Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr)                             Kong,                              D. Kong
Internet Draft                                                  Seo,                                                   K. Seo
Expires: January August 2008                                          Kent,                                            S. Kent
Intended Status: Informational                         BBN Technologies
                                                       February 25, 2008

     Template for an Internet Service Provider's Certification Practice
                 Statement (CPS) for the Internet IP address and AS Number Resource PKI
                      draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-01.txt (RPKI)
                       draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-02.txt

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Abstract

    This document contains a template to be used for creating a
    Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for a Local Internet Registry
    (LIR) or Internet Service Provider (ISP) that is part of the Internet
   IP Address and Autonomous System (AS) Number Resource
    Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).

Conventions used in this document

    The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
    "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
    document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].

Table of Contents

   Preface...........................................................8

    1. Introduction...................................................9
       1.1. Overview.................................................10
       1.2. Document name and identification.........................11
       1.3. PKI participants.........................................11
          1.3.1. Certification authorities...........................11
          1.3.2. Registration authorities............................12
          1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................12
          1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................12
          1.3.5. Other participants [OMITTED]........................12
       1.4. Certificate usage........................................12
          1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................12
          1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................13
       1.5. Policy administration....................................13
          1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............13
          1.5.2. Contact person......................................13
          1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy...13
          1.5.4. CPS approval procedures.............................13
       1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................14
    2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................15
       2.1. Repositories.............................................15
       2.2. Publication of certification information.................15
       2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication.........................15
       2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................16
    3. Identification And Authentication.............................17
       3.1. Naming...................................................17
          3.1.1. Types of names......................................17
          3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................17
          3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............17
          3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........17
          3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................17
          3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.18
       3.2. Initial identity validation..............................18
          3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........18
          3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............18
          3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............18
          3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................19
          3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................19
          3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................19
       3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....19
          3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key19
          3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after
          revocation.................................................19
       3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.20
    4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............21
       4.1. Certificate Application..................................21
          4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............21
          4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............21
       4.2. Certificate application processing.......................21
          4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions21
          4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...21
          4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............22
       4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................22
          4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............22
          4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of
          certificate................................................22
          4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
          entities [OMITTED].........................................22
       4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................22
          4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........22
          4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............22
       4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................22
          4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........23 usage........22
          4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......23
       4.6. Certificate renewal......................................23
          4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................23
          4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................23
          4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............24
          4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber24
          4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate
          ...........................................................24
          4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....24
          4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
          entities [OMITTED].........................................24
       4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................24
          4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................24
          4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...25
          4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........25
          4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber25
          4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed
          certificate................................................25
          4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...25
          4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
          entities [OMITTED].........................................26 [OMITTED].........................................25
       4.8. Certificate modification.................................26 modification.................................25
          4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........26 modification...........25
          4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............26
          4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........26
          4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to
          subscriber.................................................26
          4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
         ...........................................................27
          ...........................................................26
          4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...27 CA...26
          4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
          entities [OMITTED].........................................27
       4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................27
          4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................27
          4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................27
          4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................27
          4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................28 period.....................27
          4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request
         ...........................................................28
          ...........................................................27
          4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties.28
          4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................28
          4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................28
          4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability
         [OMITTED]..................................................29
          [OMITTED]..................................................28
          4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED].29 [OMITTED].28
          4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available
         [OMITTED]..................................................29
          [OMITTED]..................................................28
          4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]...29 [OMITTED]...28
          4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED].............29 [OMITTED].............28
          4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]...............29 [OMITTED]...............28
          4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED].........29 [OMITTED].........28
          4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]..............29 [OMITTED]..............28
       4.10. Certificate status services.............................29 services.............................28
          4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED}..............29
          4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED].....................29
          4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]........................29
       4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]...........................29
       4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED].......................29
          4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]
          ...........................................................29
          4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and
          practices [OMITTED]........................................29
    5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls................30
       5.1. Physical controls........................................30
          5.1.1. Site location and construction......................30
          5.1.2. Physical access.....................................30
          5.1.3. Power and air conditioning..........................30
          5.1.4. Water exposures.....................................30
          5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection......................30
          5.1.6. Media storage.......................................30
          5.1.7. Waste disposal......................................30
          5.1.8. Off-site backup.....................................30
       5.2. Procedural controls......................................30
          5.2.1. Trusted roles.......................................30
          5.2.2. Number of persons required per task.................30
          5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role.....30
          5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties................30
       5.3. Personnel controls.......................................30
          5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements31
          5.3.2. Background check procedures.........................31
          5.3.3. Training requirements...............................31
          5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements...............31
          5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence.................31
          5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions..................31
          5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements.................31
          5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel.................31
       5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................31
          5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................31
          5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................31
          5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................32
          5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................32
          5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................32
          5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external)
          [OMITTED]..................................................32
          5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....32
          5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................32
       5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................32
          5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED].................32
          5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]..............32
          5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED].....................32
          5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED].................32
          5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED].32
          5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external)
          [OMITTED]..................................................32
          5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information
          [OMITTED]..................................................32
       5.6. Key changeover...........................................32
       5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............33
          5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]33
          5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted
          [OMITTED]..................................................33
          5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]..33
          5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster
          [OMITTED]..................................................33
       5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................33
    6. Technical Security Controls...................................34
       6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................34
          6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................34
          6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................34
          6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........34
          6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........34
          6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................35
          6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking35
          6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)35
       6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
       Controls......................................................35
          6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........35
          6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......35
          6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................36
          6.2.4. Private key backup..................................36
          6.2.5. Private key archival................................36
          6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module
          ...........................................................36
          6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module.........36
          6.2.8. Method of activating private key....................36
          6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key..................36
          6.2.10. Method of destroying private key...................36
          6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating........................37
       6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................37
          6.3.1. Public key archival.................................37
          6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage
          periods....................................................37
       6.4. Activation data..........................................37
          6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation.........37
          6.4.2. Activation data protection..........................37
          6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data....................37
       6.5. Computer security controls...............................37
          6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement....37
          6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]..................38
       6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................38
          6.6.1. System development controls.........................38
          6.6.2. Security management controls........................38
          6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................38
       6.7. Network security controls................................38
       6.8. Time-stamping............................................38
    7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................39
       7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]............................39
          7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................39
          7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]....................39
             7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED]......39
             7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED]....39
             7.1.2.3. Optional certificate extensions [OMITTED]......39
          7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]..............39
          7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]................................39
          7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]..........................39
          7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]......39
          7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED].....39
          7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]....39
          7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate
          Policies extension [OMITTED]...............................39
       7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]....................................39
          7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................39
          7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]..............39
             7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED]..............39
             7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED]............39
             7.2.2.3. Optional CRL extensions [OMITTED]..............40
       7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]...................................40
          7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................40
          7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]...........................40
    8. Compliance Audit And Other Assessments........................41
       8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment.................41
       8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor......................41
       8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity...............41
       8.4. Topics covered by assessment.............................41
       8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency..................41
       8.6. Communication of results.................................41
    9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................42
       9.1. Fees.....................................................43
          9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees................43
          9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable).............43
          9.1.3. Refund policy.......................................43
       9.2. Financial responsibility.................................43
          9.2.1. Insurance coverage..................................43
          9.2.2. Other assets........................................43
          9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities.....43
       9.3. Confidentiality of business information..................43
          9.3.1. Scope of confidential information...................43
          9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
          information................................................43
          9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information..43
       9.4. Privacy of personal information..........................43
          9.4.1. Privacy plan........................................43
          9.4.2. Information treated as private......................43
          9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................43
          9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......43
          9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......43
          9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative
          process....................................................43
          9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........43
       9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............43
       9.6. Representations and warranties...........................43
          9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................43
          9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........44
          9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties........44
          9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants
          [OMITTED]..................................................44
       9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................44
       9.8. Limitations of liability.................................44
       9.9. Indemnities..............................................44
       9.10. Term and termination....................................44
          9.10.1. Term...............................................44
          9.10.2. Termination........................................44
          9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................44
       9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants.44
       9.12. Amendments..............................................44
          9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................44
          9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................44
          9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED]
          ...........................................................44
       9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................44
       9.14. Governing law...........................................44
       9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................44
       9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................44
          9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................44
          9.16.2. Assignment.........................................44
          9.16.3. Severability.......................................44
          9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights).44
          9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................45
       9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]..............................45
    10. Security Considerations......................................45
    11. IANA Considerations..........................................45
    12. Acknowledgments..............................................45
    13. References...................................................46
       13.1. Normative References....................................46
       13.2. Informative References..................................46
    Author's Addresses...............................................47
    Intellectual Property Statement..................................48
    Disclaimer of Validity...........................................48
    Copyright Statement..............................................48

