draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-03.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-04.txt 
Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr) Kong, D. Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr) Kong, D.
Internet Draft Seo, K. Internet Draft Seo, K.
Expires: May 2009 Kent, S. Expires: October 2010 Kent, S.
Intended Status: Informational BBN Technologies Intended Status: BCP BBN Technologies
November 2008 March 8, 2010
Template for an Internet Service Provider's Certification Practice Template for an Internet Service Provider's Certification Practice
Statement (CPS) for the Resource PKI (RPKI) Statement (CPS) for the Resource PKI (RPKI)
draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-03.txt draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-04.txt
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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Abstract
This document contains a template to be used for creating a This document contains a template to be used for creating a
Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for a Local Internet Registry Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Service
(LIR) or Internet Service Provider (ISP) that is part of the Resource Provider (ISP) that is part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). (RPKI).
Conventions used in this document Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].
Table of Contents Table of Contents
Preface...........................................................8 Preface...........................................................7
1. Introduction...................................................9 1. Introduction...................................................8
1.1. Overview.................................................10 1.1. Overview..................................................8
1.2. Document name and identification.........................11 1.2. Document name and identification..........................9
1.3. PKI participants.........................................11 1.3. PKI participants..........................................9
1.3.1. Certification authorities...........................12 1.3.1. Certification authorities............................9
1.3.2. Registration authorities............................12 1.3.2. Registration authorities.............................9
1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................12 1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................10
1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................12 1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................10
1.3.5. Other participants [OMITTED]........................12 1.3.5. Other participants..................................10
1.4. Certificate usage........................................13 1.4. Certificate usage........................................10
1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................13 1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................10
1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................13 1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................10
1.5. Policy administration....................................13 1.5. Policy administration....................................11
1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............13 1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............11
1.5.2. Contact person......................................13 1.5.2. Contact person......................................11
1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy...13 1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy...11
1.5.4. CPS approval procedures.............................13 1.5.4. CPS approval procedures.............................11
1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................14 1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................11
2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................15 2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................13
2.1. Repositories.............................................15 2.1. Repositories.............................................13
2.2. Publication of certification information.................15 2.2. Publication of certification information.................13
2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication.........................15 2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication.........................13
2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................15 2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................13
3. Identification And Authentication.............................17 3. Identification And Authentication.............................15
3.1. Naming...................................................17 3.1. Naming...................................................15
3.1.1. Types of names......................................17 3.1.1. Types of names......................................15
3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................17 3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................15
3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............17 3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............15
3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........17 3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........15
3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................17 3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................15
3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of 3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks.16
trademarks.................................................18 3.2. Initial identity validation..............................16
3.2. Initial identity validation..............................18 3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........16
3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........18 3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............16
3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............18 3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............16
3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............18 3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................17
3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................19 3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................17
3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................19 3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................17
3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................19 3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....17
3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....19 3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key17
3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-
key........................................................19
3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after 3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after
revocation.................................................19 revocation.................................................18
3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.18
3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.20 4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............19
4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............21 4.1. Certificate Application..................................19
4.1. Certificate Application..................................21 4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............19
4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............21 4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............19
4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............21 4.2. Certificate application processing.......................19
4.2. Certificate application processing.......................21 4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions19
4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication 4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...19
functions..................................................21 4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............20
4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...21 4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................20
4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............22 4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............20
4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................22 4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of
4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............22 certificate................................................20
4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance 4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
of certificate.............................................22 entities...................................................20
4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to 4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................20
other entities [OMITTED]...................................22 4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........20
4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................22 4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............20
4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........22 4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................20
4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............22 4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........21
4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................22 4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......21
4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........22 4.6. Certificate renewal......................................21
4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......23 4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................21
4.6. Certificate renewal......................................23 4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................21
4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................23 4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............22
4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................23 4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber22
4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............24 4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate
4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to ...........................................................22
subscriber.................................................24 4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....22
4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal 4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
certificate................................................24 entities...................................................22
4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....24 4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................22
4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to 4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................22
other entities [OMITTED]...................................24 4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...23
4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................24 4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........23
4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................24 4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber23
4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...25
4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........25
4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to
subscriber.................................................25
4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed 4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed
certificate................................................25 certificate................................................23
4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...25 4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...24
4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to 4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
other entities [OMITTED]...................................25 entities...................................................24
4.8. Certificate modification.................................25 4.8. Certificate modification.................................24
4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........25 4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........24
4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............26 4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............24
4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........26 4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........24
4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to 4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to
subscriber.................................................26 subscriber.................................................25
4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified 4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
certificate................................................26 ...........................................................25
4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...26 4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...25
4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to 4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
other entities [OMITTED]...................................27 entities...................................................25
4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................27 4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................25
4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................27 4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................25
4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................27 4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................25
4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................27 4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................26
4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................27 4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................26
4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation 4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request
request....................................................27 ...........................................................26
4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying 4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties.26
parties....................................................28 4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................26
4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................28 4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................26
4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................28 4.10. Certificate status services.............................26
4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability 5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls................27
[OMITTED]..................................................28 5.1. Physical controls........................................27
4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements 5.1.1. Site location and construction......................27
[OMITTED]..................................................28 5.1.2. Physical access.....................................27
4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements 5.1.3. Power and air conditioning..........................27
available [OMITTED]........................................28 5.1.4. Water exposures.....................................27
4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]...28 5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection......................27
4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED].............28 5.1.6. Media storage.......................................27
4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]...............28 5.1.7. Waste disposal......................................27
4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED].........28 5.1.8. Off-site backup.....................................27
4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]..............28 5.2. Procedural controls......................................27
4.10. Certificate status services.............................28 5.2.1. Trusted roles.......................................27
4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED}..............29 5.2.2. Number of persons required per task.................27
4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED].....................29 5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role.....27
4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]........................29 5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties................27
4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]...........................29 5.3. Personnel controls.......................................27
4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED].......................29 5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements28
4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices 5.3.2. Background check procedures.........................28
[OMITTED]..................................................29 5.3.3. Training requirements...............................28
4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and 5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements...............28
practices [OMITTED]........................................29 5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence.................28
5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls................30 5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions..................28
5.1. Physical controls........................................30 5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements.................28
5.1.1. Site location and construction......................30 5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel.................28
5.1.2. Physical access.....................................30 5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................28
5.1.3. Power and air conditioning..........................30 5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................28
5.1.4. Water exposures.....................................30 5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................28
5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection......................30 5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................29
5.1.6. Media storage.......................................30 5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................29
5.1.7. Waste disposal......................................30 5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................29
5.1.8. Off-site backup.....................................30
5.2. Procedural controls......................................30
5.2.1. Trusted roles.......................................30
5.2.2. Number of persons required per task.................30
5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role.....30
5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties................30
5.3. Personnel controls.......................................30
5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance
requirements...............................................31
5.3.2. Background check procedures.........................31
5.3.3. Training requirements...............................31
5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements...............31
5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence.................31
5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions..................31
5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements.................31
5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel.................31
5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................31
5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................31
5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................31
5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................32
5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................32
5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................32
5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) 5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external)
[OMITTED]..................................................32 [OMITTED]..................................................29
5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....32 5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....29
5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................32 5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................29
5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................32 5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................29
5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED].................32 5.6. Key changeover...........................................29
5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]..............32 5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............29
5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED].....................32 5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................29
5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED].................32 6. Technical Security Controls...................................30
5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records 6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................30
[OMITTED]..................................................32 6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................30
5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) 6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................30
[OMITTED]..................................................32 6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........30
5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive 6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........30
information [OMITTED]......................................32 6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................31
5.6. Key changeover...........................................32 6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking31
5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............33 6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)31
5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures
[OMITTED]..................................................33
5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are
corrupted [OMITTED]........................................33
5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]..33
5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster
[OMITTED]..................................................33
5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................33
6. Technical Security Controls...................................34
6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................34
6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................34
