Secure Inter-Domain Routing (sidr)                             Kong, D.
Internet Draft                                                  Seo, K.
Expires: May 2009 October 2010                                          Kent, S.
Intended Status: Informational BCP                                   BBN Technologies
                                                          November 2008
                                                          March 8, 2010

    Template for an Internet Service Provider's Certification Practice
                Statement (CPS) for the Resource PKI (RPKI)
                      draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-03.txt
                      draft-ietf-sidr-cps-isp-04.txt

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Abstract

   This document contains a template to be used for creating a
   Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for a Local Internet Registry
   (LIR) or an Internet Service
   Provider (ISP) that is part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
   (RPKI).

Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].

Table of Contents

   Preface...........................................................8

   Preface...........................................................7
   1. Introduction...................................................9 Introduction...................................................8
      1.1. Overview.................................................10 Overview..................................................8
      1.2. Document name and identification.........................11 identification..........................9
      1.3. PKI participants.........................................11 participants..........................................9
         1.3.1. Certification authorities...........................12 authorities............................9
         1.3.2. Registration authorities............................12 authorities.............................9
         1.3.3. Subscribers.........................................12 Subscribers.........................................10
         1.3.4. Relying parties.....................................12 parties.....................................10
         1.3.5. Other participants [OMITTED]........................12 participants..................................10
      1.4. Certificate usage........................................13 usage........................................10
         1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses........................13 uses........................10
         1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses.........................13 uses.........................10
      1.5. Policy administration....................................13 administration....................................11
         1.5.1. Organization administering the document.............13 document.............11
         1.5.2. Contact person......................................13 person......................................11
         1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy...13 policy...11
         1.5.4. CPS approval procedures.............................13 procedures.............................11
      1.6. Definitions and acronyms.................................14 acronyms.................................11
   2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities...................15 Responsibilities...................13
      2.1. Repositories.............................................15 Repositories.............................................13
      2.2. Publication of certification information.................15 information.................13
      2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication.........................15 Publication.........................13
      2.4. Access controls on repositories..........................15 repositories..........................13
   3. Identification And Authentication.............................17 Authentication.............................15
      3.1. Naming...................................................17 Naming...................................................15
         3.1.1. Types of names......................................17 names......................................15
         3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful.....................17 meaningful.....................15
         3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers............17 subscribers............15
         3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms...........17 forms...........15
         3.1.5. Uniqueness of names.................................17 names.................................15
         3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of
         trademarks.................................................18 trademarks.16
      3.2. Initial identity validation..............................18 validation..............................16
         3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key...........18 key...........16
         3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity.............18 identity.............16
         3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity...............18 identity...............16
         3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information.................19 information.................17
         3.2.5. Validation of authority.............................19 authority.............................17
         3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation.........................19 interoperation.........................17
      3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests....19 requests....17
         3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-
         key........................................................19 re-key17
         3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after
         revocation.................................................19
         revocation.................................................18
      3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request.20 request.18
   4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements...............21 Requirements...............19
      4.1. Certificate Application..................................21 Application..................................19
         4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application............21 application............19
         4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities.............21 responsibilities.............19
      4.2. Certificate application processing.......................21 processing.......................19
         4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication
         functions..................................................21 functions19
         4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications...21 applications...19
         4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications............22 applications............20
      4.3. Certificate issuance.....................................22 issuance.....................................20
         4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance..............22 issuance..............20
         4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate.............................................22
         certificate................................................20
         4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED]...................................22
         entities...................................................20
      4.4. Certificate acceptance...................................22 acceptance...................................20
         4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance.........22 acceptance.........20
         4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA............22 CA............20
      4.5. Key pair and certificate usage...........................22 usage...........................20
         4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage........22 usage........21
         4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage......23 usage......21
      4.6. Certificate renewal......................................23 renewal......................................21
         4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal................23 renewal................21
         4.6.2. Who may request renewal.............................23 renewal.............................21
         4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests.............24 requests.............22
         4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to
         subscriber.................................................24 subscriber22
         4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal
         certificate................................................24 certificate
         ...........................................................22
         4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA....24 CA....22
         4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED]...................................24
         entities...................................................22
      4.7. Certificate re-key.......................................24 re-key.......................................22
         4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key.................24 re-key.................22
         4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key...25 key...23
         4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests...........25 requests...........23
         4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to
         subscriber.................................................25 subscriber23
         4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed
         certificate................................................25
         certificate................................................23
         4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA...25 CA...24
         4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED]...................................25
         entities...................................................24
      4.8. Certificate modification.................................25 modification.................................24
         4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification...........25 modification...........24
         4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification............26 modification............24
         4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests........26 requests........24
         4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to
         subscriber.................................................26
         subscriber.................................................25
         4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified
         certificate................................................26 certificate
         ...........................................................25
         4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA...26 CA...25
         4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities [OMITTED]...................................27
         entities...................................................25
      4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension....................27 suspension....................25
         4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation........................27 revocation........................25
         4.9.2. Who can request revocation..........................27 revocation..........................25
         4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request....................27 request....................26
         4.9.4. Revocation request grace period.....................27 period.....................26
         4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation
         request....................................................27 request
         ...........................................................26
         4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying
         parties....................................................28 parties.26
         4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency..............................28 frequency..............................26
         4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs............................28
         4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability
         [OMITTED]..................................................28
         4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements
         [OMITTED]..................................................28
         4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements
         available [OMITTED]........................................28
         4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]...28
         4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED].............28
         4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]...............28
         4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED].........28
         4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]..............28 CRLs............................26
      4.10. Certificate status services.............................28
         4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED}..............29
         4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED].....................29
         4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]........................29
      4.11. End of subscription [OMITTED]...........................29
      4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED].......................29
         4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices
         [OMITTED]..................................................29
         4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and
         practices [OMITTED]........................................29 services.............................26
   5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls................30 Controls................27
      5.1. Physical controls........................................30 controls........................................27
         5.1.1. Site location and construction......................30 construction......................27
         5.1.2. Physical access.....................................30 access.....................................27
         5.1.3. Power and air conditioning..........................30 conditioning..........................27
         5.1.4. Water exposures.....................................30 exposures.....................................27
         5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection......................30 protection......................27
         5.1.6. Media storage.......................................30 storage.......................................27
         5.1.7. Waste disposal......................................30 disposal......................................27
         5.1.8. Off-site backup.....................................30 backup.....................................27
      5.2. Procedural controls......................................30 controls......................................27
         5.2.1. Trusted roles.......................................30 roles.......................................27
         5.2.2. Number of persons required per task.................30 task.................27
         5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role.....30 role.....27
         5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties................30 duties................27
      5.3. Personnel controls.......................................30 controls.......................................27
         5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance
         requirements...............................................31 requirements28
         5.3.2. Background check procedures.........................31 procedures.........................28
         5.3.3. Training requirements...............................31 requirements...............................28
         5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements...............31 requirements...............28
         5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence.................31 sequence.................28
         5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions..................31 actions..................28
         5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements.................31 requirements.................28
         5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel.................31 personnel.................28
      5.4. Audit logging procedures.................................31 procedures.................................28
         5.4.1. Types of events recorded............................31 recorded............................28
         5.4.2. Frequency of processing log.........................31 log.........................28
         5.4.3. Retention period for audit log......................32 log......................29
         5.4.4. Protection of audit log.............................32 log.............................29
         5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures.........................32 procedures.........................29
         5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external)
         [OMITTED]..................................................32
         [OMITTED]..................................................29
         5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED].....32 [OMITTED].....29
         5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments...........................32 assessments...........................29
      5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]...............................32
         5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED].................32
         5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]..............32
         5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED].....................32
         5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED].................32
         5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records
         [OMITTED]..................................................32
         5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external)
         [OMITTED]..................................................32
         5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive
         information [OMITTED]......................................32 [OMITTED]...............................29
      5.6. Key changeover...........................................32 changeover...........................................29
      5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]...............33
         5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures
         [OMITTED]..................................................33
         5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are
         corrupted [OMITTED]........................................33
         5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]..33
         5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster
         [OMITTED]..................................................33 [OMITTED]...............29
      5.8. CA or RA termination.....................................33 termination.....................................29
   6. Technical Security Controls...................................34 Controls...................................30
      6.1. Key pair generation and installation.....................34 installation.....................30
         6.1.1. Key pair generation.................................34 generation.................................30
         6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber..................34 subscriber..................30
         6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer...........34 issuer...........30
         6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties...........34 parties...........30
         6.1.5. Key sizes...........................................35 sizes...........................................31
         6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality
         checking...................................................35 checking31
         6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage
         field).....................................................35 field)31
      6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
      Controls......................................................35
      Controls......................................................31
         6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls.........35 controls.........31
         6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control.......35 control.......31
         6.2.3. Private key escrow..................................36 escrow..................................31
         6.2.4. Private key backup..................................36 backup..................................32
         6.2.5. Private key archival................................36 archival................................32
         6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic
         module.....................................................36 module
         ...........................................................32
         6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module.........36 module.........32
         6.2.8. Method of activating private key....................36 key....................32
         6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key..................36 key..................32
         6.2.10. Method of destroying private key...................36 key...................32
         6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating........................37 Rating........................33
      6.3. Other aspects of key pair management.....................37 management.....................33
         6.3.1. Public key archival.................................37 archival.................................33
         6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage
         periods....................................................37
         periods....................................................33
      6.4. Activation data..........................................37 data..........................................33
         6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation.........37 installation.........33
         6.4.2. Activation data protection..........................37 protection..........................33
         6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data....................37 data....................33
      6.5. Computer security controls...............................37 controls...............................33
         6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement....37
         6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]..................38 requirement....33
      6.6. Life cycle technical controls............................38 controls............................34
         6.6.1. System development controls.........................38 controls.........................34
         6.6.2. Security management controls........................38 controls........................34
         6.6.3. Life cycle security controls........................38 controls........................34
      6.7. Network security controls................................38 controls................................34
      6.8. Time-stamping............................................38 Time-stamping............................................34
   7. Certificate and CRL Profiles..................................39
      7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]............................39
         7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................39
         7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]....................39
         7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]..............39
         7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]................................39
         7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]..........................39
         7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]......39
         7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED].....39
         7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]....39
         7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate
         Policies extension [OMITTED]...............................39
      7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]....................................39
         7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................39
         7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]..............39
      7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]...................................40
         7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED].........................40
         7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]...........................40 Profiles..................................35
   8. Compliance Audit And and Other Assessments........................41 Assessments........................36
      8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment.................41 assessment.................36
      8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor......................41 assessor......................36
      8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity...............41 entity...............36
      8.4. Topics covered by assessment.............................41 assessment.............................36
      8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency..................41 deficiency..................36
      8.6. Communication of results.................................41 results.................................36
   9. Other Business And Legal Matters..............................42 Matters..............................37
      9.1. Fees.....................................................43 Fees.....................................................38
         9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees................43 fees................38
         9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable).............43 applicable).............38
         9.1.3. Refund policy.......................................43 policy.......................................38
      9.2. Financial responsibility.................................43 responsibility.................................38
         9.2.1. Insurance coverage..................................43 coverage..................................38
         9.2.2. Other assets........................................43 assets........................................38
         9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities.....43 end-entities.....38
      9.3. Confidentiality of business information..................43 information..................38
         9.3.1. Scope of confidential information...................43 information...................38
         9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
         information................................................43
         information................................................38
         9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information..43 information..38
      9.4. Privacy of personal information..........................43 information..........................38
         9.4.1. Privacy plan........................................43 plan........................................38
         9.4.2. Information treated as private......................43 private......................38
         9.4.3. Information not deemed private......................43 private......................38
         9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information.......43 information.......38
         9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information.......43 information.......38
         9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative
         process....................................................43
         process....................................................38
         9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances..........43 circumstances..........38
      9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable).............43 applicable).............38
      9.6. Representations and warranties...........................43 warranties...........................38
         9.6.1. CA representations and warranties...................43 warranties...................38
         9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties...........43 warranties...........39
         9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties........44
         9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other
         participants [OMITTED].....................................44 warranties........39
      9.7. Disclaimers of warranties................................44 warranties................................39
      9.8. Limitations of liability.................................44 liability.................................39
      9.9. Indemnities..............................................44 Indemnities..............................................39
      9.10. Term and termination....................................44 termination....................................39
         9.10.1. Term...............................................44 Term...............................................39
         9.10.2. Termination........................................44 Termination........................................39
         9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival.................44 survival.................39
      9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants.44 participants.39
      9.12. Amendments..............................................44 Amendments..............................................39
         9.12.1. Procedure for amendment............................44 amendment............................39
         9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period..................44
         9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed
         [OMITTED]..................................................44 period..................39
      9.13. Dispute resolution provisions...........................44 provisions...........................39
      9.14. Governing law...........................................44 law...........................................39
      9.15. Compliance with applicable law..........................44 law..........................39
      9.16. Miscellaneous provisions................................44 provisions................................39
         9.16.1. Entire agreement...................................44 agreement...................................39
         9.16.2. Assignment.........................................44 Assignment.........................................39
         9.16.3. Severability.......................................44 Severability.......................................39
         9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of
         rights)....................................................44 rights).39
         9.16.5. Force Majeure......................................44
      9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]..............................44 Majeure......................................39
   10. Security Considerations......................................45 Considerations......................................39
   11. IANA Considerations..........................................45 Considerations..........................................40
   12. Acknowledgments..............................................45 Acknowledgments..............................................40
   13. References...................................................46 References...................................................41
      13.1. Normative References....................................46 References....................................41
      13.2. Informative References..................................46 References..................................41
   Author's Addresses...............................................46
   Intellectual Property Statement..................................47
   Disclaimer of Validity...........................................48 Addresses...............................................42
   Pre-5378 Material Disclaimer.....................................42
   Copyright Statement..............................................48 Statement..............................................43

