 trademarks.16
3.2. Initial identity validation..............................17 validation..............................16
3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........17 key...........16
3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............17 identity.............16
3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............17 identity...............16
3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................17
3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................18 authority.............................17
3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................18 interoperation.........................17

3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....18 requests....17
3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key18 re-key17
3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after
revocation.................................................18
3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.18
4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............19
4.1. Certificate Application..................................19
4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............19
4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............19
4.2. Certificate application processing.......................19
4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions
...........................................................19
4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...19
4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............20
4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................20
4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............20
4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of
certificate................................................20
4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities...................................................20
4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................20
4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........20
4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............20
4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................21 usage...........................20
4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........21
4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......21
4.6. Certificate renewal......................................21
4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................21
4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................22 renewal.............................21
4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............22
4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
...........................................................22
4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal
certificate................................................22
4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....22
4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities [OMITTED].........................................22
entities...................................................22
4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................22
4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................22
4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...23
4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........23
4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
...........................................................23
4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed
certificate................................................23
4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...24
4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities [OMITTED].........................................24
entities...................................................24

4.8. Certificate modification.................................24
4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........24
4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............24
4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........25 requests........24
4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to
subscriber.................................................25
4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
...........................................................25
4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...25
4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities [OMITTED].........................................25
entities...................................................25
4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................25
4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................25
4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................26 revocation..........................25
4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................26
4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................26
4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation
request....................................................26
4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties.26
4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................26
4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................26
4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability
[OMITTED]..................................................27
4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED].27
4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available
[OMITTED]..................................................27
4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]...27
4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED].............27
4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]...............27
4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED].........27
4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]..............27
4.10. Certificate status services.............................27
4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]..............27
4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED].....................27
4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]........................27
4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]...........................27
4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED].......................27
4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]
...........................................................27
4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and
practices [OMITTED]........................................27 services.............................26
5. Facility, Management, And and Operational Controls................28 Controls................27
5.1. Physical controls........................................28 controls........................................27
5.1.1. Site location and construction......................28 construction......................27
5.1.2. Physical access.....................................28 access.....................................27
5.1.3. Power and air conditioning..........................28 conditioning..........................27
5.1.4. Water exposures.....................................28 exposures.....................................27
5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection......................28 protection......................27
5.1.6. Media storage.......................................28 storage.......................................27
5.1.7. Waste disposal......................................28 disposal......................................27
5.1.8. Off-site backup.....................................28 backup.....................................27
5.2. Procedural controls......................................28 controls......................................27
5.2.1. Trusted roles.......................................28 roles.......................................27
5.2.2. Number of persons required per task.................28 task.................27
5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role.....28 role.....27
5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties................28 duties................27
5.3. Personnel controls.......................................28 controls.......................................27
5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
...........................................................29
...........................................................28
5.3.2. Background check procedures.........................29 procedures.........................28
5.3.3. Training requirements...............................29 requirements...............................28
5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements...............29 requirements...............28
5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence.................29 sequence.................28
5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions..................29 actions..................28
5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements.................29 requirements.................28
5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel.................29 personnel.................28
5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................29 procedures.................................28
5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................29 recorded............................28
5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................29 log.........................28
5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................29 log......................28
5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................30 log.............................29
5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................30 procedures.........................29
5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external)
[OMITTED]..................................................30
[OMITTED]..................................................29
5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....30 [OMITTED].....29
5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................30 assessments...........................29
5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................30
5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED].................30
5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]..............30
5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED].....................30
5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED].................30
5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED].30
5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external)
[OMITTED]..................................................30
5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information
[OMITTED]..................................................30 [OMITTED]...............................29
5.6. Key changeover...........................................30 changeover...........................................29
5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............31
5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]31
5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are
corrupted [OMITTED]........................................31
5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]..31
5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster
[OMITTED]..................................................31 [OMITTED]...............29
5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................31 termination.....................................29
6. Technical Security Controls...................................32 Controls...................................30
6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................32 installation.....................30
6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................32 generation.................................30
6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................32 subscriber..................30
6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........32 issuer...........30
6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........32 parties...........30
6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................33 sizes...........................................31
6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking33 checking31
6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)33 field)31
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
Controls......................................................33
Controls......................................................31
6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........33 controls.........31
6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......33 control.......31
6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................33 escrow..................................31
6.2.4. Private key backup..................................34 backup..................................32
6.2.5. Private key archival................................34 archival................................32
6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic
module.....................................................34
module.....................................................32
6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module.........34 module.........32
6.2.8. Method of activating private key....................34 key....................32
6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key..................34 key..................32
6.2.10. Method of destroying private key...................34 key...................32
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating........................34 Rating........................33
6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................35 management.....................33
6.3.1. Public key archival.................................35 archival.................................33
6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage
periods....................................................35
periods....................................................33
6.4. Activation data..........................................35 data..........................................33
6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation.........35 installation.........33
6.4.2. Activation data protection..........................35 protection..........................33
6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data....................35 data....................33
6.5. Computer security controls...............................35 controls...............................33
6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement....35
6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]..................36 requirement....33
6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................36 controls............................34
6.6.1. System development controls.........................36 controls.........................34
6.6.2. Security management controls........................36 controls........................34
6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................36 controls........................34
6.7. Network security controls................................36 controls................................34
6.8. Time-stamping............................................36 Time-stamping............................................34
7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................37 Profiles..................................34
8. Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [draft-ietf-sidr-
res-certs-01].................................................37
7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]............................37
7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37
7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]....................37
7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]..............37
7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]................................37
7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]..........................37
7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]......37
7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED].....37
7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]....37
7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate
Policies extension [OMITTED]...............................37
7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]....................................37
7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37
7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]..............37
7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]...................................37
7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37
7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]...........................37 [RFCyyyy].....34
8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments........................38 Assessments........................35
8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment.................38 assessment.................35
8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor......................38 assessor......................35
8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity...............38 entity...............35
8.4. Topics covered by assessment.............................38 assessment.............................35
8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency..................38 deficiency..................35
8.6. Communication of results.................................38 results.................................35
9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................39 Matters..............................36
9.1. Fees.....................................................39 Fees.....................................................36
9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees................39 fees................36
9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable).............39 applicable).............36
9.1.3. Refund policy.......................................39 policy.......................................36
9.2. Financial responsibility.................................39 responsibility.................................36
9.2.1. Insurance coverage..................................39 coverage..................................36
9.2.2. Other assets........................................39 assets........................................36
9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities.....39 end-entities.....36
9.3. Confidentiality of business information..................39 information..................36
9.3.1. Scope of confidential information...................39 information...................36
9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
information................................................39
information................................................36
9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information..39 information..36
9.4. Privacy of personal information..........................39 information..........................36
9.4.1. Privacy plan........................................39 plan........................................36
9.4.2. Information treated as private......................39 private......................36
9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................39 private......................36
9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......39 information.......36
9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......39 information.......36
9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative
process....................................................40
process....................................................36
9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........40 circumstances..........37
9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............40 applicable).............37
9.6. Representations and warranties...........................40 warranties...........................37
9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................40 warranties...................37
9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........40 warranties...........37
9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties........40
9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants
[OMITTED]..................................................40 warranties........37
9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................40 warranties................................37
9.8. Limitations of liability.................................40 liability.................................37
9.9. Indemnities..............................................40 Indemnities..............................................37
9.10. Term and termination....................................40 termination....................................37
9.10.1. Term...............................................40 Term...............................................37
9.10.2. Termination........................................40 Termination........................................37
9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................40 survival.................37