6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................34
6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........34
6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........34
6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................35
6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality
checking...................................................35
6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage
field).....................................................35
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering 6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
Controls......................................................35 Controls......................................................31
6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........35 6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........31
6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......35 6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......31
6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................36 6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................31
6.2.4. Private key backup..................................36 6.2.4. Private key backup..................................32
6.2.5. Private key archival................................36 6.2.5. Private key archival................................32
6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic 6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module
module.....................................................36 ...........................................................32
6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module.........36 6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module.........32
6.2.8. Method of activating private key....................36 6.2.8. Method of activating private key....................32
6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key..................36 6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key..................32
6.2.10. Method of destroying private key...................36 6.2.10. Method of destroying private key...................32
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating........................37 6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating........................33
6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................37 6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................33
6.3.1. Public key archival.................................37 6.3.1. Public key archival.................................33
6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage 6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage
periods....................................................37 periods....................................................33
6.4. Activation data..........................................37 6.4. Activation data..........................................33
6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation.........37 6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation.........33
6.4.2. Activation data protection..........................37 6.4.2. Activation data protection..........................33
6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data....................37 6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data....................33
6.5. Computer security controls...............................37 6.5. Computer security controls...............................33
6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement....37 6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement....33
6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]..................38 6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................34
6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................38 6.6.1. System development controls.........................34
6.6.1. System development controls.........................38 6.6.2. Security management controls........................34
6.6.2. Security management controls........................38 6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................34
6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................38 6.7. Network security controls................................34
6.7. Network security controls................................38 6.8. Time-stamping............................................34
6.8. Time-stamping............................................38 7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................35
7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................39 8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments........................36
7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]............................39 8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment.................36
7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................39 8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor......................36
7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]....................39 8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity...............36
7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]..............39 8.4. Topics covered by assessment.............................36
7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]................................39 8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency..................36
7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]..........................39 8.6. Communication of results.................................36
7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]......39 9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................37
7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED].....39 9.1. Fees.....................................................38
7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]....39 9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees................38
7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate 9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable).............38
Policies extension [OMITTED]...............................39 9.1.3. Refund policy.......................................38
7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]....................................39 9.2. Financial responsibility.................................38
7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................39 9.2.1. Insurance coverage..................................38
7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]..............39 9.2.2. Other assets........................................38
7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]...................................40 9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities.....38
7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................40 9.3. Confidentiality of business information..................38
7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]...........................40 9.3.1. Scope of confidential information...................38
8. Compliance Audit And Other Assessments........................41
8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment.................41
8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor......................41
8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity...............41
8.4. Topics covered by assessment.............................41
8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency..................41
8.6. Communication of results.................................41
9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................42
9.1. Fees.....................................................43
9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees................43
9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable).............43
9.1.3. Refund policy.......................................43
9.2. Financial responsibility.................................43
9.2.1. Insurance coverage..................................43
9.2.2. Other assets........................................43
9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities.....43
9.3. Confidentiality of business information..................43
9.3.1. Scope of confidential information...................43
9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential 9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
information................................................43 information................................................38
9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information..43 9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information..38
9.4. Privacy of personal information..........................43 9.4. Privacy of personal information..........................38
9.4.1. Privacy plan........................................43 9.4.1. Privacy plan........................................38
9.4.2. Information treated as private......................43 9.4.2. Information treated as private......................38
9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................43 9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................38
9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......43 9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......38
9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......43 9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......38
9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative 9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative
process....................................................43 process....................................................38
9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........43 9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........38
9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............43 9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............38
9.6. Representations and warranties...........................43 9.6. Representations and warranties...........................38
9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................43 9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................38
9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........43 9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........39
9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties........44 9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties........39
9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other 9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................39
participants [OMITTED].....................................44 9.8. Limitations of liability.................................39
9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................44 9.9. Indemnities..............................................39
9.8. Limitations of liability.................................44 9.10. Term and termination....................................39
9.9. Indemnities..............................................44 9.10.1. Term...............................................39
9.10. Term and termination....................................44 9.10.2. Termination........................................39
9.10.1. Term...............................................44 9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................39
9.10.2. Termination........................................44 9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants.39
9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................44 9.12. Amendments..............................................39
9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants.44 9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................39
9.12. Amendments..............................................44 9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................39
9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................44 9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................39
9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................44 9.14. Governing law...........................................39
9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed 9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................39
[OMITTED]..................................................44 9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................39
9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................44 9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................39
9.14. Governing law...........................................44 9.16.2. Assignment.........................................39
9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................44 9.16.3. Severability.......................................39
9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................44 9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights).39
9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................44 9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................39
9.16.2. Assignment.........................................44 10. Security Considerations......................................39
9.16.3. Severability.......................................44 11. IANA Considerations..........................................40
9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of 12. Acknowledgments..............................................40
rights)....................................................44 13. References...................................................41
9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................44 13.1. Normative References....................................41
9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]..............................44 13.2. Informative References..................................41
10. Security Considerations......................................45 Author's Addresses...............................................42
11. IANA Considerations..........................................45 Pre-5378 Material Disclaimer.....................................42
12. Acknowledgments..............................................45 Copyright Statement..............................................43
13. References...................................................46
13.1. Normative References....................................46
13.2. Informative References..................................46
Author's Addresses...............................................46
Intellectual Property Statement..................................47
Disclaimer of Validity...........................................48
Copyright Statement..............................................48
Preface Preface
This document contains a template to be used for creating a This document contains a template to be used for creating a
Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for a Local Internet Registry Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an Internet Service
or an Internet Service Provider that is part of the Resource Public Provider that is part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
Key Infrastructure (RPKI). The user of this document should (RPKI). The user of this document should
1. substitute a title page for page 1 saying, e.g., ''<Name of 1. substitute a title page for page 1 saying, e.g., ''<Name of ISP>
LIR/ISP> Certification Practice Statement for the Resource Certification Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)'' with date, author, etc. Infrastructure (RPKI)'' with date, author, etc.
2. leave the table of contents 2. leave the table of contents
3. delete this Preface 3. delete this Preface
4. fill in the information indicated below by <text in angle 4. fill in the information indicated below by <text in angle
brackets> brackets>
5. delete sections 10, 11, 12, 13.1, Acknowledgments, Author's 5. delete sections 10, 11, 12, 13.1, Acknowledgments, Author's
Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of
Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a
reference section with just the references in 13.2 reference section with just the references in 13.2
6. update the table of contents to reflect the changes required by 6. update the table of contents to reflect the changes required by
steps 4 and 5 above . steps 4 and 5 above .
Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this
CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained
section heading ''place holders'' for these omitted sections, in order the section numbering scheme employed in the RFC to facilitate
to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme employed comparison with the section numbering scheme employed in that RFC.
in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are included and [There are 4 sub-sections that I haven't removed yet due to Word
marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant sections are problems.)
also marked [OMITTED]. There is a note to this effect in the
Introduction below. This information should be left in the CPS as an
explanation to the user.
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of <Name This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of <Name
of LIR/ISP>. It describes the practices employed by the <Name of of ISP>. It describes the practices employed by the <Name of ISP>
LIR/ISP> Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource PKI. These Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource Public Key
practices are defined in accordance with the requirements of the Infrastructure (RPKI). These practices are defined in accordance
Certificate Policy (CP, [RFCxxxx]) of this PKI. with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP, [RFCxxxx]) of
this PKI.
The Resource PKI is aimed at supporting improved routing security.
The goal is that each entity that allocates IP addresses or AS
numbers to an entity will, in parallel, issue a certificate
reflecting this allocation. These certificates will enable
verification that the holder of the associated private key has been
allocated the resources indicated in the certificate, and is the
current, unique holder of these resources. The certificates and CRLs,
in conjunction with ancillary digitally signed data structures, will
provide critical inputs for routing security mechanisms, e.g.,
generation of route filters by LIRs/ISPs.
The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which
this CPS was created is that it does not purport to identify an
address space holder or AS number holder via the subject name
contained in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each
certificate issued under this policy is intended to enable an entity
to assert in a verifiable fashion, that it is the current holder of
an address block or an AS number, based on the current records of the
entity responsible for the resources in question. Verification of the
assertion is based on two criteria: the ability of the entity to
digitally sign data producing a signature that is verifiable using
the public key contained in the corresponding certificate, and
validation of that certificate in the context of this PKI. This PKI
is designed exclusively for use in support of validation of claims
related to address space and AS number holdings, with emphasis on
support of routing security mechanisms. Use of the certificates and
CRLs managed under this PKI for any other purpose is a violation of
this PKI's CP, and relying parties should reject such uses.
For this particular CPS, it should be noted that LIRs/ISPs do not The RPKI is designed to support validation of claims by current
allocate AS numbers to their subscribers; instead subscribers receive holders of Internet Number Resources (INRs, see definition in 1.7) in
AS numbers from the RIR for their region. Thus, the certificates accordance with the records of the organizations that act as CAs in
issued by <Name of LIR/ISP> cover only IP address allocations. this PKI. The ability to verify such claims is essential to ensuring
However, in places in this document, text applying to the overall PKI the unique, unambiguous distribution of these resources
may refer to both IP address space and AS numbers.
Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A This PKI parallels the existing INR distribution hierarchy. These
number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this resources are distributed by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained (IANA) to the Regional Internet Registries. In some regions, National
section heading ''place holders'' for these omitted sections, in order Internet Registries (NIRs) form a tier of the hierarchy below the
to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme employed RIRs for internet number resource (INR) distribution. ISPs and
in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are included and network subscribers form additional tiers below registries.
marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant sections are
also marked [OMITTED].
1.1. Overview 1.1. Overview
This CPS describes: This CPS describes:
. Participants . Participants
. Distribution of the certificates and CRLs . Publication of the certificates and CRLs
. How certificates are issued, managed, and revoked
. Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.) . How certificates are issued, managed, and revoked
. Key management . Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.)
. Audit procedures . Key management
. Business and legal issues . Audit procedures
The PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see appendix in . Business and legal issues
the CP for more details): This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see IETF document
draft-ietf-sidr-arch-xx [ARCH] for more details):
. CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks . CA certificates for each organization distributing INRs and for
and/or AS numbers, and for each address space (AS number) holder each subscriber
. End entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use in verifying . End entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use to validate
Route Origination Authorizations (ROAs) and other (non- digital signatures on RPKI-signed objects (see definition in 1.7).
certificate/CRL) signed objects
In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in . In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in
support of access control for the repository system support of access control for the repository system as described in
2.4.
1.2. Document name and identification 1.2. Document name and identification
The name of this document is ''<Name of LIR/ISP>'s Certification The name of this document is ''<Name of ISP>'s Certification Practice
Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)''.
(RPKI)''.
1.3. PKI participants 1.3. PKI participants
Note: In a PKI, the term ''subscriber'' refers to an individual or Note: In a PKI, the term ''subscriber'' refers to an individual or
organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The
term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
service from an ISP. Thus, in this PKI, the term ''subscriber'' can service from an ISP. In such cases the term ''network subscriber'' will
refer both to ISPs, which can be subscribers of RIRs, NIRs, and LIRs, be used. Also note that, for brevity, this document always refers to
and also to organizations that are not ISPs, but which are PKI participants as organizations or entities, even though some of
subscribers of LIRs/ISPs in the networking sense of the term. Also them are individuals.
note that, for brevity, this document always refers to subscribers as
organizations, even though some subscribers are individuals. When
necessary, the phrase ''network subscriber'' is used to refer to an
organization that receives network services from an LIR/ISP.
