Network Working Group                                          S. Weiler
Internet-Draft                                                 W3C / MIT
Intended status: Standards Track                             A. Sonalker
Expires: July 14, August 21, 2017                                        TowerSec
                                                              R. Austein
                                                    Dragon Research Labs
                                                        January 10,
                                                       February 17, 2017

A Publication Protocol for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)


   This document defines a protocol for publishing Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI) objects.  Even though the RPKI will have many
   participants issuing certificates and creating other objects, it is
   operationally useful to consolidate the publication of those objects.
   Even in cases where a certificate issuer runs their own publication
   repository, it can be useful to run the certificate engine itself on
   a different machine from the publication repository.  This document
   defines a protocol which addresses these needs.

Status of This Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 14, August 21, 2017.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Historical Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Protocol Specification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  Common XML Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Publication and Withdrawal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6   7
     2.3.  Listing the repository  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7   8
     2.4.  Error handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.5.  Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8   9
     2.6.  XML Schema  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9  10
   3.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.1.  <publish/> Query, No Existing Object  . . . . . . . . . .  11  12
     3.2.  <publish/> Query, Overwriting Existing Object . . . . . .  11  12
     3.3.  <withdraw/> Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     3.4.  <success/> Reply  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     3.5.  <report_error/> With Optional Elements  . . . . . . . . .  12  13
     3.6.  <report_error/> Without Optional Elements . . . . . . . .  13
     3.7.  Error Handling With Multi-Element Queries . . . . . . . .  13
       3.7.1.  Multi-Element Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       3.7.2.  Successful Multi-Element Response . . . . . . . . . .  14
       3.7.3.  Failure Multi-Element Response, First Error Only  . .  14
       3.7.4.  Failure Multi-Element Response, All Errors  . . . . .  15
     3.8.  <list/> Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     3.9.  <list/> Reply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   4.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   6.  16
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   7.  17
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   8.  18
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     8.1.  18
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     8.2.  18
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20  19

1.  Introduction

   This document assumes a working knowledge of the Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI), which is intended to support improved routing
   security on the Internet.  See [RFC6480] for an overview of the RPKI.

   In order to make participation in the RPKI easier, it is helpful to
   have a few consolidated repositories for RPKI objects, thus saving
   every participant from the cost of maintaining a new service.
   Similarly, relying parties using the RPKI objects will find it faster
   and more reliable to retrieve the necessary set from a smaller number
   of repositories.

   These consolidated RPKI object repositories will in many cases be
   outside the administrative scope of the organization issuing a given
   RPKI object.  In some cases, outsourcing operation of the repository
   will be an explicit goal: some resource holders who strongly wish to
   control their own RPKI private keys may lack the resources to operate
   a 24x7 repository, or may simply not wish to do so.

   The operator of an RPKI publication repository may well be an
   Internet registry which issues certificates to its customers, but it
   need not be; conceptually, operation of a an RPKI publication
   repository is separate from operation of RPKI CA.

   Even in cases where a resource holder operates both a certificate
   engine and a publication repository, it can be useful to separate the
   two functions, as they have somewhat different operational and
   security requirements.

   This document defines an RPKI publication protocol which allows
   publication either within or across organizational boundaries, and
   which makes fairly minimal demands on either the CA engine or the
   publication service.

   The authentication and message integrity architecture of the
   publication protocol is essentially identical to the architecture
   used in [RFC6492], because the participants in this protocol are the
   same CA engines as in RFC 6492; this allows reuse of the same
   "Business PKI" ("BPKI", see Section 1.2) infrastructure used to
   support RFC 6492.  As in RCC RFC 6492, authorization is a matter of
   external configuration: we assume that any given publication
   repository has some kind of policy controlling which certificate
   engines are allowed to publish, modify, or withdraw particular RPKI
   objects, most likely following the recommendation in [RFC6480]
   Section 4.4, the details of this policy are a private matter between
   the operator of a certificate engine and the operator of the chosen
   publication repository.