9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants.40 participants.37
9.12. Amendments..............................................40 Amendments..............................................37
9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................40 amendment............................37
9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................40
9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed
[OMITTED]..................................................40 period..................37
9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................40 provisions...........................37
9.14. Governing law...........................................40 law...........................................37
9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................40 law..........................37
9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................40 provisions................................37
9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................41 agreement...................................37
9.16.2. Assignment.........................................41 Assignment.........................................37
9.16.3. Severability.......................................41 Severability.......................................37
9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights).41 rights).38
9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................41
9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]..............................41 Majeure......................................38
10. Security Considerations......................................42 Considerations......................................39
11. IANA Considerations..........................................42 Considerations..........................................39
12. Acknowledgments..............................................42 Acknowledgments..............................................39
13. References...................................................42 References...................................................39
13.1. Normative References....................................42 References....................................39
13.2. Informative References..................................43 References..................................40
Author's Addresses...............................................43
Intellectual Property Statement..................................44
Disclaimer of Validity...........................................45 Addresses...............................................40
Pre-5378 Material Disclaimer.....................................41
Copyright Statement..............................................45 Statement..............................................41

Preface

This document contains a template to be used for creating a
Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry
(e.g., an NIR or RIR) that is part of the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI). The user of this document should

1. substitute a title page for page 1 saying, e.g., "<Name ''<Name of
Registry> Certification Practice Statement for the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)" (RPKI)'' with date, author, etc.

2. delete this Preface

3. fill in the information indicated below by <text in angle
brackets>

4. delete sections 10, 11, 12, 13.1, Acknowledgments, Author's
Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of
Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a
reference section with just the references in 13.2

5. update the table of contents to reflect the deletions and
additions above.

Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this
CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have
retained section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections,
in order to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are
included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant
sections are also marked [OMITTED]. There is a note RFC to this effect
in
facilitate comparison with the Introduction below. This information should be left outline in the
CPS as an explanation RFC. [There are 4 sub-
sections that I haven't removed yet due to the user. Word problems.)

1. Introduction

This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of <Name
of Registry>. It describes the practices employed by the <Name of
Registry> Certification Authority (CA) in the Internet IP Address
and Autonomous System (AS) Number PKI. Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI). These practices are defined in accordance
with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP, [RFCxxxx]) of
this PKI.

The Resource PKI is aimed at supporting verifiable attestations
about resource controls, e.g., for improved routing security. The
goal RPKI is that each entity that allocates IP addresses or AS numbers designed to an entity will, in parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this
allocation. These certificates will enable verification that the
holder support validation of the associated private key has been allocated the
resources indicated in the certificate, and is the current, unique
holder claims by current
holders of these resources. The certificates and CRLs, Internet Number Resources (INRs, see definition in conjunction 1.7)
in accordance with ancillary digitally signed data structures, will provide
critical inputs for routing security mechanisms, e.g., generation of
route filters by ISPs.

The most important and distinguishing aspect the records of the PKI for which
this CPS was created is organizations that it does not purport to identify an
address space holder or AS number holder via the subject name
contained act as CAs
in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each
certificate issued under this policy is intended to enable an entity PKI. The ability to assert in a verifiable fashion, that it verify such claims is essential to
ensuring the current holder of
an address block or an AS number, based on the current records unique, unambiguous distribution of
the entity responsible for the these resources in question. Verification
of the assertion is based on two criteria:

This PKI parallels the ability of existing INR distribution hierarchy. These
resources are distributed by the entity Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(IANA) to digitally sign data producing the Regional Internet Registries. In some regions,
National Internet Registries (NIRs) form a signature that is verifiable
using tier of the public key contained in hierarchy
below the corresponding certificate, RIRs for internet number resource (INR) distribution. ISPs
and
validation of that certificate in the context of this PKI. network subscribers form additional tiers below registries.

1.1. Overview

This PKI
is designed exclusively for use in support of validation of claims
related to address space and AS number holdings, with emphasis on
support of routing security mechanisms. Use of the certificates and
CRLs managed under this PKI for any other purpose is a violation of
this PKI's CP, and relying parties should reject such uses.

1.1. Overview

This CPS describes:

. Participants

. Distribution CPS describes:

. Participants

. Publication of the certificates and CRLs

. How certificates are issued, managed, and revoked

. Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.)

. Key management

. Audit procedures

. Business and legal issues

The

This PKI encompasses several types of certificates: certificates (see IETF
document draft-ietf-sidr-arch-xx [ARCH] for more details):

. CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks
and/or AS numbers, distributing INRs and for
each address space (AS number) holder subscriber (INR holder)

. End entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use in verifying to validate
digital signatures of Route Origination Authorizations (ROAs) and other
(non-certificate/CRL) signed on RPKI-signed objects (see definition in 1.7).

. In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in
support of access control for the repository system as described
in 2.4.

1.2. Document name and identification

The name of this document is "<Name ''<Name of Registry>'s Certification
Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)".
(RPKI)''.