1.3.1. Certification authorities 1.3.1. Certification authorities
<Name of LIR/ISP> will operate a CA, the primary function of which is <Describe the CAs that you will operate for the RPKI. One approach
the issuance of certificates to organizations to which address space is to operate two CAs: one designated ''offline'' and the other
is allocated by <Name of LIR/ISP>. This CA will also issue end entity designated ''production.'' The offline CA is the top level CA for the
(EE) certificates for use in verifying signatures of ROAs. In the <Name of ISP> portion of the RPKI. It provides a secure revocation
future, this CA may also issue other types of end entity (EE) and recovery capability in case the production CA is compromised or
certificates, e.g., EE certificates to operations personnel in becomes unavailable. Thus the offline CA issues certificates only to
support of repository maintenance. instances of the production CA; and the CRLs it issues are used to
revoke only certificates issued to the production CA. The production
CA is used to issue RPKI certificates to <Name of ISP> members, to
whom INRs have been distributed.>
1.3.2. Registration authorities 1.3.2. Registration authorities
For the certificates issued by this LIR/ISP under this PKI, this <Describe how the registration authority function is handled for the
function is provided by the LIR/ISP per se. The LIR/ISP already CA(s) that you operate. The RPKI does not require establishment or
performs this function -- establishing a formal relationship with use of a separate registration authority (RA) in conjunction with the
each subscriber and assuming responsibility for allocating and CA function. The RA function will be provided by the same entity
tracking the current allocation of address space. Since the LIR/ISP operating as a CA, e.g., entities listed in Section 1.3.1. An entity
operates the CA, there is no distinct RA. acting as a CA in this PKI already has a formal relationship with
each organization to which it distributes INRs. These organizations
already perform the RA function implicitly since they already assume
responsibility for distributing INRs.>
1.3.3. Subscribers 1.3.3. Subscribers
The primary types of organizations that receive allocations of IP The primary types of organizations that receive distributions of INRs
addresses from this CA and thus are subscribers in the PKI sense are from this CA and thus are subscribers in the PKI sense are network
network subscribers. <If appropriate, add ''Additionally, this LIR subscribers.
issues address space to ISPs, who are thus also subscribers.''>
1.3.4. Relying parties 1.3.4. Relying parties
Entities that need to validate claims of address space current Entities or individuals that act in reliance on certificates or RPKI-
holdings are relying parties. Thus, for example, entities that make signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties. Relying
use of address certificates in support of improved routing security parties may or may not be subscribers within this PKI. (See section
are relying parties. This includes LIRs/ISPs, multi-homed 1.7 for the definition of an RPKI-signed object.)
organizations exchanging BGP [BGP4] traffic with LIRs/ISPs, and
subscribers who have received an allocation of address space from one
ISP or from a registry, but want to authorize an (or another) LIR/ISP
to originate routes to this space.
To the extent that repositories make use of certificates for access 1.3.5. Other participants
control - - checking for authorization to upload certificate, CRL, and
ROA updates -- they too act as relying parties. <If <Name of ISP> operates a repository that holds certificates,
CRLs, and other RPKI-signed objects, then indicate this here.>
1.3.5. Other participants [OMITTED]
1.4. Certificate usage 1.4. Certificate usage
1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses 1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses
The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in
support of validation of claims of current holdings of address space support of validation of claims of current holdings of INRs.
and/or AS numbers, e.g., for routing security. With regard to routing
security, an initial goal of this PKI is to allow the holder of a set
of address blocks to be able to declare, in a secure fashion, the AS
number of each entity that is authorized to originate a route to
these addresses, including the context of ISP proxy aggregation.
Additional uses of the PKI, consistent with the basic goal cited
above, are also permitted under this policy.
Some of the certificates that may be issued under this hierarchy Additional uses of the certificates, consistent with the basic goal
could be used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., cited above, are also permitted under the RPKI certificate policy.
access control for the repository system. Such uses also are
permitted under this policy.
1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses Some of the certificates that may be issued under this PKI could be
used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., access
control for the repository system as described in 2.4. Such uses also
are permitted under the RPKI certificate policy.
1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses
Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited. Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited.
1.5. Policy administration 1.5. Policy administration
1.5.1. Organization administering the document 1.5.1. Organization administering the document
This CPS is administered by <Name of LIR/ISP> This CPS is administered by <Name of ISP>
1.5.2. Contact person 1.5.2. Contact person
<Insert ISP contact info here> <Insert ISP contact info here>
1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy 1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy
Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS is attesting to the distribution of INRs to the holder of the private
numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the public key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The issuing
key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the same organizations are the same organizations as the ones that perform the
organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence they are distribution hence they are authoritative with respect to the
authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding. accuracy of this binding.
1.5.4. CPS approval procedures 1.5.4. CPS approval procedures
Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
is attesting to the allocation of resources (IP addresses, AS is attesting to the distribution of INRs to the holder of the private
numbers) to the holder of the private key corresponding to the public key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The issuing
key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the same organizations are the same organizations as the ones that perform the
organizations as the ones that perform the allocation hence they are distribution hence they are authoritative with respect to the
authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding. accuracy of this binding.
1.6. Definitions and acronyms 1.6. Definitions and acronyms
BPKI - Business PKI: A BPKI is an optional additional PKI used to
identify members to whom RPKI certificates can be issued.
CP- Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that indicates CP- Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that indicates
the applicability of a certificate to a particular the applicability of a certificate to a particular community
community and/or class of applications with common security and/or class of applications with common security requirements.
requirements.
CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that
specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs
in issuing certificates. in issuing certificates.
ISP - Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing Distribution of INRs - - A process of distribution of the INRs along the
and selling Internet services to other organizations. respective number hierarchy. IANA distributes blocks of IP
addresses and Autonomous System Numbers to the five Regional
Internet Registries (RIRs). RIRs distribute smaller address
blocks and Autonomous System Numbers to organizations within
their service regions, who in turn distribute IP addresses to
their customers.
LIR - Local Internet Registry. This is an organization, typically a IANA - Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. IANA is responsible for
network service provider, that sub allocates the assignment of global coordination of the Internet Protocol addressing systems
IP addresses for a portion of the area covered by a Regional (or and Autonomous System (AS) numbers used for routing internet
National) Registry. traffic. IANA distributes INRs to Regional Internet Registries
(RIRs).
NIR - National Internet Registry. An NIR is an organization that INRs - Internet Number Resources. INRs are number values for three
manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a protocol parameter sets, namely:
portion of the geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry. . IP Version 4 addresses,
These form an optional second tier in the tree scheme used to
manage IP address and AS number allocation. . IP version 6 addresses, and
. Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing, currently
Border Gateway Protocol-4 Autonomous System numbers.
ISP - - Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing
and selling Internet services to other organizations.
NIR - - National Internet Registry. An NIR is an organization that
manages the distribution of INRs for a portion of the
geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry. NIRs form an
optional second tier in the tree scheme used to manage INR
distribution.
RIR - Regional Internet Registry. An RIR is an organization that RIR - Regional Internet Registry. An RIR is an organization that
manages the assignment of IP address and AS numbers for a manages the distribution of INRs for a geopolitical area.
specified geopolitical area. At present, there are five RIRs:
ARIN (North America), RIPE NCC (Europe), APNIC (Asia -Pacific),
LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean), and AFRINIC (Africa).
ROA - Route Origination Authorization. This is a digitally signed RPKI-signed object - - An RPKI-signed object is a digitally signed data
object that identifies a network operator, identified by an AS, object (other than a certificate or CRL) declared to be such by
that is authorized to originate routes to a specified set of a standards track RFC, and that can be validated using
address blocks. certificates issued under this PKI. The content and format of
these data constructs depend on the context in which validation
of claims of current holdings of INRs takes place. Examples of
these objects are repository manifests and CRLs.
2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities 2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities
2.1. Repositories 2.1. Repositories
As per the CP, certificates and CRLs will be made available for As per the CP, certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects MUST be
downloading by all network operators, to enable them to validate this made available for downloading by all relying parties, to enable them
data for use in support of routing security. to validate this data.
<If you maintain a local repository system, describe here its basic <If you maintain a local repository system, describe here its basic
set up.> set up. For example, ''The <Name of ISP> RPKI CA will publish
certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects via a repository that is
accessible via RSYNC at rpki.<Name of ISP>.net.''>
2.2. Publication of certification information 2.2. Publication of certification information
<Name of LIR/ISP> will upload certificates and CRLs issued by it to a <Name of ISP> MUST publish certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects
repository that operates as part of a world-wide distributed system issued by it to a repository that operates as part of a world-wide
of repositories. <Name of LIR/ISP> will also upload to this distributed system of repositories. <Name of ISP> will also publish
repository system any ROAs that it creates. to this repository system any RPKI-signed objects that it creates.
2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication 2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication
<Describe here your procedures for publication (to the global <Describe here your procedures for publication (to the global
repository system) of the certificates and CRLs that you issue. If repository system) of the certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects
you choose to outsource publication of PKI data, you still need to that you issue. If you choose to outsource publication of PKI data,
provide this information for relying parties.> you still need to provide this information for relying parties. This
should include the period of time within which a certificate will be
published after the CA issues the certificate and the period of time
within which a CA will publish a CRL with an entry for a revoked
certificate after it revokes that certificate.>
As per the CP, the following standards exist for publication times As per the CP, the following standard exists for publication times
and frequency: and frequency:
A certificate will be published within 24 hours after issuance. The <Name of ISP> CA MUST publish its CRL prior to the
The <Name of LIR/ISP> CA will publish its CRL prior to the
nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by
the CA. Within 12 hours of effecting revocation, the CA will publish the CA.
a CRL with an entry for the revoked certificate.
A new ROA will be published before a predecessor ROA has expired, or
within 24 hours after an address space holder has changed the set of
ASes that is authorized to advertise the address blocks it holds.
