wdiff draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-03.txt draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-04.txt

Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr) Kong, D.
Internet Draft Seo, K.
Expires: May 2009 October 2010 Kent, S.
Intended Status: Informational BCP BBN Technologies
November 2008
March 8, 2010

Template for an Internet Service Provider's Certification Practice
Statement (CPS) for the Resource PKI (RPKI)
draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-03.txt
draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-04.txt

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Abstract

This document contains a template to be used for creating a
Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for a Local Internet Registry
(LIR) or an Internet Service
Provider (ISP) that is part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
(RPKI).

Conventions used in this document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].

Table of Contents

Preface...........................................................8

Preface...........................................................7
1. Introduction...................................................9 Introduction...................................................8
1.1. Overview.................................................10 Overview..................................................8
1.2. Document name and identification.........................11 identification..........................9
1.3. PKI participants.........................................11 participants..........................................9
1.3.1. Certification authorities...........................12 authorities............................9
1.3.2. Registration authorities............................12 authorities.............................9
1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................12 Subscribers.........................................10
1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................12 parties.....................................10
1.3.5. Other participants [OMITTED]........................12 participants..................................10
1.4. Certificate usage........................................13 usage........................................10
1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................13 uses........................10
1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................13 uses.........................10
1.5. Policy administration....................................13 administration....................................11
1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............13 document.............11
1.5.2. Contact person......................................13 person......................................11
1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy...13 policy...11
1.5.4. CPS approval procedures.............................13 procedures.............................11
1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................14 acronyms.................................11
2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................15 Responsibilities...................13
2.1. Repositories.............................................15 Repositories.............................................13
2.2. Publication of certification information.................15 information.................13
2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication.........................15 Publication.........................13
2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................15 repositories..........................13
3. Identification And Authentication.............................17 Authentication.............................15
3.1. Naming...................................................17 Naming...................................................15
3.1.1. Types of names......................................17 names......................................15
3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................17 meaningful.....................15
3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............17 subscribers............15
3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........17 forms...........15
3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................17 names.................................15
3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of
trademarks.................................................18 trademarks.16
3.2. Initial identity validation..............................18 validation..............................16
3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........18 key...........16
3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............18 identity.............16
3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............18 identity...............16
3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................19 information.................17
3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................19 authority.............................17
3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................19 interoperation.........................17
3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....19 requests....17
3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-
key........................................................19 re-key17
3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after
revocation.................................................19
revocation.................................................18
3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.20 request.18
4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............21 Requirements...............19
4.1. Certificate Application..................................21 Application..................................19
4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............21 application............19
4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............21 responsibilities.............19
4.2. Certificate application processing.......................21 processing.......................19
4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication
functions..................................................21 functions19
4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...21 applications...19
4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............22 applications............20
4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................22 issuance.....................................20
4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............22 issuance..............20
4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate.............................................22
certificate................................................20
4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED]...................................22
entities...................................................20
4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................22 acceptance...................................20
4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........22 acceptance.........20
4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............22 CA............20
4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................22 usage...........................20
4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........22 usage........21
4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......23 usage......21
4.6. Certificate renewal......................................23 renewal......................................21
4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................23 renewal................21
4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................23 renewal.............................21
4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............24 requests.............22
4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to
subscriber.................................................24 subscriber22
4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal
certificate................................................24 certificate
...........................................................22
4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....24 CA....22
4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED]...................................24
entities...................................................22
4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................24 re-key.......................................22
4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................24 re-key.................22
4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...25 key...23
4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........25 requests...........23
4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to
subscriber.................................................25 subscriber23
4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed
certificate................................................25
certificate................................................23
4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...25 CA...24
4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED]...................................25
entities...................................................24
4.8. Certificate modification.................................25 modification.................................24
4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........25 modification...........24
4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............26 modification............24
4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........26 requests........24
4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to
subscriber.................................................26
subscriber.................................................25
4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified
certificate................................................26 certificate
...........................................................25
4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...26 CA...25
4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED]...................................27
entities...................................................25
4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................27 suspension....................25
4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................27 revocation........................25
4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................27 revocation..........................25
4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................27 request....................26
4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................27 period.....................26
4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation
request....................................................27 request
...........................................................26
4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying
parties....................................................28 parties.26
4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................28 frequency..............................26
4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................28
4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability
[OMITTED]..................................................28
4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements
[OMITTED]..................................................28
4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements
available [OMITTED]........................................28
4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]...28
4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED].............28
4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]...............28
4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED].........28
4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]..............28 CRLs............................26
4.10. Certificate status services.............................28
4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED}..............29
4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED].....................29
4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]........................29
4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]...........................29
4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED].......................29
4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices
[OMITTED]..................................................29
4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and
practices [OMITTED]........................................29 services.............................26
5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls................30 Controls................27
5.1. Physical controls........................................30 controls........................................27
5.1.1. Site location and construction......................30 construction......................27
5.1.2. Physical access.....................................30 access.....................................27
5.1.3. Power and air conditioning..........................30 conditioning..........................27
5.1.4. Water exposures.....................................30 exposures.....................................27
5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection......................30 protection......................27
5.1.6. Media storage.......................................30 storage.......................................27
5.1.7. Waste disposal......................................30 disposal......................................27
5.1.8. Off-site backup.....................................30 backup.....................................27
5.2. Procedural controls......................................30 controls......................................27
5.2.1. Trusted roles.......................................30 roles.......................................27
5.2.2. Number of persons required per task.................30 task.................27
5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role.....30 role.....27
5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties................30 duties................27
5.3. Personnel controls.......................................30 controls.......................................27
5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance
requirements...............................................31 requirements28
5.3.2. Background check procedures.........................31 procedures.........................28
5.3.3. Training requirements...............................31 requirements...............................28
5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements...............31 requirements...............28
5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence.................31 sequence.................28
5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions..................31 actions..................28
5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements.................31 requirements.................28