Preface

   This document contains a template to be used for creating a
   Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for a Local Internet Registry
   or an Internet Service
   Provider that is part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
   (RPKI).  The user of this document should

     1. substitute a title page for page 1 saying, e.g., ''<Name of
        LIR/ISP> ISP>
        Certification Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key
        Infrastructure (RPKI)'' with date, author, etc.

     2. leave the table of contents

     3. delete this Preface

     4. fill in the information indicated below by <text in angle
        brackets>

     5. delete sections 10, 11, 12, 13.1, Acknowledgments, Author's
        Addresses, Intellectual Property Statement, Disclaimer of
        Validity, Copyright Statement, Acknowledgments; leaving a
        reference section with just the references in 13.2

     6. update the table of contents to reflect the changes required by
        steps 4 and 5 above .

   Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
   number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this
   CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained
   the section heading ''place holders'' for these omitted sections, numbering scheme employed in order the RFC to facilitate
   comparison with the section numbering scheme employed in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are included and
   marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant sections RFC.
   [There are
   also marked [OMITTED]. There is a note 4 sub-sections that I haven't removed yet due to this effect in the Word
   problems.)

1. Introduction below.

   This information should be left in the CPS as an
   explanation to the user.

1. Introduction

   This document is document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of <Name
   of LIR/ISP>. ISP>.  It describes the practices employed by the <Name of
   LIR/ISP> ISP>
   Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource PKI. Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI).   These practices are defined in accordance
   with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP, [RFCxxxx]) of
   this PKI.

   The Resource PKI is aimed at supporting improved routing security.
   The goal RPKI is that each entity that allocates IP addresses or AS
   numbers designed to an entity will, in parallel, issue a certificate
   reflecting this allocation. These certificates will enable
   verification that the holder support validation of the associated private key has been
   allocated the resources indicated in the certificate, and is the
   current, unique holder claims by current
   holders of these resources. The certificates and CRLs, Internet Number Resources (INRs, see definition in conjunction 1.7) in
   accordance with ancillary digitally signed data structures, will
   provide critical inputs for routing security mechanisms, e.g.,
   generation of route filters by LIRs/ISPs.

