Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr)                             Kong, D.
Internet Draft                                                  Seo, K.
Expires: May 2009 October 2010                                          Kent, S.
Intended Status: Informational BCP                                   BBN Technologies
                                                          November 2008
                                                          March 8, 2010

                              Template for an
        Internet Registry's Certification Practice Statement (CPS)
                        for the Resource PKI (RPKI)
                      draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-04.txt
                      draft-ietf-sidr-cps-irs-05.txt

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Abstract

   This document contains a template to be used for creating a
   Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry
   (e.g., NIR or RIR) that is part of the Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI).

Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].

Table of Contents

   Preface...........................................................8

   Preface...........................................................7
   1. Introduction...................................................9 Introduction...................................................8
      1.1. Overview.................................................10 Overview..................................................8
      1.2. Document name and identification.........................11 identification..........................9
      1.3. PKI participants.........................................11 participants..........................................9
         1.3.1. Certification authorities...........................11 authorities............................9
         1.3.2. Registration authorities............................11 authorities.............................9
         1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................12 Subscribers.........................................10
         1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................12 parties.....................................10
         1.3.5. Other participants..................................12 participants..................................10
      1.4. Certificate usage........................................12 usage........................................10
         1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................12 uses........................10
         1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................13 uses.........................10
      1.5. Policy administration....................................13 administration....................................11
         1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............13 document.............11
         1.5.2. Contact person......................................13 person......................................11
         1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy...13 policy...11
         1.5.4. CPS approval procedures.............................13 procedures.............................11
      1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................13 acronyms.................................11
   2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................15 Responsibilities...................13
      2.1. Repositories.............................................15 Repositories.............................................13
      2.2. Publication of certification information.................15 information.................13
      2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication.........................15 Publication.........................13
      2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................15 repositories..........................13
   3. Identification And Authentication.............................16 Authentication.............................15
      3.1. Naming...................................................16 Naming...................................................15
         3.1.1. Types of names......................................16 names......................................15
         3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................16 meaningful.....................15
         3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............16 subscribers............15
         3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........16 forms...........15
         3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................16 names.................................15
         3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.17 trademarks.16
      3.2. Initial identity validation..............................17 validation..............................16
         3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........17 key...........16
         3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............17 identity.............16
         3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............17 identity...............16
         3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................17
         3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................18 authority.............................17
         3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................18 interoperation.........................17

      3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....18 requests....17
         3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key18 re-key17
         3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after
         revocation.................................................18
      3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.18
   4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............19
      4.1. Certificate Application..................................19
         4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............19
         4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............19
      4.2. Certificate application processing.......................19
         4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions
         ...........................................................19
         4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...19
         4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............20
      4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................20
         4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............20
         4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of
         certificate................................................20
         4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
         entities...................................................20
      4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................20
         4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........20
         4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............20
      4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................21 usage...........................20
         4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........21
         4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......21
      4.6. Certificate renewal......................................21
         4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................21
         4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................22 renewal.............................21
         4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............22
         4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
         ...........................................................22
         4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal
         certificate................................................22
         4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....22
         4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
         entities [OMITTED].........................................22
         entities...................................................22
      4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................22
         4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................22
         4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...23
         4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........23
         4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
         ...........................................................23
         4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed
         certificate................................................23
         4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...24
         4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
         entities [OMITTED].........................................24
         entities...................................................24

      4.8. Certificate modification.................................24
         4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........24
         4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............24
         4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........25 requests........24
         4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to
         subscriber.................................................25
         4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
         ...........................................................25
         4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...25
         4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
         entities [OMITTED].........................................25
         entities...................................................25
      4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................25
         4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................25
         4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................26 revocation..........................25
         4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................26
         4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................26
         4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation
         request....................................................26
         4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties.26
         4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................26
         4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................26
         4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability
         [OMITTED]..................................................27
         4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED].27
         4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available
         [OMITTED]..................................................27
         4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]...27
         4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED].............27
         4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]...............27
         4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED].........27
         4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]..............27
      4.10. Certificate status services.............................27
         4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]..............27
         4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED].....................27
         4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]........................27
      4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]...........................27
      4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED].......................27
         4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]
         ...........................................................27
         4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and
         practices [OMITTED]........................................27 services.............................26
   5. Facility, Management, And and Operational Controls................28 Controls................27
      5.1. Physical controls........................................28 controls........................................27
         5.1.1. Site location and construction......................28 construction......................27
         5.1.2. Physical access.....................................28 access.....................................27
         5.1.3. Power and air conditioning..........................28 conditioning..........................27
         5.1.4. Water exposures.....................................28 exposures.....................................27
         5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection......................28 protection......................27
         5.1.6. Media storage.......................................28 storage.......................................27
         5.1.7. Waste disposal......................................28 disposal......................................27
         5.1.8. Off-site backup.....................................28 backup.....................................27
      5.2. Procedural controls......................................28 controls......................................27
         5.2.1. Trusted roles.......................................28 roles.......................................27
         5.2.2. Number of persons required per task.................28 task.................27
         5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role.....28 role.....27
         5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties................28 duties................27
      5.3. Personnel controls.......................................28 controls.......................................27
         5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
         ...........................................................29
         ...........................................................28
         5.3.2. Background check procedures.........................29 procedures.........................28
         5.3.3. Training requirements...............................29 requirements...............................28
         5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements...............29 requirements...............28
         5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence.................29 sequence.................28
         5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions..................29 actions..................28
         5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements.................29 requirements.................28
         5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel.................29 personnel.................28
      5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................29 procedures.................................28
         5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................29 recorded............................28
         5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................29 log.........................28
         5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................29 log......................28
         5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................30 log.............................29
         5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................30 procedures.........................29
         5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external)
         [OMITTED]..................................................30
         [OMITTED]..................................................29
         5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....30 [OMITTED].....29
         5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................30 assessments...........................29
      5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................30
         5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED].................30
         5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]..............30
         5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED].....................30
         5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED].................30
         5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED].30
         5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external)
         [OMITTED]..................................................30
         5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information
         [OMITTED]..................................................30 [OMITTED]...............................29
      5.6. Key changeover...........................................30 changeover...........................................29
      5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............31
         5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]31
         5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are
         corrupted [OMITTED]........................................31
         5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]..31
         5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster
         [OMITTED]..................................................31 [OMITTED]...............29
      5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................31 termination.....................................29
   6. Technical Security Controls...................................32 Controls...................................30
      6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................32 installation.....................30
         6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................32 generation.................................30
         6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................32 subscriber..................30
         6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........32 issuer...........30
         6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........32 parties...........30
         6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................33 sizes...........................................31
         6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking33 checking31
         6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)33 field)31
      6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
      Controls......................................................33
      Controls......................................................31
         6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........33 controls.........31
         6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......33 control.......31
         6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................33 escrow..................................31
         6.2.4. Private key backup..................................34 backup..................................32
         6.2.5. Private key archival................................34 archival................................32
         6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic
         module.....................................................34
         module.....................................................32
         6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module.........34 module.........32
         6.2.8. Method of activating private key....................34 key....................32
         6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key..................34 key..................32
         6.2.10. Method of destroying private key...................34 key...................32
         6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating........................34 Rating........................33
      6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................35 management.....................33
         6.3.1. Public key archival.................................35 archival.................................33
         6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage
         periods....................................................35
         periods....................................................33
      6.4. Activation data..........................................35 data..........................................33
         6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation.........35 installation.........33
         6.4.2. Activation data protection..........................35 protection..........................33
         6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data....................35 data....................33
      6.5. Computer security controls...............................35 controls...............................33
         6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement....35
         6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]..................36 requirement....33
      6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................36 controls............................34
         6.6.1. System development controls.........................36 controls.........................34
         6.6.2. Security management controls........................36 controls........................34
         6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................36 controls........................34
      6.7. Network security controls................................36 controls................................34
      6.8. Time-stamping............................................36 Time-stamping............................................34
   7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................37 Profiles..................................34
   8. Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [draft-ietf-sidr-
      res-certs-01].................................................37
      7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]............................37
         7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37
         7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]....................37
         7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]..............37
         7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]................................37
         7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]..........................37
         7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]......37
         7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED].....37
         7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]....37
         7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate
         Policies extension [OMITTED]...............................37
      7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]....................................37
         7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37
         7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]..............37
      7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]...................................37
         7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................37
         7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]...........................37 [RFCyyyy].....34
   8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments........................38 Assessments........................35
      8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment.................38 assessment.................35
      8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor......................38 assessor......................35
      8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity...............38 entity...............35
      8.4. Topics covered by assessment.............................38 assessment.............................35
      8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency..................38 deficiency..................35
      8.6. Communication of results.................................38 results.................................35
   9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................39 Matters..............................36
      9.1. Fees.....................................................39 Fees.....................................................36
         9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees................39 fees................36
         9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable).............39 applicable).............36
         9.1.3. Refund policy.......................................39 policy.......................................36
      9.2. Financial responsibility.................................39 responsibility.................................36
         9.2.1. Insurance coverage..................................39 coverage..................................36
         9.2.2. Other assets........................................39 assets........................................36
         9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities.....39 end-entities.....36
      9.3. Confidentiality of business information..................39 information..................36
         9.3.1. Scope of confidential information...................39 information...................36
         9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
         information................................................39
         information................................................36
         9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information..39 information..36
      9.4. Privacy of personal information..........................39 information..........................36
         9.4.1. Privacy plan........................................39 plan........................................36
         9.4.2. Information treated as private......................39 private......................36
         9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................39 private......................36
         9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......39 information.......36
         9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......39 information.......36
         9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative
         process....................................................40
         process....................................................36
         9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........40 circumstances..........37
      9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............40 applicable).............37
      9.6. Representations and warranties...........................40 warranties...........................37
         9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................40 warranties...................37
         9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........40 warranties...........37
         9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties........40
         9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants
         [OMITTED]..................................................40 warranties........37
      9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................40 warranties................................37
      9.8. Limitations of liability.................................40 liability.................................37
      9.9. Indemnities..............................................40 Indemnities..............................................37
      9.10. Term and termination....................................40 termination....................................37
         9.10.1. Term...............................................40 Term...............................................37
         9.10.2. Termination........................................40 Termination........................................37
         9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................40 survival.................37