5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel.................31 personnel.................28
5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................31 procedures.................................28
5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................31 recorded............................28
5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................31 log.........................28
5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................32 log......................29
5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................32 log.............................29
5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................32 procedures.........................29
5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external)
[OMITTED]..................................................32
[OMITTED]..................................................29
5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....32 [OMITTED].....29
5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................32 assessments...........................29
5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................32
5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED].................32
5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]..............32
5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED].....................32
5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED].................32
5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records
[OMITTED]..................................................32
5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external)
[OMITTED]..................................................32
5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive
information [OMITTED]......................................32 [OMITTED]...............................29
5.6. Key changeover...........................................32 changeover...........................................29
5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............33
5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures
[OMITTED]..................................................33
5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are
corrupted [OMITTED]........................................33
5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]..33
5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster
[OMITTED]..................................................33 [OMITTED]...............29
5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................33 termination.....................................29
6. Technical Security Controls...................................34 Controls...................................30
6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................34 installation.....................30
6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................34 generation.................................30
6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................34 subscriber..................30
6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........34 issuer...........30
6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........34 parties...........30
6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................35 sizes...........................................31
6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality
checking...................................................35 checking31
6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage
field).....................................................35 field)31
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
Controls......................................................35
Controls......................................................31
6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........35 controls.........31
6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......35 control.......31
6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................36 escrow..................................31
6.2.4. Private key backup..................................36 backup..................................32
6.2.5. Private key archival................................36 archival................................32
6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic
module.....................................................36 module
...........................................................32
6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module.........36 module.........32
6.2.8. Method of activating private key....................36 key....................32
6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key..................36 key..................32
6.2.10. Method of destroying private key...................36 key...................32
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating........................37 Rating........................33
6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................37 management.....................33
6.3.1. Public key archival.................................37 archival.................................33
6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage
periods....................................................37
periods....................................................33
6.4. Activation data..........................................37 data..........................................33
6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation.........37 installation.........33
6.4.2. Activation data protection..........................37 protection..........................33
6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data....................37 data....................33
6.5. Computer security controls...............................37 controls...............................33
6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement....37
6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]..................38 requirement....33
6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................38 controls............................34
6.6.1. System development controls.........................38 controls.........................34
6.6.2. Security management controls........................38 controls........................34
6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................38 controls........................34
6.7. Network security controls................................38 controls................................34
6.8. Time-stamping............................................38 Time-stamping............................................34
7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................39
7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]............................39
7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................39
7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]....................39
7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]..............39
7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]................................39
7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]..........................39
7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]......39
7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED].....39
7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]....39
7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate
Policies extension [OMITTED]...............................39
7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]....................................39
7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................39
7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]..............39
7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]...................................40
7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................40
7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]...........................40 Profiles..................................35
8. Compliance Audit And and Other Assessments........................41 Assessments........................36
8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment.................41 assessment.................36
8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor......................41 assessor......................36
8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity...............41 entity...............36
8.4. Topics covered by assessment.............................41 assessment.............................36
8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency..................41 deficiency..................36
8.6. Communication of results.................................41 results.................................36
9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................42 Matters..............................37
9.1. Fees.....................................................43 Fees.....................................................38
9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees................43 fees................38
9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable).............43 applicable).............38
9.1.3. Refund policy.......................................43 policy.......................................38
9.2. Financial responsibility.................................43 responsibility.................................38
9.2.1. Insurance coverage..................................43 coverage..................................38
9.2.2. Other assets........................................43 assets........................................38
9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities.....43 end-entities.....38
9.3. Confidentiality of business information..................43 information..................38
9.3.1. Scope of confidential information...................43 information...................38
9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
information................................................43
information................................................38
9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information..43 information..38
9.4. Privacy of personal information..........................43 information..........................38
9.4.1. Privacy plan........................................43 plan........................................38
9.4.2. Information treated as private......................43 private......................38
9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................43 private......................38
9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......43 information.......38
9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......43 information.......38
9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative
process....................................................43
process....................................................38
9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........43 circumstances..........38
9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............43 applicable).............38
9.6. Representations and warranties...........................43 warranties...........................38
9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................43 warranties...................38
9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........43 warranties...........39
9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties........44
9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other
participants [OMITTED].....................................44 warranties........39
9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................44 warranties................................39
9.8. Limitations of liability.................................44 liability.................................39
9.9. Indemnities..............................................44 Indemnities..............................................39
9.10. Term and termination....................................44 termination....................................39
9.10.1. Term...............................................44 Term...............................................39
9.10.2. Termination........................................44 Termination........................................39
9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................44 survival.................39
9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants.44 participants.39
9.12. Amendments..............................................44 Amendments..............................................39
9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................44 amendment............................39
9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................44
9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed
[OMITTED]..................................................44 period..................39
9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................44 provisions...........................39
9.14. Governing law...........................................44 law...........................................39
9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................44 law..........................39
9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................44 provisions................................39
9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................44 agreement...................................39
9.16.2. Assignment.........................................44 Assignment.........................................39
9.16.3. Severability.......................................44 Severability.......................................39
9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of
rights)....................................................44 rights).39
9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................44
9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]..............................44 Majeure......................................39
10. Security Considerations......................................45 Considerations......................................39
11. IANA Considerations..........................................45 Considerations..........................................40
12. Acknowledgments..............................................45 Acknowledgments..............................................40
13. References...................................................46 References...................................................41
13.1. Normative References....................................46 References....................................41
13.2. Informative References..................................46 References..................................41
Author's Addresses...............................................46
Intellectual Property Statement..................................47
Disclaimer of Validity...........................................48 Addresses...............................................42
Pre-5378 Material Disclaimer.....................................42
Copyright Statement..............................................48 Statement..............................................43

