--- 1/draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-01.txt 2008-02-26 02:12:27.000000000 +0100 +++ 2/draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-02.txt 2008-02-26 02:12:27.000000000 +0100 @@ -1,17 +1,19 @@ -Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr) Kong, D. -Internet Draft Seo, K. -Expires: January 2008 Kent, S. +Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr) D. Kong +Internet Draft K. Seo +Expires: August 2008 S. Kent Intended Status: Informational BBN Technologies + February 25, 2008 + Template for an Internet Service Provider's Certification Practice - Statement (CPS) for the Internet IP address and AS Number PKI - draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-01.txt + Statement (CPS) for the Resource PKI (RPKI) + draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-02.txt Status of this Memo By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering @@ -23,39 +25,37 @@ and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html - This Internet-Draft will expire on January 8, 2008. + This Internet-Draft will expire on August 31, 2008. Abstract This document contains a template to be used for creating a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for a Local Internet Registry - (LIR) or Internet Service Provider (ISP) that is part of the Internet - IP Address and Autonomous System (AS) Number Public Key - Infrastructure (PKI). + (LIR) or Internet Service Provider (ISP) that is part of the Resource + Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Conventions used in this document The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119]. Table of Contents - Preface...........................................................8 1. Introduction...................................................9 1.1. Overview.................................................10 1.2. Document name and identification.........................11 1.3. PKI participants.........................................11 1.3.1. Certification authorities...........................11 1.3.2. Registration authorities............................12 1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................12 1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................12 1.3.5. Other participants [OMITTED]........................12 1.4. Certificate usage........................................12 @@ -103,74 +103,74 @@ 4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................22 4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............22 4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate................................................22 4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED].........................................22 4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................22 4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........22 4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............22 4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................22 - 4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........23 + 4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........22 4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......23 4.6. Certificate renewal......................................23 4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................23 4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................23 4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............24 4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber24 4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate ...........................................................24 4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....24 4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED].........................................24 4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................24 4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................24 4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...25 4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........25 4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber25 4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate................................................25 4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...25 4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other - entities [OMITTED].........................................26 - 4.8. Certificate modification.................................26 - 4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........26 + entities [OMITTED].........................................25 + 4.8. Certificate modification.................................25 + 4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........25 4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............26 4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........26 4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to subscriber.................................................26 4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate - ...........................................................27 - 4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...27 + ...........................................................26 + 4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...26 4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED].........................................27 4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................27 4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................27 4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................27 4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................27 - 4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................28 + 4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................27 4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request - ...........................................................28 + ...........................................................27 4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties.28 4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................28 4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................28 4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability - [OMITTED]..................................................29 - 4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED].29 + [OMITTED]..................................................28 + 4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED].28 4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available - [OMITTED]..................................................29 - 4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]...29 - 4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED].............29 - 4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]...............29 - 4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED].........29 - 4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]..............29 - 4.10. Certificate status services.............................29 + [OMITTED]..................................................28 + 4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]...28 + 4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED].............28 + 4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]...............28 + 4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED].........28 + 4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]..............28 + 4.10. Certificate status services.............................28 4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED}..............29 4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED].....................29 4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]........................29 4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]...........................29 4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED].......................29 4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED] ...........................................................29 4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]........................................29 5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls................30 @@ -358,27 +358,25 @@ 13.2. Informative References..................................46 Author's Addresses...............................................47 Intellectual Property Statement..................................48 Disclaimer of Validity...........................................48 Copyright Statement..............................................48 Preface This document contains a template to be used for creating a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for a Local Internet Registry - or an Internet Service Provider that is part of the Internet IP - Address and Autonomous System (AS) Number Public Key Infrastructure - (PKI). The user of this document should + or an Internet Service Provider that is part of the Resource Public + Key Infrastructure (RPKI). The user of this document should 1. substitute a title page for page 1 saying, e.g., " Certification Practice Statement for the Internet IP - Address and AS Number Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)" with - date, author, etc. + LIR/ISP> Certification Practice Statement for the Resource + Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)" with date, author, etc. 2. leave the table of contents 3. delete this Preface 4. fill in the information indicated below by 5. delete sections 10, 11, 12, 13.1, Acknowledgments, Author's Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of @@ -396,35 +394,34 @@ in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are included and marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant sections are also marked [OMITTED]. There is a note to this effect in the Introduction below. This information should be left in the CPS as an explanation to the user. 1. Introduction This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of . It describes the practices employed by the Certification Authority (CA) in the Internet IP Address and - Autonomous System (AS) Number PKI. These