2.4. Access controls on repositories 2.4. Access controls on repositories
Access to the repository system, for modification of entries,must be Access to the repository system, for modification of entries, must be
controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data
(certificates, CRLs and ROAs) uploaded to a repository are digitally (certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects) published to a
signed. Updates to the repository system must be validated to ensure repository are digitally signed RPKI items that <Name of Registry>
that the data being added or replaced is authorized. This document issues MUST be published to the repository that it runs by means not
does not define the means by which updates are verified, but use of accessible to the outside world. <If <Name of Registry> offers
the PKI itself to validate updates is anticipated. repository services to its subscribers, then <describe here the
protocol(s) that you support for their publishing of signed objects.>
3. Identification And Authentication 3. Identification And Authentication
3.1. Naming 3.1. Naming
3.1.1. Types of names 3.1.1. Types of names
The Subject of each certificate issued by this LIR/ISP is identified The Subject of each certificate issued by this ISP is identified by
by an X.500 Disinguished Name (DN). It will consist of a single CN an X.500 Distinguished Name (DN). The distinguished name will
attribute with a value generated by the issuer. consist of a single Common Name (CN) attribute with a value
generated by <Name of ISP>. Optionally, the serialNumber attribute
may be included along with the common name (to form a terminal
relative distinguished name set), to distinguish among successive
instances of certificates associated with the same entity.
3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful 3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful
The Subject name in each subscriber certificate will be unique The Subject name in each subscriber certificate will be unique
relative to all certificates issued by <Name of LIR/ISP>. However, relative to all certificates issued by <Name of ISP>. However, there
there is no guarantee that the subject name will be globally unique is no guarantee that the subject name will be globally unique in this
in this PKI. PKI. Also, the name of the subscriber need not to be ''meaningful'' in
the conventional, human-readable sense. The certificates issued
Note: The certificates issued under this PKI are used for under this PKI are used for authorization in support of applications
authorization in support of routing security, not for identification. that make use of attestations of Internet resource holding, not for
The name of the holder of an address block need not be ''meaningful'' identification
in the conventional, human-readable sense.
3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers 3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers
Although Subject names in certificates issued by this LIR/ISP need Although Subject names in certificates issued by this ISP need not be
not be meaningful, and may appear ''random,'' anonymity is not a meaningful, and may appear ''random,'' anonymity is not a function of
function of this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature is provided.
is provided.
3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms 3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms
None None
3.1.5. Uniqueness of names 3.1.5. Uniqueness of names
<Name of LIR/ISP> certifies Subject names that are unique among the <Name of ISP> certifies Subject names that are unique among the
certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these
Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate certificate Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate certificate
path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor enforced path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor enforced
through technical means. through technical means.
3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks 3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks
Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there is Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there is
no provision to either recognize or authenticate trademarks, service no provision to either recognize or authenticate trademarks, service
marks, etc. marks, etc.
3.2. Initial identity validation 3.2. Initial identity validation
3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key 3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key
<Describe the method whereby each subscriber will be required to <Describe the method whereby each subscriber will be required to
demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to issuing corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to <Name of
the certificate. Standard methods are described in the Certificate ISP's> issuing the certificate. One possible approach makes use of
Management Protocol (CMP) (RFC 2510) and the Certificate Management the PKCS #10 format, as profiled in [RFCyyyy]. This request format
Messages over CMS protocol (CMC), RFC 2797.> requires that the PKCS #10 request be signed using the (RSA) private
key corresponding to the public key in the certificate request. This
mechanism provides proof of possession by the requester.>
3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity 3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity
Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the
organizational identity of resource holders, with the exception of organizational identity of subscribers, with the exception of
registries. However, certificates are issued to resource holders in a registries. However, certificates are issued to subscribers in a
fashion that preserves the accuracy of bindings in this ISP's fashion that preserves the accuracy of distributions of INRs in this
records. <Name of ISP's> records.
<Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that each <Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that each
certificate that is issued accurately reflects your records with certificate that is issued, accurately reflects your records with
regard to the organization to which you have allocated (or sub- regard to the organization to which you have distributed (or sub-
allocated) the address space identified in the certificate. The distributed) the INRs identified in the certificate. For example, a
specific procedures employed for this purpose should be commensurate BPKI certificate could be used to authenticate a certificate request
with those you already employ as an ISP in the maintenance of address that serves as a link to the <Name of ISP's> subscriber database that
allocation.> maintains the resource distribution records. The certificate request
could be matched against the database record for the subscriber in
question, and an RPKI certificate would be issued only if the
resources requested were a subset of those held by the subscriber.
The specific procedures employed for this purpose should be
commensurate with those you already employ as an ISP in the
maintenance of INR distribution.>
3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity 3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity
Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual
identity of a resource holder. However, this ISP maintains contact identity of a subscriber. However, <Name of ISP> maintains contact
information for each resource holder in support of certificate information for each subscriber in support of certificate renewal,
renewal, rekey, or revocation. rekey, or revocation.
<Describe the procedures that will be used to identify at least one <Describe the procedures that MUST be used to identify at least one
individual as a representative of each organization that is an individual as a representative of each subscriber. This is done in
address space holder. This is done in support of issuance, renewal, support of issuance, renewal, and revocation of the certificate
and revocation of the certificate issued to the organization. The issued to the organization. For example, one might say ''The <Name of
ISP> BPKI (see Section 3.2.6) issues certificates that MUST be used
to identify individuals who represent <Name of ISP> subscribers.'' The
procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in
authenticating individuals as representatives for address space authenticating individuals as representatives for INR holders. Note
holders. Note that this authentication is solely for use by you in that this authentication is solely for use by you in dealing with the
dealing with the organizations to which you allocate (or sub- organizations to which you distribute (or sub-distribute) INRs, and
allocate) address space, and thus must not be relied upon outside of thus must not be relied upon outside of this CA-subscriber
this CA-subscriber relationship.> relationship.>
3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information 3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information
No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued
under this certificate policy. under this certificate policy except for SIA/AIA extensions.
3.2.5. Validation of authority 3.2.5. Validation of authority
<Describe the procedures that will be used to verify that an <Describe the procedures that MUST be used to verify that an
individual claiming to represent a resource holder to which a individual claiming to represent subscriber, is authorized to
certificate is issued, is authorized to represent that resource represent that subscriber in this context. For example, one could
holder in this context. The procedures should be commensurate with say, ''Only an individual to whom a BPKI certificate (see Section
those you already employ as an LIR/ISP in authenticating individuals 3.2.6) has been issued may request issuance of an RPKI certificate.
as representatives of resource holders.> Each certificate issuance request is verified using the BPKI.'' The
procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ as an
ISP in authenticating individuals as representatives of subscribers.>
3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation 3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation
This PKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any The RPKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
other PKI. other PKI. <If you operate a separate, additional PKI for business
purposes (BPKI), then describe (or reference) how the BPKI is used to
authenticate subscribers and to enable them to manage their resource
distributions.>
3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests 3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests
3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key 3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key
<Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that an <Describe the conditions under which routine re-key is required and
organization requesting a re-key is the legitimate holder of the the manner by which it is requested. Describe the procedures that
certificate (and associated address space) to be re-keyed. This MUST be used to ensure that a subscriber requesting routine re-key is
should also include the method employed for verifying PoP of the the legitimate holder of the certificate to be re-keyed. State the
private key corresponding to the new public key. With respect to approach for establishing PoP of the private key corresponding to the
authentication of the holder of the address space, the procedures new public key. If you operate a BPKI, describe how that BPKI is used
should be commensurate with those you already employ in the to authenticate routine re-key requests.>
maintenance of address allocation. Note that your organization can
choose to require periodic re-keying consistent with contractual
agreements with the recipient.>
3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation 3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after
revocation
<Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that an <Describe the procedures that MUST be used to ensure that an
organization requesting a re-key after revocation is the legitimate organization requesting a re-key after revocation is the legitimate
holder of the address space in the certificate being re-keyed. This holder of the INRs in the certificate being re-keyed. This should
should also include the method employed for verifying PoP of the also include the method employed for verifying PoP of the private key
private key corresponding to the new public key. With respect to corresponding to the new public key. If you operate a BPKI, describe
authentication of the resource holder, the procedures should be how that BPKI is used to authenticate re-key requests. With respect
commensurate with those you already employ in the maintenance of to authentication of the subscriber, the procedures should be
resource allocation records.> commensurate with those you already employ in the maintenance of INR
distribution records.>
3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request 3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request
<Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that the <Describe the procedures that MUST be used by an RPKI subscriber to
resource holder requesting revocation is the subject of the make a revocation request. Describe the manner by which it is
certificate (or an authorized representative thereof) to be revoked. ensured that the subscriber requesting revocation is the subject of
Note that there may be different procedures for the case where the the certificate (or an authorized representative thereof) to be
legitimate subject still possesses the original private key as revoked. Note that there may be different procedures for the case
opposed to the case when it no longer has access to that key.These where the legitimate subject still possesses the original private key
procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in as opposed to the case when it no longer has access to that key.
the maintenance of resource holder records.> These procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ
in the maintenance of subscriber records.>
Note: If additional IP addresses are being added to an Note that if a subscriber requests a new INR distribution, an
organization's existing allocation, the old certificate is not existing RPKI certificate issued to the subscriber is NOT revoked, so
revoked. Instead, a new certificate is issued with both the old and long as the set of INRs distributed to the subscriber did not
the new resources and the old key. If IP addresses or AS numbers are ''shrink,'' i.e., the new INRs are a superset of the old INR set.
being removed or if there has been a key compromise, then the old However, if a new INR distribution results in ''shrinkage'' of the set
certificate will be revoked (and a re-key will be performed in the of INRs distributed to a subscriber, this triggers an implicit
event of a key compromise). A subscriber may request that its revocation of the old RPKI certificate(s) associated with that
resource holdings be spread over a set of certificates, rather than subscriber.
consolidating all resources in one certificate. This may be
appropriate if the subscriber wants to manage his resource
allocations as distinct allocations within his organization.
4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements 4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements
4.1. Certificate Application 4.1. Certificate Application
4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application 4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application
The following entities may submit a certificate application to this
CA:
. <Insert if appropriate: "Any ISP subordinate to this LIR.">
. Any entity that holds address space assigned by this LIR/ISP Any subscriber who holds INRs distributed by this ISP may submit a
certificate application to this CA.