Preface

    This document contains a template to be used for creating a
    Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for a Local Internet Registry
    or an Internet Service Provider that is part of the Internet IP
   Address and Autonomous System (AS) Number Resource Public
    Key Infrastructure
   (PKI). (RPKI).  The user of this document should
      1. substitute a title page for page 1 saying, e.g., "<Name of
         LIR/ISP> Certification Practice Statement for the Internet IP
        Address and AS Number Resource
         Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)" (RPKI)" with date, author, etc.

      2. leave the table of contents

      3. delete this Preface

      4. fill in the information indicated below by <text in angle
         brackets>

      5. delete sections 10, 11, 12, 13.1, Acknowledgments, Author's
         Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of
         Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a
         reference section with just the references in 13.2

      6. update the table of contents to reflect the changes required by
         steps 4 and 5 above .

    Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
    number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this
    CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained
    section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections, in order
    to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme employed
    in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are included and
    marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant sections are
    also marked [OMITTED]. There is a note to this effect in the
    Introduction below.  This information should be left in the CPS as an
    explanation to the user.

1. Introduction

    This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of <Name
    of LIR/ISP>.  It describes the practices employed by the <Name of
    LIR/ISP> Certification Authority (CA) in the Internet IP Address and
   Autonomous System (AS) Number Resource PKI.   These
    practices are defined in accordance with the requirements of the
    Certificate Policy (CP, [CP]) [RFCxxxx]) of this PKI.

    The Internet IP Address and AS Number Resource PKI is aimed at supporting improved routing security.
    The goal is that each entity that allocates IP addresses or AS
    numbers to an entity will, in parallel, issue a certificate
    reflecting this allocation. These certificates will enable
    verification that the holder of the associated private key has been
    allocated the resources indicated in the certificate, and is the
    current, unique holder of these resources. The certificates and CRLs,
    in conjunction with ancillary digitally signed data structures, will
    provide critical inputs for routing security mechanisms, e.g.,
    generation of route filters by LIRs/ISPs.

    The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which
    this CPS was created is that it does not purport to identify an
    address space holder or AS number holder via the subject name
    contained in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each
    certificate issued under this policy is intended to enable an entity
    to assert in a verifiable fashion, that it is the current holder of
    an address block or an AS number, based on the current records of the
    entity responsible for the resources in question. Verification of the
    assertion is based on two criteria: the ability of the entity to
    digitally sign data producing a signature that is verifiable using
    the public key contained in the corresponding certificate, and
    validation of that certificate in the context of this PKI. This PKI
    is designed exclusively for use in support of validation of claims
    related to address space and AS number holdings, with emphasis on
    support of routing security mechanisms. Use of the certificates and
    CRLs managed under this PKI for any other purpose is a violation of
    this PKI's CP, and relying parties should reject such uses.