1.3. PKI participants

Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" ''subscriber'' refers to an individual or
organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The
term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
service from an LIR/ISP. Thus, in this PKI, ISP. In such cases the term "subscriber"
can refer both to LIRs/ISPs, which can ''network subscriber''
will be subscribers of RIRs, NIRs,
and other LIRs, and also to organizations that are not ISPs, but
which are subscribers of ISPs in the networking sense of the term. used. Also note that, for brevity, this document always
refers to
subscribers PKI participants as organizations, organizations or entities, even though
some subscribers of them are individuals. When necessary, the phrase "network subscriber" is used
to refer to an organization that receives network services from an
LIR/ISP.

1.3.1. Certification authorities

<Describe the CAs that you will operate two CAs for the RPKI: one RPKI. One approach
is to operate two CAs: one designated "offline" ''offline'' and the other is
designated "production." ''production.'' The offline CA is the top level CA for the
<Name of Registry> portion of the RPKI. It provides a secure
revocation and recovery capability in case the production CA is
compromised or becomes unavailable. Thus
this the offline CA issues
certificates only to instances of the production CA CA; and the CRLs it
issues are used to revoke only a certificate certificates issued to that the production
CA. The production CA is used to issue RPKI certificates to <Name of
Registry> members, to which address space or AS numbers whom INRs have been allocated. distributed. >

1.3.2. Registration authorities

There is no

<Describe how the registration authority (RA) function is handled for either the offline or the production CA operating under this CPS.
CA(s) that you operate. The former needs no RA
capability because it issues certificates only to RPKI does not require establishment or
use of a separate registration authority (RA) in conjunction with
the production CA.
The production CA relies upon certificates issued function. The RA function will be provided by the <Name of
Registry> Business PKI (BPKI) (see same entity
operating as a CA, e.g., entities listed in Section 3.2.6) to identify
individuals authorized to requests certificates under the RPKI.
<Name of Registry> 1.3.1. An entity
acting as a CA in this PKI already establishes has a business formal relationship with
each subscriber (<Name of Registry> member) and assumes
responsibility for allocating and tracking the current allocation of
address space and AS numbers. Since <Name of Registry> operates organization to which it distributes INRs. These organizations
already perform the
BPKI CA, there is no distinct RA function implicitly since they already assume
responsibility for the RPKI. distributing INRs.>

1.3.3. Subscribers

Two types of organizations receive allocations distributions of IP addresses and
AS numbers INRs from this
CA and thus are subscribers in the PKI sense: network subscribers
and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). <Additionally, this CA issues
certificates to <Local/National>
Registries (choose the right term for this RIR, if either applies) <National> Registries, who, in turn, issue
certificates to network subscribers or
LIRs/ISPs.> ISPs.>

1.3.4. Relying parties

Entities or individuals that need to validate claims of address space and/or AS
number current holdings are relying parties. Thus, for example,
entities that make use of address and AS number allocation
certificates act in support of improved routing security reliance on certificates or
RPKI-signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties. Registries are relying
Relying parties because they transfer
resources between one another and thus will need to verify (cross)
certificates issued in conjunction with such transfers. This
includes LIRs/ISPs, multi-homed organizations exchanging BGP [BGP4]
traffic with LIRs/ISPs, and subscribers who have received an
allocation of address space from one ISP may or from a registry, but
want to authorize an (or another) LIR/ISP to originate routes to may not be subscribers within this space.

To PKI. (See
section 1.7 for the extent that repositories make use definition of certificates for access
control - checking for authorization to upload certificate, CRL, and
ROA update packages -- they too act as relying parties. an RPKI-signed object.)

1.3.5. Other participants

<Name of Registry> will operate a repository that holds
certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI signed objects, e.g., ROAs. RPKI-signed objects.

1.4. Certificate usage

1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses

The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization
in support of validation of claims of current holdings of address
space and/or AS numbers, e.g., for routing security. With regard to
routing security, an initial goal of this PKI is to allow the holder
of a set of address blocks to be able to declare, in a secure
fashion, the AS number of each entity that is authorized to
originate a route to these addresses, including the context of ISP
proxy aggregation. INRs.

Additional uses of the PKI, certificates, consistent with the basic goal
cited above, are also permitted under this the RPKI certificate policy.

Some of the certificates that may be issued under this hierarchy PKI could be
used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., access
control for the repository system. system as described in 2.4. Such uses
also are permitted under this the RPKI certificate policy.

1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses

Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited.

1.5. Policy administration

1.5.1. Organization administering the document

This CPS is administered by <Name of Registry> Registry>.

1.5.2. Contact person

1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy

Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
is attesting to the allocation distribution of resources (IP addresses, AS
numbers) INRs to the holder of the
private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The
issuing organizations are the same organizations as the ones that
perform the allocation distribution hence they are authoritative with respect
to the accuracy of this binding.

1.5.4. CPS approval procedures

1.6. Definitions and acronyms

BPKI - Business PKI: PKI. A BPKI is an optional additional PKI used by an
RIR to identify members to whom RPKI certificates can be
issued.

CP - Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that
indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular
community and/or class of applications with common security
requirements.

CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that
specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs
in issuing certificates.

Distribution of INRs - - A process of distribution of the INRs along
the respective number hierarchy. IANA distributes blocks of IP
addresses and Autonomous System Numbers to the five Regional
Internet Registries (RIRs). RIRs distribute smaller address
blocks and Autonomous System Numbers to organizations within
their service regions, who in turn distribute IP addresses to
their customers.

IANA - Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. IANA is responsible
for global coordination of the Internet Protocol addressing
systems and Autonomous System (AS) numbers used for routing
internet traffic. IANA distributes INRs to Regional Internet
Registries (RIRs).

INRs - Internet Number Resources. INRs are number values for three
protocol parameter sets, namely:

. IP Version 4 addresses,

. IP version 6 addresses, and

. Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing, currently
Border Gateway Protocol-4 Autonomous System numbers.

ISP - - Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing
and selling Internet services to other organizations.

LIR - Local Internet Registry. This is an organization, typically a
network service provider, that sub-allocates the assignment of
IP addresses for a portion of the area covered by a Regional
(or National) Registry.

NIR - - National Internet Registry. An NIR is an organization that
manages the assignment distribution of IP address and AS numbers INRS for a portion of the
geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry. These NIRs form an
optional second tier in the tree scheme used to manage IP address and AS number allocation. INR
distribution.

RIR - Regional Internet Registry. An RIR is an organization that
manages the assignment distribution of IP address and AS numbers INRs for a
specified geopolitical area. At present, there are five RIRs:
ARIN (North America), RIPE NCC (Europe), APNIC (Asia

RPKI-signed object -
Pacific), LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean), and AfriNIC
(Africa).