      9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants.40 participants.37
      9.12. Amendments..............................................40 Amendments..............................................37
         9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................40 amendment............................37
         9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................40
         9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed
         [OMITTED]..................................................40 period..................37
      9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................40 provisions...........................37
      9.14. Governing law...........................................40 law...........................................37
      9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................40 law..........................37
      9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................40 provisions................................37
         9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................41 agreement...................................37
         9.16.2. Assignment.........................................41 Assignment.........................................37
         9.16.3. Severability.......................................41 Severability.......................................37
         9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights).41 rights).38
         9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................41
      9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]..............................41 Majeure......................................38
   10. Security Considerations......................................42 Considerations......................................39
   11. IANA Considerations..........................................42 Considerations..........................................39
   12. Acknowledgments..............................................42 Acknowledgments..............................................39
   13. References...................................................42 References...................................................39
      13.1. Normative References....................................42 References....................................39
      13.2. Informative References..................................43 References..................................40
   Author's Addresses...............................................43
   Intellectual Property Statement..................................44
   Disclaimer of Validity...........................................45 Addresses...............................................40
   Pre-5378 Material Disclaimer.....................................41
   Copyright Statement..............................................45 Statement..............................................41

Preface

   This document contains a template to be used for creating a
   Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Registry
   (e.g., an NIR or RIR) that is part of the Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI).  The user of this document should

     1. substitute a title page for page 1 saying, e.g., "<Name ''<Name of
        Registry> Certification Practice Statement for the Resource
        Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)" (RPKI)'' with date, author, etc.

     2. delete this Preface

     3. fill in the information indicated below by <text in angle
        brackets>

     4. delete sections 10, 11, 12, 13.1, Acknowledgments, Author's
        Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of
        Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a
        reference section with just the references in 13.2

     5. update the table of contents to reflect the deletions and
        additions above.

   Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
   number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this
   CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have
   retained section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections,
   in order to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are
   included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant
   sections are also marked [OMITTED]. There is a note RFC to this effect
   in
   facilitate comparison with the Introduction below.  This information should be left outline in the
   CPS as an explanation RFC. [There are 4 sub-
   sections that I haven't removed yet due to the user. Word problems.)

1. Introduction

   This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of <Name
   of Registry>.  It describes the practices employed by the <Name of
   Registry> Certification Authority (CA) in the Internet IP Address
   and Autonomous System (AS) Number PKI. Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI).   These practices are defined in accordance
   with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP, [RFCxxxx]) of
   this PKI.

   The Resource PKI is aimed at supporting verifiable attestations
   about resource controls, e.g., for improved routing security. The
   goal RPKI is that each entity that allocates IP addresses or AS numbers designed to an entity will, in parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this
   allocation. These certificates will enable verification that the
   holder support validation of the associated private key has been allocated the
   resources indicated in the certificate, and is the current, unique
   holder claims by current
   holders of these resources. The certificates and CRLs, Internet Number Resources (INRs, see definition in conjunction 1.7)
   in accordance with ancillary digitally signed data structures, will provide
   critical inputs for routing security mechanisms, e.g., generation of
   route filters by ISPs.

   The most important and distinguishing aspect the records of the PKI for which
   this CPS was created is organizations that it does not purport to identify an
   address space holder or AS number holder via the subject name
   contained act as CAs
   in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each
   certificate issued under this policy is intended to enable an entity PKI. The ability to assert in a verifiable fashion, that it verify such claims is essential to
   ensuring the current holder of
   an address block or an AS number, based on the current records unique, unambiguous distribution of
   the entity responsible for the these resources in question. Verification
   of the assertion is based on two criteria:

   This PKI parallels the ability of existing INR distribution hierarchy. These
   resources are distributed by the entity Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
   (IANA) to digitally sign data producing the Regional Internet Registries. In some regions,
   National Internet Registries (NIRs) form a signature that is verifiable
   using tier of the public key contained in hierarchy
   below the corresponding certificate, RIRs for internet number resource (INR) distribution. ISPs
   and
   validation of that certificate in the context of this PKI. network subscribers form additional tiers below registries.

1.1. Overview

   This PKI
   is designed exclusively for use in support of validation of claims
   related to address space and AS number holdings, with emphasis on
   support of routing security mechanisms. Use of the certificates and
   CRLs managed under this PKI for any other purpose is a violation of
   this PKI's CP, and relying parties should reject such uses.

   Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
   number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this
   CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have
   retained section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections,
   in order to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme
   employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are
   included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant
   sections are also marked [OMITTED].

1.1. Overview

   This CPS describes:

     . Participants

     . Distribution CPS describes:

     . Participants

     . Publication of the certificates and CRLs

     . How certificates are issued, managed, and revoked

     . Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.)

     . Key management

     . Audit procedures

     . Business and legal issues

   The

   This PKI encompasses several types of certificates: certificates (see IETF
   document draft-ietf-sidr-arch-xx [ARCH] for more details):

  . CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks
     and/or AS numbers, distributing INRs and for
     each address space (AS number) holder subscriber (INR holder)

  . End entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use in verifying to validate
     digital signatures of Route Origination Authorizations (ROAs) and other
     (non-certificate/CRL) signed on RPKI-signed objects (see definition in 1.7).

  . In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in
     support of access control for the repository system as described
     in 2.4.

1.2. Document name and identification

   The name of this document is "<Name ''<Name of Registry>'s Certification
   Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
   (RPKI)".
   (RPKI)''.