    For this particular CPS, it should be noted that LIRs/ISPs do not
    allocate AS numbers to their subscribers; instead subscribers receive
    AS numbers from the RIR for their region.  Thus, the certificates
    issued by <Name of LIR/ISP> cover only IP address allocations.
    However, in places in this document, text applying to the overall PKI
    may refer to both IP address space and AS numbers.

    Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
    number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this
    CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained
    section heading "place holders" for these omitted sections, in order
    to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme employed
    in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are included and
    marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant sections are
    also marked [OMITTED].

1.1. Overview

    This CPS describes:

o  Participants

o  Distribution of the certificates and CRLs

o  How certificates are issued, managed, and revoked

o  Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.)

o  Key management

o  Audit procedures

o  Business and legal issues

    The PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see appendix in
    the CP for more details):

o  CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks
    and/or AS numbers, and for each address space (AS number) holder

o  End entity ("shadow") (EE) certificates for organizations to use in verifying
    Route Origination Authorizations (ROAs) and other (non-
    certificate/CRL) signed objects

o  In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in
    support of access control for the repository system

1.2. Document name and identification

    The name of this document is "<Name of LIR/ISP>'s Certification
    Practice Statement for the Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI". Resource Public Key Infrastructure
    (RPKI)".

1.3. PKI participants

    Note: In a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or
    organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The
    term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
    qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
    the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
    service from an ISP.  Thus, in this PKI, the term "subscriber" can
    refer both to ISPs, which can be subscribers of RIRs, NIRs, and LIRs,
    and also to organizations that are not ISPs, but which are
    subscribers of LIRs/ISPs in the networking sense of the term. Also
    note that, for brevity, this document always refers to subscribers as
    organizations, even though some subscribers are individuals. When
    necessary, the phrase "network subscriber" is used to refer to an
    organization that receives network services from an LIR/ISP.

        1.3.1. Certification authorities

    <Name of LIR/ISP> will operate a CA, the primary function of which is
    the issuance of certificates to organizations to which address space
    is allocated by <Name of LIR/ISP>. This CA will also issue end entity
   ("shadow")
    (EE) certificates for use in verifying signatures of ROAs. In the
    future, this CA may also issue other types of end entity (EE)
    certificates, e.g., EE certificates to operations personnel in
    support of repository maintenance.

        1.3.2. Registration authorities

    For the certificates issued by this LIR/ISP under this PKI, this
    function is provided by the LIR/ISP per se. The LIR/ISP already
    performs this function -- establishing a formal relationship with
    each subscriber and assuming responsibility for allocating and
    tracking the current allocation of address space. Since the LIR/ISP
    operates the CA, there is no distinct RA.

        1.3.3. Subscribers

    The primary types of organizations that receive allocations of IP
    addresses from this CA and thus are subscribers in the PKI sense are
    network subscribers.  <If appropriate, add "Additionally, this LIR
    issues address space to ISPs, who are thus also subscribers.">

        1.3.4. Relying parties

    Entities that need to validate claims of address space current
    holdings are relying parties.  Thus, for example, entities that make
    use of address certificates in support of improved routing security
    are relying parties. This includes LIRs/ISPs, multi-homed
    organizations exchanging BGP [BGP4] traffic with LIRs/ISPs, and
    subscribers who have received an allocation of address space from one
    ISP or from a registry, but want to authorize an (or another) LIR/ISP
    to originate routes to this space.

    To the extent that repositories make use of certificates for access
    control - checking for authorization to upload certificate, CRL, and
    ROA updates -- they too act as relying parties.

        1.3.5. Other participants [OMITTED]

1.4. Certificate usage

        1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses

    The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in
    support of validation of claims of current holdings of address space
    and/or AS numbers, e.g., for routing security. With regard to routing
    security, an initial goal of this PKI is to allow the holder of a set
    of address blocks to be able to declare, in a secure fashion, the AS
    number of each entity that is authorized to originate a route to
    these addresses, including the context of ISP proxy aggregation.
    Additional uses of the PKI, consistent with the basic goal cited
    above, are also permitted under this policy.

    Some of the certificates that may be issued under this hierarchy
    could be used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g.,
    access control for the repository system. Such uses also are
    permitted under this policy.

        1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses

    Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited.

1.5. Policy administration

        1.5.1. Organization administering the document

    This CPS is administered by <Name of LIR/ISP>

        1.5.2. Contact person

    <Insert ISP contact info here>

        1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy

    Not applicable.  Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
    is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS
    numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the public
    key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the same
    organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence they are
    authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding.

        1.5.4. CPS approval procedures

    Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
    is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS
    numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the public
    key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the same
    organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence they are
    authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding.

1.6. Definitions and acronyms

CP-    Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that indicates
        the      applicability of a certificate to a particular
        community and/or class of applications with common security
        requirements.

CPS -  Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that
        specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs
        in issuing certificates.

ISP -  Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing
        and selling Internet services to other organizations.

LIR -  Local Internet Registry. This is an organization, typically a
        network service provider,  that sub allocates the assignment of
        IP addresses for a portion of the area covered by a Regional (or
        National) Registry.

NIR -  National Internet Registry. An NIR is an organization that
        manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a
        portion of the geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry.
        These form an optional second tier in the tree scheme used to
        manage IP address and AS number allocation.

RIR -   Regional Internet Registry.  An RIR is an organization that
        manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a
        specified geopolitical area.  At present, there are five RIRs:
        ARIN (North America), RIPE NCC (Europe), APNIC (Asia -Pacific),
        LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean), and AFRINIC (Africa).

ROA -  Route Origination Authorization.  This is a digitally signed
        object that identifies a network operator, identified by an AS,
        that is authorized to originate routes to a specified set of
        address blocks.