Preface

This document contains a template to be used for creating a
Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for a Local Internet Registry
or an Internet Service
Provider that is part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI). The user of this document should

1. substitute a title page for page 1 saying, e.g., ''<Name of
LIR/ISP> ISP>
Certification Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI)'' with date, author, etc.

2. leave the table of contents

3. delete this Preface

4. fill in the information indicated below by <text in angle
brackets>

5. delete sections 10, 11, 12, 13.1, Acknowledgments, Author's
Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of
Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a
reference section with just the references in 13.2

6. update the table of contents to reflect the changes required by
steps 4 and 5 above .

Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this
CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained
the section heading ''place holders'' for these omitted sections, numbering scheme employed in order the RFC to facilitate
comparison with the section numbering scheme employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are included and
marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant sections RFC.
[There are
also marked [OMITTED]. There is a note 4 sub-sections that I haven't removed yet due to this effect in the Word
problems.)

1. Introduction below.

This information should be left in the CPS as an
explanation to the user.

1. Introduction

This document is document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of <Name
of LIR/ISP>. ISP>. It describes the practices employed by the <Name of
LIR/ISP> ISP>
Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource PKI. Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI). These practices are defined in accordance
with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP, [RFCxxxx]) of
this PKI.

The Resource PKI is aimed at supporting improved routing security.
The goal RPKI is that each entity that allocates IP addresses or AS
numbers designed to an entity will, in parallel, issue a certificate
reflecting this allocation. These certificates will enable
verification that the holder support validation of the associated private key has been
allocated the resources indicated in the certificate, and is the
current, unique holder claims by current
holders of these resources. The certificates and CRLs, Internet Number Resources (INRs, see definition in conjunction 1.7) in
accordance with ancillary digitally signed data structures, will
provide critical inputs for routing security mechanisms, e.g.,
generation of route filters by LIRs/ISPs.

The most important and distinguishing aspect the records of the PKI for which
this CPS was created is organizations that it does not purport to identify an
address space holder or AS number holder via the subject name
contained act as CAs in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each
certificate issued under
this policy is intended to enable an entity PKI. The ability to assert in a verifiable fashion, that it verify such claims is essential to ensuring
the current holder of
an address block or an AS number, based on the current records unique, unambiguous distribution of the
entity responsible for the these resources in question. Verification of the
assertion is based on two criteria:

This PKI parallels the ability of existing INR distribution hierarchy. These
resources are distributed by the entity Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(IANA) to
digitally sign data producing the Regional Internet Registries. In some regions, National
Internet Registries (NIRs) form a signature that is verifiable using tier of the public key contained in hierarchy below the corresponding certificate,
RIRs for internet number resource (INR) distribution. ISPs and
validation of that certificate in the context of this PKI.
network subscribers form additional tiers below registries.

1.1. Overview

This PKI
is designed exclusively for use in support of validation CPS describes:

. Participants

. Publication of claims
related to address space and AS number holdings, with emphasis on
support of routing security mechanisms. Use of the certificates and
CRLs managed under this PKI for any other purpose is a violation of
this PKI's CP, and relying parties should reject such uses.

For this particular CPS, it should be noted that LIRs/ISPs do not
allocate AS numbers to their subscribers; instead subscribers receive
AS numbers from the RIR for their region. Thus, the certificates
issued by <Name of LIR/ISP> cover only IP address allocations.
However, in places in this document, text applying to the overall PKI
may refer to both IP address space and AS numbers.

Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this
CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained
section heading ''place holders'' for these omitted sections, in order
to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme employed
in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are included and
marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant sections are
also marked [OMITTED].

1.1. Overview

This CPS describes:

. Participants

. Distribution of the certificates the certificates and CRLs

. How certificates are issued, managed, and revoked

. Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.)

. Key management

. Audit procedures

. Business and legal issues

The
This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see appendix in
the CP IETF document
draft-ietf-sidr-arch-xx [ARCH] for more details):

. CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks
and/or AS numbers, distributing INRs and for
each address space (AS number) holder subscriber

. End entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use in verifying
Route Origination Authorizations (ROAs) and other (non-
certificate/CRL) signed to validate
digital signatures on RPKI-signed objects (see definition in 1.7).

. In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in
support of access control for the repository system as described in
2.4.

1.2. Document name and identification

The name of this document is ''<Name of LIR/ISP>'s ISP>'s Certification Practice
Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)''.

1.3. PKI participants

Note: In a PKI, the term ''subscriber'' refers to an individual or
organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The
term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
service from an ISP. Thus, in this PKI, In such cases the term ''subscriber'' can
refer both to ISPs, which can ''network subscriber'' will
be subscribers of RIRs, NIRs, and LIRs,
and also to organizations that are not ISPs, but which are
subscribers of LIRs/ISPs in the networking sense of the term. used. Also note that, for brevity, this document always refers to subscribers
PKI participants as
organizations, organizations or entities, even though some subscribers of
them are individuals. When
necessary, the phrase ''network subscriber'' is used to refer to an
organization that receives network services from an LIR/ISP.

1.3.1. Certification authorities

<Describe the CAs that you will operate a CA, for the primary function of which RPKI. One approach
is
the issuance of certificates to organizations to which address space operate two CAs: one designated ''offline'' and the other
designated ''production.'' The offline CA is allocated by the top level CA for the
<Name of LIR/ISP>. This ISP> portion of the RPKI. It provides a secure revocation
and recovery capability in case the production CA will also issue end entity
(EE) is compromised or
becomes unavailable. Thus the offline CA issues certificates for use in verifying signatures only to
instances of ROAs. In the
future, this production CA; and the CRLs it issues are used to
revoke only certificates issued to the production CA. The production
CA may also is used to issue other types of end entity (EE)
certificates, e.g., EE RPKI certificates to operations personnel in
support <Name of repository maintenance. ISP> members, to
whom INRs have been distributed.>

1.3.2. Registration authorities

For

1.3.3. Subscribers

The primary types of organizations that receive allocations distributions of IP
addresses INRs
from this CA and thus are subscribers in the PKI sense are network
subscribers. <If appropriate, add ''Additionally, this LIR
issues address space to ISPs, who are thus also subscribers.''>

1.3.4. Relying parties

Entities or individuals that need to validate claims of address space current
holdings act in reliance on certificates or RPKI-
signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties. Thus, Relying
parties may or may not be subscribers within this PKI. (See section
1.7 for example, entities that make
use the definition of address certificates in support of improved routing security
are relying parties. This includes LIRs/ISPs, multi-homed
organizations exchanging BGP [BGP4] traffic with LIRs/ISPs, and
subscribers who have received an allocation RPKI-signed object.)

1.3.5. Other participants

<If <Name of address space from one
ISP or from ISP> operates a registry, but want to authorize an (or another) LIR/ISP
to originate routes to this space.