1.3. PKI participants

   Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" ''subscriber'' refers to an individual or
   organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The
   term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
   qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
   the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
   service from an LIR/ISP.  Thus, in this PKI, ISP. In such cases the term "subscriber"
   can refer both to LIRs/ISPs, which can ''network subscriber''
   will be subscribers of RIRs, NIRs,
   and other LIRs, and also to organizations that are not ISPs, but
   which are subscribers of ISPs in the networking sense of the term. used. Also note that, for brevity, this document always
   refers to
   subscribers PKI participants as organizations, organizations or entities, even though
   some subscribers of them are individuals. When necessary, the phrase "network subscriber" is used
   to refer to an organization that receives network services from an
   LIR/ISP.

1.3.1. Certification authorities

   <Name of Registry>

   <Describe the CAs that you will operate two CAs for the RPKI: one RPKI.  One approach
   is to operate two CAs: one designated "offline" ''offline'' and the other is
   designated "production." ''production.'' The offline CA is the top level CA for the
   <Name of Registry> portion of the RPKI. It provides a secure
   revocation and recovery capability in case the production CA is
   compromised or becomes unavailable. Thus
   this the offline CA issues
   certificates only to instances of the production CA CA; and the CRLs it
   issues are used to revoke only a certificate certificates issued to that the production
   CA. The production CA is used to issue RPKI certificates to <Name of
   Registry> members, to which address space or AS numbers whom INRs have been allocated. distributed. >

1.3.2. Registration authorities

   There is no

   <Describe how the registration authority (RA) function is handled for either the offline or the production CA operating under this CPS.
   CA(s) that you operate.  The former needs no RA
   capability because it issues certificates only to RPKI does not require establishment or
   use of a separate registration authority (RA) in conjunction with
   the production CA.
   The production CA relies upon certificates issued function. The RA function will be provided by the <Name of
   Registry> Business PKI (BPKI) (see same entity
   operating as a CA, e.g., entities listed in Section 3.2.6) to identify
   individuals authorized to requests certificates under the RPKI.
   <Name of Registry> 1.3.1. An entity
   acting as a CA in this PKI already establishes has a business formal relationship with
   each subscriber (<Name of Registry> member) and assumes
   responsibility for allocating and tracking the current allocation of
   address space and AS numbers. Since <Name of Registry> operates organization to which it distributes INRs. These organizations
   already perform the
   BPKI CA, there is no distinct RA function implicitly since they already assume
   responsibility for the RPKI. distributing INRs.>

1.3.3. Subscribers

   Two types of organizations receive allocations distributions of IP addresses and
   AS numbers INRs from this
   CA and thus are subscribers in the PKI sense: network subscribers
   and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). <Additionally, this CA issues
   certificates to <Local/National>
   Registries (choose the right term for this RIR, if either applies) <National> Registries, who, in turn, issue
   certificates to network subscribers or
   LIRs/ISPs.> ISPs.>

1.3.4. Relying parties

   Entities or individuals that need to validate claims of address space and/or AS
   number current holdings are relying parties.  Thus, for example,
   entities that make use of address and AS number allocation
   certificates act in support of improved routing security reliance on certificates or
   RPKI-signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties. Registries are relying
   Relying parties because they transfer
   resources between one another and thus will need to verify (cross)
   certificates issued in conjunction with such transfers.  This
   includes LIRs/ISPs, multi-homed organizations exchanging BGP [BGP4]
   traffic with LIRs/ISPs, and subscribers who have received an
   allocation of address space from one ISP may or from a registry, but
   want to authorize an (or another) LIR/ISP to originate routes to may not be subscribers within this space.

   To PKI. (See
   section 1.7 for the extent that repositories make use definition of certificates for access
   control - checking for authorization to upload certificate, CRL, and
   ROA update packages -- they too act as relying parties. an RPKI-signed object.)

1.3.5. Other participants

   <Name of Registry> will operate a repository that holds
   certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI signed objects, e.g., ROAs. RPKI-signed objects.

1.4. Certificate usage

1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses

   The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization
   in support of validation of claims of current holdings of address
   space and/or AS numbers, e.g., for routing security. With regard to
   routing security, an initial goal of this PKI is to allow the holder
   of a set of address blocks to be able to declare, in a secure
   fashion, the AS number of each entity that is authorized to
   originate a route to these addresses, including the context of ISP
   proxy aggregation. INRs.

   Additional uses of the PKI, certificates, consistent with the basic goal
   cited above, are also permitted under this the RPKI certificate policy.

   Some of the certificates that may be issued under this hierarchy PKI could be
   used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., access
   control for the repository system. system as described in 2.4. Such uses
   also are permitted under this the RPKI certificate policy.

1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses

   Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited.

1.5. Policy administration

1.5.1. Organization administering the document

   This CPS is administered by <Name of Registry> Registry>.

1.5.2. Contact person

   <Insert Registry contact info here>

1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy

   Not applicable.  Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
   is attesting to the allocation distribution of resources (IP addresses, AS
   numbers) INRs to the holder of the
   private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The
   issuing organizations are the same organizations as the ones that
   perform the allocation distribution hence they are authoritative with respect
   to the accuracy of this binding.

1.5.4. CPS approval procedures

   Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
   is attesting to the allocation distribution of resources (IP addresses, AS
   numbers) INRs to the holder of the
   private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The
   issuing organizations are the same organizations as the ones that
   perform the allocation distribution hence they are authoritative with respect
   to the accuracy of this binding.

1.6. Definitions and acronyms

   BPKI - Business PKI: PKI. A BPKI is an optional additional PKI used by an
         RIR to identify members to whom RPKI certificates can be
         issued.

   CP -  Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that
         indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular
         community and/or class of applications with common security
         requirements.

   CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that
         specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs
         in issuing certificates.

   Distribution of INRs -                             - A process of distribution of the INRs along
         the respective number hierarchy. IANA distributes blocks of IP
         addresses and Autonomous System Numbers to the five Regional
         Internet Registries (RIRs). RIRs distribute smaller address
         blocks and Autonomous System Numbers to organizations within
         their service regions, who in turn distribute IP addresses to
         their customers.

   IANA -   Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. IANA is responsible
         for global coordination of the Internet Protocol addressing
         systems and Autonomous System (AS) numbers used for routing
         internet traffic. IANA distributes INRs to Regional Internet
         Registries (RIRs).

   INRs - Internet Number Resources. INRs are number values for three
         protocol parameter sets, namely:

        . IP Version 4 addresses,

        . IP version 6 addresses, and

        . Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing, currently
          Border Gateway Protocol-4 Autonomous System numbers.

   ISP -            - Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing
         and selling Internet services to other organizations.

   LIR - Local Internet Registry. This is an organization, typically a
        network service provider, that sub-allocates the assignment of
        IP addresses for a portion of the area covered by a Regional
        (or National) Registry.

   NIR -            - National Internet Registry. An NIR is an organization that
         manages the assignment distribution of IP address and AS numbers INRS for a portion of the
         geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry. These NIRs form an
         optional second tier in the tree scheme used to manage IP address and AS number allocation. INR
         distribution.

   RIR - Regional Internet Registry.  An RIR is an organization that
         manages the assignment distribution of IP address and AS numbers INRs for a
         specified geopolitical area.  At present, there are five RIRs:
         ARIN (North America), RIPE NCC (Europe), APNIC (Asia

   RPKI-signed object -
         Pacific), LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean), and AfriNIC
         (Africa).

   ROA                           - Route Origination Authorization.  This An RPKI-signed object is a digitally signed
         data object that identifies (other than a network operator, identified by an
         AS, that is authorized to originate routes certificate or CRL) declared to be
         such by a specified set
         of address blocks.

2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities

2.1. Repositories

   As per the CP, certificates standards track RFC, and CRLs, will that can be validated using
         certificates issued under this PKI. The content and format of
         these data constructs depend on the context in which
         validation of claims of current holdings of INRs takes place.
         Examples of these objects are repository manifests and CRLs.

2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities

2.1. Repositories

   As per the CP, certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects MUST be
   made available for downloading by all network operators, relying parties to enable them
   to validate this data for use in support of routing security. data.

   The <Name of Registry> RPKI CA will publish certificates, CRLs, and
   other signed
   RPKI-signed objects via a repository that is accessible via RSYNC at
   rpki.<Name of Registry>.net.