   The following diagram attempts to convey where this publication
   protocol fits into the overall data flow between the certificate
   issuers and relying parties:

          +------+    +------+    +------+
          |  CA  |    |  CA  |    |  CA  |
          +------+    +------+    +------+
              |           |           |    Publication Protocol
              |           |           |    Business relationship
              +-------+   |  +--------+      perhaps set up by
                      |   |  |        draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-oob-setup
                 |                 |
                 |   Publication   |
                 |   Repository    |
                 |                 |
                 +-----------------+     Distribution protocols
                          |                   rsync or RRDP
           |              |                |
   +-------v-----+ +------v------+  +------v------+
   |   Relying   | |   Relying   |  |   Relying   |
   |    Party    | |    Party    |  |    Party    |
   +-------------+ +-------------+  +-------------+

   The publication protocol itself is not visible to relying parties: a
   relying party sees the public interface of the publication server,
   which is an rsync or RRDP ([I-D.ietf-sidr-delta-protocol]) server.

   Operators of certificate engines and publication repositories may
   find [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-oob-setup] a useful tool in setting up the
   pairwise relationships between these servers, but are not required to
   use it.

1.1.  Historical Note

   This protocol started out as an informal collaboration between
   several of the early RPKI implementers, and while it was always the
   designers' intention that the resulting protocol end up on the IETF
   standards track, it took a few years to get there, because
   standardization of other pieces of the overall RPKI protocol space
   was more urgent.  The standards track version of this publication
   protocol preserves the original XML namespace and protocol version
   scheme in order to maintain backwards compatibility with running code
   implemented against older versions of the specification.

1.2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   "Publication engine" and "publication server" are used
   interchangeably to refer to the server providing the service
   described in this document.

   "Business Public Key Infrastructure" ("Business PKI" or "BPKI")
   refers to a PKI, separate from the RPKI, used to authenticate clients
   to the publication engine.  We use the term "Business PKI" here
   because an Internet registry might already have a PKI for
   authenticating its clients and might wish to reuse that PKI for this
   protocol.  There is, however, no requirement to reuse such a PKI.

2.  Protocol Specification

   The publication protocol uses XML ([XML]) messages wrapped in signed
   CMS messages, carried over HTTP transport. transport ([RFC2616]).  The CMS
   encapsulation is identical to that used in [RFC6492], section 3.1 and

   The publication protocol uses a simple request/response interaction.
   The client passes a request to the server, and the server generates a
   corresponding response.

   A message exchange commences with the client initiating an HTTP POST
   with content type of "application/rpki-publication", with the message
   object as the body.  The server's response will similarly be the body
   of the response with a content type of "application/rpki-

   The content of the POST and the server's response will be a well-
   formed Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] object with OID =
   1.2.840.113549.1.7.2 as described in Section 3.1 of [RFC6492].

   The CMS signatures are used to protect the integrity of the protocol
   messages and to authenticate the client and server to each other.
   Authorization to perform particular operations is a local matter,
   perhaps determined by contractual agreements between the operators of
   any particular client-server pair, but in any case is beyond the
   scope of this specification.

2.1.  Common XML Message Format

   The XML schema for this protocol is below in Section 2.6.  The basic
   XML message format looks like this:

     <!-- Zero or more PDUs -->

     <!-- Zero or more PDUs -->

   As noted above, the outermost XML element is encapsulated in in a
   signed CMS message.  Query messages are signed by the client, reply
   messages are signed by the server.

   Common attributes:

   version:  The value of this attribute is the version of this
      protocol.  This document describes version 4.

   type:  The possible values of this attribute are "reply" and "query".

   A query PDU may be one of three types: <publish/>, <withdraw/>, or

   A reply PDU may be one of three types: <success/>, <list/>, or

   The <publish/> and <withdraw/> PDUs include a "tag" attribute to
   facilitate bulk operation.  When performing bulk operations, a CA
   engine will probably find it useful to specify a distinct tag value
   for each <publish/> or <withdraw/> PDU, to simplify matching an error
   with the PDU which triggered it.  The tag attribute is mandatory, to
   simplify parsing, but a CA engine which has no particular use for
   tagging MAY use any syntactically legal value, including simply using
   the empty string for all tag fields.