   The most important and distinguishing aspect the records of the PKI for which
   this CPS was created is organizations that it does not purport to identify an
   address space holder or AS number holder via the subject name
   contained act as CAs in the certificate issued to that entity. Rather, each
   certificate issued under
   this policy is intended to enable an entity PKI. The ability to assert in a verifiable fashion, that it verify such claims is essential to ensuring
   the current holder of
   an address block or an AS number, based on the current records unique, unambiguous distribution of the
   entity responsible for the these resources in question. Verification of the
   assertion is based on two criteria:

   This PKI parallels the ability of existing INR distribution hierarchy. These
   resources are distributed by the entity Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
   (IANA) to
   digitally sign data producing the Regional Internet Registries. In some regions, National
   Internet Registries (NIRs) form a signature that is verifiable using tier of the public key contained in hierarchy below the corresponding certificate,
   RIRs for internet number resource (INR) distribution. ISPs and
   validation of that certificate in the context of this PKI.
   network subscribers form additional tiers below registries.

1.1. Overview

   This PKI
   is designed exclusively for use in support of validation CPS describes:

   .  Participants

   .  Publication of claims
   related to address space and AS number holdings, with emphasis on
   support of routing security mechanisms. Use of the certificates and
   CRLs managed under this PKI for any other purpose is a violation of
   this PKI's CP, and relying parties should reject such uses.

   For this particular CPS, it should be noted that LIRs/ISPs do not
   allocate AS numbers to their subscribers; instead subscribers receive
   AS numbers from the RIR for their region.  Thus, the certificates
   issued by <Name of LIR/ISP> cover only IP address allocations.
   However, in places in this document, text applying to the overall PKI
   may refer to both IP address space and AS numbers.

   Note: This CPS is based on the template specified in RFC 3647. A
   number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this
   CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained
   section heading ''place holders'' for these omitted sections, in order
   to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme employed
   in that RFC, i.e., the relevant section headings are included and
   marked [OMITTED]. In the Table of Contents the relevant sections are
   also marked [OMITTED].

1.1. Overview

   This CPS describes:

  . Participants

  . Distribution of the certificates the certificates and CRLs

   .  How certificates are issued, managed, and revoked

   .  Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.)

   .  Key management

   .  Audit procedures

   .  Business and legal issues

   The
   This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see appendix in
   the CP IETF document
   draft-ietf-sidr-arch-xx [ARCH] for more details):

  . CA certificates for each organization allocating address blocks
     and/or AS numbers, distributing INRs and for
     each address space (AS number) holder subscriber

  . End entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use in verifying
     Route Origination Authorizations (ROAs) and other (non-
     certificate/CRL) signed to validate
     digital signatures on RPKI-signed objects (see definition in 1.7).

  . In the future, the PKI also may include end entity certificates in
     support of access control for the repository system as described in
     2.4.

1.2. Document name and identification

   The name of this document is ''<Name of LIR/ISP>'s ISP>'s Certification Practice
   Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)''.

1.3. PKI participants

   Note: In a PKI, the term ''subscriber'' refers to an individual or
   organization that is a Subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The
   term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
   qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
   the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
   service from an ISP.  Thus, in this PKI, In such cases the term ''subscriber'' can
   refer both to ISPs, which can ''network subscriber'' will
   be subscribers of RIRs, NIRs, and LIRs,
   and also to organizations that are not ISPs, but which are
   subscribers of LIRs/ISPs in the networking sense of the term. used. Also note that, for brevity, this document always refers to subscribers
   PKI participants as
   organizations, organizations or entities, even though some subscribers of
   them are individuals. When
   necessary, the phrase ''network subscriber'' is used to refer to an
   organization that receives network services from an LIR/ISP.

       1.3.1. Certification authorities

   <Name of LIR/ISP>

   <Describe the CAs that you will operate a CA, for the primary function of which RPKI.  One approach
   is
   the issuance of certificates to organizations to which address space operate two CAs: one designated ''offline'' and the other
   designated ''production.'' The offline CA is allocated by the top level CA for the
   <Name of LIR/ISP>. This ISP> portion of the RPKI. It provides a secure revocation
   and recovery capability in case the production CA will also issue end entity
   (EE) is compromised or
   becomes unavailable. Thus the offline CA issues certificates for use in verifying signatures only to
   instances of ROAs. In the
   future, this production CA; and the CRLs it issues are used to
   revoke only certificates issued to the production CA. The production
   CA may also is used to issue other types of end entity (EE)
   certificates, e.g., EE RPKI certificates to operations personnel in
   support <Name of repository maintenance. ISP> members, to
   whom INRs have been distributed.>

       1.3.2. Registration authorities

   For

   <Describe how the certificates issued by this LIR/ISP under this PKI, this registration authority function is handled for the
   CA(s) that you operate.  The RPKI does not require establishment or
   use of a separate registration authority (RA) in conjunction with the
   CA function. The RA function will be provided by the LIR/ISP per se. The LIR/ISP already
   performs same entity
   operating as a CA, e.g., entities listed in Section 1.3.1. An entity
   acting as a CA in this function -- establishing PKI already has a formal relationship with
   each subscriber and assuming organization to which it distributes INRs. These organizations
   already perform the RA function implicitly since they already assume
   responsibility for allocating and
   tracking the current allocation of address space. Since the LIR/ISP
   operates the CA, there is no distinct RA. distributing INRs.>

       1.3.3. Subscribers

   The primary types of organizations that receive allocations distributions of IP
   addresses INRs
   from this CA and thus are subscribers in the PKI sense are network
   subscribers.  <If appropriate, add ''Additionally, this LIR
   issues address space to ISPs, who are thus also subscribers.''>

       1.3.4. Relying parties

   Entities or individuals that need to validate claims of address space current
   holdings act in reliance on certificates or RPKI-
   signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties.  Thus, Relying
   parties may or may not be subscribers within this PKI. (See section
   1.7 for example, entities that make
   use the definition of address certificates in support of improved routing security
   are relying parties. This includes LIRs/ISPs, multi-homed
   organizations exchanging BGP [BGP4] traffic with LIRs/ISPs, and
   subscribers who have received an allocation RPKI-signed object.)

       1.3.5. Other participants

   <If <Name of address space from one
   ISP or from ISP> operates a registry, but want to authorize an (or another) LIR/ISP
   to originate routes to this space.

   To the extent repository that repositories make use of certificates for access
   control -                - checking for authorization to upload certificate, CRL, holds certificates,
   CRLs, and
   ROA updates -- they too act as relying parties.

1.3.5. Other participants [OMITTED] other RPKI-signed objects, then indicate this here.>

1.4. Certificate usage

       1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses

   The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in
   support of validation of claims of current holdings of address space
   and/or AS numbers, e.g., for routing security. With regard to routing
   security, an initial goal of this PKI is to allow the holder of a set
   of address blocks to be able to declare, in a secure fashion, the AS
   number of each entity that is authorized to originate a route to
   these addresses, including the context of ISP proxy aggregation. INRs.

   Additional uses of the PKI, certificates, consistent with the basic goal
   cited above, are also permitted under this the RPKI certificate policy.

   Some of the certificates that may be issued under this hierarchy PKI could be
   used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., access
   control for the repository system. system as described in 2.4. Such uses also
   are permitted under this the RPKI certificate policy.

       1.4.2. Prohibited certificate uses

   Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited.

1.5. Policy administration

       1.5.1. Organization administering the document

   This CPS is administered by <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP>

       1.5.2. Contact person

   <Insert ISP contact info here>

       1.5.3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy

   Not applicable.  Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
   is attesting to the allocation distribution of resources (IP addresses, AS
   numbers) INRs to the holder of the private
   key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The issuing
   organizations are the same organizations as the ones that perform the allocation
   distribution hence they are authoritative with respect to the
   accuracy of this binding.

       1.5.4. CPS approval procedures

   Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
   is attesting to the allocation distribution of resources (IP addresses, AS
   numbers) INRs to the holder of the private
   key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The issuing
   organizations are the same organizations as the ones that perform the allocation
   distribution hence they are authoritative with respect to the
   accuracy of this binding.

1.6. Definitions and acronyms

BPKI - Business PKI: A BPKI is an optional additional PKI used to
       identify members to whom RPKI certificates can be issued.

CP-    Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that indicates
       the applicability of a certificate to a particular community
       and/or class of applications with common security requirements.

CPS -  Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that
       specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs
       in issuing certificates.

Distribution of INRs -                          - A process of distribution of the INRs along the
       respective number hierarchy. IANA distributes blocks of IP
       addresses and Autonomous System Numbers to the five Regional
       Internet Registries (RIRs). RIRs distribute smaller address
       blocks and Autonomous System Numbers to organizations within
       their service regions, who in turn distribute IP addresses to
       their customers.