2.2. Publication of certification information

   <Name of Registry> will upload certificates MUST publish certificates, CRLs, and CRLs RPKI-signed
   objects issued by it to a local repository system that it operates
   as part of a world-wide distributed system of repositories.

2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication

   <Describe here your procedures for publication (via the repository)
   of the certificates and certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects that you issue. If
   you choose to outsource publication of PKI data, you still need to
   provide this information for relying parties.> parties. This should include
   the period of time within which a certificate will be published
   after he CA issues the certificate and the period of time within
   which a CA will publish a CRL with an entry for a revoked
   certificate after it revokes that certificate. >

   As per the CP, the following standards exist standard exists for publication times
   and frequency:

   A certificate will be published within 24 hours after issuance.

   The <Name of Registry> RPKI CA will MUST publish its CRL prior to the
   nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by
   the CA. Within 24 hours of effecting revocation, the CA will publish
   a CRL with an entry for the revoked certificate.

2.4. Access controls on repositories

   Access to the repository system, for modification of entries, must
   be controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data
   (certificates, CRLs and ROAs) uploaded RPKI-signed objects) published to a
   repository are digitally signed. Updates RPKI items that <Name of Registry>
   issues MUST be published to the repository system must be validated to ensure that the data being added or replaced is authorized. This document
   does it runs by means not define
   accessible to the means by which updates are verified, but use outside world. <If <Name of
   the PKI itself Registry> offers
   repository services to validate updates is anticipated. its subscribers, then <describe here the
   protocol(s) that you support for their publishing of signed
   objects.>

3. Identification And Authentication

3.1. Naming

3.1.1. Types of names

   The Subject of each certificate issued by this Registry is
   identified by an X.500 Distinguished Name (DN). For certificates
   issued to LIRs/ISPs and subscribers, the Subject The distinguished
   name will consist of a single CN Common Name (CN) attribute with a
   value generated by <Name of Registry>. Optionally, the issuer. For
   certificates issued to an NIR, the Subject will serialNumber
   attribute may be included along with the common name (to form a
   terminal relative distinguished name set), to distinguish among
   successive instances of certificates associated with the
   NIR. same
   entity.

3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful

   The Subject name in each subscriber certificate will be unique
   relative to all certificates issued by <Name of LIR/ISP> RPKI CA. Registry>. However,
   there is no guarantee that the subject name will be globally unique
   in this PKI.

   Note: The Also, the name of the holder of an address block or AS number subscriber need not to be "meaningful"
   ''meaningful'' in the conventional, human-readable sense,
   since sense.  The
   certificates issued under this PKI are used for authorization in
   support of routing security, applications that make use of attestations of Internet
   resource holding, not for identification

3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers

   Although Subject names in certificates issued by this registry need
   not be meaningful, and may appear "random," ''random,'' anonymity is not a
   function of this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature
   is provided.

3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms

   None

3.1.5. Uniqueness of names

   <Name of Registry> certifies Subject names that are unique among the
   certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these
   Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate
   certificate path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor
   enforced through technical means.

3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks

   Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there
   is no provision to recognize nor or authenticate trademarks, service
   marks, etc.

3.2. Initial identity validation

3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key

   <Name

   <Describe the method whereby each subscriber will be required to
   demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of Registry> accepts certificate requests via the protocol
   described private key
   corresponding to the public key in [up/down]. This protocol the certificate, prior to <Name
   of Registry's> issuing the certificate. One possible approach makes
   use of the PKCS #10 format, as profiled in [RFCyyyy]. This request
   format requires that the PKCS #10 request be signed using the (RSA)
   private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate
   request. This mechanism provides proof of possession by the requester.
   requester.>

3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity

   Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the
   organizational identity of resource holders, subscribers, with the exception of
   registries. However, certificates are issued to resource holders subscribers in a
   fashion that preserves the accuracy of allocations distributions as represented
   in <Name of Registry> records. Specifically,

   <Describe the method whereby this is accomplished.  For example, a
   BPKI certificate could be used to authenticate a certificate request
   that serves as a link to the <Name of Registry> member subscriber database
   that maintains the resource allocation INR distribution records. The certificate request is
   could be matched against the database record for the member subscriber in
   question, and an RPKI certificate is would be issued only if the resources INRs
   requested are were a subset of those held by the
   member. subscriber.>

3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity

   Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual
   identity of a resource holder. subscriber. However, <Name of Registry> maintains
   contact information for each resource holder subscriber in support of certificate
   renewal, re-key, or revocation, via revocation.

   < Describe the BPKI.

   The procedures that MUST be used to identify at least one
   individual as a representative of each subscriber. This is done in
   support of issuance, renewal, and revocation of the certificate
   issued to the organization. For example, one might say ''The <Name of
   Registry> BPKI (see Section 3.2.6) issues certificates that are MUST be
   used to identify individuals who represent <Name of Registry> members
   subscribers.'' The procedures should be commensurate with those you
   already employ in authenticating individuals as representatives for
   INR holders. Note that are address space this authentication is solely for use by you
   in dealing with the organizations to which you distribute (or AS number) holders. sub-
   distribute) INRs, and thus must not be relied upon outside of this
   CA-subscriber relationship>

3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information

   No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued
   under this certificate policy. policy except for SIA/AIA extensions.

3.2.5. Validation of authority

   Only

   <Describe what procedures that MUST be used to verify that an
   individual claiming to represent a subscriber, is authorized to
   represent that subscriber in this context. For example, one could
   say, ''Only an individual to whom a BPKI certificate (see Section
   3.2.6) has been issued may request issuance of an RPKI certificate.
   Each certificate issuance request is verified using the BPKI. BPKI.'' The
   procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ as a
   registry in authenticating individuals as representatives of
   subscribers.>

3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation

   The RPKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
   other PKI. However, <Name of Registry> operates <If you operate a separate, additional PKI for business
   purposes (BPKI), then describe (or reference) how the BPKI [cps-
   business-pki] that is used
   to authenticate members subscribers and to enable them to manage their
   resource allocations. The Resource PKI relies
   on this BPKI to authenticate Subscribers who make certificate
   requests, revocation requests, etc. distributions.>

3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests

3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key

   Routine

   <Describe the conditions under which routine re-key is effected via a Certificate Issuance Request
   message as described in [up/down]. This digitally signed CMS message required and
   the manner by which it is authenticated using requested.  Describe the procedures that
   MUST be used to ensure that a BPKI subscriber requesting routine re-key
   is the legitimate holder of the certificate associated with to be re-keyed. State
   the approach for establishing PoP of the private key corresponding
   to the
   requester. new public key. If you operate a BPKI, describe how that BPKI
   is used to authenticate routine re-key requests.>

3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation

   Re-key

   <Describe the procedures that MUST be used to ensure that an
   organization requesting a re-key after revocation is effected via a Certificate Issuance
   Request message as described the legitimate
   holder of the INRs in [up/down]. the certificate being re-keyed. This digitally signed CMS
   message is authenticated using should
   also include the method employed for verifying PoP of the private
   key corresponding to the new public key. If you operate a business-
   based PKI, describe how that BPKI certificate associated is used to authenticate re-key
   requests and refer to 3.2.6. With respect to authentication of the
   subscriber, the procedures should be commensurate with those you
   already employ in the requester. maintenance of INR distribution records.>

3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request

   An RPKI Subscriber makes an explicit revocation request using the
   protocol defined in [up/down]. Revocation requests in this protocol
   are digitally signed CMS messages, and are verified using a public
   key bound to an authorized representative via

   <Describe the <Name of Registry>
   BPKI.