To the extent repository that repositories make use of certificates for access
control - - checking for authorization to upload certificate, CRL, holds certificates,
CRLs, and
ROA updates -- they too act as relying parties.

1.3.5. Other participants [OMITTED] other RPKI-signed objects, then indicate this here.>

1.4. Certificate usage

1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses

The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in
support of validation of claims of current holdings of address space
and/or AS numbers, e.g., for routing security. With regard to routing
security, an initial goal of this PKI is to allow the holder of a set
of address blocks to be able to declare, in a secure fashion, the AS
number of each entity that is authorized to originate a route to
these addresses, including the context of ISP proxy aggregation. INRs.

Additional uses of the PKI, certificates, consistent with the basic goal
cited above, are also permitted under this the RPKI certificate policy.

Some of the certificates that may be issued under this hierarchy PKI could be
used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., access
control for the repository system. system as described in 2.4. Such uses also
are permitted under this the RPKI certificate policy.

1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses

Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited.

1.5. Policy administration

1.5.1. Organization administering the document

This CPS is administered by <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP>

1.5.2. Contact person

1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy

Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
is attesting to the allocation distribution of resources (IP addresses, AS
numbers) INRs to the holder of the private
key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The issuing
organizations are the same organizations as the ones that perform the allocation
distribution hence they are authoritative with respect to the
accuracy of this binding.

1.5.4. CPS approval procedures

1.6. Definitions and acronyms

BPKI - Business PKI: A BPKI is an optional additional PKI used to
identify members to whom RPKI certificates can be issued.

CP- Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that indicates
the applicability of a certificate to a particular community
and/or class of applications with common security requirements.

CPS - Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that
specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs
in issuing certificates.

Distribution of INRs - - A process of distribution of the INRs along the
respective number hierarchy. IANA distributes blocks of IP
addresses and Autonomous System Numbers to the five Regional
Internet Registries (RIRs). RIRs distribute smaller address
blocks and Autonomous System Numbers to organizations within
their service regions, who in turn distribute IP addresses to
their customers.

IANA - Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. IANA is responsible for
global coordination of the Internet Protocol addressing systems
and Autonomous System (AS) numbers used for routing internet
traffic. IANA distributes INRs to Regional Internet Registries
(RIRs).

INRs - Internet Number Resources. INRs are number values for three
protocol parameter sets, namely:
. IP Version 4 addresses,

. IP version 6 addresses, and

. Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing, currently
Border Gateway Protocol-4 Autonomous System numbers.

ISP - - Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing
and selling Internet services to other organizations.

LIR

NIR - - Local National Internet Registry. This is an organization, typically a
network service provider, that sub allocates the assignment of
IP addresses for a portion of the area covered by a Regional (or
National) Registry.

NIR - National Internet Registry. An NIR An NIR is an organization that
manages the assignment distribution of IP address and AS numbers INRs for a portion of the
geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry.
These NIRs form an
optional second tier in the tree scheme used to manage IP address and AS number allocation. INR
distribution.

RIR - Regional Internet Registry. An RIR is an organization that
manages the assignment distribution of IP address and AS numbers INRs for a
specified geopolitical area. At present, there are five RIRs:
ARIN (North America), RIPE NCC (Europe), APNIC (Asia -Pacific),
LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean), and AFRINIC (Africa).

ROA

RPKI-signed object - Route Origination Authorization. This - An RPKI-signed object is a digitally signed data
object that identifies (other than a network operator, identified by an AS,
that is authorized to originate routes certificate or CRL) declared to be such by
a specified set standards track RFC, and that can be validated using
certificates issued under this PKI. The content and format of
address blocks.
these data constructs depend on the context in which validation
of claims of current holdings of INRs takes place. Examples of
these objects are repository manifests and CRLs.

2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities

2.1. Repositories

As per the CP, certificates and certificates, CRLs will and RPKI-signed objects MUST be
made available for downloading by all network operators, relying parties, to enable them
to validate this
data for use in support of routing security. data.

<If you maintain a local repository system, describe here its basic
set up.> up. For example, ''The <Name of ISP> RPKI CA will publish
certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects via a repository that is
accessible via RSYNC at rpki.<Name of ISP>.net.''>

2.2. Publication of certification information

<Name of LIR/ISP> will upload certificates and ISP> MUST publish certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects
issued by it to a repository that operates as part of a world-wide
distributed system of repositories. <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> will also upload publish
to this repository system any ROAs RPKI-signed objects that it creates.

2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication

<Describe here your procedures for publication (to the global
repository system) of the certificates and certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects
that you issue. If you choose to outsource publication of PKI data,
you still need to provide this information for relying parties.> parties. This
should include the period of time within which a certificate will be
published after the CA issues the certificate and the period of time
within which a CA will publish a CRL with an entry for a revoked
certificate after it revokes that certificate.>

As per the CP, the following standards exist standard exists for publication times
and frequency:

A certificate will be published within 24 hours after issuance.

The <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> CA will MUST publish its CRL prior to the
nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by
the CA. Within 12 hours of effecting revocation,

2.4. Access controls on repositories

Access to the CA will publish
a CRL with an entry repository system, for the revoked certificate.

A new ROA will be published before a predecessor ROA has expired, or
within 24 hours after an address space holder has changed the set of
ASes that is authorized to advertise the address blocks it holds.

2.4. Access controls on repositories

Access to the repository system, for modification of entries,must modification of entries, must be
controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data
(certificates, CRLs and ROAs) uploaded RPKI-signed objects) published to a
repository are digitally
signed. Updates signed RPKI items that <Name of Registry>
issues MUST be published to the repository system must be validated to ensure that the data being added or replaced is authorized. This document
does it runs by means not define
accessible to the means by which updates are verified, but use outside world. <If <Name of
the PKI itself Registry> offers
repository services to validate updates is anticipated. its subscribers, then <describe here the
protocol(s) that you support for their publishing of signed objects.>

3. Identification And Authentication

3.1. Naming

3.1.1. Types of names

The Subject of each certificate issued by this LIR/ISP ISP is identified by
an X.500 Disinguished Distinguished Name (DN). It The distinguished name will
consist of a single CN Common Name (CN) attribute with a value
generated by <Name of ISP>. Optionally, the serialNumber attribute
may be included along with the common name (to form a terminal
relative distinguished name set), to distinguish among successive
instances of certificates associated with the issuer. same entity.

