--- 1/draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-00.txt 2007-07-10 20:12:17.000000000 +0200 +++ 2/draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-01.txt 2007-07-10 20:12:17.000000000 +0200 @@ -1,19 +1,17 @@ Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr) Kong, D. Internet Draft Seo, K. -Expires: August 2007 Kent, S. +Expires: January 2008 Kent, S. Intended Status: Informational BBN Technologies - February 2007 - Template for an Internet Service Provider's Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for the Internet IP address and AS Number PKI - draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-00.txt + draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-01.txt Status of this Memo By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering @@ -25,21 +23,21 @@ and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html - This Internet-Draft will expire on July 25, 2007. + This Internet-Draft will expire on January 8, 2008. Abstract This document contains a template to be used for creating a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for a Local Internet Registry (LIR) or Internet Service Provider (ISP) that is part of the Internet IP Address and Autonomous System (AS) Number Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Conventions used in this document @@ -100,62 +98,62 @@ 4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............21 4.2. Certificate application processing.......................21 4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions21 4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...21 4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............22 4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................22 4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............22 4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate................................................22 4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other - entities [OMITTED].........................................23 - 4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................23 - 4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........23 - 4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............23 - 4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................23 + entities [OMITTED].........................................22 + 4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................22 + 4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........22 + 4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............22 + 4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................22 4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........23 4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......23 - 4.6. Certificate renewal......................................24 - 4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................24 - 4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................24 + 4.6. Certificate renewal......................................23 + 4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................23 + 4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................23 4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............24 4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber24 4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate ...........................................................24 - 4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....25 + 4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....24 4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other - entities [OMITTED].........................................25 - 4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................25 - 4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................25 + entities [OMITTED].........................................24 + 4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................24 + 4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................24 4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...25 4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........25 - 4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber26 + 4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber25 4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed - certificate................................................26 - 4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...26 + certificate................................................25 + 4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...25 4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED].........................................26 4.8. Certificate modification.................................26 4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........26 4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............26 - 4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........27 + 4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........26 4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to - subscriber.................................................27 + subscriber.................................................26 4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate ...........................................................27 4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...27 4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED].........................................27 4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................27 4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................27 4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................27 - 4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................28 + 4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................27 4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................28 4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request ...........................................................28 4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties.28 4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................28 4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................28 4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED]..................................................29 4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED].29 4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available @@ -318,21 +316,21 @@ 9.4.2. Information treated as private......................43 9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................43 9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......43 9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......43 9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process....................................................43 9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........43 9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............43 9.6. Representations and warranties...........................43 9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................43 - 9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........43 + 9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........44 9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties........44 9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants [OMITTED]..................................................44 9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................44 9.8. Limitations of liability.................................44 9.9. Indemnities..............................................44 9.10. Term and termination....................................44 9.10.1. Term...............................................44 9.10.2. Termination........................................44 9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................44 @@ -343,79 +341,79 @@ 9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED] ...........................................................44 9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................44 9.14. Governing law...........................................44 9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................44 9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................44 9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................44 9.16.2. Assignment.........................................44 9.16.3. Severability.......................................44 9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights).44 - 9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................44 - 9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]..............................44 + 9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................45 + 9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]..............................45 10. Security Considerations......................................45 11. IANA Considerations..........................................45 12. Acknowledgments..............................................45 13. References...................................................46 13.1. Normative References....................................46 13.2. Informative References..................................46 Author's Addresses...............................................47 Intellectual Property Statement..................................48 Disclaimer of Validity...........................................48 Copyright Statement..............................................48 Preface This document contains a template to be used for creating a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for a Local Internet Registry or an Internet Service Provider that is part of the Internet IP Address and Autonomous System (AS) Number Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). The user of this document should - 1. substitute a title page for page 1 saying, e.g., '' Certification Practice Statement for the Internet IP - Address and AS Number Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)'' with + Address and AS Number Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)" with date, author, etc. 2. leave the table of contents 3. delete this Preface 4. fill in the information indicated below by 5. delete sections 10, 11, 12, 13.1, Acknowledgments, Author's Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a reference section with just the references in 13.2 6. update the table of contents to reflect the changes required by steps 4 and 5 above . Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained - section heading ''place holders'' for these omitted sections, in - order to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme - employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are - included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant - sections are also marked [OMITTED]. There is a note to this effect - in the Introduction below. This information should be left in the - CPS as an explanation to the user. + section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections, in order + to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme employed + in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are included and + marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant sections are + also marked [OMITTED]. There is a note to this effect in the + Introduction below. This information should be left in the CPS as an + explanation to the user. 1. Introduction This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of . It describes the practices employed by the Certification Authority (CA) in the Internet IP Address and Autonomous System (AS) Number PKI. These practices are defined in - accordance with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP, - [RFCxxxx]) of this PKI. + accordance with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP, [CP]) + of this PKI. The Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI is aimed at supporting improved routing security. The goal is that each entity that allocates IP addresses or AS numbers to an entity will, in parallel, issue a certificate reflecting this allocation. These certificates will enable verification that the holder of the associated private key has been allocated the resources indicated in the certificate, and is the current, unique holder of these resources. The certificates and CRLs, in conjunction with ancillary digitally signed data structures, will provide critical inputs for routing security @@ -442,25 +440,25 @@ For this particular CPS, it should be noted that LIRs/ISPs do not allocate AS numbers to their subscribers; instead subscribers receive AS numbers from the RIR for their region. Thus, the certificates issued by cover only IP address allocations. However, in places in this document, text applying to the overall PKI may refer to both IP address space and AS numbers. Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained - section heading ''place holders'' for these omitted sections, in - order to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme - employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are - included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant - sections are also marked [OMITTED]. + section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections, in order + to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme employed + in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are included and + marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant sections are + also marked [OMITTED]. 1.1. Overview This CPS describes: o Participants o Distribution of the certificates and CRLs o How certificates are issued, managed, and revoked @@ -472,87 +470,87 @@ o Audit procedures o Business and legal issues The PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see appendix in the CP for more details): o CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks and/or AS numbers, and for each address space (AS number) holder -o End entity (''shadow'') certificates for organizations to use in +o End entity ("shadow") certificates for organizations to use in verifying Route Origination Authorizations (ROAs) and other (non- certificate/CRL) signed objects o In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in support of access control for the repository system 1.2. Document name and identification - The name of this document is '''s Certification - Practice Statement for the Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI''. + The name of this document is "'s Certification + Practice Statement for the Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI". 1.3. PKI participants - Note: In a PKI, the term ''subscriber'' refers to an individual or + Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives - service from an ISP. Thus, in this PKI, the term ''subscriber'' can + service from an ISP. Thus, in this PKI, the term "subscriber" can refer both to ISPs, which can be subscribers of RIRs, NIRs, and LIRs, and also to organizations that are not ISPs, but which are subscribers of LIRs/ISPs in the networking sense of the term. Also note that, for brevity, this document always refers to subscribers as organizations, even though some subscribers are individuals. When - necessary, the phrase ''network subscriber'' is used to refer to an + necessary, the phrase "network subscriber" is used to refer to an organization that receives network services from an LIR/ISP. 1.3.1. Certification authorities will operate a CA, the primary function of which is the issuance of certificates to organizations to which address space is allocated by . This CA will also issue end entity - (''shadow'') certificates for use in verifying signatures of ROAs. In + ("shadow") certificates for use in verifying signatures of ROAs. In the future, this CA may also issue other types of end entity (EE) certificates, e.g., EE certificates to operations personnel in support of repository maintenance. 1.3.2. Registration authorities For the certificates issued by this LIR/ISP under this PKI, this function is provided by the LIR/ISP per se. The LIR/ISP already performs this function -- establishing a formal relationship with each subscriber and assuming responsibility for allocating and tracking the current allocation of address space. Since the LIR/ISP operates the CA, there is no distinct RA. 1.3.3. Subscribers The primary types of organizations that receive allocations of IP addresses from this CA and thus are subscribers in the PKI sense are - network subscribers. + network subscribers. 1.3.4. Relying parties Entities that need to validate claims of address space current holdings are relying parties. Thus, for example, entities that make use of address certificates in support of improved routing security are relying parties. This includes LIRs/ISPs, multi-homed organizations exchanging BGP [BGP4] traffic with LIRs/ISPs, and subscribers who have received an allocation of address space from one ISP or from a registry, but want to authorize an (or another) LIR/ISP to originate routes to this space. To the extent that repositories make use of certificates for access - control -- checking for authorization to upload certificate, CRL, and + control - checking for authorization to upload certificate, CRL, and ROA updates -- they too act as relying parties. 