practices are defined in - accordance with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP, [CP]) - of this PKI. + LIR/ISP> Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource PKI. These + practices are defined in accordance with the requirements of the + Certificate Policy (CP, [RFCxxxx]) of this PKI. - The Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI is aimed at supporting - improved routing security. The goal is that each entity that - allocates IP addresses or AS numbers to an entity will, in parallel, - issue a certificate reflecting this allocation. These certificates - will enable verification that the holder of the associated private - key has been allocated the resources indicated in the certificate, - and is the current, unique holder of these resources. The - certificates and CRLs, in conjunction with ancillary digitally signed - data structures, will provide critical inputs for routing security - mechanisms, e.g., generation of route filters by LIRs/ISPs. + The Resource PKI is aimed at supporting improved routing security. + The goal is that each entity that allocates IP addresses or AS + numbers to an entity will, in parallel, issue a certificate + reflecting this allocation. These certificates will enable + verification that the holder of the associated private key has been + allocated the resources indicated in the certificate, and is the + current, unique holder of these resources. The certificates and CRLs, + in conjunction with ancillary digitally signed data structures, will + provide critical inputs for routing security mechanisms, e.g., + generation of route filters by LIRs/ISPs. The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which this CPS was created is that it does not purport to identify an address space holder or AS number holder via the subject name contained in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each certificate issued under this policy is intended to enable an entity to assert in a verifiable fashion, that it is the current holder of an address block or an AS number, based on the current records of the entity responsible for the resources in question. Verification of the assertion is based on two criteria: the ability of the entity to @@ -470,31 +467,32 @@ o Audit procedures o Business and legal issues The PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see appendix in the CP for more details): o CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks and/or AS numbers, and for each address space (AS number) holder -o End entity ("shadow") certificates for organizations to use in - verifying Route Origination Authorizations (ROAs) and other (non- +o End entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use in verifying + Route Origination Authorizations (ROAs) and other (non- certificate/CRL) signed objects o In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in support of access control for the repository system 1.2. Document name and identification The name of this document is "'s Certification - Practice Statement for the Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI". + Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure + (RPKI)". 1.3. PKI participants Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives service from an ISP. Thus, in this PKI, the term "subscriber" can refer both to ISPs, which can be subscribers of RIRs, NIRs, and LIRs, @@ -503,22 +501,22 @@ note that, for brevity, this document always refers to subscribers as organizations, even though some subscribers are individuals. When necessary, the phrase "network subscriber" is used to refer to an organization that receives network services from an LIR/ISP. 1.3.1. Certification authorities will operate a CA, the primary function of which is the issuance of certificates to organizations to which address space is allocated by . This CA will also issue end entity - ("shadow") certificates for use in verifying signatures of ROAs. In - the future, this CA may also issue other types of end entity (EE) + (EE) certificates for use in verifying signatures of ROAs. In the + future, this CA may also issue other types of end entity (EE) certificates, e.g., EE certificates to operations personnel in support of repository maintenance. 1.3.2. Registration authorities For the certificates issued by this LIR/ISP under this PKI, this function is provided by the LIR/ISP per se. The LIR/ISP already performs this function -- establishing a formal relationship with each subscriber and assuming responsibility for allocating and tracking the current allocation of address space. Since the LIR/ISP @@ -926,42 +924,41 @@ review and acceptance. 4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA Certificates will be published in the Repository system once issued following the conduct described in 4.4.1. 4.5. Key pair and certificate usage - A summary of the use model for the IP Address and AS Number PKI is - provided below. + A summary of the use model for the Resource PKI is provided below. 4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage The certificates issued by this LIR/ISP to resource holders are CA certificates. The private key associated with each of these certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and CRLs. Resource holders who are LIRs/ISPs will issue CA certificates to any organizations which they allocate IP address space, one or - more end entity "shadow" certificates for use in verifying signatures - on ROAs, and end entity certificates to operators in support of + more end entity (EE) certificates for use in verifying signatures on + ROAs, and end entity certificates to operators in support of repository access control. Non-LIR/ISP resource holders will issue just the latter two kinds of certificates since they will not be allocating address space to other organizations. 4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage The primary relying parties in this PKI are LIRs/ISPs, who will use - shadow certificates to verify ROAs, e.g., in support of generating - route filters. Repositories will use operator certificates to verify - the authorization of entities to engage in repository maintenance + EE certificates to verify ROAs, e.g., in support of generating route + filters. Repositories will use operator certificates to verify the + authorization of entities to engage in repository maintenance activities, and thus repositories represent a secondary type of relying party. 4.6. Certificate renewal 4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal As per the CP, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate Subject. If initiates the renewal process based on @@ -1423,23 +1414,22 @@ Except for the Root CA, all CA public keys used in this PKI are contained in certificates issued by other CAs and will be published via a repository system. Relying parties will download these certificates from this system. Public key values and associated data for the default trust anchors (RIRs) will be distributed out of band, e.g., embedded in path validation software that will be made available to the Internet community. 6.1.5. Key sizes - For the CA's certificate and shadow CA certificate, - the RSA key size will be + For the CA's certificate, the RSA key size will be + 6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking The RSA algorithm [RSA] is used in this PKI with the public exponent (e) F4 (65,537). is not responsible for performing such checks for @@ -1475,32 +1464,30 @@ No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI. 6.2.4. Private key backup - 6.2.5. Private key archival See sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module - The private keys for 's CA and shadow CA will be - generated by the cryptographic module specified in 6.2.1. The - private keys will never leave the module except in encrypted form for - backup and/or transfer to a new module. - + The private key for 's CA will be generated by the + cryptographic module specified in 6.2.1. The private keys will never + leave the module except in encrypted form for backup and/or transfer + to a new module. 6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module The private keys for 's CA will be stored in the cryptographic module and will be protected from unauthorized use in accordance with the FIPS 140-2 requirements applicable to the module. (See [FIPS]) 6.2.8. Method of activating private key 6.8. Time-stamping The PKI in question does not make use of time stamping. 7. Certificate and CRL Profiles - Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RESCERT]. + Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy]. 7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED] 7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED] 7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED] 7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED] 7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED] @@ -1811,27 +1794,27 @@ 13.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W., Solo, D., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. - [CP] Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S., "Certificate - Policy for the Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI", - draft-ietf-sidr-cp, July 2007 (work in progress). + [RFCxxxx] Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S., "Certificate + Policy for the Resource PKI (RPKI)", work in progress, + February 2008. - [RESCERT] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for - X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", draft-ietf-sidr-res- - certs, June 2007 (work in progress). + [RFCyyyy] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for + X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", work in progress, + November 2007. 13.2. Informative References [BGP4] Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors), A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995. [FIPS] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 (FIPS PUB 140-2), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, May 25, 2001. @@ -1898,15 +1881,15 @@ This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Copyright Statement - Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). + Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.