ROA - Route Origination Authorization. This An RPKI-signed object is a digitally signed
data object that identifies (other than a network operator, identified by an
AS, that is authorized to originate routes certificate or CRL) declared to be
such by a specified set
of address blocks.

2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities

2.1. Repositories

As per the CP, certificates standards track RFC, and CRLs, will that can be validated using
certificates issued under this PKI. The content and format of
these data constructs depend on the context in which
validation of claims of current holdings of INRs takes place.
Examples of these objects are repository manifests and CRLs.

2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities

2.1. Repositories

As per the CP, certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects MUST be
made available for downloading by all network operators, relying parties to enable them
to validate this data for use in support of routing security. data.

The <Name of Registry> RPKI CA will publish certificates, CRLs, and
other signed
RPKI-signed objects via a repository that is accessible via RSYNC at
rpki.<Name of Registry>.net.

2.2. Publication of certification information

<Name of Registry> will upload certificates MUST publish certificates, CRLs, and CRLs RPKI-signed
objects issued by it to a local repository system that it operates
as part of a world-wide distributed system of repositories.

2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication

<Describe here your procedures for publication (via the repository)
of the certificates and certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects that you issue. If
you choose to outsource publication of PKI data, you still need to
provide this information for relying parties.> parties. This should include
the period of time within which a certificate will be published
after he CA issues the certificate and the period of time within
which a CA will publish a CRL with an entry for a revoked
certificate after it revokes that certificate. >

As per the CP, the following standards exist standard exists for publication times
and frequency:

A certificate will be published within 24 hours after issuance.

The <Name of Registry> RPKI CA will MUST publish its CRL prior to the
nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by
the CA. Within 24 hours of effecting revocation, the CA will publish
a CRL with an entry for the revoked certificate.

2.4. Access controls on repositories

Access to the repository system, for modification of entries, must
be controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data
(certificates, CRLs and ROAs) uploaded RPKI-signed objects) published to a
repository are digitally signed. Updates RPKI items that <Name of Registry>
issues MUST be published to the repository system must be validated to ensure that the data being added or replaced is authorized. This document
does it runs by means not define
accessible to the means by which updates are verified, but use outside world. <If <Name of
the PKI itself Registry> offers
repository services to validate updates is anticipated. its subscribers, then <describe here the
protocol(s) that you support for their publishing of signed
objects.>

3. Identification And Authentication

3.1. Naming

3.1.1. Types of names

The Subject of each certificate issued by this Registry is
identified by an X.500 Distinguished Name (DN). For certificates
issued to LIRs/ISPs and subscribers, the Subject The distinguished
name will consist of a single CN Common Name (CN) attribute with a
value generated by <Name of Registry>. Optionally, the issuer. For
certificates issued to an NIR, the Subject will serialNumber
attribute may be included along with the common name (to form a
terminal relative distinguished name set), to distinguish among
successive instances of certificates associated with the
NIR. same
entity.

3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful

The Subject name in each subscriber certificate will be unique
relative to all certificates issued by <Name of LIR/ISP> RPKI CA. Registry>. However,
there is no guarantee that the subject name will be globally unique
in this PKI.

Note: The Also, the name of the holder of an address block or AS number subscriber need not to be "meaningful"
''meaningful'' in the conventional, human-readable sense,
since sense. The
certificates issued under this PKI are used for authorization in
support of routing security, applications that make use of attestations of Internet
resource holding, not for identification

3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers

Although Subject names in certificates issued by this registry need
not be meaningful, and may appear "random," ''random,'' anonymity is not a
function of this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature
is provided.

3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms

None

3.1.5. Uniqueness of names

<Name of Registry> certifies Subject names that are unique among the
certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these
Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate
certificate path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor
enforced through technical means.

3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks

Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there
is no provision to recognize nor or authenticate trademarks, service
marks, etc.

3.2. Initial identity validation

3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key

<Name

<Describe the method whereby each subscriber will be required to
demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of Registry> accepts certificate requests via the protocol
described private key
corresponding to the public key in [up/down]. This protocol the certificate, prior to <Name
of Registry's> issuing the certificate. One possible approach makes
use of the PKCS #10 format, as profiled in [RFCyyyy]. This request
format requires that the PKCS #10 request be signed using the (RSA)
private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate
request. This mechanism provides proof of possession by the requester.
requester.>

3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity

Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the
organizational identity of resource holders, subscribers, with the exception of
registries. However, certificates are issued to resource holders subscribers in a
fashion that preserves the accuracy of allocations distributions as represented
in <Name of Registry> records. Specifically,

<Describe the method whereby this is accomplished. For example, a
BPKI certificate could be used to authenticate a certificate request
that serves as a link to the <Name of Registry> member subscriber database
that maintains the resource allocation INR distribution records. The certificate request is
could be matched against the database record for the member subscriber in
question, and an RPKI certificate is would be issued only if the resources INRs
requested are were a subset of those held by the
member. subscriber.>

3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity

Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual
identity of a resource holder. subscriber. However, <Name of Registry> maintains
contact information for each resource holder subscriber in support of certificate
renewal, re-key, or revocation, via revocation.

< Describe the BPKI.

The procedures that MUST be used to identify at least one
individual as a representative of each subscriber. This is done in
support of issuance, renewal, and revocation of the certificate
issued to the organization. For example, one might say ''The <Name of
Registry> BPKI (see Section 3.2.6) issues certificates that are MUST be
used to identify individuals who represent <Name of Registry> members
subscribers.'' The procedures should be commensurate with those you
already employ in authenticating individuals as representatives for
INR holders. Note that are address space this authentication is solely for use by you
in dealing with the organizations to which you distribute (or AS number) holders. sub-
distribute) INRs, and thus must not be relied upon outside of this
CA-subscriber relationship>

3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information

No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued
under this certificate policy. policy except for SIA/AIA extensions.

3.2.5. Validation of authority

Only

3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation

The RPKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
other PKI. However, <Name of Registry> operates <If you operate a separate, additional PKI for business
purposes (BPKI), then describe (or reference) how the BPKI [cps-
business-pki] that is used
to authenticate members subscribers and to enable them to manage their
resource allocations. The Resource PKI relies
on this BPKI to authenticate Subscribers who make certificate
requests, revocation requests, etc. distributions.>

3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests

3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key

Routine

3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation

Re-key

3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request

An RPKI Subscriber makes an explicit revocation request using the
protocol defined in [up/down]. Revocation requests in this protocol
are digitally signed CMS messages, and are verified using a public
key bound to an authorized representative via

<Describe the <Name of Registry>
BPKI.