1.3.5. Other participants [OMITTED] 1.4. Certificate usage 1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in support of validation of claims of current holdings of address space @@ -658,23 +656,21 @@ 2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication As per the CP, the following standards exist for publication times and frequency: -o A certificate will be published within 24 hours after a CA has - received acknowledgement from the subject of the certificate that the - certificate is accurate. +o A certificate will be published within 24 hours after issuance. o The CA will publish its CRL prior to the nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA. Within 12 hours of effecting revocation, the CA will publish a CRL with an entry for the revoked certificate. o A new ROA will be published before a predecessor ROA has expired, or within 24 hours after an address space holder has changed the set of ASes that is authorized to advertise the address blocks it holds. @@ -700,27 +696,27 @@ 3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful The Subject name in each subscriber certificate will be unique relative to all certificates issued by . However, there is no guarantee that the subject name will be globally unique in this PKI. Note: The certificates issued under this PKI are used for authorization in support of routing security, not for identification. - The name of the holder of an address block need not be ''meaningful'' + The name of the holder of an address block need not be "meaningful" in the conventional, human-readable sense. 3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers Although Subject names in certificates issued by this LIR/ISP need - not be meaningful, and may appear ''random,'' anonymity is not a + not be meaningful, and may appear "random," anonymity is not a function of this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature is provided. 3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms None 3.1.5. Uniqueness of names certifies Subject names that are unique among the @@ -807,21 +803,22 @@ organization requesting a re-key is the legitimate holder of the certificate (and associated address space) to be re-keyed. This should also include the method employed for verifying PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public key. With respect to authentication of the holder of the address space, the procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in the maintenance of address allocation. Note that your organization can choose to require periodic re-keying consistent with contractual agreements with the recipient.> -3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation +3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after + revocation @@ -850,21 +847,21 @@ 4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements 4.1. Certificate Application 4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application The following entities may submit a certificate application to this CA: - o + o o Any entity that holds address space assigned by this LIR/ISP 4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities 4.3. Certificate issuance 4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance - + -4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate +4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of + certificate - + -4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities - [OMITTED] +4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other + entities [OMITTED] 4.4. Certificate acceptance 4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance - When a draft certificate is generated and the subscriber is notified, - it is required that the subscriber review the proposed certificate - and either approve or reject it within days. - - If a certificate remains unprocessed by the requester after days, - + When a certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the repository + and notify the subscriber. This will be done without subscriber + review and acceptance. 4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA - Certificates will be published in the Repository system once - approved. + Certificates will be published in the Repository system once issued + following the conduct described in 4.4.1. 4.5. Key pair and certificate usage - Use of the credentials from the IP Address and AS Number PKI is - discussed in detail in the Appendix of the CP. + A summary of the use model for the IP Address and AS Number PKI is + provided below. 4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage The certificates issued by this LIR/ISP to resource holders are CA certificates. The private key associated with each of these certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and CRLs. Resource holders who are LIRs/ISPs will issue CA certificates to any organizations which they allocate IP address space, one or - more end entity ''shadow'' certificates for use in verifying - signatures on ROAs, and end entity certificates to operators in - support of repository access control. Non-LIR/ISP resource holders - will issue just the latter two kinds of certificates since they - will not be allocating address space to other organizations. + more end entity "shadow" certificates for use in verifying signatures + on ROAs, and end entity certificates to operators in support of + repository access control. Non-LIR/ISP resource holders will issue + just the latter two kinds of certificates since they will not be + allocating address space to other organizations. 4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage The primary relying parties in this PKI are LIRs/ISPs, who will use shadow certificates to verify ROAs, e.g., in support of generating route filters. Repositories will use operator certificates to verify the authorization of entities to engage in repository maintenance activities, and thus repositories represent a secondary type of relying party. 4.6. Certificate renewal 4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal As per the CP, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate Subject. If initiates the renewal process based on the certificate expiration date, then will notify - the resource holder - The validity interval of the new (renewed) certificate will overlap - that of the previous certificate by The + validity interval of the new (renewed) certificate will overlap that + of the previous certificate by , to ensure uninterrupted coverage. Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as compromised. If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of Section 4.7 will apply. 4.6.2. Who may request renewal The certificate holder or may initiate the renewal @@ -1013,37 +983,39 @@ The certificate holder or may initiate the renewal process. 4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests + 4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber 4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate - + When a renewal certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the + repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without + subscriber review and acceptance. 4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA -4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities - [OMITTED] +4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other + entities [OMITTED] 4.7. Certificate re-key 4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key As per the CP, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when required, based on: 1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated private key, or @@ -1080,32 +1052,32 @@ 4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber 4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate - + When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the + repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without + subscriber review and acceptance. 4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA -4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities - [OMITTED] +4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other + entities [OMITTED] 4.8. Certificate modification 4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification As per the CP, modification of a certificate occurs to implement changes to the RFC 3779 extension values in a certificate. A subscriber can request a certificate modification when this information in a currently valid certificate has changed, as a result of changes in the resource holdings of the subscriber. @@ -1128,40 +1100,41 @@ holder, state here what steps will be taken to verify the identity and authorization of the entity requesting the modification.