3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful

The Subject name in each subscriber certificate will be unique
relative to all certificates issued by <Name of LIR/ISP>. ISP>. However, there
is no guarantee that the subject name will be globally unique in this
PKI.

Note: Also, the name of the subscriber need not to be ''meaningful'' in
the conventional, human-readable sense. The certificates issued
under this PKI are used for authorization in support of routing security, not for identification.
The name applications
that make use of the holder attestations of an address block need Internet resource holding, not be ''meaningful''
in the conventional, human-readable sense. for
identification

3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers

Although Subject names in certificates issued by this LIR/ISP ISP need not be
meaningful, and may appear ''random,'' anonymity is not a function of
this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature is provided.

3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms

None

3.1.5. Uniqueness of names

<Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> certifies Subject names that are unique among the
certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these
Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate certificate
path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor enforced
through technical means.

3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks

Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there is
no provision to either recognize or authenticate trademarks, service
marks, etc.

3.2. Initial identity validation

3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key

<Describe the method whereby each subscriber will be required to
demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to <Name of
ISP's> issuing the certificate. Standard methods are described One possible approach makes use of
the PKCS #10 format, as profiled in [RFCyyyy]. This request format
requires that the Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP) (RFC 2510) and PKCS #10 request be signed using the Certificate Management
Messages over CMS protocol (CMC), RFC 2797.> (RSA) private
key corresponding to the public key in the certificate request. This
mechanism provides proof of possession by the requester.>

3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity

Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the
organizational identity of resource holders, subscribers, with the exception of
registries. However, certificates are issued to resource holders subscribers in a
fashion that preserves the accuracy of bindings distributions of INRs in this ISP's
<Name of ISP's> records.

3.2.3. Authentication <Name of individual identity

Certificates issued ISP's> subscriber database that
maintains the resource distribution records. The certificate request
could be matched against the database record for the subscriber in
question, and an RPKI certificate would be issued only if the
resources requested were a subset of those held by the subscriber.
The specific procedures employed for this purpose should be
commensurate with those you already employ as an ISP in the
maintenance of INR distribution.>

3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity

Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual
identity of a resource holder. subscriber. However, this ISP <Name of ISP> maintains contact
information for each resource holder subscriber in support of certificate renewal,
rekey, or revocation.

<Describe the procedures that will MUST be used to identify at least one
individual as a representative of each organization that is an
address space holder. subscriber. This is done in
support of issuance, renewal, and revocation of the certificate
issued to the organization. For example, one might say ''The <Name of
ISP> BPKI (see Section 3.2.6) issues certificates that MUST be used
to identify individuals who represent <Name of ISP> subscribers.'' The
procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in
authenticating individuals as representatives for address space INR holders. Note
that this authentication is solely for use by you in dealing with the
organizations to which you allocate distribute (or sub-
allocate) address space, sub-distribute) INRs, and
thus must not be relied upon outside of this CA-subscriber
relationship.>

3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information

No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued
under this certificate policy. policy except for SIA/AIA extensions.

3.2.5. Validation of authority

<Describe the procedures that will MUST be used to verify that an
individual claiming to represent a resource holder to which a
certificate is issued, subscriber, is authorized to
represent that resource
holder subscriber in this context. For example, one could
say, ''Only an individual to whom a BPKI certificate (see Section
3.2.6) has been issued may request issuance of an RPKI certificate.
Each certificate issuance request is verified using the BPKI.'' The
procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ as an LIR/ISP
ISP in authenticating individuals as representatives of resource holders.> subscribers.>

3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation

This PKI

The RPKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
other PKI. <If you operate a separate, additional PKI for business
purposes (BPKI), then describe (or reference) how the BPKI is used to
authenticate subscribers and to enable them to manage their resource
distributions.>

3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests

3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key

3.3.2. Identification and authentication of the holder of the address space, for re-key after
revocation

3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation

3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request

Note: If additional IP addresses are being added to an
organization's existing allocation, the old certificate is not
revoked. Instead,

Note that if a subscriber requests a new INR distribution, an
existing RPKI certificate is issued with both to the old and subscriber is NOT revoked, so
long as the new resources and set of INRs distributed to the old key. If IP addresses or AS numbers subscriber did not
''shrink,'' i.e., the new INRs are
being removed or if there has been a key compromise, then superset of the old
certificate will be revoked (and INR set.
However, if a re-key will be performed new INR distribution results in ''shrinkage'' of the
event set
of INRs distributed to a key compromise). A subscriber may request that its
resource holdings be spread over a set subscriber, this triggers an implicit
revocation of certificates, rather than
consolidating all resources in one certificate. This may be
appropriate if the subscriber wants to manage his resource
allocations as distinct allocations within his organization. old RPKI certificate(s) associated with that
subscriber.

4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

4.1. Certificate Application

4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application

The following entities

Any subscriber who holds INRs distributed by this ISP may submit a
certificate application to this
CA:

. <Insert if appropriate: "Any ISP subordinate to this LIR.">

. Any entity that holds address space assigned by this LIR/ISP CA.

4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities

4.2. Certificate application processing

4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions

4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications

<Describe your practices for approval or rejection of applications
and refer to documentation of existing business practices relevant to
this process. Note that according to the CP, certificate
applications will be approved based on the normal business practices
of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's records of address
space holders. Also,
subscribers. The CP also says that each CA will follow the procedures
specified in 3.2.1 to verify that the requester holds the
corresponding private key for
corresponding to the public key that will be bound to the certificate
the CA issues to the requester.>
4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications

<You may declare

4.3. Certificate issuance

4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance

4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of
certificate

<Name of ISP> MUST notify the subscriber when the certificate is
published. <Describe in this section your procedures for notification
of a subscriber when a certificate has been issued.> published.>

4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities
[OMITTED]

4.4. Certificate acceptance

4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance

When a certificate is issued, the CA will place MUST publish it in to the
repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without
subscriber review and acceptance.