When a Subscriber requests an new resource allocation, procedures that MUST be used by an existing
resource certificate issued RPKI subscriber to
make a revocation request. Describe the manner by which it is
ensured that the subscriber requesting revocation is NOT revoked, so
long as the set subject of resources allocated to
the Subscriber did certificate (or an authorized representative thereof) to be
revoked. Note that there may be different procedures for the case
where the legitimate subject still possesses the original private
key as opposed to the case when it no longer has access to that key.
These procedures should be commensurate with those you already
employ in the maintenance of subscriber records.>

Note that if a Subscriber requests a new INR distribution, an
existing RPKI certificate issued to the subscriber is NOT revoked,
so long as the set of INRs distributed to the subscriber did not
"shrink,"
''shrink,'' i.e., the new resources INRs are a superset of the old resource INR set.
However, if a new resource allocation INR distribution results in "shrinkage" ''shrinkage'' of the set
of resources allocated INRs distributed to a Subscriber, subscriber, this triggers an implicit
revocation of the old resource RPKI certificate(s) associated with that Subscriber.
subscriber.

4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

4.1. Certificate Application

4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application

The following entities

Any subscriber who holds INRs distributed by this registry may
submit a certificate application to this
CA:

o <Insert if appropriate: "Any NIR or LIR/ISP operating in the
geopolitical region served by this registry">

o Any entity that holds AS numbers or address space assigned by
this registry CA.

4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities

<Name

<Describe your enrollment process for issuing certificates both for
initial deployment of Registry> members who are resource holders are enrolled in the <Name PKI and as an ongoing process. Note that
most of Registry> BPKI via the process described certificates in
[operations-business-pki]. Only this PKI are issued as part of your
normal business practices, as an adjunct to INR distribution, and
thus a member who holds separate application to request a certificate
issued under the BPKI is eligible may not be
necessary. If so, reference should be made to make an RPKI certificate
request. where these practices
are documented.>

4.2. Certificate application processing

<A/An Name of Registry> resource holder requests a certificate via a
Certificate Issuance Request message [up/down], which is
authenticated via the digital signature on

<Describe the CMS envelope. The certificate used to authenticate the message is issued under the
<Name of Registry> BPKI. <Name request/response processing that you will
employ. You should make use of Registry> processes the resource
request as described in [up/down]. The Certificate Issuance Response
message [up/down] either provides the existing standards for certificate to the Subscriber,
or provides a response indicating why the request was not fulfilled.
application processing. Relevant standards include RFC 4210,
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management
Protocol (CMP), RFC 2797, Certificate Management Messages over CMS,
and RSA Labs standards PKCS #7 and PKCS #10. >

4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions

The <Name

<Describe your practices for identification and authentication of Registry> BPKI is used
certificate applicants. Often, existing practices employed by you
to identify <A/An Name of
Registry> member representative applying and authenticate organizations can be used as the basis
for a certificate via a
certificate issuance request in the up/down protocol. See the <Name of Registry> BPKI CPS for additional details [cp-business-pki]. certificates to these subscribers. Reference can be
made to documentation of such existing practices.>

4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications

The Certificate Issuance Response message [up/down] either provides
the certificate to the Subscriber, or provides a response indicating
why the request was not fulfilled.

4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications

<You may declare

4.3. Certificate issuance

4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance

A Subscriber generates a draft certificate using the PKCS #10
format, as profiled in [RFCyyyy]. This draft certificate is
encapsulated in a CMS message, signed by the requester, and
submitted as a Certificate Issuance Request as described in
[up/down]. The CA verifies the request message as described

4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate

A Subscriber is notified

<Name of registry> MUST notify the issuance of subscriber when the certificate
is published. <Describe here any other entities that will be
notified when a new certificate by the
Certificate Issuance Response message. is published.>

4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]

4.4. Certificate acceptance

4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance

When a certificate is issued, the RPKI CA will place MUST publish it in the
repository. A subject is deemed to have accepted a certificate
issued by this CA unless the subject explicitly requests revocation
of the certificate after publication in
repository and notify the <Name of Registry> RPKI
repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3 subscriber. This will be done without
subscriber review and acceptance.

4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA

Certificates will MUST be published in the Repository RPKI distributed repository
system via publication of the certificate at <name of Registry>'s
repository publication. This will be done within 1
business day <specify the
timeframe within which the certificate will be placed in the
repository and the subscriber will be notified>. <Describe your
procedures for publication of being issued by this CA. the certificate.>

4.5. Key pair and certificate usage

A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below.

4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage

The certificates issued by this registry <name of registry> to resource holders subscribers are CA
certificates. The private key associated with each of these
certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and
CRLs. A subscriber will may in turn issue certificates to any
organizations to which it allocates resources distributes INRs and may issue one or more
EE certificates for use in verifying signatures on ROAs RPKI-signed
objects signed by the subscriber. <If
appropriate, add "Subscribers that are NIRs issue certificates to
organizations to which they have allocated address space or AS
numbers. Subscribers that are LIRs issue certificates to
organizations to which they have allocated address space."> Subscribers also will issue
certificates to operators in support of repository access control.

4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage

The primary relying parties in this PKI are LIRs/ISPs, organizations who will
use RPKI EE certificates to verify ROAs and other signed objects, e.g., RPKI-signed objects. Repositories
will use operator certificates to verify the authorization of
entities to engage in support repository maintenance activities, and thus
repositories represent a secondary type of generating route filters. relying party.

4.6. Certificate renewal

4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal

As per the CP, a certificate will MUST be processed for renewal based on
its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate
Subject. The request may be implicit, a side effect of renewing its
resource holding agreement, or may be explicit. If <Name of
Registry> initiates the renewal process based on the certificate
expiration date, then <Name of Registry> will notify the resource
holder subscriber
<insert the period of advance warning, e.g., "2 ''2 weeks in advance of
the expiration date", date'', or the general policy, e.g., "in ''in conjunction
with notification of service expiration".> expiration''.> The validity interval of
the new (renewed) certificate will overlap that of the previous
certificate by <insert length of overlap period, e.g., 1 week>, to
ensure uninterrupted coverage.

Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the
previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
compromised. If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
Section 4.7 will apply.

4.6.2. Who may request renewal

The certificate holder subscriber or <Name of Registry> may initiate the renewal
process. For <For the case of the certificate holder, only an
individual to whom a BPKI certificate (see Section 3.2.6) has been
issued may request renewal of an RPKI certificate. Each certificate
issuance request is verified using subscriber, describe the BPKI.

4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests

A Subscriber requests certificate renewal by sending a Certificate
Issuance Request message [up/down].

4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance procedures
that will be used to subscriber

A Subscriber ensure that the requester is notified of the issuance legitimate
holder of a new certificate via the Certificate Issuance Response message, if INRs in the Subscriber
initiated certificate being renewed. This should
also include the renewal. If <Name method employed for verifying PoP of Registry> initiated the renewal
process, the Subscriber is notified by the posting of private
key corresponding to the renewed
certificate public key in the <Name of Registry> repository. A Subscriber can
discover a certificate being renewed
or the new public key if the public key is being changed. With
respect to authentication of the subscriber, the procedures should
be commensurate with those you already employ in the maintenance of
INR distribution records. If you operate a BPKI for this, describe
how that business-based PKI is used to authenticate re-newal
requests and refer to 3.2.6.>

4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests

4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

<Name of Registry> through use MUST notify the subscriber when the certificate
is published. <Describe your procedure for notification of new
certificate issuance to the List message [up/down]. subscriber. This should be consistent
with 4.3.2.>

4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate

When a renewal certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the
repository. A Subscriber is deemed to have accepted a certificate
unless the subscriber explicitly requests revocation of the
certificate after publication in the <Name of Registry> RPKI MUST
publish it to the repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3. and notify the subscriber. This will be
done without subscriber review and acceptance.

4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA

<Name

<Describe your policy and procedures for publication of Registry> will publish a renewal certificate in the <Name
of Registry> RPKI repository within 1 business day after issuance of
the renewed
certificate. This should be consistent with 4.4.2.>

4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]

4.7. Certificate re-key

4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key

As per the CP, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when
requested,
required, based on:

(1) knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
private key, or

(2) the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated
key pair

If a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the
replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a
new key, unless the subscriber requests a re-key at the same time.

If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
certificate will be revoked.

Section 5.6 of the Certificate Policy notes that when a CA signs a
certificate, the signing key should have a validity period that
exceeds the validity period of the certificate. This places
additional constraints on when a CA should request a re-key.

4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key

The holder of

Only the certificate subscriber may request a re-key. In addition, <Name of
Registry> may initiate a re-key based on a verified compromise
report. If <If the Subscriber subscriber (certificate Subject) requests the rekey,
describe how authentication is effected effected, e.g., using the <Name of
Registry> BPKI. <Describe Describe how a compromise report received from other
than a subscriber is verified.>

4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests

A Subscriber requests a re-key of a certificate by issuing a
Certificate Issuance Request message in which the resources are ones
that the Subscriber already holds, but a new public key is provided
in

4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

A Subscriber is notified of

4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate

When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will place publish it in the
repository. A subject is deemed to have accepted a certificate
issued by this CA unless the subject explicitly requests revocation
of the certificate after publication in the <Name of Registry> RPKI
repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3. and notify the subscriber. This will be done without
subscriber review and acceptance.

4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA

A re-keyed certificate will

4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]

4.8. Certificate modification

4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification

As per the CP, modification of a certificate occurs to implement
changes to the RFC 3779 extension values in a certificate. A
subscriber can request a certificate modification when this
information in a currently valid certificate has changed, changed as a result
of changes in the resource INR holdings of the subscriber. The
request may

If INRs are to be implicit, distributed to a side effect of the allocation of
additional resources, or may be explicit. A subscriber also may
request that its existing set of resources be redistributed among
multiple certificates. This example of certificate modification is
effected through issuance of new certificates, and revocation of the
previous certificates.

If a subscriber is to be allocated address space or AS numbers INRs are in
addition to a current allocation, distribution, and if the subscriber does not
request that a new certificate be issued containing only these
additional resources, then this is accomplished through a
certificate modification. When a certificate modification is
approved, a new certificate is issued. The new certificate will
contain the same public key and the same expiration date as the
original certificate, but with the incidental information corrected
and/or the address
space and AS allocations INR distribution expanded. When previously allocated address
space or AS numbers distributed
INRs are to be removed from a certificate, then the old certificate
MUST be revoked and a new certificate (reflecting the new allocation)
distribution) issued.

4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification

The certificate holder subscriber or <Name of Registry> may initiate the certificate
modification process. If a certificate holder requests <For the modification, case of the request is authenticated using the <Name of
Registry> BPKI, as described in [up/down]. <Name of Registry> subscriber, state here
what steps will
modify a certificate, be taken to verify the identity and revoke authorization of
the old certificate, if, for
example, a Subscriber fails to renew membership in a timely fashion. entity requesting the modification.>

4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests

A certificate can be modified (other than

4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to subscriber

A Subscriber is notified of

<Describe your procedure for notifying the subscriber about the
issuance of a modified certificate
by the publication of certificate. This should be consistent with
the notification process for any new certificate in the <Name of Registry> RPKI
repository system. (see section
4.3.2).>

4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate

When a modified certificate is issued, the CA <Name of Registry> will place it
publish in the repository and notify the subscriber. A subject is deemed to have
accepted the modified certificate unless the subject explicitly
requests revocation of the certificate after publication in the
<Name of Registry> RPKI repository system, as described in Section
4.9.3. This will be
done without subscriber review and acceptance.

4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA

<Describe your procedure for publication of a modified certificate will certificate.
This should be published in consistent with the <Name of Registry>
RPKI Repository system within 1 business day of being issued by this
CA. publication process for any new
certificate (see section 4.4.2).>

4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]

4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension

4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation

As per the CP, certificates can be revoked for several reasons.
Either <Name of Registry> or the subject may choose to end the
relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to
revoke the certificate. If one or more of the resources INRs bound to the
public key in the certificate are no longer associated with the
subject, that too constitutes a basis for revocation. A certificate
also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate. Finally, a
certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by
that certificate.

4.9.2. the
private key associated with that certificate.