   When a Subscriber requests an new resource allocation, procedures that MUST be used by an existing
   resource certificate issued RPKI subscriber to
   make a revocation request.  Describe the manner by which it is
   ensured that the subscriber requesting revocation is NOT revoked, so
   long as the set subject of resources allocated to
   the Subscriber did certificate (or an authorized representative thereof) to be
   revoked. Note that there may be different procedures for the case
   where the legitimate subject still possesses the original private
   key as opposed to the case when it no longer has access to that key.
   These procedures should be commensurate with those you already
   employ in the maintenance of subscriber records.>

   Note that if a Subscriber requests a new INR distribution, an
   existing RPKI certificate issued to the subscriber is NOT revoked,
   so long as the set of INRs distributed to the subscriber did not
   "shrink,"
   ''shrink,'' i.e., the new resources INRs are a superset of the old resource INR set.
   However, if a new resource allocation INR distribution results in "shrinkage" ''shrinkage'' of the set
   of resources allocated INRs distributed to a Subscriber, subscriber, this triggers an implicit
   revocation of the old resource RPKI certificate(s) associated with that Subscriber.
   subscriber.

4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

4.1. Certificate Application

4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application

   The following entities

   Any subscriber who holds INRs distributed by this registry may
   submit a certificate application to this
   CA:

     o <Insert if appropriate: "Any NIR or LIR/ISP operating in the
        geopolitical region served by this registry">

     o Any entity that holds AS numbers or address space assigned by
        this registry CA.

4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities

   <Name

   <Describe your enrollment process for issuing certificates both for
   initial deployment of Registry> members who are resource holders are enrolled in the <Name PKI and as an ongoing process. Note that
   most of Registry> BPKI via the process described certificates in
   [operations-business-pki]. Only this PKI are issued as part of your
   normal business practices, as an adjunct to INR distribution, and
   thus a member who holds separate application to request a certificate
   issued under the BPKI is eligible may not be
   necessary.  If so, reference should be made to make an RPKI certificate
   request. where these practices
   are documented.>

4.2. Certificate application processing

   <A/An Name of Registry> resource holder requests a certificate via a
   Certificate Issuance Request message [up/down], which is
   authenticated via the digital signature on

   <Describe the CMS envelope. The certificate used to authenticate the message is issued under the
   <Name of Registry> BPKI. <Name request/response processing that you will
   employ.  You should make use of Registry> processes the resource
   request as described in [up/down]. The Certificate Issuance Response
   message [up/down] either provides the existing standards for certificate to the Subscriber,
   or provides a response indicating why the request was not fulfilled.
   application processing.  Relevant standards include RFC 4210,
   Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management
   Protocol (CMP), RFC 2797, Certificate Management Messages over CMS,
   and RSA Labs standards PKCS #7 and PKCS #10. >

4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions

   The <Name

   <Describe your practices for identification and authentication of Registry> BPKI is used
   certificate applicants.  Often, existing practices employed by you
   to identify <A/An Name of
   Registry> member representative applying and authenticate organizations can be used as the basis
   for a certificate via a
   certificate issuance request in the up/down protocol. See the <Name of Registry> BPKI CPS for additional details [cp-business-pki]. certificates to these subscribers.  Reference can be
   made to documentation of such existing practices.>

4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications

   The Certificate Issuance Response message [up/down] either provides
   the certificate to the Subscriber, or provides a response indicating
   why the request was not fulfilled.

   <Describe your practices for approval or rejection of applications
   and refer to documentation of existing business practices relevant
   to this process.  Note that according to the CP, certificate
   applications will be approved based on the normal business practices
   of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's records of address space and AS number holders.
   Also,
   subscribers. The CP also says that each CA will follow the
   procedures specified in 3.2.1 to verify that the requester holds the corresponding
   private key for corresponding to the public key that will be bound to
   the certificate the CA issues to the requester.>

4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications

   <You may declare

   <Specify here your expected time frame for processing certificate
   applications.>

4.3. Certificate issuance

4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance

   A Subscriber generates a draft certificate using the PKCS #10
   format, as profiled in [RFCyyyy]. This draft certificate is
   encapsulated in a CMS message, signed by the requester, and
   submitted as a Certificate Issuance Request as described in
   [up/down]. The CA verifies the request message as described

   <Describe in
   [up/down] this section your procedures for issuance and generates a Certificate Issuance Response message.
   That message either contains the requested certificate, or provides
   publication of a response indicating why the request was not fulfilled. certificate.>

4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate

   A Subscriber is notified

   <Name of registry> MUST notify the issuance of subscriber when the certificate
   is published. <Describe here any other entities that will be
   notified when a new certificate by the
   Certificate Issuance Response message. is published.>

4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]

   <Describe here any other entities that will be notified when a new
   certificate is published.>

4.4. Certificate acceptance

4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance

   When a certificate is issued, the RPKI CA will place MUST publish it in the
   repository. A subject is deemed to have accepted a certificate
   issued by this CA unless the subject explicitly requests revocation
   of the certificate after publication in
   repository and notify the <Name of Registry> RPKI
   repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3 subscriber.  This will be done without
   subscriber review and acceptance.

4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA

   Certificates will MUST be published in the Repository RPKI distributed repository
   system via publication of the certificate at <name of Registry>'s
   repository publication. This will be done within 1
   business day <specify the
   timeframe within which the certificate will be placed in the
   repository and the subscriber will be notified>. <Describe your
   procedures for publication of being issued by this CA. the certificate.>

4.5. Key pair and certificate usage

   A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below.

4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage

   The certificates issued by this registry <name of registry> to resource holders subscribers are CA
   certificates. The private key associated with each of these
   certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and
   CRLs. A subscriber will may in turn issue certificates to any
   organizations to which it allocates resources distributes INRs and may issue one or more
   EE certificates for use in verifying signatures on ROAs RPKI-signed
   objects signed by the subscriber. <If
   appropriate, add "Subscribers that are NIRs issue certificates to
   organizations to which they have allocated address space or AS
   numbers.  Subscribers that are LIRs issue certificates to
   organizations to which they have allocated address space."> Subscribers also will issue
   certificates to operators in support of repository access control.

4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage

   The primary relying parties in this PKI are LIRs/ISPs, organizations who will
   use RPKI EE certificates to verify ROAs and other signed objects, e.g., RPKI-signed objects. Repositories
   will use operator certificates to verify the authorization of
   entities to engage in support repository maintenance activities, and thus
   repositories represent a secondary type of generating route filters. relying party.

4.6. Certificate renewal

4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal

   As per the CP, a certificate will MUST be processed for renewal based on
   its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate
   Subject. The request may be implicit, a side effect of renewing its
   resource holding agreement, or may be explicit. If <Name of
   Registry> initiates the renewal process based on the certificate
   expiration date, then <Name of Registry> will notify the resource
   holder subscriber
   <insert the period of advance warning, e.g., "2 ''2 weeks in advance of
   the expiration date", date'', or the general policy, e.g., "in ''in conjunction
   with notification of service expiration".> expiration''.>  The validity interval of
   the new (renewed) certificate will overlap that of the previous
   certificate by <insert length of overlap period, e.g., 1 week>, to
   ensure uninterrupted coverage.

   Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the
   previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
   compromised.  If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
   Section 4.7 will apply.

4.6.2. Who may request renewal

   The certificate holder subscriber or <Name of Registry> may initiate the renewal
   process. For <For the case of the certificate holder, only an
   individual to whom a BPKI certificate (see Section 3.2.6) has been
   issued may request renewal of an RPKI certificate. Each certificate
   issuance request is verified using subscriber, describe the BPKI.

4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests

   A Subscriber requests certificate renewal by sending a Certificate
   Issuance Request message [up/down].