4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA

Certificates will MUST be published in the Repository RPKI distributed repository
system once issued following the conduct described in 4.4.1. <Describe This
will be done within <specify the timeframe within which the
certificate will be placed in the repository and the subscriber will
be notified>.<Describe your procedures for publication of the approved
certificate.>

4.5. Key pair and certificate usage

A summary of the use model for the Resource PKI RPKI is provided below.

4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage

The certificates issued by this LIR/ISP <Name of ISP> to resource holders subscribers are CA
certificates. The private key associated with each of these
certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and
CRLs. Resource holders Subscribers who are LIRs/ISPs ISPs will issue CA certificates to any
organizations to which they allocate IP address space, in turn distribute INRs, one or more end
entity (EE) certificates for use in verifying signatures on
ROAs, RPKI-
signed objects signed by the suscriber, and end entity certificates
to operators in support of repository access control. Non-LIR/ISP resource Non-ISP INR
holders will issue just the latter two kinds of certificates since
they will not be
allocating address space distributing INRs to other organizations.

4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage

The primary relying parties in this PKI are LIRs/ISPs, organizations who will
use EE certificates to verify ROAs, e.g., in support of generating route
filters. RPKI-signed objects. Repositories will
use operator certificates to verify the authorization of entities to
engage in repository maintenance activities, and thus repositories
represent a secondary type of relying party.

4.6. Certificate renewal

4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal

As per the CP, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on
its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate
Subject. If <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> initiates the renewal process based on the
certificate expiration date, then <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> will notify the resource holder
subscriber <insert the period of advance warning, e.g., ''2 weeks in
advance of the expiration date'', or the general policy, e.g., ''in
conjunction with notification of service expiration''.> The validity
interval of the new (renewed) certificate will overlap that of the
previous certificate by <insert length of overlap period, e.g., 1
week>, to ensure uninterrupted coverage.

Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the
previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
compromised. If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
Section 4.7 will apply.

4.6.2. Who may request renewal

The certificate holder subscriber or <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> may initiate the renewal process.
<For the case of the certificate holder, subscriber, describe what steps the procedures that will be taken
used to verify ensure that the identity and authorization requester is the legitimate holder of the entity
requesting
INRs in the certificate being renewed. This should also include the
method employed for verifying PoP of the private key corresponding to
the public key in the certificate being renewed or the new public key
if the public key is being changed. With respect to authentication
of the subscriber, the procedures should be commensurate with those
you already employ in the renewal.> maintenance of INR distribution records. If
you operate a BPKI for this, describe how that business-based PKI is
used to authenticate re-newal requests and refer to 3.2.6.>

4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests

<Describe your procedures for handling certificate renewal requests.
This must include verification that the requester is the subscriber
or is authorized by the subscriber and that the certificate in
question has not been revoked.>
4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

<Name of ISP> MUST notify the subscriber when the certificate is
published <Describe your procedure for notification of new
certificate issuance to the subscriber. This should be consistent
with 4.3.2.>

4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate

When a renewal certificate is issued, the <name of ISP> CA will place MUST
publish it in to the repository and notify the subscriber. This will be
done without subscriber review and acceptance.

4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA

4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities
[OMITTED]

4.7. Certificate re-key

4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key

As per the CP, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when
required, based on:

1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
private key, or

2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key
pair

If a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the
replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a
new key, unless the subscriber requests a re-key at the same time.

If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
certificate will be revoked.

Section 5.6 of the Certificate Policy notes that when a CA signs a
certificate, the signing key should have a validity period that
exceeds the validity period of the certificate. This places
additional constraints on when a CA should request a re-key.

4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key

The holder of

Only the certificate subscriber may request a re-key. In addition, <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP>
may initiate a re-key based on a verified compromise report. <Describe what steps will be taken to verify <If the
identity and authorization of a
subscriber to request a re-key when (certificate Subject) requests the private key has been reported as compromised. Also rekey, describe how
authentication is effected, e.g., using the <Name of Registry> BPKI.
Describe how a compromise report received from other than a
subscriber is verified.>

4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests

4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate

When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will place publish it in the
repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without
subscriber review and acceptance.

4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA

4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities
[OMITTED]

4.8. Certificate modification

4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification

As per the CP, modification of a certificate occurs to implement
changes to the RFC 3779 extension values in a certificate. A
subscriber can request a certificate modification when this
information in a currently valid certificate has changed, as a result
of changes in the resource INR holdings of the subscriber.

If a subscriber is to be allocated address space receive a distribution of INRs in addition to a
current allocation, distribution, and if the subscriber does not request that a
new certificate be issued containing only these additional INRs, then
this is accomplished through a certificate modification. When a
certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is issued.
The new certificate will contain the same public key and the same
expiration date as the original certificate, but with the incidental
information corrected and/or the address
space and AS allocations INR distribution expanded. When
previously allocated address
space is distributed INRs are to be removed from a certificate,
then the old certificate MUST be revoked and a new certificate
(reflecting the new allocation) distribution) issued.

4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification

The certificate holder subscriber or <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> may initiate the certificate
modification process. <For the case of the certificate
holder, subscriber, state here
what steps will be taken to verify the identity and authorization of
the entity requesting the modification.>

4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests

<Describe your procedures for verification of the modification
request and procedures for the issuance of a new certificate. These
should be consistent with the processes described in Sections 4.2 and
4.3.1.>
4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to
subscriber

4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate

When a modified certificate is issued, the CA will place publish it in to the
repository and notify the subscriber. This will be done without
subscriber review and acceptance.

4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA

4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
entities
[OMITTED]

<List here any entities (other than the subscriber) who will be
notified when a modified certificate is issued.

4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension

4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation

As per the CP, certificates can be revoked for several reasons.
Either <Name of ISP> or the subject may choose to end the
relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to
revoke the certificate. If one or more of the INRs bound to the
public key in the certificate are no longer associated with the
subject, that too constitutes a basis for revocation. A certificate
also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate. Finally, a
certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by the
private key associated with that certificate.