4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities 4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities
<Describe your enrollment process for issuing certificates both for <Describe your enrollment process for issuing certificates both for
initial deployment of the PKI and as an ongoing process. Note that initial deployment of the PKI and as an ongoing process. Note that
most of the certificates in this PKI are issued as part of ISP normal most of the certificates in this PKI are issued as part of your
business practices, as an adjunct to address space allocation, and normal business practices, as an adjunct to INR distribution, and
thus a separate application to request a certificate may not be thus a separate application to request a certificate may not be
necessary. If so, reference should be made to where these practices necessary. If so, reference should be made to where these practices
are documented.> are documented.>
4.2. Certificate application processing 4.2. Certificate application processing
<Describe the certificate request/response standards that you will <Describe the certificate request/response processing that you will
employ. You should make use of existing standards for certificate employ. You should make use of existing standards for certificate
application processing. Relevant standards include RFC 4210, application processing. Relevant standards include RFC 4210,
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management
Protocol (CMP), RFC 2797, Certificate Management Messages over CMS, Protocol (CMP), RFC 2797, Certificate Management Messages over CMS,
and RSA Labs standards PKCS #7 and PKCS #10. > and RSA Labs standards PKCS #7 and PKCS #10. >
4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions 4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions
<Describe your practices for identification and authentication of <Describe your practices for identification and authentication of
certificate applicants. Often, existing practices employed by you to certificate applicants. Often, existing practices employed by you to
identify and authenticate organizations form the basis for issuance identify and authenticate organizations can be used as the basis for
of certificates to these subscribers. Reference can be made to issuance of certificates to these subscribers. Reference can be made
documentation of such existing practices.> to documentation of such existing practices.>
4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications 4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications
<Describe your practices for approval or rejection of applications <Describe your practices for approval or rejection of applications
and refer to documentation of existing business practices relevant to and refer to documentation of existing business practices relevant to
this process. Note that according to the CP, certificate this process. Note that according to the CP, certificate
applications will be approved based on the normal business practices applications will be approved based on the normal business practices
of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's records of address of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's records of
space holders. Also, each CA will verify that the requester holds the subscribers. The CP also says that each CA will follow the procedures
corresponding private key for the public key that will be bound to specified in 3.2.1 to verify that the requester holds the private key
the certificate the CA issues to the requester.> corresponding to the public key that will be bound to the certificate
the CA issues to the requester.>
4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications 4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications
<You may declare here your expected time frame for processing <Specify here your expected time frame for processing certificate
certificate applications.> applications.>
4.3. Certificate issuance 4.3. Certificate issuance
4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance 4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance
<Describe in this section your procedures for issuance of a <Describe in this section your procedures for issuance and
certificate.> publication of a certificate.>
4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate 4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of
certificate
<Describe in this section your procedures for notification of a <Name of ISP> MUST notify the subscriber when the certificate is
subscriber when a certificate has been issued.> published. <Describe in this section your procedures for notification
of a subscriber when a certificate has been published.>
4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities 4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
[OMITTED] entities
<Describe here any other entities that MUST be notified when a new
certificate is published.>
4.4. Certificate acceptance 4.4. Certificate acceptance
4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance 4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance
When a certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the repository When a certificate is issued, the CA MUST publish it to the
and notify the subscriber. This will be done without subscriber repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without
review and acceptance. subscriber review and acceptance.
4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA 4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA
Certificates will be published in the Repository system once issued Certificates MUST be published in the RPKI distributed repository
following the conduct described in 4.4.1. <Describe your procedures system once issued following the conduct described in 4.4.1. This
for publication of the approved certificate.> will be done within <specify the timeframe within which the
certificate will be placed in the repository and the subscriber will
be notified>.<Describe your procedures for publication of the
certificate.>
4.5. Key pair and certificate usage 4.5. Key pair and certificate usage
A summary of the use model for the Resource PKI is provided below. A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below.
4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage 4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage
The certificates issued by this LIR/ISP to resource holders are CA The certificates issued by <Name of ISP> to subscribers are CA
certificates. The private key associated with each of these certificates. The private key associated with each of these
certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and
CRLs. Resource holders who are LIRs/ISPs will issue CA certificates CRLs. Subscribers who are ISPs will issue CA certificates to any
to any organizations which they allocate IP address space, one or organizations to which they in turn distribute INRs, one or more end
more end entity (EE) certificates for use in verifying signatures on entity (EE) certificates for use in verifying signatures on RPKI-
ROAs, and end entity certificates to operators in support of signed objects signed by the suscriber, and end entity certificates
repository access control. Non-LIR/ISP resource holders will issue to operators in support of repository access control. Non-ISP INR
just the latter two kinds of certificates since they will not be holders will issue just the latter two kinds of certificates since
allocating address space to other organizations. they will not be distributing INRs to other organizations.
4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage 4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage
The primary relying parties in this PKI are LIRs/ISPs, who will use The primary relying parties in this PKI are organizations who will
EE certificates to verify ROAs, e.g., in support of generating route use EE certificates to verify RPKI-signed objects. Repositories will
filters. Repositories will use operator certificates to verify the use operator certificates to verify the authorization of entities to
authorization of entities to engage in repository maintenance engage in repository maintenance activities, and thus repositories
activities, and thus repositories represent a secondary type of represent a secondary type of relying party.
relying party.
4.6. Certificate renewal 4.6. Certificate renewal
4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal 4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal
As per the CP, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on As per the CP, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on
its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate
Subject. If <Name of LIR/ISP> initiates the renewal process based on Subject. If <Name of ISP> initiates the renewal process based on the
the certificate expiration date, then <Name of LIR/ISP> will notify certificate expiration date, then <Name of ISP> will notify the
the resource holder <insert the period of advance warning, e.g., ''2 subscriber <insert the period of advance warning, e.g., ''2 weeks in
weeks in advance of the expiration date'', or the general policy, advance of the expiration date'', or the general policy, e.g., ''in
e.g., ''in conjunction with notification of service expiration''.> The conjunction with notification of service expiration''.> The validity
validity interval of the new (renewed) certificate will overlap that interval of the new (renewed) certificate will overlap that of the
of the previous certificate by <insert length of overlap period, previous certificate by <insert length of overlap period, e.g., 1
e.g., 1 week>, to ensure uninterrupted coverage. week>, to ensure uninterrupted coverage.
Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the
previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
compromised. If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of compromised. If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
Section 4.7 will apply. Section 4.7 will apply.
4.6.2. Who may request renewal 4.6.2. Who may request renewal
The certificate holder or <Name of LIR/ISP> may initiate the renewal The subscriber or <Name of ISP> may initiate the renewal process.
process. <For the case of the certificate holder, describe what steps <For the case of the subscriber, describe the procedures that will be
will be taken to verify the identity and authorization of the entity used to ensure that the requester is the legitimate holder of the
requesting the renewal.> INRs in the certificate being renewed. This should also include the
method employed for verifying PoP of the private key corresponding to
the public key in the certificate being renewed or the new public key
if the public key is being changed. With respect to authentication
of the subscriber, the procedures should be commensurate with those
you already employ in the maintenance of INR distribution records. If
you operate a BPKI for this, describe how that business-based PKI is
used to authenticate re-newal requests and refer to 3.2.6.>
4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests 4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests
<Describe your procedures for handling certificate renewal requests. <Describe your procedures for handling certificate renewal requests.
This must include verification that the certificate in question has This must include verification that the requester is the subscriber
not been revoked.> or is authorized by the subscriber and that the certificate in
4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber question has not been revoked.>
4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
<Describe your procedure for notification of new certificate issuance <Name of ISP> MUST notify the subscriber when the certificate is
to the subscriber. This should be consistent with 4.3.2.> published <Describe your procedure for notification of new
certificate issuance to the subscriber. This should be consistent
with 4.3.2.>
4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate 4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate
When a renewal certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the When a renewal certificate is issued, the <name of ISP> CA MUST
repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without publish it to the repository and notify the subscriber. This will be
subscriber review and acceptance. done without subscriber review and acceptance.
4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA 4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA
<Describe your policy and procedures for publication of a renewed <Describe your policy and procedures for publication of a renewal
certificate. This should be consistent with 4.4.2.> certificate. This should be consistent with 4.4.2.>
4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities 4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
[OMITTED] entities
<List here any other entities (besides the subscriber) who will be
notified when a renewed certificate is issued.>
4.7. Certificate re-key 4.7. Certificate re-key
4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key 4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key
As per the CP, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when As per the CP, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when
required, based on: required, based on:
1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated 1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
private key, or private key, or
2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key 2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key
pair pair
skipping to change at page 25, line 7 skipping to change at page 23, line 23
new key, unless the subscriber requests a re-key at the same time. new key, unless the subscriber requests a re-key at the same time.
If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
certificate will be revoked. certificate will be revoked.
Section 5.6 of the Certificate Policy notes that when a CA signs a Section 5.6 of the Certificate Policy notes that when a CA signs a
certificate, the signing key should have a validity period that certificate, the signing key should have a validity period that
exceeds the validity period of the certificate. This places exceeds the validity period of the certificate. This places
additional constraints on when a CA should request a re-key. additional constraints on when a CA should request a re-key.