IANA - Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. IANA is responsible for
       global coordination of the Internet Protocol addressing systems
       and Autonomous System (AS) numbers used for routing internet
       traffic. IANA distributes INRs to Regional Internet Registries
       (RIRs).

INRs - Internet Number Resources. INRs are number values for three
       protocol parameter sets, namely:
          . IP Version 4 addresses,

          . IP version 6 addresses, and

          . Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing, currently
            Border Gateway Protocol-4 Autonomous System numbers.

ISP -         -  Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing
       and selling Internet services to other organizations.

LIR

NIR -         -  Local  National Internet Registry. This is an organization, typically a
       network service provider,  that sub allocates the assignment of
       IP addresses for a portion of the area covered by a Regional (or
       National) Registry.

NIR -  National Internet Registry. An NIR An NIR is an organization that
       manages the assignment distribution of IP address and AS numbers INRs for a portion of the
       geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry.
       These NIRs form an
       optional second tier in the tree scheme used to manage IP address and AS number allocation. INR
       distribution.

RIR -   Regional Internet Registry.  An RIR is an organization that
       manages the assignment distribution of IP address and AS numbers INRs for a
       specified geopolitical area.  At present, there are five RIRs:
       ARIN (North America), RIPE NCC (Europe), APNIC (Asia -Pacific),
       LACNIC (Latin America and Caribbean), and AFRINIC (Africa).

ROA

RPKI-signed object -  Route Origination Authorization.  This                        - An RPKI-signed object is a digitally signed data
       object that identifies (other than a network operator, identified by an AS,
       that is authorized to originate routes certificate or CRL) declared to be such by
       a specified set standards track RFC, and that can be validated using
       certificates issued under this PKI. The content and format of
       address blocks.
       these data constructs depend on the context in which validation
       of claims of current holdings of INRs takes place. Examples of
       these objects are repository manifests and CRLs.

2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities

2.1. Repositories

   As per the CP, certificates and certificates, CRLs will and RPKI-signed objects MUST be
   made available for downloading by all network operators, relying parties, to enable them
   to validate this
   data for use in support of routing security. data.

   <If you maintain a local repository system, describe here its basic
   set up.> up. For example, ''The <Name of ISP> RPKI CA will publish
   certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects via a repository that is
   accessible via RSYNC at rpki.<Name of ISP>.net.''>

2.2. Publication of certification information

   <Name of LIR/ISP> will upload certificates and ISP> MUST publish certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects
   issued by it to a repository that operates as part of a world-wide
   distributed system of repositories. <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> will also upload publish
   to this repository system any ROAs RPKI-signed objects that it creates.

2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication

   <Describe here your procedures for publication (to the global
   repository system) of the certificates and certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects
   that you issue. If you choose to outsource publication of PKI data,
   you still need to provide this information for relying parties.> parties. This
   should include the period of time within which a certificate will be
   published after the CA issues the certificate and the period of time
   within which a CA will publish a CRL with an entry for a revoked
   certificate after it revokes that certificate.>

   As per the CP, the following standards exist standard exists for publication times
   and frequency:

   A certificate will be published within 24 hours after issuance.

   The <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> CA will MUST publish its CRL prior to the
   nextScheduledUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by
   the CA. Within 12 hours of effecting revocation,

2.4. Access controls on repositories

   Access to the CA will publish
   a CRL with an entry repository system, for the revoked certificate.

   A new ROA will be published before a predecessor ROA has expired, or
   within 24 hours after an address space holder has changed the set of
   ASes that is authorized to advertise the address blocks it holds.

2.4. Access controls on repositories

    Access to the repository system, for modification of entries,must modification of entries, must be
   controlled to prevent denial of service attacks. All data
   (certificates, CRLs and ROAs) uploaded RPKI-signed objects) published to a
   repository are digitally
   signed. Updates signed RPKI items that <Name of Registry>
   issues MUST be published to the repository system must be validated to ensure that the data being added or replaced is authorized. This document
   does it runs by means not define
   accessible to the means by which updates are verified, but use outside world. <If <Name of
   the PKI itself Registry> offers
   repository services to validate updates is anticipated. its subscribers, then <describe here the
   protocol(s) that you support for their publishing of signed objects.>

3. Identification And Authentication

3.1. Naming

       3.1.1. Types of names

   The Subject of each certificate issued by this LIR/ISP ISP is identified by
   an X.500 Disinguished Distinguished Name (DN). It The distinguished name will
   consist of a single CN Common Name (CN) attribute with a value
   generated by <Name of ISP>. Optionally, the serialNumber attribute
   may be included along with the common name (to form a terminal
   relative distinguished name set), to distinguish among successive
   instances of certificates associated with the issuer. same entity.

       3.1.2. Need for names to be meaningful

   The Subject name in each subscriber certificate will be unique
   relative to all certificates issued by <Name of LIR/ISP>. ISP>. However, there
   is no guarantee that the subject name will be globally unique in this
   PKI.

   Note: Also, the name of the subscriber need not to be ''meaningful'' in
   the conventional, human-readable sense.  The certificates issued
   under this PKI are used for authorization in support of routing security, not for identification.
   The name applications
   that make use of the holder attestations of an address block need Internet resource holding, not be ''meaningful''
   in the conventional, human-readable sense. for
   identification

       3.1.3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers

   Although Subject names in certificates issued by this LIR/ISP ISP need not be
   meaningful, and may appear ''random,'' anonymity is not a function of
   this PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature is provided.

       3.1.4. Rules for interpreting various name forms

   None

       3.1.5. Uniqueness of names

   <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> certifies Subject names that are unique among the
   certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these
   Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate certificate
   path discovery, such uniqueness is neither mandated nor enforced
   through technical means.

       3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks

   Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there is
   no provision to either recognize or authenticate trademarks, service
   marks, etc.

3.2. Initial identity validation

       3.2.1. Method to prove possession of private key

   <Describe the method whereby each subscriber will be required to
   demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key
   corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to <Name of
   ISP's> issuing the certificate. Standard methods are described One possible approach makes use of
   the PKCS #10 format, as profiled in [RFCyyyy]. This request format
   requires that the Certificate
   Management Protocol (CMP) (RFC 2510) and PKCS #10 request be signed using the Certificate Management
   Messages over CMS protocol (CMC), RFC 2797.> (RSA) private
   key corresponding to the public key in the certificate request. This
   mechanism provides proof of possession by the requester.>

       3.2.2. Authentication of organization identity

   Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the
   organizational identity of resource holders, subscribers, with the exception of
   registries. However, certificates are issued to resource holders subscribers in a
   fashion that preserves the accuracy of bindings distributions of INRs in this ISP's
   <Name of ISP's> records.

   <Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that each
   certificate that is issued issued, accurately reflects your records with
   regard to the organization to which you have allocated distributed (or sub-
   allocated)
   distributed) the address space INRs identified in the certificate. The
   specific procedures employed for this purpose should For example, a
   BPKI certificate could be commensurate
   with those you already employ used to authenticate a certificate request
   that serves as an ISP in a link to the maintenance of address
   allocation.>

3.2.3. Authentication <Name of individual identity

   Certificates issued ISP's> subscriber database that
   maintains the resource distribution records. The certificate request
   could be matched against the database record for the subscriber in
   question, and an RPKI certificate would be issued only if the
   resources requested were a subset of those held by the subscriber.
   The specific procedures employed for this purpose should be
   commensurate with those you already employ as an ISP in the
   maintenance of INR distribution.>

       3.2.3. Authentication of individual identity

   Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual
   identity of a resource holder. subscriber. However, this ISP <Name of ISP> maintains contact
   information for each resource holder subscriber in support of certificate renewal,
   rekey, or revocation.

   <Describe the procedures that will MUST be used to identify at least one
   individual as a representative of each organization that is an
   address space holder. subscriber. This is done in
   support of issuance, renewal, and revocation of the certificate
   issued to the organization. For example, one might say ''The <Name of
   ISP> BPKI (see Section 3.2.6) issues certificates that MUST be used
   to identify individuals who represent <Name of ISP> subscribers.'' The
   procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in
   authenticating individuals as representatives for address space INR holders. Note
   that this authentication is solely for use by you in dealing with the
   organizations to which you allocate distribute (or sub-
   allocate) address space, sub-distribute) INRs, and
   thus must not be relied upon outside of this CA-subscriber
   relationship.>

       3.2.4. Non-verified subscriber information

   No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued
   under this certificate policy. policy except for SIA/AIA extensions.