4.9.2. Who can request revocation

The certificate holder subscriber or <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> may request a revocation. <For the
case of the certificate holder, subscriber, describe what steps will be taken to verify
the identity and authorization of the entity requesting the
revocation.>
4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request

<Describe your process for handling a certificate revocation request.
This should include:

o Procedure to be used by the certificate holder subscriber to request a revocation

o Procedure for notification of the certificate holder subscriber when the revocation
is initiated by <Name of LIR/ISP>.> ISP>.>

4.9.4. Revocation request grace period

A subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the
need for revocation has been identified.

4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request

4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties

As per the CP, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and
checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the
certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate.

4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency

<Name of LIR/ISP> will publish

<State the CRL issuance frequency for the CRLs approximately every 24 hours. that you publish.> <
Each CRL will carry a nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL will be
published at or before that time. <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> will set the
nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the
next scheduled CRL will be issued.

4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs

A CRL will be posted published to the repository system with minimal delay within <state the
maximum latency> after generation.

4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED]

4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED]

4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED]

4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]

4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED]

4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]

4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED]

4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]

4.10. Certificate status services

<Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> does not support OCSP or SCVP.

4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED}

4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED]

4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]

4.11. End <Name of subscription [OMITTED]

4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED]

4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]

4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices
[OMITTED] ISP> issues
CRLs.

5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls

5.1. Physical controls

<As per the CP, describe the physical controls that you employ for
certificate management. These should be commensurate to those used in
the management of address space allocation.> INR distribution.>

5.1.1. Site location and construction

5.1.2. Physical access

5.1.3. Power and air conditioning

5.1.4. Water exposures

5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection

5.1.6. Media storage

5.1.7. Waste disposal

5.1.8. Off-site backup

5.2. Procedural controls

<As per the CP, describe the procedural security controls that you
employ for certificate management. These should be commensurate to
those used in the management of address space allocation.> INR distribution.>

5.2.1. Trusted roles

5.2.2. Number of persons required per task

5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role

5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties

5.3. Personnel controls

<As per the CP, describe the personnel security controls that you
employ for individuals associated with certificate management. These
should be commensurate to those used in the management of address
space allocation.> INR
distribution.>
5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements

5.3.2. Background check procedures

5.3.3. Training requirements

5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements

5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence

5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions

5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements

5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel

5.4. Audit logging procedures

5.4.1. Types of

5.4.1. Types of events recorded

Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the
certification authority computing equipment. Audit records will
include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
content data relating to the event. Auditable events include:

. Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)

. Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate
requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise
notifications)

. Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions

. Posting of any material to a repository

. Any attempts to change or delete audit data
<List here any additional types of events that will be audited.>

5.4.2. Frequency of processing log

<Describe your procedures for review of audit logs.>
5.4.3. Retention period for audit log

5.4.4. Protection of audit log

5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures

5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]

5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED]

5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments

5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]

5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED]

5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]

5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED]

5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED]

5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED]

5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) [OMITTED]

5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information [OMITTED]

5.6. Key changeover

The <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> CA certificate will contain a validity period that encompasses
is at least as long as that of all certificates verifiable using this CA any certificate being issued under
that certificate. To support this, When <Name of ISP> CA wishes to change keys, <Name
of LIR/ISP> ISP> will create a new signature key pair, and acquire and publish
a new certificate containing the public key of the pair, <specify
here the minimum amount of lead time, e.g., ''a minimum of 6 months''>
in advance of the scheduled change of the current signature key pair.

5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]

5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]

5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted
[OMITTED]

5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]

5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster [OMITTED]

5.8. CA or RA termination

6. Technical Security Controls

This section describes the security controls used by <Name of
LIR/ISP>. ISP>.

6.1. Key pair generation and installation

6.1.1. Key pair generation

6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber

6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer

<Describe the means by which the procedures that will be used to deliver a subscriber's
public keys are delivered to you,
e.g., electronic submission using a PKCS#10 Certificate Signing
Request (CSR). This description the <Name of ISP> RPKI CA. These procedures should explain how this
ensure that the public key
delivery fits in with the process whereby has not been altered during transit and
that the subscriber requests IP
address space, authenticates itself, pays for the resources, etc. The
security of possesses the procedures used by a subscriber to deliver its public private key corresponding to you need only be commensurate with the security of the
procedures already employed for management of the IP address space.>
transferred public key. >

6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties

Except for the Root CA, all

CA public keys used in this PKI for all entities (other than trust anchors) are
contained in certificates issued by other CAs and will MUST be published
via a
to the RPKI repository system. Relying parties will MUST download these
certificates from this system. Public key values and associated data
for the default (putative) trust anchors (RIRs) will MUST be distributed out of band, band and
accepted by relying parties on the basis of locally-defined criteria,
e.g., embedded in path validation software that will be made
available to the Internet community.

6.1.5. Key sizes

For the <Name of LIR/ISP> CA's certificate, the RSA key size will be
<insert

The key size -- e.g., 2048 or 1024 bits.> sizes used in this PKI are as specified in RFC ZZZZ
[RFCzzzz]. <Describe any deviations from this statement.>

6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking

The RSA algorithm [RSA] is public key algorithms and parameters used in this PKI with the public exponent
(e) F4 (65,537). are as
specified in RFC ZZZZ [RFCzzzz]. <Describe any deviations from this
statement.>

<If the procedures in 6.1.1 include subscriber key pair generation,
EITHER insert here text specifying EITHER that the subscriber is responsible
for performing checks on the quality of its key pair and saying that
<Name of ISP> is not responsible for performing such checks for
subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the CA for checking
the quality of these subscriber key pairs.>

6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

The Key usage extension bit values will be consistent with RFC 3280. 5280.
For <Name of LIR/ISP>'s ISP>'s CA certificates, the keyCertSign and cRLSign bits
will be set TRUE. All other bits (including digitalSignature) will be
set FALSE, and the extension will be marked critical. <Specify
whether end entity certificates (issued (e.g., issued by the CA for its
operators) will include this extension and if so, the appropriate bit
values as per RFC 3280.> 5280.>

6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
Controls

6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls

The <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> CA employs a cryptographic module evaluated under
FIPS 140-2, 140-2/3, at level 4 2 or 3 [FIPS].

6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control

<If you choose to use multi-person controls to constrain access to
this
your CA's private keys, then insert the following text. ''There will
be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m> multi-person
control.''>

6.2.3. Private key escrow

No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI.