4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key 4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key
The holder of the certificate may request a re-key. In addition, Only the subscriber may request a re-key. In addition, <Name of ISP>
<Name of LIR/ISP> may initiate a re-key based on a verified may initiate a re-key based on a verified compromise report. <If the
compromise report. <Describe what steps will be taken to verify the subscriber (certificate Subject) requests the rekey, describe how
identity and authorization of a subscriber to request a re-key when authentication is effected, e.g., using the <Name of Registry> BPKI.
the private key has been reported as compromised. Also describe how a Describe how a compromise report received from other than a
compromise report received from other than a subscriber is verified.> subscriber is verified.>
4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests 4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests
<Describe your process for handling re-keying requests. As per the <Describe your process for handling re-keying requests. As per the
CP, this should be consistent with the process described in Section CP, this should be consistent with the process described in Section
4.3. So reference can be made to that section.> 4.3. So reference can be made to that section.>
4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber 4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
<Describe your policy regarding notifying the subscriber re: <Describe your policy regarding notifying the subscriber re:
availability of the new certificate. This should be consistent with availability of the new re-keyed certificate. This should be
the notification process for any new certificate issuance (see consistent with the notification process for any new certificate
section 4.3.2).> issuance (see section 4.3.2).>
4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate 4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate
When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will publish it in the
repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without
subscriber review and acceptance. subscriber review and acceptance.
4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA 4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA
<Describe your policy regarding publication of the new certificate. <Describe your policy regarding publication of the new certificate.
This should be consistent with the publication process for any new This should be consistent with the publication process for any new
certificate (see section 4.4.2).> certificate (see section 4.4.2).>
4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities 4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
[OMITTED] entities
<List here any entities (other than the subscriber) who will be
notified when a re-keyed certificate is issued.>
4.8. Certificate modification 4.8. Certificate modification
4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification 4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification
As per the CP, modification of a certificate occurs to implement As per the CP, modification of a certificate occurs to implement
changes to the RFC 3779 extension values in a certificate. A changes to the RFC 3779 extension values in a certificate. A
subscriber can request a certificate modification when this subscriber can request a certificate modification when this
information in a currently valid certificate has changed, as a result information in a currently valid certificate has changed, as a result
of changes in the resource holdings of the subscriber. of changes in the INR holdings of the subscriber.
If a subscriber is to be allocated address space in addition to a If a subscriber is to receive a distribution of INRs in addition to a
current allocation, then this is accomplished through a certificate current distribution, and if the subscriber does not request that a
modification. When a certificate modification is approved, a new new certificate be issued containing only these additional INRs, then
certificate is issued. The new certificate will contain the same this is accomplished through a certificate modification. When a
public key and the same expiration date as the original certificate, certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is issued.
but with the incidental information corrected and/or the address The new certificate will contain the same public key and the same
space and AS allocations expanded. When previously allocated address expiration date as the original certificate, but with the incidental
space is to be removed from a certificate, then the old certificate information corrected and/or the INR distribution expanded. When
MUST be revoked and a new certificate (reflecting the new allocation) previously distributed INRs are to be removed from a certificate,
issued. then the old certificate MUST be revoked and a new certificate
(reflecting the new distribution) issued.
4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification 4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification
The certificate holder or <Name of LIR/ISP> may initiate the The subscriber or <Name of ISP> may initiate the certificate
certificate modification process. <For the case of the certificate modification process. <For the case of the subscriber, state here
holder, state here what steps will be taken to verify the identity what steps will be taken to verify the identity and authorization of
and authorization of the entity requesting the modification.> the entity requesting the modification.>
4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests 4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests
<Describe your procedures for verification of the modification <Describe your procedures for verification of the modification
request and procedures for the issuance of a new certificate. These request and procedures for the issuance of a new certificate. These
should be consistent with the processes described in Sections 4.2 and should be consistent with the processes described in Sections 4.2 and
4.3.1.> 4.3.1.>
4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to
subscriber
4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to subscriber <Describe your procedure for notifying the subscriber about the
issuance of a modified certificate. This should be consistent with
<Describe your procedure for notification of issuance of a modified the notification process for any new certificate (see section
certificate. This should be consistent with the notification process 4.3.2).>
for any new certificate (see section 4.3.2).>
4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate 4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
When a modified certificate is issued, the CA will place it in the When a modified certificate is issued, the CA will publish it to the
repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without
subscriber review and acceptance. subscriber review and acceptance.
4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA 4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA
<Describe your procedure for publication of a modified certificate. <Describe your procedure for publication of a modified certificate.
This should be consistent with the publication process for any new This should be consistent with the publication process for any new
certificate (see section 4.4.2).> certificate (see section 4.4.2).>
4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities 4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
[OMITTED] entities
<List here any entities (other than the subscriber) who will be
notified when a modified certificate is issued.
4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension 4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension
4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation 4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation
As per the CP, certificates can be revoked for several reasons. As per the CP, certificates can be revoked for several reasons.
Either <Name of ISP> or the subject may choose to end the Either <Name of ISP> or the subject may choose to end the
relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to
revoke the certificate. A certificate also may be revoked due to revoke the certificate. If one or more of the INRs bound to the
loss or compromise of the private key corresponding to the public key public key in the certificate are no longer associated with the
in the certificate. Finally, a certificate may be revoked in order subject, that too constitutes a basis for revocation. A certificate
to invalidate data signed by that certificate. also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate. Finally, a
4.9.2. Who can request revocation certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by the
private key associated with that certificate.
The certificate holder or <Name of LIR/ISP> may request a revocation. 4.9.2. Who can request revocation
<For the case of the certificate holder, describe what steps will be
taken to verify the identity and authorization of the entity
requesting the revocation.>
4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request The subscriber or <Name of ISP> may request a revocation. <For the
case of the subscriber, describe what steps will be taken to verify
the identity and authorization of the entity requesting the
revocation.>
4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request
<Describe your process for handling a certificate revocation request. <Describe your process for handling a certificate revocation request.
This should include: This should include:
. Procedure to be used by the certificate holder to request a o Procedure to be used by the subscriber to request a revocation
revocation
. Procedure for notification of the certificate holder when the o Procedure for notification of the subscriber when the revocation
revocation is initiated by <Name of LIR/ISP>.> is initiated by <Name of ISP>.>
4.9.4. Revocation request grace period 4.9.4. Revocation request grace period
A subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the A subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the
need for revocation has been identified. need for revocation has been identified.
4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request 4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request
<Describe your policy on the time period within which you will <Describe your policy on the time period within which you will
process a revocation request.> process a revocation request.>
4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties 4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties
As per the CP, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and As per the CP, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and
checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the
certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate. certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate.
4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency 4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency
<Name of LIR/ISP> will publish CRLs approximately every 24 hours. <State the CRL issuance frequency for the CRLs that you publish.> <
Each CRL will carry a nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL will be Each CRL will carry a nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL will be
published at or before that time. <Name of LIR/ISP> will set the published at or before that time. <Name of ISP> will set the
nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the
next scheduled CRL will be issued. next scheduled CRL will be issued.
4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs 4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs
A CRL will be posted to the repository system with minimal delay
after generation.
4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED]
4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED]
4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED]
4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]
4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED]
4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]
4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED]
4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED] A CRL will be published to the repository system within <state the
maximum latency> after generation.
4.10. Certificate status services 4.10. Certificate status services
<Name of LIR/ISP> does not support OCSP or SCVP. <Name of ISP> does not support OCSP or SCVP. <Name of ISP> issues
CRLs.
4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED}
4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED]
4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]
4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]
4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED]
4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]
4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices
[OMITTED]
5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls 5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls
5.1. Physical controls 5.1. Physical controls
<As per the CP, describe the physical controls that you employ for <As per the CP, describe the physical controls that you employ for
certificate management. These should be commensurate to those used in certificate management. These should be commensurate to those used in
the management of address space allocation.> the management of INR distribution.>
5.1.1. Site location and construction 5.1.1. Site location and construction
5.1.2. Physical access 5.1.2. Physical access
5.1.3. Power and air conditioning 5.1.3. Power and air conditioning
5.1.4. Water exposures 5.1.4. Water exposures
5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection 5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection
5.1.6. Media storage 5.1.6. Media storage
5.1.7. Waste disposal 5.1.7. Waste disposal
5.1.8. Off-site backup 5.1.8. Off-site backup
5.2. Procedural controls 5.2. Procedural controls
<As per the CP, describe the procedural security controls that you <As per the CP, describe the procedural security controls that you
employ for certificate management. These should be commensurate to employ for certificate management. These should be commensurate to
those used in the management of address space allocation.> those used in the management of INR distribution.>
5.2.1. Trusted roles 5.2.1. Trusted roles
5.2.2. Number of persons required per task 5.2.2. Number of persons required per task
5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role 5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role
5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties 5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties
5.3. Personnel controls 5.3. Personnel controls
<As per the CP, describe the personnel security controls that you <As per the CP, describe the personnel security controls that you
employ for individuals associated with certificate management. These employ for individuals associated with certificate management. These
should be commensurate to those used in the management of address should be commensurate to those used in the management of INR
space allocation.> distribution.>
5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
5.3.2. Background check procedures 5.3.2. Background check procedures
5.3.3. Training requirements 5.3.3. Training requirements
5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements 5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements
5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence 5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence
5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions 5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions
5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements 5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements
5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel 5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel
5.4. Audit logging procedures 5.4. Audit logging procedures
5.4.1. Types of events recorded <As per the CP, describe in the following sections the details of how
you implement audit logging.>
5.4.1. Types of events recorded
Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the
certification authority computing equipment. Audit records will certification authority computing equipment. Audit records will
include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
content data relating to the event. Auditable events include: content data relating to the event. Auditable events include:
. Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout) . Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)
. Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate . Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate
requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise
skipping to change at page 31, line 41 skipping to change at page 28, line 43
. Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate . Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate
requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise
notifications) notifications)
. Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions . Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions
. Posting of any material to a repository . Posting of any material to a repository
. Any attempts to change or delete audit data . Any attempts to change or delete audit data
<List here any additional types of events that will be audited.> <List here any additional types of events that will be audited.>
5.4.2. Frequency of processing log 5.4.2. Frequency of processing log
<Describe your procedures for review of audit logs.> <Describe your procedures for review of audit logs.>
5.4.3. Retention period for audit log
5.4.3. Retention period for audit log
<Describe your policies for retention of audit logs.> <Describe your policies for retention of audit logs.>
5.4.4. Protection of audit log 5.4.4. Protection of audit log
<Describe your policies for protection of the audit logs.> <Describe your policies for protection of the audit logs.>
5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures 5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures
<Describe your policies for backup of the audit logs.> <Describe your policies for backup of the audit logs.>
5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED] 5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]
5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED] 5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED]
5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments 5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments
<Describe any vulnerability assessments that you will apply (or have <Describe any vulnerability assessments that you will apply (or have
already applied) to the PKI subsystems. This should include whether already applied) to the PKI subsystems. This should include whether
such assessments have taken place and any procedures or plans to such assessments have taken place and any procedures or plans to
perform or repeat/reassess vulnerabilities in the future.> perform or repeat/reassess vulnerabilities in the future.>
5.5. Records archival [OMITTED] 5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]
5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED]
5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]
5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED]
5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED]
5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED]
5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) [OMITTED]
5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information [OMITTED]
5.6. Key changeover 5.6. Key changeover
The <Name of LIR/ISP> CA certificate will contain a validity period The <Name of ISP> CA certificate will contain a validity period that
that encompasses that of all certificates verifiable using this CA is at least as long as that of any certificate being issued under
certificate. To support this, <Name of LIR/ISP> will create a new that certificate. When <Name of ISP> CA wishes to change keys, <Name
signature key pair, and acquire and publish a new certificate of ISP> will create a new signature key pair, and acquire and publish
containing the public key of the pair, <specify here the minimum a new certificate containing the public key of the pair, <specify
amount of lead time, e.g., ''a minimum of 6 months''> in advance of the here the minimum amount of lead time, e.g., ''a minimum of 6 months''>
scheduled change of the current signature key pair. in advance of the scheduled change of the current signature key pair.