2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities

2.1. Repositories

    As per the CP, certificates and CRLs will be made available for
    downloading by all network operators, to enable them to validate this
    data for use in support of routing security.

    <If you maintain a local repository system, describe here its basic
    set up.>

2.2. Publication of certification information

    <Name of LIR/ISP> will upload certificates and CRLs issued by it to a
    repository that operates as part of a world-wide distributed system
    of repositories. <Name of LIR/ISP> will also upload to this
    repository system any ROAs that it creates.

2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication

    <Describe here your procedures for publication (to the global
    repository system) of the certificates and CRLs that you issue. If
    you choose to outsource publication of PKI data, you still need to
    provide this information for relying parties.>

    As per the CP, the following standards exist for publication times
    and frequency:

o  A certificate will be published within 24 hours after issuance.

o  The <Name of LIR/ISP> CA will publish its CRL prior to the
    nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by
    the CA. Within 12 hours of effecting revocation, the CA will publish
    a CRL with an entry for the revoked certificate.

o  A new ROA will be published before a predecessor ROA has expired, or
    within 24 hours after an address space holder has changed the set of
    ASes that is authorized to advertise the address blocks it holds.

2.4. Access controls on repositories

o   Access to the repository system, for modification of entries,must be
    controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data
    (certificates, CRLs and ROAs) uploaded to a repository are digitally
    signed. Updates to the repository system must be validated to ensure
    that the data being added or replaced is authorized. This document
    does not define the means by which updates are verified, but use of
    the PKI itself to validate updates is anticipated.

3. Identification And Authentication

3.1. Naming

        3.1.1. Types of names

    The Subject of each certificate issued by this LIR/ISP is identified
    by an X.500 Disinguished Name (DN). It will consist of a single CN
    attribute with a value generated by the issuer.

        3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful

    The Subject name in each subscriber certificate will be unique
    relative to all certificates issued by <Name of LIR/ISP>. However,
    there is no guarantee that the subject name will be globally unique
    in this PKI.

    Note: The certificates issued under this PKI are used for
    authorization in support of routing security, not for identification.
    The name of the holder of an address block need not be "meaningful"
    in the conventional, human-readable sense.

        3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers

    Although Subject names in certificates issued by this LIR/ISP need
    not be meaningful, and may appear "random," anonymity is not a
    function of this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature
    is provided.

        3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms

    None

        3.1.5. Uniqueness of names

    <Name of LIR/ISP> certifies Subject names that are unique among the
    certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these
    Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate certificate
    path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor enforced
    through technical means.

        3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks

    Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there is
    no provision to either recognize or authenticate trademarks, service
    marks, etc.

3.2. Initial identity validation

        3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key

    <Describe the method whereby each subscriber will be required to
    demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key
    corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to issuing
    the certificate. Standard methods are described in the Certificate
    Management Protocol (CMP) (RFC 2510) and the Certificate Management
    Messages over CMS protocol (CMC), RFC 2797.>

        3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity

    Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the
    organizational identity of resource holders, with the exception of
    registries. However, certificates are issued to resource holders in a
    fashion that preserves the accuracy of bindings in this ISP's
    records.

    <Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that each
    certificate that is issued accurately reflects your records with
    regard to the organization to which you have allocated (or sub-
    allocated) the address space identified in the certificate. The
    specific procedures employed for this purpose should be commensurate
    with those you already employ as an ISP in the maintenance of address
    allocation.>

        3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity

    Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual
    identity of a resource holder. However, this ISP maintains contact
    information for each resource holder in support of certificate
    renewal, rekey, or revocation.

    <Describe the procedures that will be used to identify at least one
    individual as a representative of each organization that is an
    address space holder. This is done in support of issuance, renewal,
    and revocation of the certificate issued to the organization. The
    procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in
    authenticating individuals as representatives for address space
    holders. Note that this authentication is solely for use by you in
    dealing with the organizations to which you allocate (or sub-
    allocate) address space, and thus must not be relied upon outside of
    this CA-subscriber relationship.>

        3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information

    No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued
    under this certificate policy.

        3.2.5. Validation of authority

    <Describe the procedures that will be used to verify that an
    individual claiming to represent a resource holder to which a
    certificate is issued, is authorized to represent that resource
    holder in this context.  The procedures should be commensurate with
    those you already employ as an LIR/ISP in authenticating individuals
    as representatives of resource holders.>

        3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation

    This PKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
    other PKI.

3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests

        3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key

    <Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that an
    organization requesting a re-key is the legitimate holder of the
    certificate (and associated address space) to be re-keyed.  This
    should also include the method employed for verifying PoP of the
    private key corresponding to the new public key.   With respect to
    authentication of the holder of the address space, the procedures
    should be commensurate with those you already employ in the
    maintenance of address allocation.  Note that your organization can
    choose to require periodic re-keying consistent with contractual
    agreements with the recipient.>

        3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after
           revocation

    <Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that an
    organization requesting a re-key after revocation is the legitimate
    holder of the address space in the certificate being re-keyed. This
    should also include the method employed for verifying PoP of the
    private key corresponding to the new public key.  With respect to
    authentication of the resource holder, the procedures should be
    commensurate with those you already employ in the maintenance of
    resource allocation records.>

3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request

    <Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that the
    resource holder requesting revocation is the subject of the
    certificate (or an authorized representative thereof) to be revoked.
    Note that there may be different procedures for the case where the
    legitimate subject still possesses the original private key as
    opposed to the case when it no longer has access to that key.These
    procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in
    the maintenance of resource holder records.>

    Note:  If additional IP addresses are being added to an
    organization's existing allocation, the old certificate is not
    revoked. Instead, a new certificate is issued with both the old and
    the new resources and the old key. If IP addresses or AS numbers are
    being removed or if there has been a key compromise, then the old
    certificate will be revoked (and a re-key will be performed in the
    event of a key compromise). A subscriber may request that its
    resource holdings be spread over a set of certificates, rather than
    consolidating all resources in one certificate. This may be
    appropriate if the subscriber wants to manage his resource
    allocations as distinct allocations within his organization.