6.2.4. Private key backup

<Describe the procedures used for backing up your CA's private key.
The following aspects should be included. (1) The copying should be
done under the same multi-party control as is used for controlling
the original private key. (2) At least one copy should be kept at an
off-site location for disaster recovery purposes.>
6.2.5. Private key archival

See sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4

6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module

The private key for <Name of LIR/ISP>'s ISP>'s production CA will <if appropriate,
change ''production CA'' to ''production and offline CAs''> MUST be
generated by the cryptographic module specified in 6.2.1. The
private keys will never leave the module except in encrypted form for
backup and/or transfer to a new module.
6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module

The private keys key for <Name of LIR/ISP>'s ISP>'s production CA will <if appropriate,
change ''production CA'' to ''production and offline CAs''> MUST be
stored in the cryptographic module and will be protected from
unauthorized use in accordance with the FIPS 140-2 140-2/3 requirements
applicable to the module. (See [FIPS])

6.2.8. Method of activating private key

6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key

The cryptographic module, when activated, will not be left
unattended. After use, it will be deactivated by <Describe the
procedure for deactivation of your CA's private key.> The module will
be stored securely when not in use.

6.2.10. Method of destroying private key

<Describe the method used for destroying your CA's private key, e.g.,
when it is superseded. This will depend on the particular module.>
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating

The cryptographic module will be certified FIPS 140-2, 140-2/3, at level 2
or 3 [FIPS].

6.3. Other aspects of key pair management

6.3.1. Public key archival

Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
to archive public keys.

6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage
periods

The <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> CA's key pair will have a validity interval of
<insert number of years - - LIR/ISP ISP key pairs and certificates should have
reasonably long validity intervals, e.g., 10 years, to minimize the
disruption caused by key changeover.>

6.4. Activation data

6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation

6.4.2. Activation data protection

Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by <Describe
your procedures here>.

6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data

6.5. Computer security controls

6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement

6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED] INRs.>

6.6. Life cycle technical controls

6.6.1. System development controls

6.6.2. Security management controls

<Describe the security management controls that will be used for the
RPKI software and equipment employed by the CA. These security
measures should be commensurate with those used for the systems used
by the CAs for managing and allocating IP addresses.> distributing INRs.>

6.6.3. Life cycle security controls

<Describe how the equipment (hardware and software) used for PKI RPKI
functions will be procured, installed, maintained, and updated. This
should be done in a fashion commensurate with the way in which
equipment for the management and allocation distribution of IP address space INRs is handled. >
6.7. Network security controls

6.8. Time-stamping

The PKI in question RPKI does not make use of time stamping.

7. Certificate and CRL Profiles

Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy].

7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]

7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.3. Optional certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]

7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]

7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]

7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]

7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED]

7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]

7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies
extension [OMITTED]

7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]

7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED]
7.2.2.3. Optional CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]

7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]

8. Compliance Audit And and Other Assessments

8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment

8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor

8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity

8.4. Topics covered by assessment

8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency

8.6. Communication of results
9. Other Business And Legal Matters

9.1. Fees

9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees

9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable)

9.1.3. Refund policy

9.2. Financial responsibility

9.2.1. Insurance coverage

9.2.2. Other assets

9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities

9.3. Confidentiality of business information

9.3.1. Scope of confidential information

9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
information

9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information

9.4. Privacy of personal information

9.4.1. Privacy plan

9.4.2. Information treated as private

9.4.3. Information not deemed private

9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information

9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information

9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process

9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances

9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable)

9.6. Representations and warranties

9.6.1. CA representations and warranties
9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties

9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties

9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants [OMITTED]

9.7. Disclaimers of warranties

9.8. Limitations of liability

9.9. Indemnities

9.10. Term and termination

9.10.1. Term

9.10.2. Termination

9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival

9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants

9.12. Amendments

9.12.1. Procedure for amendment

9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period

9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED]

9.13. Dispute resolution provisions

9.14. Governing law

9.15. Compliance with applicable law

9.16. Miscellaneous provisions

9.16.1. Entire agreement

9.16.2. Assignment

9.16.3. Severability

9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)

9.16.5. Force Majeure

9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]

10. Security Considerations
The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied in
a certificate depends on several factors. These factors can include
the practices followed by the certification authority (CA) in
authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy, procedures,
and technical security controls, including the scope of the
subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the private
key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms and
conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of
warranties, and limitations of liability). This document provides a
framework to address the technical, procedural, personnel, and
physical security aspects of Certification Authorities, Registration
Authorities, repositories, subscribers, and relying party
cryptographic modules, in order to ensure that the certificate
generation, publication, renewal, re-key, usage, and revocation is
done in a secure manner. Specifically, Section 3 Identification and
Authentication (I&A); Section 4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational
Requirements; Section 5 Facility Management, and Operational
Controls; Section 6 Technical Security Controls; Section 7
Certificate and CRL Profiles; and Section 8 Compliance Audit and
Other Assessments are oriented towards ensuring secure operation of
the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and
relying party systems.

11. IANA Considerations

None.

12. Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Matt Lepinski for his help with the
formatting and Ron Watro for assistance with the editing of this
document.

13. References

13.1. Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W., Solo, D., "Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March
1997.

[RFCxxxx] Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S., "Certificate
Policy for the Resource PKI (RPKI)", work in progress.

[RFCyyyy] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., and Loomans, R., ''A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates'', work in progress.

[RFCzzzz] Huston, G., ''A Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for use
in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure,'' work in
progress.

13.2. Informative References

[BGP4] Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors), A Border Gateway Protocol 4
(BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995.

[FIPS] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2
(FIPS PUB 140-2), 140-3
(FIPS-140-3), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National
Institute of Standards and Technology, May 25, 2001. work in progress.

[RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method
for obtaining digital signatures and public-key
cryptosystems. Commun. ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126.

Author's Addresses

Stephen Kent
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA

Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
Email: skent@bbn.com

Derrick Kong
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA

Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951
Email: dkong@bbn.com

Karen Seo
BBN Technologies
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge MA 02138
USA

Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
Email: kseo@bbn.com

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