   This document describes version 4 of this protocol.  An
   implementation which understands only this version of the protocol
   MUST reject messages with a different protocol version attribute,
   signalling the error as described in Section 2.4.  Since "4" is
   currently the only value allowed for the version attribute in the
   schema (Section 2.6), an incorrect protocol version can be detected
   either by checking the version attribute directly or as a schema
   validation error.

2.2.  Publication and Withdrawal

   The publication protocol uses a common message format to request
   publication of any RPKI object.  This format was chosen specifically
   to allow this protocol to accommodate new types of RPKI objects
   without needing changes to this protocol.

   Both the <publish/> and <withdraw/> PDUs have a payload of a tag and
   a URI.
   an rsync URI ([RFC3986], [RFC5781]).  The <publish/> query also
   contains the DER object to be published, encoded in Base64. Base64 ([RFC4648]
   section 4, with line breaks within the Base64 text permitted but not

   Both the <publish/> and <withdraw/> PDUs also have a "hash"
   attribute, which carries a hash of an existing object at the
   specified repository URI, encoded as a hexadecimal string.  For
   <withdraw/> PDUs, the hash MUST be present, as this operation makes
   no sense if there is no existing object to withdraw.  For <publish/>
   PDUs, the hash is MUST be present if the publication operation is
   overwriting an existing object, and MUST NOT be present if this
   publication operation is writing to a new URI where no prior object
   exists.  Presence of an object when no "hash" attribute has been
   specified is an error, as is absence of an object or an incorrect
   hash value when a "hash" attribute has been specified.  Any such
   errors MUST be reported using the <report_error/> PDU.

   The hash algorithm is SHA-256 [SHS], to simplify comparison of
   publication protocol hashes with RPKI manifest hashes.

   The intent behind the "hash" attribute is to allow the client and
   server to detect any disagreements about the effect that a <publish/>
   or <withdraw/> PDU will have on the repository.

   Note that every publish and withdraw action requires a new manifest,
   thus every publish or withdraw action will involve at least two

   Processing of a query message is handled atomically: either the
   entire query succeeds or none of it does.  When a query message
   contains multiple PDUs, failure of any PDU may require the server to
   roll back actions triggered by earlier PDUs.

   When a query messages message containing <publish/> or <withdraw/> PDUs
   succeeds, the server returns a single <success/> reply.

   When a query fails, the server returns one or more <report_error/>
   reply PDUs.  Typically, a server will only generate one
   <report_error/> corresponding to the first query PDU that failed, but
   servers MAY return multiple <report_error/> PDUs at the implementor's

2.3.  Listing the repository

   The <list/> operation allows the client to ask the server for a
   complete listing of objects which the server believes the client has
   published.  This is intended primarily to allow the client to recover
   upon detecting (probably via use of the "hash" attribute, see
   Section 2.2) that they have somehow lost synchronization.

   The <list/> query consists of a single PDU.  A <list/> query MUST be
   the only PDU in a query - it may not be combined with any <publish/>
   or <withdraw/> queries.

   The <list/> reply consists of zero or more PDUs, one per object
   published in this repository by this client, each PDU conveying the
   URI and hash of one published object.

2.4.  Error handling

   Errors are handled at two levels.

   Errors that make it impossible to decode a query or encode a response
   are handled at the HTTP layer.  4xx and 5xx HTTP response codes
   indicate that something bad happened.

   In all other cases, errors result in an XML <report_error/> PDU.
   Like the rest of this protocol, <report_error/> PDUs are CMS-signed
   XML messages and thus can be archived to provide an audit trail.

   <report_error/> PDUs only appear in replies, never in queries.

   The "tag" attribute of the <report_error/> PDU associated with a
   <publish/> or <withdraw/> PDU MUST be set to the same value as the
   "tag" attribute in the PDU which generated the error.  A client can
   use the "tag" attribute to determine which PDU caused processing of
   an update to fail.