4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

4.1. Certificate Application

        4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application

    The following entities may submit a certificate application to this
    CA:

        o <Insert if appropriate: "Any ISP subordinate to this LIR.">

        o Any entity that holds address space assigned by this LIR/ISP

        4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities

    <Describe your enrollment process for issuing certificates both for
    initial deployment of the PKI and as an ongoing process. Note that
    most of the certificates in this PKI are issued as part of ISP normal
    business practices, as an adjunct to address space allocation, and
    thus a separate application to request a certificate may not be
    necessary.  If so, reference should be made to where these practices
    are documented.>

4.2. Certificate application processing

    <Describe the certificate request/response standards that you will
    employ.  You should make use of existing standards for certificate
    application processing.  Relevant standards include RFC 4210,
    Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management
    Protocol (CMP), RFC 2797, Certificate Management Messages over CMS,
    and RSA Labs standards PKCS #7 and PKCS #10. >

        4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions

    <Describe your practices for identification and authentication of
    certificate applicants.  Often, existing practices employed by you to
    identify and authenticate organizations form the basis for issuance
    of certificates to these subscribers.  Reference can be made to
    documentation of such existing practices.>

        4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications

    <Describe your practices for approval or rejection of applications
    and refer to documentation of existing business practices relevant to
    this process.  Note that according to the CP, certificate
    applications will be approved based on the normal business practices
    of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's records of address
    space holders. Also, each CA will verify that the requester holds the
    corresponding private key for the public key that will be bound to
    the certificate the CA issues to the requester.>

        4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications

    <You may declare here your expected time frame for processing
    certificate applications.>

4.3. Certificate issuance

        4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance

    <Describe in this section your procedures for issuance of a
    certificate.>

        4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of
           certificate

    <Describe in this section your procedures for notification of a
    subscriber when a certificate has been issued.>

        4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
           entities [OMITTED]

4.4. Certificate acceptance

        4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance

    When a certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the repository
    and notify the subscriber.  This will be done without subscriber
    review and acceptance.

        4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA

    Certificates will be published in the Repository system once issued
    following the conduct described in 4.4.1. <Describe your procedures
    for publication of the approved certificate.>

4.5. Key pair and certificate usage

    A summary of the use model for the IP Address and AS Number Resource PKI is provided below.

        4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage

    The certificates issued by this LIR/ISP to resource holders are CA
    certificates. The private key associated with each of these
    certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and
    CRLs.  Resource holders who are LIRs/ISPs will issue CA certificates
    to any organizations which they allocate IP address space, one or
    more end entity "shadow" (EE) certificates for use in verifying signatures on
    ROAs, and end entity certificates to operators in support of
    repository access control. Non-LIR/ISP resource holders will issue
    just the latter two kinds of certificates since they will not be
    allocating address space to other organizations.

        4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage

    The primary relying parties in this PKI are LIRs/ISPs, who will use
   shadow
    EE certificates to verify ROAs, e.g., in support of generating route
    filters.  Repositories will use operator certificates to verify the
    authorization of entities to engage in repository maintenance
    activities, and thus repositories represent a secondary type of
    relying party.

4.6. Certificate renewal

        4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal

    As per the CP, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on
    its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate
    Subject.  If <Name of LIR/ISP> initiates the renewal process based on
    the certificate expiration date, then <Name of LIR/ISP> will notify
    the resource holder <insert the period of advance warning, e.g., "2
    weeks in advance of the expiration date", or the general policy,
    e.g., "in conjunction with notification of service expiration".>  The
    validity interval of the new (renewed) certificate will overlap that
    of the previous certificate by <insert length of overlap period,
    e.g., 1 week>, to ensure uninterrupted coverage.

    Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the
    previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
    compromised.  If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
    Section 4.7 will apply.

        4.6.2. Who may request renewal

    The certificate holder or <Name of LIR/ISP> may initiate the renewal
    process. <For the case of the certificate holder, describe what steps
    will be taken to verify the identity and authorization of the entity
    requesting the renewal.>
        4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests

   <Describe your procedures for handling certificate renewal requests.
   This must include verification that the certificate in question has
   not been revoked.>
        4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

    <Describe your procedure for notification of new certificate issuance
    to the subscriber. This should be consistent with 4.3.2.>

        4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate

    When a renewal certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the
    repository and notify the subscriber.  This will be done without
    subscriber review and acceptance.

        4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA

    <Describe your policy and procedures for publication of a renewed
    certificate. This should be consistent with 4.4.2.>

        4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
           entities [OMITTED]

4.7. Certificate re-key

        4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key

    As per the CP, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when
    required, based on:

    1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
       private key, or

    2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key
       pair

    If a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the
    replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a
    new key, unless the subscriber requests a re-key at the same time.

    If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
    certificate will be revoked.

    Section 5.6 of the Certificate Policy notes that when a CA signs a
    certificate, the signing key should have a validity period that
    exceeds the validity period of the certificate.  This places
    additional constraints on when a CA should request a re-key.

        4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key

    The holder of the certificate may request a re-key. In addition,
    <Name of LIR/ISP> may initiate a re-key based on a verified
    compromise report. <Describe what steps will be taken to verify the
    identity and authorization of a subscriber to request a re-key when
    the private key has been reported as compromised. Also describe how a
    compromise report received from other than a subscriber is verified.>

        4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests

    <Describe your process for handling re-keying requests.  As per the
    CP, this should be consistent with the process described in Section
    4.3.  So reference can be made to that section.>

        4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

    <Describe your policy regarding notifying the subscriber re:
    availability of the new certificate.  This should be consistent with
    the notification process for any new certificate issuance (see
    section 4.3.2).>

        4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate

    When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the
    repository and notify the subscriber.  This will be done without
    subscriber review and acceptance.