       3.2.5. Validation of authority

   <Describe the procedures that will MUST be used to verify that an
   individual claiming to represent a resource holder to which a
   certificate is issued, subscriber, is authorized to
   represent that resource
   holder subscriber in this context. For example, one could
   say, ''Only an individual to whom a BPKI certificate (see Section
   3.2.6) has been issued may request issuance of an RPKI certificate.
   Each certificate issuance request is verified using the BPKI.'' The
   procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ as an LIR/ISP
   ISP in authenticating individuals as representatives of resource holders.> subscribers.>

       3.2.6. Criteria for interoperation

   This PKI

   The RPKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
   other PKI. <If you operate a separate, additional PKI for business
   purposes (BPKI), then describe (or reference) how the BPKI is used to
   authenticate subscribers and to enable them to manage their resource
   distributions.>

3.3. Identification and authentication for re-key requests

       3.3.1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key

   <Describe the conditions under which routine re-key is required and
   the manner by which it is requested. Describe the procedures that will
   MUST be used to ensure that an
   organization requesting a subscriber requesting routine re-key is
   the legitimate holder of the certificate (and associated address space) to be re-keyed.  This
   should also include State the method employed
   approach for verifying establishing PoP of the private key corresponding to the
   new public key.   With respect If you operate a BPKI, describe how that BPKI is used
   to authenticate routine re-key requests.>

       3.3.2. Identification and authentication of the holder of the address space, for re-key after
          revocation

   <Describe the procedures
   should be commensurate with those you already employ in the
   maintenance of address allocation.  Note that your organization can
   choose to require periodic re-keying consistent with contractual
   agreements with the recipient.>

3.3.2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation

   <Describe the procedures that will that MUST be used to ensure that an
   organization requesting a re-key after revocation is the legitimate
   holder of the address space INRs in the certificate being re-keyed. This should
   also include the method employed for verifying PoP of the private key
   corresponding to the new public key. If you operate a BPKI, describe
   how that BPKI is used to authenticate re-key requests. With respect
   to authentication of the resource holder, subscriber, the procedures should be
   commensurate with those you already employ in the maintenance of
   resource allocation INR
   distribution records.>

3.4. Identification and authentication for revocation request

   <Describe the procedures that will MUST be used by an RPKI subscriber to ensure
   make a revocation request.  Describe the manner by which it is
   ensured that the
   resource holder subscriber requesting revocation is the subject of
   the certificate (or an authorized representative thereof) to be
   revoked. Note that there may be different procedures for the case
   where the legitimate subject still possesses the original private key
   as opposed to the case when it no longer has access to that key.These key.
   These procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ
   in the maintenance of resource holder subscriber records.>

   Note:  If additional IP addresses are being added to an
   organization's existing allocation, the old certificate is not
   revoked. Instead,

   Note that if a subscriber requests a new INR distribution, an
   existing RPKI certificate is issued with both to the old and subscriber is NOT revoked, so
   long as the new resources and set of INRs distributed to the old key. If IP addresses or AS numbers subscriber did not
   ''shrink,'' i.e., the new INRs are
   being removed or if there has been a key compromise, then superset of the old
   certificate will be revoked (and INR set.
   However, if a re-key will be performed new INR distribution results in ''shrinkage'' of the
   event set
   of INRs distributed to a key compromise). A subscriber may request that its
   resource holdings be spread over a set subscriber, this triggers an implicit
   revocation of certificates, rather than
   consolidating all resources in one certificate. This may be
   appropriate if the subscriber wants to manage his resource
   allocations as distinct allocations within his organization. old RPKI certificate(s) associated with that
   subscriber.

4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

4.1. Certificate Application

       4.1.1. Who can submit a certificate application

   The following entities

   Any subscriber who holds INRs distributed by this ISP may submit a
   certificate application to this
   CA:

  . <Insert if appropriate: "Any ISP subordinate to this LIR.">

  . Any entity that holds address space assigned by this LIR/ISP CA.

       4.1.2. Enrollment process and responsibilities

   <Describe your enrollment process for issuing certificates both for
   initial deployment of the PKI and as an ongoing process. Note that
   most of the certificates in this PKI are issued as part of ISP your
   normal business practices, as an adjunct to address space allocation, INR distribution, and
   thus a separate application to request a certificate may not be
   necessary.  If so, reference should be made to where these practices
   are documented.>

4.2. Certificate application processing

   <Describe the certificate request/response standards processing that you will
   employ.  You should make use of existing standards for certificate
   application processing.  Relevant standards include RFC 4210,
   Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management
   Protocol (CMP), RFC 2797, Certificate Management Messages over CMS,
   and RSA Labs standards PKCS #7 and PKCS #10. >

       4.2.1. Performing identification and authentication functions

   <Describe your practices for identification and authentication of
   certificate applicants.  Often, existing practices employed by you to
   identify and authenticate organizations form can be used as the basis for
   issuance of certificates to these subscribers.  Reference can be made
   to documentation of such existing practices.>

       4.2.2. Approval or rejection of certificate applications

   <Describe your practices for approval or rejection of applications
   and refer to documentation of existing business practices relevant to
   this process.  Note that according to the CP, certificate
   applications will be approved based on the normal business practices
   of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's records of address
   space holders. Also,
   subscribers. The CP also says that each CA will follow the procedures
   specified in 3.2.1 to verify that the requester holds the
   corresponding private key for
   corresponding to the public key that will be bound to the certificate
   the CA issues to the requester.>
       4.2.3. Time to process certificate applications

   <You may declare

   <Specify here your expected time frame for processing certificate
   applications.>

4.3. Certificate issuance

       4.3.1. CA actions during certificate issuance

   <Describe in this section your procedures for issuance and
   publication of a certificate.>

       4.3.2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of
          certificate

   <Name of ISP> MUST notify the subscriber when the certificate is
   published. <Describe in this section your procedures for notification
   of a subscriber when a certificate has been issued.> published.>

       4.3.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
          entities
   [OMITTED]

   <Describe here any other entities that MUST be notified when a new
   certificate is published.>

4.4. Certificate acceptance

       4.4.1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance

   When a certificate is issued, the CA will place MUST publish it in to the
   repository and notify the subscriber.  This will be done without
   subscriber review and acceptance.

       4.4.2. Publication of the certificate by the CA

   Certificates will MUST be published in the Repository RPKI distributed repository
   system once issued following the conduct described in 4.4.1. <Describe This
   will be done within <specify the timeframe within which the
   certificate will be placed in the repository and the subscriber will
   be notified>.<Describe your procedures for publication of the approved
   certificate.>

4.5. Key pair and certificate usage

   A summary of the use model for the Resource PKI RPKI is provided below.

       4.5.1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage

   The certificates issued by this LIR/ISP <Name of ISP> to resource holders subscribers are CA
   certificates. The private key associated with each of these
   certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and
   CRLs.  Resource holders  Subscribers who are LIRs/ISPs ISPs will issue CA certificates to any
   organizations to which they allocate IP address space, in turn distribute INRs, one or more end
   entity (EE) certificates for use in verifying signatures on
   ROAs, RPKI-
   signed objects signed by the suscriber, and end entity certificates
   to operators in support of repository access control. Non-LIR/ISP resource Non-ISP INR
   holders will issue just the latter two kinds of certificates since
   they will not be
   allocating address space distributing INRs to other organizations.

       4.5.2. Relying party public key and certificate usage

   The primary relying parties in this PKI are LIRs/ISPs, organizations who will
   use EE certificates to verify ROAs, e.g., in support of generating route
   filters. RPKI-signed objects.  Repositories will
   use operator certificates to verify the authorization of entities to
   engage in repository maintenance activities, and thus repositories
   represent a secondary type of relying party.

4.6. Certificate renewal

       4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal

   As per the CP, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on
   its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate
   Subject.  If <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> initiates the renewal process based on the
   certificate expiration date, then <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> will notify the resource holder
   subscriber <insert the period of advance warning, e.g., ''2 weeks in
   advance of the expiration date'', or the general policy, e.g., ''in
   conjunction with notification of service expiration''.>  The validity
   interval of the new (renewed) certificate will overlap that of the
   previous certificate by <insert length of overlap period, e.g., 1
   week>, to ensure uninterrupted coverage.

   Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the
   previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
   compromised.  If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
   Section 4.7 will apply.

       4.6.2. Who may request renewal

   The certificate holder subscriber or <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> may initiate the renewal process.
   <For the case of the certificate holder, subscriber, describe what steps the procedures that will be taken
   used to verify ensure that the identity and authorization requester is the legitimate holder of the entity
   requesting
   INRs in the certificate being renewed. This should also include the
   method employed for verifying PoP of the private key corresponding to
   the public key in the certificate being renewed or the new public key
   if the public key is being changed.  With respect to authentication
   of the subscriber, the procedures should be commensurate with those
   you already employ in the renewal.> maintenance of INR distribution records. If
   you operate a BPKI for this, describe how that business-based PKI is
   used to authenticate re-newal requests and refer to 3.2.6.>

       4.6.3. Processing certificate renewal requests

  <Describe your procedures for handling certificate renewal requests.
  This must include verification that the requester is the subscriber
  or is authorized by the subscriber and that the certificate in
  question has not been revoked.>
       4.6.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

   <Name of ISP> MUST notify the subscriber when the certificate is
   published <Describe your procedure for notification of new
   certificate issuance to the subscriber. This should be consistent
   with 4.3.2.>

       4.6.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate

   When a renewal certificate is issued, the <name of ISP> CA will place MUST
   publish it in to the repository and notify the subscriber.  This will be
   done without subscriber review and acceptance.

       4.6.6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA

   <Describe your policy and procedures for publication of a renewed renewal
   certificate. This should be consistent with 4.4.2.>

       4.6.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
          entities
   [OMITTED]

   <List here any other entities (besides the subscriber) who will be
   notified when a renewed certificate is issued.>

4.7. Certificate re-key

       4.7.1. Circumstance for certificate re-key

   As per the CP, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when
   required, based on:

   1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
      private key, or

   2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key
      pair

   If a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the
   replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a
   new key, unless the subscriber requests a re-key at the same time.

   If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
   certificate will be revoked.

   Section 5.6 of the Certificate Policy notes that when a CA signs a
   certificate, the signing key should have a validity period that
   exceeds the validity period of the certificate.  This places
   additional constraints on when a CA should request a re-key.

       4.7.2. Who may request certification of a new public key

   The holder of

   Only the certificate subscriber may request a re-key. In addition, <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP>
   may initiate a re-key based on a verified compromise report. <Describe what steps will be taken to verify <If the
   identity and authorization of a
   subscriber to request a re-key when (certificate Subject) requests the private key has been reported as compromised. Also rekey, describe how
   authentication is effected, e.g., using the <Name of Registry> BPKI.
   Describe how a compromise report received from other than a
   subscriber is verified.>

       4.7.3. Processing certificate re-keying requests

   <Describe your process for handling re-keying requests.  As per the
   CP, this should be consistent with the process described in Section
   4.3.  So reference can be made to that section.>

       4.7.4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

   <Describe your policy regarding notifying the subscriber re:
   availability of the new re-keyed certificate.  This should be
   consistent with the notification process for any new certificate
   issuance (see section 4.3.2).>

       4.7.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate

   When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will place publish it in the
   repository and notify the subscriber.  This will be done without
   subscriber review and acceptance.

       4.7.6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA

   <Describe your policy regarding publication of the new certificate.
   This should be consistent with the publication process for any new
   certificate (see section 4.4.2).>

       4.7.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
          entities
   [OMITTED]

   <List here any entities (other than the subscriber) who will be
   notified when a re-keyed certificate is issued.>

4.8. Certificate modification

       4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification

   As per the CP, modification of a certificate occurs to implement
   changes to the RFC 3779 extension values in a certificate.  A
   subscriber can request a certificate modification when this
   information in a currently valid certificate has changed, as a result
   of changes in the resource INR holdings of the subscriber.

   If a subscriber is to be allocated address space receive a distribution of INRs in addition to a
   current allocation, distribution, and if the subscriber does not request that a
   new certificate be issued containing only these additional INRs, then
   this is accomplished through a certificate modification. When a
   certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is issued.
   The new certificate will contain the same public key and the same
   expiration date as the original certificate, but with the incidental
   information corrected and/or the address
   space and AS allocations INR distribution expanded. When
   previously allocated address
   space is distributed INRs are to be removed from a certificate,
   then the old certificate MUST be revoked and a new certificate
   (reflecting the new allocation) distribution) issued.

       4.8.2. Who may request certificate modification

   The certificate holder subscriber or <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> may initiate the certificate
   modification process. <For the case of the certificate
   holder, subscriber, state here
   what steps will be taken to verify the identity and authorization of
   the entity requesting the modification.>

       4.8.3. Processing certificate modification requests

   <Describe your procedures for verification of the modification
   request and procedures for the issuance of a new certificate.  These
   should be consistent with the processes described in Sections 4.2 and
   4.3.1.>
       4.8.4. Notification of modified certificate issuance to
          subscriber

   <Describe your procedure for notification of notifying the subscriber about the
   issuance of a modified certificate.  This should be consistent with
   the notification process for any new certificate (see section
   4.3.2).>

       4.8.5. Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate

   When a modified certificate is issued, the CA will place publish it in to the
   repository and notify the subscriber.  This will be done without
   subscriber review and acceptance.

       4.8.6. Publication of the modified certificate by the CA

   <Describe your procedure for publication of a modified certificate.
   This should be consistent with the publication process for any new
   certificate (see section 4.4.2).>

       4.8.7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
          entities
   [OMITTED]

   <List here any entities (other than the subscriber) who will be
   notified when a modified certificate is issued.

4.9. Certificate revocation and suspension

       4.9.1. Circumstances for revocation

   As per the CP, certificates can be revoked for several reasons.
   Either <Name of ISP> or the subject may choose to end the
   relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to
   revoke the certificate. If one or more of the INRs bound to the
   public key in the certificate are no longer associated with the
   subject, that too constitutes a basis for revocation. A certificate
   also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key
   corresponding to the public key in the certificate.  Finally, a
   certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by the
   private key associated with that certificate.

       4.9.2. Who can request revocation

   The certificate holder subscriber or <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> may request a revocation. <For the
   case of the certificate holder, subscriber, describe what steps will be taken to verify
   the identity and authorization of the entity requesting the
   revocation.>
       4.9.3. Procedure for revocation request

   <Describe your process for handling a certificate revocation request.
   This should include:

  .

   o  Procedure to be used by the certificate holder subscriber to request a revocation

  .

   o  Procedure for notification of the certificate holder subscriber when the revocation
      is initiated by <Name of LIR/ISP>.> ISP>.>

       4.9.4. Revocation request grace period

   A subscriber should request revocation as soon as possible after the
   need for revocation has been identified.

       4.9.5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request

   <Describe your policy on the time period within which you will
   process a revocation request.>

       4.9.6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties

   As per the CP, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and
   checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the
   certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate.

       4.9.7. CRL issuance frequency

   <Name of LIR/ISP> will publish

   <State the CRL issuance frequency for the CRLs approximately every 24 hours. that you publish.> <
   Each CRL will carry a nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL will be
   published at or before that time. <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> will set the
   nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the
   next scheduled CRL will be issued.

       4.9.8. Maximum latency for CRLs

   A CRL will be posted published to the repository system with minimal delay within <state the
   maximum latency> after generation.

4.9.9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED]

4.9.10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED]

4.9.11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED]

4.9.12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]

4.9.13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED]

4.9.14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]

4.9.15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED]

4.9.16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]

4.10. Certificate status services

   <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> does not support OCSP or SCVP.

4.10.1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED}

4.10.2. Service availability [OMITTED]

4.10.3. Optional features [OMITTED]

4.11. End <Name of subscription [OMITTED]

4.12. Key escrow and recovery [OMITTED]

4.12.1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]

4.12.2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices
   [OMITTED] ISP> issues
   CRLs.