   The error itself is conveyed in the "error_code" attribute.  The
   value of this attribute is a token indicating the specific error that

   The body of the <report_error/> element contains two sub-elements:

   1.  An optional text element <error_text/>, which if present,
       contains a text string with debugging information intended for
       human consumption.

   2.  An optional element <failed_pdu/>, which, if present, contains a
       verbatim copy of the query PDU whose failure triggered the
       <report_error/> PDU.  The quoted element must be syntactically

   See Section 3.7 for examples of a multi-element query and responses.

2.5.  Error Codes

   These are the defined error codes as well as some discussion of each.
   Text similar to these descriptions may be sent in an <error_text/>
   element to help explain the error encountered.

   xml_error:  Encountered an XML problem.  Note that some XML errors
      may be severe enough to require error reporting at the HTTP layer,
      instead.  Implementations MAY choose to report any or all XML
      errors at the HTTP layer.

   permission_failure:  Client does not have permission to update this

   bad_cms_signature:  Bad CMS signature.

   object_already_present:  An object is already present at this URI,
      yet a "hash" attribute was not specified.  A "hash" attribute must
      be specified when overwriting or deleting an object.  Perhaps
      client and server are out of sync?

   no_object_present:  There is no object present at this URI, yet a
      "hash" attribute was specified.  Perhaps client and server are out
      of sync?

   no_object_matching_hash  The "hash" attribute supplied does not match
      the "hash" attribute of the object at this URI.  Perhaps client
      and server are out of sync?

   consistency_problem:  Server detected an update that looks like it
      will cause a consistency problem (e.g. an object was deleted, but
      the manifest was not updated).  Note that a server is not required
      to make such checks.  Indeed, it may be unwise for a server to do
      so.  This error code just provides a way for the server to explain
      its (in-)action.

   other_error:  A meteor fell on the server.

2.6.  XML Schema

   The following is a [RelaxNG] compact form schema describing the
   Publication Protocol.

   This schema is normative: in the event of a disagreement between this
   schema and the document text above, this schema is authoritative.

   # RelaxNG schema for RPKI publication protocol.

   default namespace =

   # This is version 4 of the protocol.

   version = "4"

   # Top level PDU is either a query or a reply.

   start |= element msg {
     attribute version { version },
     attribute type    { "query" },

   start |= element msg {
     attribute version { version },
     attribute type    { "reply" },

   # Tag attributes for bulk operations.

   tag = attribute tag { xsd:token { maxLength="1024" } }

   # Base64 encoded DER stuff.

   base64 = xsd:base64Binary

   # Publication URIs.

   uri = attribute uri { xsd:anyURI { maxLength="4096" } }

   # Digest of an existing object (hexadecimal).

   hash = attribute hash { xsd:string { pattern = "[0-9a-fA-F]+" } }

   # Error codes.

   error |= "xml_error"
   error |= "permission_failure"
   error |= "bad_cms_signature"
   error |= "object_already_present"
   error |= "no_object_present"
   error |= "no_object_matching_hash"
   error |= "consistency_problem"
   error |= "other_error"

   # <publish/> and <withdraw/> query elements

   query_elt |= (
     element publish  { tag, uri, hash?, base64 } |
     element withdraw { tag, uri, hash          }

   # <success/> reply

   reply_elt |= element success { empty }

   # <list/> query and reply

   query_elt |= element list { empty }
   reply_elt |= element list { uri, hash }*

   # <report_error/> reply

   reply_elt |= element report_error {
     attribute error_code { error },
     element   error_text { xsd:string { maxLength="512000" }}?,
     element   failed_pdu { query_elt }?

3.  Examples

   Following are examples of various queries and the corresponding
   replies for the RPKI publication protocol.

   Note the authors have taken liberties with the Base64, hash, and URI
   text in these examples in the interest of making the examples fit
   nicely into RFC text format.  Similarly, these examples do not show
   the CMS signature wrapper around the XML, just the XML payload.