        4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA

    <Describe your policy regarding publication of the new certificate.
    This should be consistent with the publication process for any new
    certificate (see section 4.4.2).>

        4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
           entities [OMITTED]

4.8. Certificate modification

        4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification

    As per the CP, modification of a certificate occurs to implement
    changes to the RFC 3779 extension values in a certificate.  A
    subscriber can request a certificate modification when this
    information in a currently valid certificate has changed, as a result
    of changes in the resource holdings of the subscriber.

    If a subscriber is to be allocated address space in addition to a
    current allocation, then this is accomplished through a certificate
    modification. When a certificate modification is approved, a new
    certificate is issued.  The new certificate will contain the same
    public key and the same expiration date as the original certificate,
    but with the incidental information corrected and/or the address
    space and AS allocations expanded. When previously allocated address
    space is to be removed from a certificate, then the old certificate
    MUST be revoked and a new certificate (reflecting the new allocation)
    issued.

        4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification

    The certificate holder or <Name of LIR/ISP> may initiate the
    certificate modification process. <For the case of the certificate
    holder, state here what steps will be taken to verify the identity
    and authorization of the entity requesting the modification.>

        4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests

    <Describe your procedures for verification of the modification
    request and procedures for the issuance of a new certificate.  These
    should be consistent with the processes described in Sections 4.2 and
    4.3.1.>

        4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to
           subscriber

    <Describe your procedure for notification of issuance of a modified
    certificate.  This should be consistent with the notification process
    for any new certificate (see section 4.3.2).>

        4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate

    When a modified certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the
    repository and notify the subscriber.  This will be done without
    subscriber review and acceptance.

        4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA

    <Describe your procedure for publication of a modified certificate.
    This should be consistent with the publication process for any new
    certificate (see section 4.4.2).>
        4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
           entities [OMITTED]

4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension

        4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation

    As per the CP, certificates can be revoked for several reasons.
    Either <Name of ISP> or the subject may choose to end the
    relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to
    revoke the certificate.  A certificate also may be revoked due to
    loss or compromise of the private key corresponding to the public key
    in the certificate.  Finally, a certificate may be revoked in order
    to invalidate data signed by that certificate.

        4.9.2. Who can request revocation

    The certificate holder or <Name of LIR/ISP> may request a revocation.
    <For the case of the certificate holder, describe what steps will be
    taken to verify the identity and authorization of the entity
    requesting the revocation.>

        4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request

    <Describe your process for handling a certificate revocation request.
    This should include:

o  Procedure to be used by the certificate holder to request a
    revocation

o  Procedure for notification of the certificate holder when the
    revocation is initiated by <Name of LIR/ISP>.>

        4.9.4. Revocation request grace period

    A subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the
    need for revocation has been identified.

        4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request

    <Describe your policy on the time period within which you will
    process a revocation request.>
        4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties

    As per the CP, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and
    checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the
    certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate.

        4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency

    <Name of LIR/ISP> will publish CRLs approximately every 24 hours.
    Each CRL will carry a nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL will be
    published at or before that time. <Name of LIR/ISP> will set the
    nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the
    next scheduled CRL will be issued.

        4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs

    A CRL will be posted to the repository system with minimal delay
    after generation.

        4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED]

        4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED]

        4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available
           [OMITTED]

        4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]

        4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED]

        4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]

        4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED]

        4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]

4.10. Certificate status services

    <Name of LIR/ISP> does not support OCSP or SCVP.

        4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED}

        4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED]

        4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]

4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]

4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED]

        4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]

        4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and
           practices [OMITTED]

5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls

5.1. Physical controls

    <As per the CP, describe the physical controls that you employ for
    certificate management. These should be commensurate to those used in
    the management of address space allocation.>

        5.1.1. Site location and construction

        5.1.2. Physical access

        5.1.3. Power and air conditioning

        5.1.4. Water exposures

        5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection

        5.1.6. Media storage

        5.1.7. Waste disposal

        5.1.8. Off-site backup

5.2. Procedural controls

    <As per the CP, describe the procedural security controls that you
    employ for certificate management.  These should be commensurate to
    those used in the management of address space allocation.>

        5.2.1. Trusted roles

        5.2.2. Number of persons required per task

        5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role

        5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties

5.3. Personnel controls

    <As per the CP, describe the personnel security controls that you
    employ for individuals associated with certificate management. These
    should be commensurate to those used in the management of address
    space allocation.>
        5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements

        5.3.2. Background check procedures

        5.3.3. Training requirements

        5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements

        5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence

        5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions

        5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements

        5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel

5.4. Audit logging procedures

        5.4.1. Types of events recorded

    Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the
    certification authority computing equipment.  Audit records will
    include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
    content data relating to the event.  Auditable events include:

   . Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)

   . Messages received requesting CA actions  (e.g., certificate
      requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise
      notifications)

   . Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions

   . Posting of any material to a repository

   . Any attempts to change or delete audit data
    <List here any additional types of events that will be audited.>

        5.4.2. Frequency of processing log

    <Describe your procedures for review of audit logs.>
        5.4.3. Retention period for audit log

    <Describe your policies for retention of audit logs.>

        5.4.4. Protection of audit log

    <Describe your policies for protection of the audit logs.>

        5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures

    <Describe your policies for backup of the audit logs.>

        5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]

        5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED]

        5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments

    <Describe any vulnerability assessments that you will apply (or have
    already applied) to the PKI subsystems.  This should include whether
    such assessments have taken place and any procedures or plans to
    perform or repeat/reassess vulnerabilities in the future.>

5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]

        5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED]

        5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]

        5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED]

        5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED]

        5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED]

        5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external)
           [OMITTED]

        5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information
           [OMITTED]

5.6. Key changeover

    The <Name of LIR/ISP> CA certificate will contain a validity period
    that encompasses that of all certificates verifiable using this CA
    certificate.  To support this, <Name of LIR/ISP> will create a new
    signature key pair, and acquire and publish a new certificate
    containing the public key of the pair, <specify here the minimum
    amount of lead time, e.g., "a minimum of 6 months"> in advance of the
    scheduled change of the current signature key pair.