5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls

5.1. Physical controls

   <As per the CP, describe the physical controls that you employ for
   certificate management. These should be commensurate to those used in
   the management of address space allocation.> INR distribution.>

       5.1.1. Site location and construction

       5.1.2. Physical access

       5.1.3. Power and air conditioning

       5.1.4. Water exposures

       5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection

       5.1.6. Media storage

       5.1.7. Waste disposal

       5.1.8. Off-site backup

5.2. Procedural controls

   <As per the CP, describe the procedural security controls that you
   employ for certificate management.  These should be commensurate to
   those used in the management of address space allocation.> INR distribution.>

       5.2.1. Trusted roles

       5.2.2. Number of persons required per task

       5.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role

       5.2.4. Roles requiring separation of duties

5.3. Personnel controls

   <As per the CP, describe the personnel security controls that you
   employ for individuals associated with certificate management. These
   should be commensurate to those used in the management of address
   space allocation.> INR
   distribution.>
       5.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements

       5.3.2. Background check procedures

       5.3.3. Training requirements

       5.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements

       5.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence

       5.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions

       5.3.7. Independent contractor requirements

       5.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel

5.4. Audit logging procedures

5.4.1. Types of

   <As per the CP, describe in the following sections the details of how
   you implement audit logging.>

       5.4.1. Types of events recorded

   Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the
   certification authority computing equipment.  Audit records will
   include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
   content data relating to the event.  Auditable events include:

  . Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)

  . Messages received requesting CA actions  (e.g., certificate
     requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise
     notifications)

  . Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions

  . Posting of any material to a repository

  . Any attempts to change or delete audit data
   <List here any additional types of events that will be audited.>

       5.4.2. Frequency of processing log

   <Describe your procedures for review of audit logs.>
       5.4.3. Retention period for audit log

   <Describe your policies for retention of audit logs.>

       5.4.4. Protection of audit log

   <Describe your policies for protection of the audit logs.>

       5.4.5. Audit log backup procedures

   <Describe your policies for backup of the audit logs.>

       5.4.6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]

       5.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED]

       5.4.8. Vulnerability assessments

   <Describe any vulnerability assessments that you will apply (or have
   already applied) to the PKI subsystems.  This should include whether
   such assessments have taken place and any procedures or plans to
   perform or repeat/reassess vulnerabilities in the future.>

5.5. Records archival [OMITTED]

5.5.1. Types of records archived [OMITTED]

5.5.2. Retention period for archive [OMITTED]

5.5.3. Protection of archive [OMITTED]

5.5.4. Archive backup procedures [OMITTED]

5.5.5. Requirements for time-stamping of records [OMITTED]

5.5.6. Archive collection system (internal or external) [OMITTED]

5.5.7. Procedures to obtain and verify archive information [OMITTED]

5.6. Key changeover

   The <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> CA certificate will contain a validity period that encompasses
   is at least as long as that of all certificates verifiable using this CA any certificate being issued under
   that certificate.  To support this,  When <Name of ISP> CA wishes to change keys, <Name
   of LIR/ISP> ISP> will create a new signature key pair, and acquire and publish
   a new certificate containing the public key of the pair, <specify
   here the minimum amount of lead time, e.g., ''a minimum of 6 months''>
   in advance of the scheduled change of the current signature key pair.

5.7. Compromise and disaster recovery [OMITTED]

5.7.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures [OMITTED]

5.7.2. Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted
   [OMITTED]

5.7.3. Entity private key compromise procedures [OMITTED]

5.7.4. Business continuity capabilities after a disaster [OMITTED]

5.8. CA or RA termination

   <Describe the fallback your policy for management of your CA's IP address
   space allocations INR distributions
   in case of its own termination.>

6. Technical Security Controls

   This section describes the security controls used by <Name of
   LIR/ISP>. ISP>.

6.1. Key pair generation and installation

       6.1.1. Key pair generation

   <Describe the procedures that will be used to generate the CA key
   pair, and, if applicable, key pairs for network subscribers.  In most
   instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the subscriber,
   i.e., the organization receiving the allocation distribution of address space. INRs.  However,
   your procedures may include one for generating key pairs on behalf of
   your subscribers if they so request. (This might be done for
   subscribers who do not have the ability to perform key generation in
   a secure fashion or who want a registry to provide backup for the
   subscriber private key.) Since the keys used in this PKI are not for
   non-repudiation purposes, generation of key pairs by CAs does not
   inherently undermine the security of the PKI.>

       6.1.2. Private key delivery to subscriber

   <If the procedures in 6.1.1 include providing key pair generation
   services for subscribers, describe the means by which private keys
   are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion. Otherwise say this
   is not applicable.>

       6.1.3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer

   <Describe the means by which the procedures that will be used to deliver a subscriber's
   public keys are delivered to you,
   e.g., electronic submission using a PKCS#10 Certificate Signing
   Request (CSR).  This description the <Name of ISP> RPKI CA.  These procedures should explain how this
   ensure that the public key
   delivery fits in with the process whereby has not been altered during transit and
   that the subscriber requests IP
   address space, authenticates itself, pays for the resources, etc. The
   security of possesses the procedures used by a subscriber to deliver its public private key corresponding to you need only be commensurate with the security of the
   procedures already employed for management of the IP address space.>
   transferred public key. >

       6.1.4. CA public key delivery to relying parties

   Except for the Root CA, all

   CA public keys used in this PKI for all entities (other than trust anchors) are
   contained in certificates issued by other CAs and will MUST be published
   via a
   to the RPKI repository system. Relying parties will MUST download these
   certificates from this system. Public key values and associated data
   for the default (putative) trust anchors (RIRs) will MUST be distributed out of band, band and
   accepted by relying parties on the basis of locally-defined criteria,
   e.g., embedded in path validation software that will be made
   available to the Internet community.

       6.1.5. Key sizes

   For the <Name of LIR/ISP> CA's certificate, the RSA key size will be
   <insert

   The key size -- e.g., 2048 or 1024 bits.> sizes used in this PKI are as specified in RFC ZZZZ
   [RFCzzzz]. <Describe any deviations from this statement.>

       6.1.6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking

   The RSA algorithm [RSA] is public key algorithms and parameters used in this PKI with the public exponent
   (e) F4 (65,537). are as
   specified in RFC ZZZZ [RFCzzzz]. <Describe any deviations from this
   statement.>

   <If the procedures in 6.1.1 include subscriber key pair generation,
   EITHER insert here text specifying EITHER that the subscriber is responsible
   for performing checks on the quality of its key pair and saying that
   <Name of ISP> is not responsible for performing such checks for
   subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the CA for checking
   the quality of these subscriber key pairs.>

       6.1.7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

   The Key usage extension bit values will be consistent with RFC 3280. 5280.
   For <Name of LIR/ISP>'s ISP>'s CA certificates, the keyCertSign and cRLSign bits
   will be set TRUE. All other bits (including digitalSignature) will be
   set FALSE, and the extension will be marked critical. <Specify
   whether end entity certificates (issued (e.g., issued by the CA for its
   operators) will include this extension and if so, the appropriate bit
   values as per RFC 3280.> 5280.>

6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
   Controls

       6.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls

   The <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> CA employs a cryptographic module evaluated under
   FIPS 140-2, 140-2/3, at level 4 2 or 3 [FIPS].

       6.2.2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control

   <If you choose to use multi-person controls to constrain access to
   this
   your CA's private keys, then insert the following text. ''There will
   be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m> multi-person
   control.''>

       6.2.3. Private key escrow

   No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI.

       6.2.4. Private key backup

   <Describe the procedures used for backing up your CA's private key.
   The following aspects should be included. (1) The copying should be
   done under the same multi-party control as is used for controlling
   the original private key.  (2) At least one copy should be kept at an
   off-site location for disaster recovery purposes.>
       6.2.5. Private key archival

   See sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4

       6.2.6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module

   The private key for <Name of LIR/ISP>'s ISP>'s production CA will <if appropriate,
   change ''production CA'' to ''production and offline CAs''> MUST be
   generated by the cryptographic module specified in 6.2.1.  The
   private keys will never leave the module except in encrypted form for
   backup and/or transfer to a new module.
       6.2.7. Private key storage on cryptographic module

   The private keys key for <Name of LIR/ISP>'s ISP>'s production CA will <if appropriate,
   change ''production CA'' to ''production and offline CAs''> MUST be
   stored in the cryptographic module and will be protected from
   unauthorized use in accordance with the FIPS 140-2 140-2/3 requirements
   applicable to the module. (See [FIPS])

       6.2.8. Method of activating private key

   <Describe the mechanisms and data used to activate your CA's private
   key.>

       6.2.9. Method of deactivating private key

   The cryptographic module, when activated, will not be left
   unattended.  After use, it will be deactivated by <Describe the
   procedure for deactivation of your CA's private key.> The module will
   be stored securely when not in use.