5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED] 5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]
5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]
5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted
[OMITTED]
5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]
5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster [OMITTED]
5.8. CA or RA termination 5.8. CA or RA termination
<Describe the fallback policy for management of your CA's IP address <Describe your policy for management of your CA's INR distributions
space allocations in case of its own termination.> in case of its own termination.>
6. Technical Security Controls 6. Technical Security Controls
This section describes the security controls used by <Name of This section describes the security controls used by <Name of ISP>.
LIR/ISP>.
6.1. Key pair generation and installation 6.1. Key pair generation and installation
6.1.1. Key pair generation 6.1.1. Key pair generation
<Describe the procedures that will be used to generate the CA key <Describe the procedures that will be used to generate the CA key
pair, and, if applicable, key pairs for network subscribers. In most pair, and, if applicable, key pairs for subscribers. In most
instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the subscriber, instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the subscriber,
i.e., the organization receiving the allocation of address space. i.e., the organization receiving the distribution of INRs. However,
However, your procedures may include one for generating key pairs on your procedures may include one for generating key pairs on behalf of
behalf of your subscribers if they so request. (This might be done your subscribers if they so request. (This might be done for
for subscribers who do not have the ability to perform key generation subscribers who do not have the ability to perform key generation in
in a secure fashion or who want a registry to provide backup for the a secure fashion or who want a registry to provide backup for the
subscriber private key.) Since the keys used in this PKI are not for subscriber private key.) Since the keys used in this PKI are not for
non-repudiation purposes, generation of key pairs by CAs does not non-repudiation purposes, generation of key pairs by CAs does not
inherently undermine the security of the PKI.> inherently undermine the security of the PKI.>
6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber 6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber
<If the procedures in 6.1.1 include providing key pair generation <If the procedures in 6.1.1 include providing key pair generation
services for subscribers, describe the means by which private keys services for subscribers, describe the means by which private keys
are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion. Otherwise say this are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion. Otherwise say this
is not applicable.> is not applicable.>
6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer 6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer
<Describe the means by which the public keys are delivered to you, <Describe the procedures that will be used to deliver a subscriber's
e.g., electronic submission using a PKCS#10 Certificate Signing public keys to the <Name of ISP> RPKI CA. These procedures should
Request (CSR). This description should explain how this public key ensure that the public key has not been altered during transit and
delivery fits in with the process whereby the subscriber requests IP that the subscriber possesses the private key corresponding to the
address space, authenticates itself, pays for the resources, etc. The transferred public key. >
security of the procedures used by a subscriber to deliver its public
key to you need only be commensurate with the security of the
procedures already employed for management of the IP address space.>
6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties 6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties
Except for the Root CA, all CA public keys used in this PKI are CA public keys for all entities (other than trust anchors) are
contained in certificates issued by other CAs and will be published contained in certificates issued by other CAs and MUST be published
via a repository system. Relying parties will download these to the RPKI repository system. Relying parties MUST download these
certificates from this system. Public key values and associated data certificates from this system. Public key values and associated data
for the default trust anchors (RIRs) will be distributed out of band, for (putative) trust anchors MUST be distributed out of band and
accepted by relying parties on the basis of locally-defined criteria,
e.g., embedded in path validation software that will be made e.g., embedded in path validation software that will be made
available to the Internet community. available to the Internet community.
6.1.5. Key sizes 6.1.5. Key sizes
For the <Name of LIR/ISP> CA's certificate, the RSA key size will be The key sizes used in this PKI are as specified in RFC ZZZZ
<insert key size -- e.g., 2048 or 1024 bits.> [RFCzzzz]. <Describe any deviations from this statement.>
6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking 6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking
The RSA algorithm [RSA] is used in this PKI with the public exponent The public key algorithms and parameters used in this PKI are as
(e) F4 (65,537). specified in RFC ZZZZ [RFCzzzz]. <Describe any deviations from this
statement.>
<If the procedures in 6.1.1 include subscriber key pair generation, <If the procedures in 6.1.1 include subscriber key pair generation,
insert here text specifying EITHER that the subscriber is responsible EITHER insert here text specifying that the subscriber is responsible
for performing checks on the quality of its key pair and saying that for performing checks on the quality of its key pair and saying that
<Name of ISP> is not responsible for performing such checks for <Name of ISP> is not responsible for performing such checks for
subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the CA for checking subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the CA for checking
the quality of these subscriber key pairs.> the quality of these subscriber key pairs.>
6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field) 6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)
The Key usage extension bit values will be consistent with RFC 3280. The Key usage extension bit values will be consistent with RFC 5280.
For <Name of LIR/ISP>'s CA certificates, the keyCertSign and cRLSign For <Name of ISP>'s CA certificates, the keyCertSign and cRLSign bits
bits will be set TRUE. All other bits (including digitalSignature) will be set TRUE. All other bits (including digitalSignature) will be
will be set FALSE, and the extension will be marked critical. set FALSE, and the extension will be marked critical. <Specify
<Specify whether end entity certificates (issued by the CA for its whether end entity certificates (e.g., issued by the CA for its
operators) will include this extension and if so, the appropriate bit operators) will include this extension and if so, the appropriate bit
values as per RFC 3280.> values as per RFC 5280.>
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering 6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
Controls Controls
6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls 6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls
The <Name of LIR/ISP> CA employs a cryptographic module evaluated The <Name of ISP> CA employs a cryptographic module evaluated under
under FIPS 140-2, at level 4 [FIPS]. FIPS 140-2/3, at level 2 or 3 [FIPS].
6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control 6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control
<If you choose to use multi-person controls to constrain access to <If you choose to use multi-person controls to constrain access to
this CA's private keys, then insert the following text. ''There will your CA's private keys, then insert the following text. ''There will
be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m> multi-person be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m> multi-person
control.''> control.''>
6.2.3. Private key escrow 6.2.3. Private key escrow
No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI. No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI.
6.2.4. Private key backup 6.2.4. Private key backup
<Describe the procedures used for backing up your CA's private key. <Describe the procedures used for backing up your CA's private key.
The following aspects should be included. (1) The copying should be The following aspects should be included. (1) The copying should be
done under the same multi-party control as is used for controlling done under the same multi-party control as is used for controlling
the original private key. (2) At least one copy should be kept at an the original private key. (2) At least one copy should be kept at an
off-site location for disaster recovery purposes.> off-site location for disaster recovery purposes.>
6.2.5. Private key archival 6.2.5. Private key archival
See sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 See sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4
6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module 6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module
The private key for <Name of LIR/ISP>'s CA will be generated by the The private key for <Name of ISP>'s production CA <if appropriate,
cryptographic module specified in 6.2.1. The private keys will never change ''production CA'' to ''production and offline CAs''> MUST be
leave the module except in encrypted form for backup and/or transfer generated by the cryptographic module specified in 6.2.1. The
to a new module. private keys will never leave the module except in encrypted form for
6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module backup and/or transfer to a new module.
6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module
The private keys for <Name of LIR/ISP>'s CA will be stored in the The private key for <Name of ISP>'s production CA <if appropriate,
cryptographic module and will be protected from unauthorized use in change ''production CA'' to ''production and offline CAs''> MUST be
accordance with the FIPS 140-2 requirements applicable to the module. stored in the cryptographic module and will be protected from
(See [FIPS]) unauthorized use in accordance with the FIPS 140-2/3 requirements
applicable to the module. (See [FIPS])
6.2.8. Method of activating private key 6.2.8. Method of activating private key
<Describe the mechanisms and data used to activate your CA's private <Describe the mechanisms and data used to activate your CA's private
key.> key.>
6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key 6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key
The cryptographic module, when activated, will not be left The cryptographic module, when activated, will not be left
unattended. After use, it will be deactivated by <Describe the unattended. After use, it will be deactivated by <Describe the
procedure for deactivation of your CA's private key.> The module will procedure for deactivation of your CA's private key.> The module will
be stored securely when not in use. be stored securely when not in use.