4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance procedures
   that will be used to subscriber

   A Subscriber ensure that the requester is notified of the issuance legitimate
   holder of a new certificate via the Certificate Issuance Response message, if INRs in the Subscriber
   initiated certificate being renewed. This should
   also include the renewal. If <Name method employed for verifying PoP of Registry> initiated the renewal
   process, the Subscriber is notified by the posting of private
   key corresponding to the renewed
   certificate public key in the <Name of Registry> repository. A Subscriber can
   discover a certificate being renewed
   or the new public key if the public key is being changed.  With
   respect to authentication of the subscriber, the procedures should
   be commensurate with those you already employ in the maintenance of
   INR distribution records. If you operate a BPKI for this, describe
   how that business-based PKI is used to authenticate re-newal
   requests and refer to 3.2.6.>

4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests

   <Describe your procedures for handling certificate renewal requests.
   This must include verification that the requester is the subscriber
   or is authorized by the subscriber and that the certificate in
   question has not been revoked.>

4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

   <Name of Registry> through use MUST notify the subscriber when the certificate
   is published. <Describe your procedure for notification of new
   certificate issuance to the List message [up/down]. subscriber. This should be consistent
   with 4.3.2.>

4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate

   When a renewal certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the
   repository. A Subscriber is deemed to have accepted a certificate
   unless the subscriber explicitly requests revocation of the
   certificate after publication in the <Name of Registry> RPKI MUST
   publish it to the repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3. and notify the subscriber. This will be
   done without subscriber review and acceptance.

4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA

   <Name

   <Describe your policy and procedures for publication of Registry> will publish a renewal certificate in the <Name
   of Registry> RPKI repository within 1 business day after issuance of
   the renewed
   certificate. This should be consistent with 4.4.2.>

4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]

   <List here any other entities (besides the subscriber) who will be
   notified when a renewed certificate is issued.>

4.7. Certificate re-key

4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key

   As per the CP, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when
   requested,
   required, based on:

  (1) knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
     private key, or

  (2) the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated
     key pair

   If a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the
   replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a
   new key, unless the subscriber requests a re-key at the same time.

   If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
   certificate will be revoked.

   Section 5.6 of the Certificate Policy notes that when a CA signs a
   certificate, the signing key should have a validity period that
   exceeds the validity period of the certificate.  This places
   additional constraints on when a CA should request a re-key.

4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key

   The holder of

   Only the certificate subscriber may request a re-key. In addition, <Name of
   Registry> may initiate a re-key based on a verified compromise
   report. If <If the Subscriber subscriber (certificate Subject) requests the rekey,
   describe how authentication is effected effected, e.g., using the <Name of
   Registry> BPKI. <Describe Describe how a compromise report received from other
   than a subscriber is verified.>

4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests

   A Subscriber requests a re-key of a certificate by issuing a
   Certificate Issuance Request message in which the resources are ones
   that the Subscriber already holds, but a new public key is provided
   in

   <Describe your process for handling re-keying requests.  As per the PKCS #10 portion of
   CP, this should be consistent with the request. process described in Section
   4.3.  So reference can be made to that section.>

4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

   A Subscriber is notified of

   <Describe your policy regarding notifying the issuance subscriber re:
   availability of a the new re-keyed certificate
   via certificate.  This should be
   consistent with the Certificate Issuance Response message. notification process for any new certificate
   issuance (see section 4.3.2).>

4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate

   When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will place publish it in the
   repository. A subject is deemed to have accepted a certificate
   issued by this CA unless the subject explicitly requests revocation
   of the certificate after publication in the <Name of Registry> RPKI
   repository system, as described in Section 4.9.3. and notify the subscriber.  This will be done without
   subscriber review and acceptance.

4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA

   A re-keyed certificate will

   <Describe your policy regarding publication of the new certificate.
   This should be published in consistent with the Repository system
   within 1 business day of being issued by this CA. publication process for any new
   certificate (see section 4.4.2).>

4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]

   <List here any entities (other than the subscriber) who will be
   notified when a re-keyed certificate is issued.>

4.8. Certificate modification

4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification

   As per the CP, modification of a certificate occurs to implement
   changes to the RFC 3779 extension values in a certificate.  A
   subscriber can request a certificate modification when this
   information in a currently valid certificate has changed, changed as a result
   of changes in the resource INR holdings of the subscriber. The
   request may

   If INRs are to be implicit, distributed to a side effect of the allocation of
   additional resources, or may be explicit.  A subscriber also may
   request that its existing set of resources be redistributed among
   multiple certificates. This example of certificate modification is
   effected through issuance of new certificates, and revocation of the
   previous certificates.

   If a subscriber is to be allocated address space or AS numbers INRs are in
   addition to a current allocation, distribution, and if the subscriber does not
   request that a new certificate be issued containing only these
   additional resources, then this is accomplished through a
   certificate modification. When a certificate modification is
   approved, a new certificate is issued.  The new certificate will
   contain the same public key and the same expiration date as the
   original certificate, but with the incidental information corrected
   and/or the address
   space and AS allocations INR distribution expanded. When previously allocated address
   space or AS numbers distributed
   INRs are to be removed from a certificate, then the old certificate
   MUST be revoked and a new certificate (reflecting the new allocation)
   distribution) issued.

4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification

   The certificate holder subscriber or <Name of Registry> may initiate the certificate
   modification process. If a certificate holder requests <For the modification, case of the request is authenticated using the <Name of
   Registry> BPKI, as described in [up/down]. <Name of Registry> subscriber, state here
   what steps will
   modify a certificate, be taken to verify the identity and revoke authorization of
   the old certificate, if, for
   example, a Subscriber fails to renew membership in a timely fashion. entity requesting the modification.>

4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests

   A certificate can be modified (other than

   <Describe your procedures for re-key) only by verification of the
   addition or removal or resources. A Subscriber requests certificate modification by submitting a Certificate Issuance Request. If the
   request contains values and procedures for AS and/or (IPv4 or IPv6) address
   resource sets that the Subscriber already holds, but which are
   different from those in the currently issued certificates, the
   request is interpreted as issuance of a request for certificate modification. new certificate.  These
   should be consistent with the processes described in Sections 4.2
   and 4.3.1.>

4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to subscriber

   A Subscriber is notified of

   <Describe your procedure for notifying the subscriber about the
   issuance of a modified certificate
   by the publication of certificate.  This should be consistent with
   the notification process for any new certificate in the <Name of Registry> RPKI
   repository system. (see section
   4.3.2).>

4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate

   When a modified certificate is issued, the CA <Name of Registry> will place it
   publish in the repository and notify the subscriber. A subject is deemed to have
   accepted the modified certificate unless the subject explicitly
   requests revocation of the certificate after publication in the
   <Name of Registry> RPKI repository system, as described in Section
   4.9.3. This will be
   done without subscriber review and acceptance.

4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA

   A

   <Describe your procedure for publication of a modified certificate will certificate.
   This should be published in consistent with the <Name of Registry>
   RPKI Repository system within 1 business day of being issued by this
   CA. publication process for any new
   certificate (see section 4.4.2).>

4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
[OMITTED]

   <List here any entities (other than the subscriber) who will be
   notified when a modified certificate is issued.>

4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension

4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation

   As per the CP, certificates can be revoked for several reasons.
   Either <Name of Registry> or the subject may choose to end the
   relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to
   revoke the certificate. If one or more of the resources INRs bound to the
   public key in the certificate are no longer associated with the
   subject, that too constitutes a basis for revocation.  A certificate
   also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key
   corresponding to the public key in the certificate.  Finally, a
   certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by
   that certificate.

4.9.2. the
   private key associated with that certificate.

4.9.2. Who can request revocation

   The certificate holder subscriber or <Name of Registry> may request a revocation. A Subscriber requests certificate revocation using <For
   the
   Certificate Revocation Request message described in [up/down]. case of the subscriber, describe what steps will be taken to
   verify the identity and authorization of the entity requesting the
   revocation.>

4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request

   A Subscriber requests

   <Describe your process for handling a certificate revocation using
   request.  This should include:

   o  Procedure to be used by the Certificate
   Revocation Request message described in [up/down]. The Certificate
   Revocation Response message confirms receipt subscriber to request a revocation

   o  Procedure for notification of the subscriber when the revocation
   request
   is initiated by <Name of Registry>, and indicates that <Name of Registry>
   will include the revoked certificate in a CRL. ISP>.>

4.9.4. Revocation request grace period

   A Subscriber subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the
   need for revocation has been identified.

4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request

   <Describe your policy on the time period within which you will
   process a revocation request.>

4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties

   As per the CP, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and
   checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the
   certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate.