4.9.2. Who can request revocation

The certificate holder subscriber or <Name of Registry> may request a revocation. A Subscriber requests certificate revocation using <For
the
Certificate Revocation Request message described in [up/down]. case of the subscriber, describe what steps will be taken to
verify the identity and authorization of the entity requesting the
revocation.>

4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request

A Subscriber requests

<Describe your process for handling a certificate revocation using
request. This should include:

o Procedure to be used by the Certificate
Revocation Request message described in [up/down]. The Certificate
Revocation Response message confirms receipt subscriber to request a revocation

o Procedure for notification of the subscriber when the revocation
request
is initiated by <Name of Registry>, and indicates that <Name of Registry>
will include the revoked certificate in a CRL. ISP>.>

4.9.4. Revocation request grace period

A Subscriber subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the
need for revocation has been identified.

4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request

4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties

As per the CP, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and
checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the
certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate.

4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency

The <Name of Registry> RPKI production CA will publish CRLs
approximately every 24 hours. The <Name of Registry> RPKI offline CA
will publish

<State the CRL issuance frequency for the CRLs on a monthly basis. that you publish.>
Each CRL will carry a nextScheduledUpdate value value; and a new CRL will
be published at or before that time. <Name of Registry> will set
the nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when
the next scheduled CRL will be issued.

4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs

A CRL will be posted published to the repository system with minimal delay within <state the
maximum latency> after generation.

4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED]

4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED]

4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED]

4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]

4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED]

4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]

4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED]

4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]

4.10. Certificate status services

<Name of Registry> does not support OCSP. OCSP or SCVP. <Name of Registry>
issues CRLs.

4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]

4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED]

4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]

4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]

4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED]

4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]

4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices
[OMITTED]

5. Facility, Management, And and Operational Controls

5.1. Physical controls

<As per the CP, describe the physical controls that you employ for
certificate management. These should be commensurate to those used
in the management of address space and AS number allocation.> INR distribution.>

5.1.1. Site location and construction

5.1.2. Physical access

5.1.3. Power and air conditioning

5.1.4. Water exposures

5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection

5.1.6. Media storage

5.1.7. Waste disposal

5.1.8. Off-site backup

5.2. Procedural controls

<As per the CP, describe the procedural security controls that you
employ for certificate management. These should be commensurate to
those used in the management of address space and AS number
allocation.> INR distribution.>

5.2.1. Trusted roles

5.2.2. Number of persons required per task

5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role

5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties

5.3. Personnel controls

<As per the CP, describe the personnel security controls that you
employ for individuals associated with certificate management. These
should be commensurate to those used in the management of address
space and AS number allocation.> INR
distribution.>

5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements

5.3.2. Background check procedures

5.3.3. Training requirements

5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements

5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence

5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions

5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements

5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel

5.4. Audit logging procedures

5.4.1. Types of events recorded

Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the
certification authority computing equipment. Audit records will
include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
content data relating to the event. Auditable events include:

Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)

Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate requests,
certificate revocation requests, compromise notifications)

Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions

Posting of any material to a repository

Any attempts to change or delete audit data

5.4.2. Frequency of processing log

5.4.3. Retention period for audit log

5.4.4. Protection of audit log

5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures

5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]

5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED]

5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments

5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]

5.5.1. Types

5.6. Key changeover

The <Name of records archived [OMITTED]

5.5.2. Retention Registry> CA certificate will contain a validity period for archive [OMITTED]

5.5.3. Protection
that is at least as long as that of archive [OMITTED]

5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED]

5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED]

5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) [OMITTED]

5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information [OMITTED]

5.6. Key changeover

The <Name of Registry> CA any certificate will contain a validity period
that encompasses being issued
under that certificate. When <Name of all certificates verifiable using this Registry> CA
certificate. To support this, wishes to change
keys, <Name of Registry> will create a new signature key pair, and
acquire and publish a new certificate containing the public key of
the pair, <specify here the minimum amount of lead time, e.g., "a ''a
minimum of 6 months"> months''> in advance of the scheduled change of the
current signature key pair.

5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]

5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]

5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted
[OMITTED]

5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]

5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster [OMITTED]

5.8. CA or RA termination

6. Technical Security Controls

This section describes the security controls used by <Name of
Registry>.

6.1. Key pair generation and installation

6.1.1. Key pair generation

6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber

6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer

Subscribers

<Describe the procedures that will be used to deliver a subscriber's
public keys to the <Name of Registry> RPKI CA by
use of CA. These procedures
should ensure that the up/down protocol as described in [up/down]. public key has not been altered during
transit and that the subscriber possesses the private key
corresponding to the transferred public key. >

6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties

CA public keys for all entities other (other than RIRs trust anchors) are
contained in certificates issued by other CAs. These certificates plus
certificates used to represent inter-RIR transfers of address space
or AS numbers will CAs and MUST be published via a
to the RPKI repository system. Relying parties will MUST download these
certificates from this system. Public key values and associated data
for the (putative) trust anchors (RIRs) will MUST be distributed out of band, band and
accepted by relying parties on the basis of locally-defined
criteria, e.g., embedded in path validation software that will be
made available to the Internet community.

6.1.5. Key sizes

For the <Name of Registry> offline CA'sand production CA's
certificates, the RSA key size will be 2048 bits. For subscriber
certificates, the RSA keys will be <insert key size -- e.g., 2048 or
1024 bits. If NIR key size is larger than LIR/ISP/subscriber

The key
size, describe each independently.> sizes used in this PKI are as specified in RFC ZZZZ
[RFCzzzz]. <Describe any deviations from this statement.>

6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking

The RSA algorithm [RSA] is public key algorithms and parameters used in this PKI with the public exponent
(e) F4 (65,537). are as
specified in RFC ZZZZ [RFCzzzz]. <Describe any deviations from this
statement.>

<If the procedures in 6.1.1 include subscriber key pair generation,
EITHER insert here text specifying that the subscriber is
responsible for performing checks on the quality of its key pair and
saying that <Name of Registry> is not responsible for performing
such checks for subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the
CA for checking the quality of these subscriber key pairs.>

6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

The Key usage extension bit values will be consistent with RFC 3280. 5280.
For <Name of Registry>'s CA certificates, the keyCertSign and
cRLSign bits will be set TRUE. All other bits (including
digitalSignature) will be set FALSE, and the extension will be
marked critical.