6.2.10. Method of destroying private key 6.2.10. Method of destroying private key
<Describe the method used for destroying your CA's private key, e.g., <Describe the method used for destroying your CA's private key, e.g.,
when it is superseded. This will depend on the particular module.> when it is superseded. This will depend on the particular module.>
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating The cryptographic module will be certified FIPS 140-2/3, at level 2
or 3 [FIPS].
The cryptographic module will be certified FIPS 140-2, at level 2 or
3 [FIPS].
6.3. Other aspects of key pair management 6.3. Other aspects of key pair management
6.3.1. Public key archival 6.3.1. Public key archival
Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
to archive public keys. to archive public keys.
6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods 6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage
periods
The <Name of LIR/ISP> CA's key pair will have a validity interval of The <Name of ISP> CA's key pair will have a validity interval of
<insert number of years - - LIR/ISP key pairs and certificates should <insert number of years - - ISP key pairs and certificates should have
have reasonably long validity intervals, e.g., 10 years, to minimize reasonably long validity intervals, e.g., 10 years, to minimize the
the disruption caused by key changeover.> disruption caused by key changeover.>
6.4. Activation data 6.4. Activation data
6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation 6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation
<Describe how activation data for your CA will be generated.> <Describe how activation data for your CA will be generated.>
6.4.2. Activation data protection 6.4.2. Activation data protection
Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by <Describe Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by <Describe
your procedures here>. your procedures here>.
6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data 6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data
<Add here any details you wish to provide with regard to the <Add here any details you wish to provide with regard to the
activation data for your CA. If there are none, say ''None.''> activation data for your CA. If there are none, say ''None.''>
6.5. Computer security controls 6.5. Computer security controls
6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement 6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement
<Describe your security requirements for the computers used to <Describe your security requirements for the computers used to
support this PKI, e.g., requirements for authenticated logins, audit support this PKI, e.g., requirements for authenticated logins, audit
capabilities, etc. These requirements should be commensurate with capabilities, etc. These requirements should be commensurate with
those used for the computers used for managing allocation of IP those used for the computers used for managing distribution of INRs.>
addresses.>
6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]
6.6. Life cycle technical controls 6.6. Life cycle technical controls
6.6.1. System development controls 6.6.1. System development controls
<Describe any system development controls that you will apply to the <Describe any system development controls that you will apply to the
PKI systems, e.g., use of Trusted System Development Methodology PKI systems, e.g., use of Trusted System Development Methodology
(TSDM) Level 2.> (TSDM) Level 2.>
6.6.2. Security management controls 6.6.2. Security management controls
<Describe the security management controls that will be used for the <Describe the security management controls that will be used for the
software and equipment employed by the CA. These security measures RPKI software and equipment employed by the CA. These security
should be commensurate with those used for the systems used by the measures should be commensurate with those used for the systems used
CAs for managing and allocating IP addresses.> by the CAs for managing and distributing INRs.>
6.6.3. Life cycle security controls 6.6.3. Life cycle security controls
<Describe how the equipment (hardware and software) used for PKI <Describe how the equipment (hardware and software) used for RPKI
functions will be procured, installed, maintained, and updated. This functions will be procured, installed, maintained, and updated. This
should be done in a fashion commensurate with the way in which should be done in a fashion commensurate with the way in which
equipment for the management and allocation of IP address space is equipment for the management and distribution of INRs is handled. >
handled. >
6.7. Network security controls 6.7. Network security controls
<Describe the network security controls that will be used for CA <Describe the network security controls that will be used for CA
operation. These should be commensurate with the network security operation. These should be commensurate with the network security
controls employed for the computers used for managing allocation of controls employed for the computers used for managing distribution of
IP addresses.> INRs.>
6.8. Time-stamping 6.8. Time-stamping
The PKI in question does not make use of time stamping. The RPKI does not make use of time stamping.
7. Certificate and CRL Profiles 7. Certificate and CRL Profiles
Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy]. Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy].
7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED] 8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments
7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]
7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]
7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED]
7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED]
7.1.2.3. Optional certificate extensions [OMITTED]
7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]
7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]
7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]
7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]
7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED]
7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]
7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies
extension [OMITTED]
7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]
7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]
7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]
7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED]
7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED]
7.2.2.3. Optional CRL extensions [OMITTED]
7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]
7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]
7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]
8. Compliance Audit And Other Assessments
<List here any audit and other assessments used to ensure the <List here any audit and other assessments used to ensure the
security of the administration of IP addresses. These are sufficient security of the administration of INRs. These are sufficient for the
for the PKI systems.> RPKI systems.>
8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment 8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment
8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor 8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor
8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity 8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity
8.4. Topics covered by assessment 8.4. Topics covered by assessment
8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency 8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency
8.6. Communication of results 8.6. Communication of results
9. Other Business And Legal Matters 9. Other Business And Legal Matters
<The sections below are optional. Fill them in as appropriate for <The sections below are optional. Fill them in as appropriate for
your organization. Note that the manner in which you manage your your organization. The CP says that CAs should cover 9.1 to 9.11 and
business and legal matters for this PKI should be commensurate with 9.13 to 9.17 although not every CA will choose to do so. Note that
the way in which you manage business and legal matters for the the manner in which you manage your business and legal matters for
allocation of IP addresses.> this PKI should be commensurate with the way in which you manage
business and legal matters for the distribution of INRs.>
9.1. Fees 9.1. Fees
9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees 9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees
9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable) 9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable)
9.1.3. Refund policy 9.1.3. Refund policy
9.2. Financial responsibility 9.2. Financial responsibility
9.2.1. Insurance coverage 9.2.1. Insurance coverage
9.2.2. Other assets 9.2.2. Other assets
9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities 9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities
9.3. Confidentiality of business information 9.3. Confidentiality of business information
9.3.1. Scope of confidential information 9.3.1. Scope of confidential information
9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential information 9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
information
9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information 9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information
9.4. Privacy of personal information 9.4. Privacy of personal information
9.4.1. Privacy plan 9.4.1. Privacy plan
9.4.2. Information treated as private 9.4.2. Information treated as private
9.4.3. Information not deemed private 9.4.3. Information not deemed private
9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information 9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information
9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information 9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information
9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process 9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process
9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances 9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances
9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable) 9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable)
9.6. Representations and warranties 9.6. Representations and warranties
9.6.1. CA representations and warranties 9.6.1. CA representations and warranties
9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties
9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties
9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties
9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants [OMITTED] 9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties
9.7. Disclaimers of warranties 9.7. Disclaimers of warranties
9.8. Limitations of liability 9.8. Limitations of liability
9.9. Indemnities 9.9. Indemnities
9.10. Term and termination 9.10. Term and termination
9.10.1. Term 9.10.1. Term
9.10.2. Termination 9.10.2. Termination
9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival 9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival
9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants 9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants
9.12. Amendments 9.12. Amendments
9.12.1. Procedure for amendment 9.12.1. Procedure for amendment
9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period
9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED] 9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period
9.13. Dispute resolution provisions 9.13. Dispute resolution provisions
9.14. Governing law 9.14. Governing law
9.15. Compliance with applicable law 9.15. Compliance with applicable law
9.16. Miscellaneous provisions 9.16. Miscellaneous provisions
9.16.1. Entire agreement 9.16.1. Entire agreement
9.16.2. Assignment 9.16.2. Assignment
9.16.3. Severability 9.16.3. Severability
9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights) 9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)
9.16.5. Force Majeure 9.16.5. Force Majeure
9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]
10. Security Considerations 10. Security Considerations
The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied in The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied in
a certificate depends on several factors. These factors can include a certificate depends on several factors. These factors can include
the practices followed by the certification authority (CA) in the practices followed by the certification authority (CA) in
authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy, procedures, authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy, procedures,
and technical security controls, including the scope of the and technical security controls, including the scope of the
subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the private subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the private
key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms and key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms and
conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of
warranties, and limitations of liability). This document provides a warranties, and limitations of liability). This document provides a
framework to address the technical, procedural, personnel, and framework to address the technical, procedural, personnel, and
skipping to change at page 45, line 36 skipping to change at page 40, line 34
the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and
relying party systems. relying party systems.
11. IANA Considerations 11. IANA Considerations
None. None.
12. Acknowledgments 12. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Matt Lepinski for his help with the The authors would like to thank Matt Lepinski for his help with the
formatting of this document. formatting and Ron Watro for assistance with the editing of this
document.
13. References 13. References
13.1. Normative References 13.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W., Solo, D., "Internet X.509 [RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W., Solo, D., "Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March Revocation List (CRL) Profile", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March
1997. 1997.
[RFCxxxx] Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S., "Certificate [RFCxxxx] Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S., "Certificate
Policy for the Resource PKI (RPKI)", work in progress. Policy for the Resource PKI (RPKI)", work in progress.
[RFCyyyy] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., ''A Profile for [RFCyyyy] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and Loomans, R., ''A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates'', work in progress. X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates'', work in progress.
[RFCzzzz] Huston, G., ''A Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for use
in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure,'' work in
progress.
13.2. Informative References 13.2. Informative References
[BGP4] Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors), A Border Gateway Protocol 4 [BGP4] Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors), A Border Gateway Protocol 4
(BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995. (BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995.
[FIPS] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 [FIPS] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3
(FIPS PUB 140-2), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic (FIPS-140-3), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National
Institute of Standards and Technology, May 25, 2001. Institute of Standards and Technology, work in progress.
[RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method [RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method
for obtaining digital signatures and public-key for obtaining digital signatures and public-key
cryptosystems. Commun. ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126. cryptosystems. Commun. ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126.
Author's Addresses Author's Addresses
Stephen Kent Stephen Kent
BBN Technologies BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street 10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138 Cambridge MA 02138
USA USA
skipping to change at page 47, line 25 skipping to change at page 42, line 34
Karen Seo Karen Seo
BBN Technologies BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street 10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138 Cambridge MA 02138
USA USA
Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152 Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
Email: kseo@bbn.com Email: kseo@bbn.com
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