5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]

        5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]

        5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted
           [OMITTED]

        5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]

        5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster
           [OMITTED]

5.8. CA or RA termination

    <Describe the fallback policy for management of your CA's IP address
    space allocations in case of its own termination.>

6. Technical Security Controls

    This section describes the security controls used by <Name of
    LIR/ISP>.

6.1. Key pair generation and installation

        6.1.1. Key pair generation

    <Describe the procedures that will be used to generate the CA key
    pair, and, if applicable, key pairs for network subscribers.  In most
    instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the subscriber,
    i.e., the organization receiving the allocation of address space.
    However, your procedures may include one for generating key pairs on
    behalf of your subscribers if they so request. (This might be done
    for subscribers who do not have the ability to perform key generation
    in a secure fashion or who want a registry to provide backup for the
    subscriber private key.) Since the keys used in this PKI are not for
    non-repudiation purposes, generation of key pairs by CAs does not
    inherently undermine the security of the PKI.>

        6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber

    <If the procedures in 6.1.1 include providing key pair generation
    services for subscribers, describe the means by which private keys
    are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion. Otherwise say this
    is not applicable.>

        6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer

    <Describe the means by which the public keys are delivered to you,
    e.g., electronic submission using a PKCS#10 Certificate Signing
    Request (CSR).  This description should explain how this public key
    delivery fits in with the process whereby the subscriber requests IP
    address space, authenticates itself, pays for the resources, etc. The
    security of the procedures used by a subscriber to deliver its public
    key to you need only be commensurate with the security of the
    procedures already employed for management of the IP address space.>

        6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties

    Except for the Root CA, all CA public keys used in this PKI are
    contained in certificates issued by other CAs and will be published
    via a repository system. Relying parties will download these
    certificates from this system. Public key values and associated data
    for the default trust anchors (RIRs) will be distributed out of band,
    e.g., embedded in path validation software that will be made
    available to the Internet community.

        6.1.5. Key sizes

    For the <Name of LIR/ISP> CA's certificate and shadow CA certificate, the RSA key size will be
    <insert key size -- e.g., 2048 or 1024 bits.>

        6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking

    The RSA algorithm [RSA] is used in this PKI with the public exponent
    (e) F4 (65,537).

    <If the procedures in 6.1.1 include subscriber key pair generation,
    insert here text specifying EITHER that the subscriber is responsible
    for performing checks on the quality of its key pair and saying that
    <Name of ISP> is not responsible for performing such checks for
    subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the CA for checking
    the quality of these subscriber key pairs.>

        6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

    The Key usage extension bit values will be consistent with RFC 3280.
    For <Name of LIR/ISP>'s CA certificates, the keyCertSign and cRLSign
    bits will be set TRUE. All other bits (including digitalSignature)
    will be set FALSE, and the extension will be marked critical.
    <Specify whether end entity certificates (issued by the CA for its
    operators) will include this extension and if so, the appropriate bit
    values as per RFC 3280.>

6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
    Controls

        6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls

    The <Name of LIR/ISP> CA employs a cryptographic module evaluated
    under FIPS 140-2, at level 4 [FIPS].

        6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control

    <If you choose to use multi-person controls to constrain access to
    this CA's private keys, then insert the following text. "There will
    be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m> multi-person
    control.">
        6.2.3. Private key escrow

    No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI.

        6.2.4. Private key backup

    <Describe the procedures used for backing up your CA's private key.
    The following aspects should be included. (1) The copying should be
    done under the same multi-party control as is used for controlling
    the original private key.  (2) At least one copy should be kept at an
    off-site location for disaster recovery purposes.>
        6.2.5. Private key archival

    See sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4

        6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module

    The private keys key for <Name of LIR/ISP>'s CA and shadow CA will be generated by the
    cryptographic module specified in 6.2.1.  The private keys will never
    leave the module except in encrypted form for backup and/or transfer
    to a new module.
        6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module

    The private keys for <Name of LIR/ISP>'s CA will be stored in the
    cryptographic module and will be protected from unauthorized use in
    accordance with the FIPS 140-2 requirements applicable to the module.
    (See [FIPS])

        6.2.8. Method of activating private key

    <Describe the mechanisms and data used to activate your CA's private
    key.>

        6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key

    The cryptographic module, when activated, will not be left
    unattended.  After use, it will be deactivated by <Describe the
    procedure for deactivation of your CA's private key.> The module will
    be stored securely when not in use.

        6.2.10. Method of destroying private key

    <Describe the method used for destroying your CA's private key, e.g.,
    when it is superseded.  This will depend on the particular module.>
        6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating

    The cryptographic module will be certified FIPS 140-2, at level 2 or
    3 [FIPS].

6.3. Other aspects of key pair management

        6.3.1. Public key archival

    Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
    to archive public keys.

        6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage
           periods

    The <Name of LIR/ISP> CA's key pair will have a validity interval of
    <insert number of years - LIR/ISP key pairs and certificates should
    have reasonably long validity intervals, e.g., 10 years, to minimize
    the disruption caused by key changeover.>

6.4. Activation data

        6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation

    <Describe how activation data for your CA will be generated.>

        6.4.2. Activation data protection

    Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by <Describe
    your procedures here>.