> 4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests -4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to subscriber +4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to + subscriber 4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate - + When a modified certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the + repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without + subscriber review and acceptance. 4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA -4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities - [OMITTED] +4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other + entities [OMITTED] 4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension 4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation As per the CP, certificates can be revoked for several reasons. Either or the subject may choose to end the relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to revoke the certificate. A certificate also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key corresponding to the public key @@ -1212,21 +1185,22 @@ 4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs A CRL will be posted to the repository system with minimal delay after generation. 4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED] 4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED] -4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED] +4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available + [OMITTED] 4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED] 4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED] 4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED] 4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED] 4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED] @@ -1240,22 +1214,22 @@ 4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED] 4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED] 4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED] 4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED] 4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED] -4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices - [OMITTED] +4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and + practices [OMITTED] 5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls 5.1. Physical controls 5.1.1. Site location and construction @@ -1365,44 +1339,47 @@ 5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED] 5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED] 5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED] 5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED] 5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED] -5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) [OMITTED] +5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) + [OMITTED] -5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information [OMITTED] +5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information + [OMITTED] 5.6. Key changeover The CA certificate will contain a validity period that encompasses that of all certificates verifiable using this CA certificate. To support this, will create a new signature key pair, and acquire and publish a new certificate containing the public key of the pair, in advance - of the scheduled change of the current signature key pair. + amount of lead time, e.g., "a minimum of 6 months"> in advance of the + scheduled change of the current signature key pair. 5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED] 5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED] 5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted [OMITTED] 5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED] -5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster [OMITTED] +5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster + [OMITTED] 5.8. CA or RA termination 6. Technical Security Controls This section describes the security controls used by . @@ -1483,23 +1460,23 @@ Controls 6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls The CA employs a cryptographic module evaluated under FIPS 140-2, at level 4 [FIPS]. 6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control out of multi-person - control.''> + control."> 6.2.3. Private key escrow No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI. 6.2.4. Private key backup CA's key pair will have a validity interval of - 6.4. Activation data 6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation 6.4.2. Activation data protection Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by . 6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data + activation data for your CA. If there are none, say "None."> 6.5. Computer security controls 6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement @@ -1614,22 +1594,21 @@ operation. These should be commensurate with the network security controls employed for the computers used for managing allocation of IP addresses.> 6.8. Time-stamping The PKI in question does not make use of time stamping. 7. Certificate and CRL Profiles - Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [draft-ietf-sidr-res- - certs-01. + Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RESCERT]. 7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED] 7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED] 7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED] 7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED] 7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED] @@ -1641,22 +1620,22 @@ 7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED] 7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED] 7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED] 7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED] 7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED] -7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies - extension [OMITTED] +7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate + Policies extension [OMITTED] 7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED] 7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED] 7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED] 7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED] 7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED] @@ -1708,21 +1687,22 @@ 9.2.1. Insurance coverage 9.2.2. Other assets 9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities 9.3. Confidentiality of business information 9.3.1. Scope of confidential information -9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential information +9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential + information 9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information 9.4. Privacy of personal information 9.4.1. Privacy plan 9.4.2. Information treated as private 9.4.3. Information not deemed private @@ -1738,21 +1718,22 @@ 9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable) 9.6. Representations and warranties 9.6.1. CA representations and warranties 9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties 9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties -9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants [OMITTED] +9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants + [OMITTED] 9.7. Disclaimers of warranties 9.8. Limitations of liability 9.9. Indemnities 9.10. Term and termination 9.10.1. Term @@ -1815,39 +1796,42 @@ Other Assessments are oriented towards ensuring secure operation of the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and relying party systems. 11. IANA Considerations None. 12. Acknowledgments + The authors would like to thank Matt Lepinski for his help with the + formatting of this document. + 13. References 13.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W., Solo, D., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. - [RFCxxxx] Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S., "Certificate - Policy for the Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI", RFC - xxxx. + [CP] Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S., "Certificate + Policy for the Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI", + draft-ietf-sidr-cp, July 2007 (work in progress). - [RFCYYYY] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., ''A Profile for - X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates'', work in progress, June - 19, 2006. + [RESCERT] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for + X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", draft-ietf-sidr-res- + certs, June 2007 (work in progress). 13.2. Informative References [BGP4] Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors), A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995. [FIPS] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 (FIPS PUB 140-2), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, May 25, 2001.