4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency

   The <Name of Registry> RPKI production CA will publish CRLs
   approximately every 24 hours. The <Name of Registry> RPKI offline CA
   will publish

   <State the CRL issuance frequency for the CRLs on a monthly basis. that you publish.>
   Each CRL will carry a nextScheduledUpdate value value; and a new CRL will
   be published at or before that time.  <Name of Registry> will set
   the nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when
   the next scheduled CRL will be issued.

4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs

   A CRL will be posted published to the repository system with minimal delay within <state the
   maximum latency> after generation.

4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED]

4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED]

4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED]

4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]

4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED]

4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]

4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED]

4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]

4.10. Certificate status services

   <Name of Registry> does not support OCSP. OCSP or SCVP. <Name of Registry>
   issues CRLs.

4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]

4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED]

4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]

4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]

4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED]

4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]

4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices
[OMITTED]

5. Facility, Management, And and Operational Controls

5.1. Physical controls

   <As per the CP, describe the physical controls that you employ for
   certificate management. These should be commensurate to those used
   in the management of address space and AS number allocation.> INR distribution.>

5.1.1. Site location and construction

5.1.2. Physical access

5.1.3. Power and air conditioning

5.1.4. Water exposures

5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection

5.1.6. Media storage

5.1.7. Waste disposal

5.1.8. Off-site backup

5.2. Procedural controls

   <As per the CP, describe the procedural security controls that you
   employ for certificate management.  These should be commensurate to
   those used in the management of address space and AS number
   allocation.> INR distribution.>

5.2.1. Trusted roles

5.2.2. Number of persons required per task

5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role

5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties

5.3. Personnel controls

   <As per the CP, describe the personnel security controls that you
   employ for individuals associated with certificate management. These
   should be commensurate to those used in the management of address
   space and AS number allocation.> INR
   distribution.>

5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements

5.3.2. Background check procedures

5.3.3. Training requirements

5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements

5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence

5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions

5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements

5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel

5.4. Audit logging procedures

   <As per the CP, describe in the following sections the details of
   how you implement audit logging.>

5.4.1. Types of events recorded

   Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the
   certification authority computing equipment.  Audit records will
   include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
   content data relating to the event.  Auditable events include:

   Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)

   Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate requests,
   certificate revocation requests, compromise notifications)

   Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions

   Posting of any material to a repository

   Any attempts to change or delete audit data

   <List here any additional types of events that will be audited.>

5.4.2. Frequency of processing log

   <Describe your procedures for review of audit logs.>

5.4.3. Retention period for audit log

   <Describe your polices policies for retention of audit logs.>

5.4.4. Protection of audit log

   <Describe your policies for protection of the audit logs.>

5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures

   <Describe your policies for backup of the audit logs.>

5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]

5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED]

5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments

   <Describe any vulnerability assessments that you will apply (or have
   already applied) to the PKI subsystems.  This should include whether
   such assessments have taken place and any procedures or plans to
   perform or repeat/reassess vulnerabilities in the future.>

5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]

5.5.1. Types

5.6. Key changeover

   The <Name of records archived [OMITTED]

5.5.2. Retention Registry> CA certificate will contain a validity period for archive [OMITTED]

5.5.3. Protection
   that is at least as long as that of archive [OMITTED]

5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED]

5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED]

5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) [OMITTED]

5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information [OMITTED]

5.6. Key changeover

   The <Name of Registry> CA any certificate will contain a validity period
   that encompasses being issued
   under that certificate.  When <Name of all certificates verifiable using this Registry> CA
   certificate.  To support this, wishes to change
   keys, <Name of Registry> will create a new signature key pair, and
   acquire and publish a new certificate containing the public key of
   the pair, <specify here the minimum amount of lead time, e.g.,  "a  ''a
   minimum of 6 months"> months''> in advance of the scheduled change of the
   current signature key pair.

5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]

5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]

5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted
[OMITTED]

5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]

5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster [OMITTED]

5.8. CA or RA termination

   <Describe the fallback your policy for management of your CA's IP address
   space and AS number allocations INR distributions
   in case of its own termination.>

6. Technical Security Controls

   This section describes the security controls used by <Name of
   Registry>.

6.1. Key pair generation and installation

6.1.1. Key pair generation

   <Describe the procedures that will be used to generate the CA key
   pair, and, if applicable, key pairs for network subscribers.  In most
   instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the subscriber,
   i.e., the organization receiving the allocation distribution of
   address space or AS numbers. INRs.  However,
   your procedures may include one for generating key pairs on behalf
   of your subscribers if they so request. (This might be done for
   subscribers who do not have the ability to perform key generation in
   a secure fashion or who want a registry to provide backup for the
   subscriber private key.) Since the keys used in this PKI are not for
   non-repudiation purposes, generation of key pairs by CAs does not
   inherently undermine the security of the PKI. > PKI.>

6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber

   <If the procedures in 6.1.1 include providing key pair generation
   services for subscribers, describe the means by which private keys
   are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion. Otherwise say this
   is not applicable.>

6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer

   Subscribers

   <Describe the procedures that will be used to deliver a subscriber's
   public keys to the <Name of Registry> RPKI CA by
   use of CA.  These procedures
   should ensure that the up/down protocol as described in [up/down]. public key has not been altered during
   transit and that the subscriber possesses the private key
   corresponding to the transferred public key. >

6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties

   CA public keys for all entities other (other than RIRs trust anchors) are
   contained in certificates issued by other CAs. These certificates plus
   certificates used to represent inter-RIR transfers of address space
   or AS numbers will CAs and MUST be published via a
   to the RPKI repository system. Relying parties will MUST download these
   certificates from this system. Public key values and associated data
   for the (putative) trust anchors (RIRs) will MUST be distributed out of band, band and
   accepted by relying parties on the basis of locally-defined
   criteria, e.g., embedded in path validation software that will be
   made available to the Internet community.

6.1.5. Key sizes

   For the <Name of Registry> offline CA'sand production CA's
   certificates, the RSA key size will be 2048 bits. For subscriber
   certificates, the RSA keys will be <insert key size -- e.g., 2048 or
   1024 bits. If NIR key size is larger than LIR/ISP/subscriber

   The key
   size, describe each independently.> sizes used in this PKI are as specified in RFC ZZZZ
   [RFCzzzz]. <Describe any deviations from this statement.>

6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking

   The RSA algorithm [RSA] is public key algorithms and parameters used in this PKI with the public exponent
   (e) F4 (65,537). are as
   specified in RFC ZZZZ [RFCzzzz]. <Describe any deviations from this
   statement.>

   <If the procedures in 6.1.1 include subscriber key pair generation,
   EITHER insert here text specifying that the subscriber is
   responsible for performing checks on the quality of its key pair and
   saying that <Name of Registry> is not responsible for performing
   such checks for subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the
   CA for checking the quality of these subscriber key pairs.>

6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

   The Key usage extension bit values will be consistent with RFC 3280. 5280.
   For <Name of Registry>'s CA certificates, the keyCertSign and
   cRLSign bits will be set TRUE. All other bits (including
   digitalSignature) will be set FALSE, and the extension will be
   marked critical.

6.2. Private Key Protection <Specify whether end entity certificates (e.g.,
   issued by the CA for its operators) will include this extension and Cryptographic Module Engineering
     Controls
   if so, the appropriate bit values as per RFC 5280.>

6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
     Controls

6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls

   The <Name of Registry> RPKI CA employs a cryptographic module evaluated
   under FIPS 140-2, 140-2/3, at level 3 [FIPS].

6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control

   There

   <If you choose to use multi-person controls to constrain access to
   your CA's private keys, then insert the following text. ''There will
   be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m> multi-person control.
   control.''>

6.2.3. Private key escrow

   No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI.