        6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data

    <Add here any details you wish to provide with regard to the
    activation data for your CA. If there are none, say "None.">

6.5. Computer security controls

        6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement

    <Describe your security requirements for the computers used to
    support this PKI, e.g., requirements for authenticated logins, audit
    capabilities, etc.  These requirements should be commensurate with
    those used for the computers used for managing allocation of IP
    addresses.>
        6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]

6.6. Life cycle technical controls

        6.6.1. System development controls

    <Describe any system development controls that you will apply to the
    PKI systems, e.g., use of Trusted System Development Methodology
    (TSDM) Level 2.>

        6.6.2. Security management controls

    <Describe the security management controls that will be used for the
    software and equipment employed by the CA.  These security measures
    should be commensurate with those used for the systems used by the
    CAs for managing and allocating IP addresses.>

        6.6.3. Life cycle security controls

    <Describe how the equipment (hardware and software) used for PKI
    functions will be procured, installed, maintained, and updated.  This
    should be done in a fashion commensurate with the way in which
    equipment for the management and allocation of IP address space is
    handled. >
6.7. Network security controls

    <Describe the network security controls that will be used for CA
    operation.  These should be commensurate with the network security
    controls employed for the computers used for managing allocation of
    IP addresses.>

6.8. Time-stamping

    The PKI in question does not make use of time stamping.

7. Certificate and CRL Profiles

    Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RESCERT]. [RFCyyyy].

7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]

7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.3. Optional certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]

7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]

7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]

7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]

7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED]

7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]

        7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate
           Policies extension [OMITTED]

7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]

7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.3. Optional CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]

7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

        7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]

8. Compliance Audit And Other Assessments

    <List here any audit and other assessments used to ensure the
    security of the administration of IP addresses. These are sufficient
    for the PKI systems.>

8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment

8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor

8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity

8.4. Topics covered by assessment

8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency

8.6. Communication of results

9. Other Business And Legal Matters

    <The sections below are optional. Fill them in as appropriate for
    your organization. Note that the manner in which you manage your
    business and legal matters for this PKI should be commensurate with
    the way in which you manage business and legal matters for the
    allocation of IP addresses.>

9.1. Fees

        9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees

        9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable)

        9.1.3. Refund policy

9.2. Financial responsibility

        9.2.1. Insurance coverage

        9.2.2. Other assets

        9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities

9.3. Confidentiality of business information

        9.3.1. Scope of confidential information

        9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
           information

        9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information

9.4. Privacy of personal information

        9.4.1. Privacy plan

        9.4.2. Information treated as private

        9.4.3. Information not deemed private

        9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information

        9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information

        9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process

        9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances

9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable)

9.6. Representations and warranties

        9.6.1. CA representations and warranties
        9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties

        9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties

        9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants
           [OMITTED]

9.7. Disclaimers of warranties

9.8. Limitations of liability

9.9. Indemnities

9.10. Term and termination

        9.10.1. Term

        9.10.2. Termination

        9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival

9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants

9.12. Amendments

        9.12.1. Procedure for amendment

        9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period

        9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED]

9.13. Dispute resolution provisions

9.14. Governing law

9.15. Compliance with applicable law

9.16. Miscellaneous provisions

        9.16.1. Entire agreement

        9.16.2. Assignment

        9.16.3. Severability

        9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)
        9.16.5. Force Majeure

9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]

10. Security Considerations

    The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied in
    a certificate depends on several factors.  These factors can include
    the practices followed by the certification authority (CA) in
    authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy, procedures,
    and technical security controls, including the scope of the
    subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the private
    key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms and
    conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of
    warranties, and limitations of liability). This document provides a
    framework to address the technical, procedural, personnel, and
    physical security aspects of Certification Authorities, Registration
    Authorities, repositories, subscribers, and relying party
    cryptographic modules, in order to ensure that the certificate
    generation, publication, renewal, re-key, usage, and revocation is
    done in a secure manner.  Specifically, Section 3 Identification and
    Authentication (I&A); Section 4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational
    Requirements; Section 5 Facility Management, and Operational
    Controls; Section 6 Technical Security Controls; Section 7
    Certificate and CRL Profiles; and Section 8 Compliance Audit and
    Other Assessments are oriented towards ensuring secure operation of
    the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and
    relying party systems.

11. IANA Considerations

    None.

12. Acknowledgments

    The authors would like to thank Matt Lepinski for his help with the
    formatting of this document.

13. References

13.1. Normative References

    [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

    [RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W., Solo, D., "Internet X.509
              Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
              Revocation List (CRL) Profile", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March
              1997.

   [CP]

    [RFCxxxx] Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S., "Certificate
              Policy for the Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI",
             draft-ietf-sidr-cp, July 2007 (work Resource PKI (RPKI)", work in progress).

   [RESCERT] progress,
              February 2008.

    [RFCyyyy] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for
              X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", draft-ietf-sidr-res-
             certs, June 2007 (work work in progress). progress,
              November 2007.

13.2. Informative References

    [BGP4]   Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors), A Border Gateway Protocol 4
              (BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995.

    [FIPS]   Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2
              (FIPS PUB 140-2), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic
              Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National
              Institute of Standards and Technology, May 25, 2001.

     [RSA]   Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method
              for obtaining digital signatures and public-key
              cryptosystems. Commun. ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126.

Author's Addresses

    Stephen Kent
    BBN Technologies
    10 Moulton Street
    Cambridge MA 02138
    USA

    Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
    Email: skent@bbn.com

    Derrick Kong
    BBN Technologies
    10 Moulton Street
    Cambridge MA 02138
    USA

    Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951
    Email: dkong@bbn.com

    Karen Seo
    BBN Technologies
    10 Moulton Street
    Cambridge MA 02138
    USA

    Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
    Email: kseo@bbn.com

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    Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). (2008).

    This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
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