6.2. Private Key Protection <Specify whether end entity certificates (e.g.,
issued by the CA for its operators) will include this extension and Cryptographic Module Engineering
Controls
if so, the appropriate bit values as per RFC 5280.>

6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
Controls

6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls

The <Name of Registry> RPKI CA employs a cryptographic module evaluated
under FIPS 140-2, 140-2/3, at level 3 [FIPS].

6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control

There

<If you choose to use multi-person controls to constrain access to
your CA's private keys, then insert the following text. ''There will
be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m> multi-person control.
control.''>

6.2.3. Private key escrow

No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI.

6.2.4. Private key backup

6.2.5. Private key archival

See sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4

6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module

The private keys for <Name of Registry>'s offline CA and production CA will < if
appropriate, change ''production CA'' to ''production and offline CAs''>
MUST be generated by the cryptographic module specified in 6.2.1.
The private keys will never leave the module except in encrypted
form for backup and/or transfer to a new module.

6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module

The private keys key for <Name of Registry>'s production CA will <if
appropriate, change ''production CA'' to ''production and offline CAs''>
MUST be stored in the cryptographic module and will be protected
from unauthorized use in accordance with the FIPS 140-2 140-2/3
requirements applicable to the module. (See [FIPS])

6.2.8. Method of activating private key

6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key

The cryptographic module, when activated, will not be left
unattended. After use, it will be deactivated by <Describe the
procedure for deactivation of your CA's private key.> The module
will be stored securely when not in use.

6.2.10. Method of destroying private key

6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating

The cryptographic module used by the <Name of Registry> production
CA will be certified FIPS 140-2, 140-2/3, at level 3 [FIPS].

6.3. Other aspects of key pair management

6.3.1. Public key archival

Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
to archive public keys.

6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods

The <Name of Registry> CA's key pair will have a validity interval
of <insert number of years - - Registry key pairs and certificates
should have long validity intervals, e.g., 10 years, to minimize the
disruption caused by key changeover for top tier CAs.>

6.4. Activation data

6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation

6.4.2. Activation data protection

Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by
<Describe your procedures here>.

6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data

6.5. Computer security controls

6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement

6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]
INRs.>

6.6. Life cycle technical controls

6.6.1. System development controls

6.6.2. Security management controls

<Describe the security management controls that will be used for the
RPKI software and equipment employed by the CA. These security
measures should be commensurate with those used for the systems used
by the CAs for managing and allocating RPKI resources.> distributing INRs.>

6.6.3. Life cycle security controls

6.7. Network security controls

6.8. Time-stamping

The PKI in question RPKI does not make use of time stamping.

7. Certificate and CRL Profiles

8. Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy].

7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]

7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.3. Optional certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]

7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]

7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]

7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]

7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED]

7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]

7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies
extension [OMITTED]

7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]

7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.3. Optional CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]

7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]
8.

Compliance Audit and Other Assessments

8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment

8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor

8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity

8.4. Topics covered by assessment

8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency

8.6. Communication of results
9. Other Business And Legal Matters

9.1. Fees

9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees

9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable)

9.1.3. Refund policy

9.2. Financial responsibility

9.2.1. Insurance coverage

9.2.2. Other assets

9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities

9.3. Confidentiality of business information

9.3.1. Scope of confidential information

9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential information

9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information

9.4. Privacy of personal information

9.4.1. Privacy plan

9.4.2. Information treated as private

9.4.3. Information not deemed private

9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information

9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information

9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process
9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances

9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable)

9.6. Representations and warranties

9.6.1. CA representations and warranties

9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties

9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties

9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants [OMITTED]

9.7. Disclaimers of warranties

9.8. Limitations of liability

9.9. Indemnities

9.10. Term and termination

9.10.1. Term

9.10.2. Termination

9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival

9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants

9.12. Amendments

9.12.1. Procedure for amendment

9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period

9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED]

9.13. Dispute resolution provisions

9.14. Governing law

9.15. Compliance with applicable law

9.16. Miscellaneous provisions

9.16.1. Entire agreement

9.16.2. Assignment

9.16.3. Severability
9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)

9.16.5. Force Majeure

9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]
10. Security Considerations

The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied
in a certificate depends on several factors. These factors can
include the practices followed by the certification authority (CA)
in authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy,
procedures, and technical security controls, including the scope of
the subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the
private key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms
and conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of
warranties, and limitations of liability). This document provides a
framework to address the technical, procedural, personnel, and
physical security aspects of Certification Authorities, Registration
Authorities, repositories, subscribers, and relying party
cryptographic modules, in order to ensure that the certificate
generation, publication, renewal, re-key, usage, and revocation is
done in a secure manner. Specifically, Section 3 Identification and
Authentication (I&A); Section 4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational
Requirements; Section 5 Facility Management, and Operational
Controls; Section 6 Technical Security Controls; Section 7
Certificate and CRL Profiles; and Section 8 Compliance Audit and
Other Assessments are oriented towards ensuring secure operation of
the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and
relying party systems.

11. IANA Considerations

None.

12. Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Geoff Huston for reviewing this
document and
document, Matt Lepinski for his help with the formatting. formatting, and Ron
Watro for assistance with editing.

13. References

13.1. Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W., Solo, D., "Internet ''Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile", Profile,'' BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFCxxxx] Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S., "Certificate
''Certificate Policy for the Resource PKI (RPKI)", (RPKI),'' work in
progress.

[RFCyyyy] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Loomans, R., ''A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", Certificates,'' work in progress.

[up/down] Houston,

[RFCzzzz] Huston, G., Loomis, R., Ellacott, B., Austein, R., "A
Protocol ''A Profile for Provisioning Algorithms and Key Sizes for
use in the Resource Certificates", Public Key Infrastructure,'' work in
progress.

13.2. Informative References

[BGP4] Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors), A Border Gateway Protocol 4
(BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995.

[cps-business-pki] <Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for
this registry's business PKI -- to be filled in>

[FIPS] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2
(FIPS PUB 140-2), 140-3
(FIPS-140-3), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National
Institute of Standards and Technology, May 25, 2001.

[operations-business-pki] <Document or pointer to document
describing the operations of this registry's business PKI --
to be filled in> work in progress.

[RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method for
obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems.
Commun. ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126.

Author's Addresses

Stephen Kent
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA
Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
Email: skent@bbn.com

Derrick Kong
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA

Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951
Email: dkong@bbn.com

Karen Seo
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA

Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
Email: kseo@bbn.com

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