6.2.4. Private key backup

   <Describe the procedures used for backing up your CA's private key.
   The following aspects should be included. (1) The copying should be
   done under the same multi-party control as is used for controlling
   the original private key.  (2) At least one copy should be kept at
   an off-site location for disaster recovery purposes.>

6.2.5. Private key archival

   See sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4

6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module

   The private keys for <Name of Registry>'s offline CA and production CA will < if
   appropriate, change ''production CA'' to ''production and offline CAs''>
   MUST be generated by the cryptographic module specified in 6.2.1.
   The private keys will never leave the module except in encrypted
   form for backup and/or transfer to a new module.

6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module

   The private keys key for <Name of Registry>'s production CA will <if
   appropriate, change ''production CA'' to ''production and offline CAs''>
   MUST be stored in the cryptographic module and will be protected
   from unauthorized use in accordance with the FIPS 140-2 140-2/3
   requirements applicable to the module. (See [FIPS])

6.2.8. Method of activating private key

   <Describe the mechanisms and data used to activate your CA's private
   key.>

6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key

   The cryptographic module, when activated, will not be left
   unattended.  After use, it will be deactivated by <Describe the
   procedure for deactivation of your CA's private key.> The module
   will be stored securely when not in use.

6.2.10. Method of destroying private key

   <Describe the method used for destroying your CA's private key,
   e.g., when it is superseded.  This will depend on the particular
   module.>

6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating

   The cryptographic module used by the <Name of Registry> production
   CA will be certified FIPS 140-2, 140-2/3, at level 3 [FIPS].

6.3. Other aspects of key pair management

6.3.1. Public key archival

   Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
   to archive public keys.

6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods

   The <Name of Registry> CA's key pair will have a validity interval
   of <insert number of years -                                   - Registry key pairs and certificates
   should have long validity intervals, e.g., 10 years, to minimize the
   disruption caused by key changeover for top tier CAs.>

6.4. Activation data

6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation

   <Describe how activation data for your CA will be generated.>

6.4.2. Activation data protection

   Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by
   <Describe your procedures here>.

6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data

   <Add here any details you wish to provide with regard to the
   activation data for your CA. If there are none, say "None."> ''None.''>

6.5. Computer security controls

6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement

   <Describe your security requirements for the computers used to
   support this PKI, e.g., requirements for authenticated logins, audit
   capabilities, etc.  These requirements should be commensurate with
   those used for the computers used for managing allocation distribution of IP
   addresses and AS numbers.>

6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]
   INRs.>

6.6. Life cycle technical controls

6.6.1. System development controls

   <Describe any system development controls that you will apply to the
   PKI systems, e.g., use of Trusted System Development Methodology
   (TSDM) Level 2.>

6.6.2. Security management controls

   <Describe the security management controls that will be used for the
   RPKI software and equipment employed by the CA.  These security
   measures should be commensurate with those used for the systems used
   by the CAs for managing and allocating RPKI resources.> distributing INRs.>

6.6.3. Life cycle security controls

   <Describe how the equipment (hardware and software) used for PKI RPKI
   functions will be procured, installed, maintained, and updated.
   This should be done in a fashion commensurate with the way in which
   equipment for the management and allocation distribution of IP address space and
   AS numbers INRs is handled. >

6.7. Network security controls

   <Describe the network security controls that will be used for CA
   operation.  These should be commensurate with the network security
   controls employed for the computers used for managing allocation distribution
   of
   IP addresses and AS numbers.> INRs.>

6.8. Time-stamping

   The PKI in question RPKI does not make use of time stamping.

7. Certificate and CRL Profiles

8. Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy].

7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]

7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.3. Optional certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]

7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]

7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]

7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]

7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED]

7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]

7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies
extension [OMITTED]

7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]

7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.3. Optional CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]

7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]
8.

Compliance Audit and Other Assessments

   <List here any audit and other assessments used to ensure the
   security of the administration of IP addresses and AS numbers. INRs. These are sufficient for the PKI
   RPKI systems.>

8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment

8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor

8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity

8.4. Topics covered by assessment

8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency

8.6. Communication of results
9. Other Business And Legal Matters

   <The sections below are optional. Fill them in as appropriate for
   your organization. The CP says that CAs should cover 9.1 to 9.11 and
   9.13 to 9.17 although not every CA will choose to do so. Note that
   the manner in which you manage your business and legal matters for
   this PKI should be commensurate with the way in which you manage
   business and legal matters for the
   allocation distribution of RPKI resources.> INRs.>

9.1. Fees

9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees

9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable)

9.1.3. Refund policy

9.2. Financial responsibility

9.2.1. Insurance coverage

9.2.2. Other assets

9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities

9.3. Confidentiality of business information

9.3.1. Scope of confidential information

9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential information

9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information

9.4. Privacy of personal information

9.4.1. Privacy plan

9.4.2. Information treated as private

9.4.3. Information not deemed private

9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information

9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information

9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process
9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances

9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable)

9.6. Representations and warranties

9.6.1. CA representations and warranties

9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties

9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties

9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants [OMITTED]

9.7. Disclaimers of warranties

9.8. Limitations of liability

9.9. Indemnities

9.10. Term and termination

9.10.1. Term

9.10.2. Termination

9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival

9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants

9.12. Amendments

9.12.1. Procedure for amendment

9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period

9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED]

9.13. Dispute resolution provisions

9.14. Governing law

9.15. Compliance with applicable law

9.16. Miscellaneous provisions

9.16.1. Entire agreement

9.16.2. Assignment

9.16.3. Severability
9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)

9.16.5. Force Majeure

9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]
10. Security Considerations

   The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied
   in a certificate depends on several factors.  These factors can
   include the practices followed by the certification authority (CA)
   in authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy,
   procedures, and technical security controls, including the scope of
   the subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the
   private key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms
   and conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of
   warranties, and limitations of liability). This document provides a
   framework to address the technical, procedural, personnel, and
   physical security aspects of Certification Authorities, Registration
   Authorities, repositories, subscribers, and relying party
   cryptographic modules, in order to ensure that the certificate
   generation, publication, renewal, re-key, usage, and revocation is
   done in a secure manner.  Specifically, Section 3 Identification and
   Authentication (I&A); Section 4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational
   Requirements; Section 5 Facility Management, and Operational
   Controls; Section 6 Technical Security Controls; Section 7
   Certificate and CRL Profiles; and Section 8 Compliance Audit and
   Other Assessments are oriented towards ensuring secure operation of
   the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and
   relying party systems.

11. IANA Considerations

   None.

12. Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Geoff Huston for reviewing this
   document and
   document, Matt Lepinski for his help with the formatting. formatting, and Ron
   Watro for assistance with editing.

13. References

13.1. Normative References

   [RFC2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
         Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3280]   Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W., Solo, D., "Internet ''Internet
         X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
         Revocation List (CRL) Profile", Profile,'' BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFCxxxx]   Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S., "Certificate
         ''Certificate Policy for the Resource PKI (RPKI)", (RPKI),'' work in
         progress.

   [RFCyyyy]   Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Loomans, R., ''A Profile for
         X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", Certificates,'' work in progress.

   [up/down]   Houston,

   [RFCzzzz]   Huston, G., Loomis, R., Ellacott, B.,  Austein, R., "A
         Protocol ''A Profile for Provisioning Algorithms and Key Sizes for
         use in the Resource Certificates", Public Key Infrastructure,''  work in
         progress.

13.2. Informative References

   [BGP4]   Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors),  A Border Gateway Protocol 4
         (BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995.

   [cps-business-pki]   <Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for
         this registry's business PKI -- to be filled in>

   [FIPS]   Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2
         (FIPS PUB 140-2), 140-3
         (FIPS-140-3), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic
         Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National
         Institute of Standards and Technology, May 25, 2001.

   [operations-business-pki]  <Document or pointer to document
         describing the operations of this registry's business PKI --
         to be filled in> work in progress.

   [RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method for
         obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems.
         Commun. ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126.

Author's Addresses

   Stephen Kent
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA
   Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
   Email: skent@bbn.com

   Derrick Kong
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA

   Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951
   Email: dkong@bbn.com

   Karen Seo
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA

   Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
   Email: kseo@bbn.com

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