       6.2.10. Method of destroying private key

   <Describe the method used for destroying your CA's private key, e.g.,
   when it is superseded.  This will depend on the particular module.>
       6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating

   The cryptographic module will be certified FIPS 140-2, 140-2/3, at level 2
   or 3 [FIPS].

6.3. Other aspects of key pair management

       6.3.1. Public key archival

   Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
   to archive public keys.

       6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage
          periods

   The <Name of LIR/ISP> ISP> CA's key pair will have a validity interval of
   <insert number of years -                                - LIR/ISP ISP key pairs and certificates should have
   reasonably long validity intervals, e.g., 10 years, to minimize the
   disruption caused by key changeover.>

6.4. Activation data

       6.4.1. Activation data generation and installation

   <Describe how activation data for your CA will be generated.>

       6.4.2. Activation data protection

   Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by <Describe
   your procedures here>.

       6.4.3. Other aspects of activation data

   <Add here any details you wish to provide with regard to the
   activation data for your CA. If there are none, say ''None.''>

6.5. Computer security controls

       6.5.1. Specific computer security technical requirement

   <Describe your security requirements for the computers used to
   support this PKI, e.g., requirements for authenticated logins, audit
   capabilities, etc.  These requirements should be commensurate with
   those used for the computers used for managing allocation distribution of IP
   addresses.>

6.5.2. Computer security rating [OMITTED] INRs.>

6.6. Life cycle technical controls

       6.6.1. System development controls

   <Describe any system development controls that you will apply to the
   PKI systems, e.g., use of Trusted System Development Methodology
   (TSDM) Level 2.>

       6.6.2. Security management controls

   <Describe the security management controls that will be used for the
   RPKI software and equipment employed by the CA.  These security
   measures should be commensurate with those used for the systems used
   by the CAs for managing and allocating IP addresses.> distributing INRs.>

       6.6.3. Life cycle security controls

   <Describe how the equipment (hardware and software) used for PKI RPKI
   functions will be procured, installed, maintained, and updated.  This
   should be done in a fashion commensurate with the way in which
   equipment for the management and allocation distribution of IP address space INRs is handled. >
6.7. Network security controls

   <Describe the network security controls that will be used for CA
   operation.  These should be commensurate with the network security
   controls employed for the computers used for managing allocation distribution of
   IP addresses.>
   INRs.>

6.8. Time-stamping

   The PKI in question RPKI does not make use of time stamping.

7. Certificate and CRL Profiles

   Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFCyyyy].

7.1. Certificate profile [OMITTED]

7.1.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.1.2. Certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.1. Required certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.2. Deprecated certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.2.3. Optional certificate extensions [OMITTED]

7.1.3. Algorithm object identifiers [OMITTED]

7.1.4. Name forms [OMITTED]

7.1.5. Name constraints [OMITTED]

7.1.6. Certificate policy object identifier [OMITTED]

7.1.7. Usage of Policy Constraints extension [OMITTED]

7.1.8. Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics [OMITTED]

7.1.9. Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies
   extension [OMITTED]

7.2. CRL profile [OMITTED]

7.2.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.2.2. CRL and CRL entry extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.1. Required CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.2.2.2. Deprecated CRL extensions [OMITTED]
7.2.2.3. Optional CRL extensions [OMITTED]

7.3. OCSP profile [OMITTED]

7.3.1. Version number(s) [OMITTED]

7.3.2. OCSP extensions [OMITTED]

8. Compliance Audit And and Other Assessments

   <List here any audit and other assessments used to ensure the
   security of the administration of IP addresses. INRs. These are sufficient for the PKI
   RPKI systems.>

8.1. Frequency or circumstances of assessment

8.2. Identity/qualifications of assessor

8.3. Assessor's relationship to assessed entity

8.4. Topics covered by assessment

8.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency

8.6. Communication of results
9. Other Business And Legal Matters

   <The sections below are optional. Fill them in as appropriate for
   your organization. The CP says that CAs should cover 9.1 to 9.11 and
   9.13 to 9.17 although not every CA will choose to do so. Note that
   the manner in which you manage your business and legal matters for
   this PKI should be commensurate with the way in which you manage
   business and legal matters for the
   allocation distribution of IP addresses.> INRs.>

9.1. Fees

       9.1.1. Certificate issuance or renewal fees

       9.1.2. Fees for other services (if applicable)

       9.1.3. Refund policy

9.2. Financial responsibility

       9.2.1. Insurance coverage

       9.2.2. Other assets

       9.2.3. Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities

9.3. Confidentiality of business information

       9.3.1. Scope of confidential information

       9.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
          information

       9.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information

9.4. Privacy of personal information

       9.4.1. Privacy plan

       9.4.2. Information treated as private

       9.4.3. Information not deemed private

       9.4.4. Responsibility to protect private information

       9.4.5. Notice and consent to use private information

       9.4.6. Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process

       9.4.7. Other information disclosure circumstances

9.5. Intellectual property rights (if applicable)

9.6. Representations and warranties

       9.6.1. CA representations and warranties
       9.6.2. Subscriber representations and warranties

       9.6.3. Relying party representations and warranties

9.6.4. Representations and warranties of other participants [OMITTED]

9.7. Disclaimers of warranties

9.8. Limitations of liability

9.9. Indemnities

9.10. Term and termination

       9.10.1. Term

       9.10.2. Termination

       9.10.3. Effect of termination and survival

9.11. Individual notices and communications with participants

9.12. Amendments

       9.12.1. Procedure for amendment

       9.12.2. Notification mechanism and period

9.12.3. Circumstances under which OID must be changed [OMITTED]

9.13. Dispute resolution provisions

9.14. Governing law

9.15. Compliance with applicable law

9.16. Miscellaneous provisions

       9.16.1. Entire agreement

       9.16.2. Assignment

       9.16.3. Severability

       9.16.4. Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)

       9.16.5. Force Majeure

9.17. Other provisions [OMITTED]

10. Security Considerations
   The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied in
   a certificate depends on several factors.  These factors can include
   the practices followed by the certification authority (CA) in
   authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy, procedures,
   and technical security controls, including the scope of the
   subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the private
   key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms and
   conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of
   warranties, and limitations of liability). This document provides a
   framework to address the technical, procedural, personnel, and
   physical security aspects of Certification Authorities, Registration
   Authorities, repositories, subscribers, and relying party
   cryptographic modules, in order to ensure that the certificate
   generation, publication, renewal, re-key, usage, and revocation is
   done in a secure manner.  Specifically, Section 3 Identification and
   Authentication (I&A); Section 4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational
   Requirements; Section 5 Facility Management, and Operational
   Controls; Section 6 Technical Security Controls; Section 7
   Certificate and CRL Profiles; and Section 8 Compliance Audit and
   Other Assessments are oriented towards ensuring secure operation of
   the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and
   relying party systems.

11. IANA Considerations

   None.

12. Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Matt Lepinski for his help with the
   formatting and Ron Watro for assistance with the editing of this
   document.

13. References

13.1. Normative References

   [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W., Solo, D., "Internet X.509
             Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
             Revocation List (CRL) Profile", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March
             1997.

   [RFCxxxx] Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S., "Certificate
             Policy for the Resource PKI (RPKI)", work in progress.

   [RFCyyyy] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., and Loomans, R., ''A Profile for
             X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates'', work in progress.

   [RFCzzzz] Huston, G., ''A Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for use
             in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure,'' work in
             progress.

13.2. Informative References

   [BGP4]   Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors), A Border Gateway Protocol 4
             (BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995.

   [FIPS]   Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2
             (FIPS PUB 140-2), 140-3
             (FIPS-140-3), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic
             Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National
             Institute of Standards and Technology, May 25, 2001. work in progress.

   [RSA]    Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method
             for obtaining digital signatures and public-key
             cryptosystems. Commun. ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126.

Author's Addresses

   Stephen Kent
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA

   Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
   Email: skent@bbn.com

   Derrick Kong
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA

   Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951
   Email: dkong@bbn.com

   Karen Seo
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton Street
   Cambridge MA 02138
   USA

   Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
   Email: kseo@bbn.com

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