3.1.  <publish/> Query, No Existing Object

     <!-- body is base64(new-object) -->

3.2.  <publish/> Query, Overwriting Existing Object

     <!-- hash is hex(SHA-256(old-object)) -->
     <!-- body is base64(new-object) -->

3.3.  <withdraw/> Query

     <!-- hash is hex(SHA-256(old-object)) -->

3.4.  <success/> Reply

3.5.  <report_error/> With Optional Elements

         Can't delete an object I don't have

3.6.  <report_error/> Without Optional Elements


3.7.  Error Handling With Multi-Element Queries

3.7.1.  Multi-Element Query

3.7.2.  Successful Multi-Element Response


3.7.3.  Failure Multi-Element Response, First Error Only

3.7.4.  Failure Multi-Element Response, All Errors


3.8.  <list/> Query


3.9.  <list/> Reply


4.  Operational  IANA Considerations

   There are two basic options open

   IANA is asked to register the repository operator application/rpki-publication MIME media
   type as follows:

      MIME media type name:  application
      MIME subtype name:  rpki-publication
      Required parameters:  None
      Optional parameters:  None
      Encoding considerations:  binary
      Security considerations:  Carries an RPKI Publication Protocol
         Message, as to how
   the publication tree is laid out.  The first option is simple: each
   publication client is given its own directory one level below the top
   of the rsync module, and there is no overlap between the publication
   spaces used by different clients.  For example:


   This has the advantage of being very easy for the publication
   operator to manage, but has the drawback of making it difficult for
   relying parties to fetch published objects efficiently, particularly
   for relying party implementations which follow the safety rule of
   never retrieving anything from a URI which didn't come directly from
   either a signed object or a trust anchor locator.

   Given that the mandatory-to-implement retrieval protocol for relying
   parties is rsync, a more efficient repository structure would be one
   which minimized the number of rsync fetches required.  One such
   structure would be one in which the publication directories for
   subjects were placed underneath the publication directories of their
   issuers: since the normal synchronization tree walk is top-down, this
   can significantly reduce the total number of rsync connections
   required to synchronize.  For example:


   Preliminary measurement suggests that, in the case of large numbers
   of small publication directories, the time needed to set up and tear
   down individual rsync connections becomes significant, and that a
   properly optimized tree structure can reduce synchronization time by
   an order of magnitude.

   The more complex tree structure does require careful attention when
   setting up clients.  In the example above, assuming that Alice issues
   to Bob who in turn issues to Carol, Alice has ceded control of a
   portion of her publication space to Bob, who has in turn ceded a
   portion of that to Carol.

   The details of how the repository operator determines that Alice has
   given Bob permission to nest Bob's publication directory under
   Alice's is outside the scope of this protocol.

5.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is asked to register the application/rpki-publication MIME media
   type as follows:

      MIME media type name:  application
      MIME subtype name:  rpki-publication
      Required parameters:  None
      Optional parameters:  None
      Encoding considerations:  binary
      Security considerations:  Carries an RPKI Publication Protocol
         Message, as defined in this document.
      Interoperability considerations:  None
      Published specification:  This document
      Applications which use this media type: HTTP
      Additional information:
         Magic number(s):  None
         File extension(s):
         Macintosh File Type Code(s):
      Person & email address defined in this document.
      Interoperability considerations:  None
      Published specification:  [[RFCxxxx]]
      Applications which use this media type: HTTP
      Additional information:
         Magic number(s):  None
         File extension(s):
         Macintosh File Type Code(s):
      Person & email address to contact for further information:
         Rob Austein <>
      Intended usage:  COMMON
      Author/Change controller: IETF


5.  Security Considerations

   The RPKI publication protocol and the data it publishes use entirely
   separate PKIs for authentication.  The published data is
   authenticated within the RPKI, and this protocol has nothing to do
   with that authentication, nor does it require that the published
   objects be valid in the RPKI.  The publication protocol uses a
   separate Business PKI (BPKI) to authenticate its messages.

   Each RPKI publication protocol message is CMS-signed. wrapped in a signed CMS
   message, which provides message integrity protection and an auditable
   form of message authentication.  Because of
   that protection these protections at the
   application layer, and because all the data being published are
   intended to be public information in any case, this protocol does not
   not, strictly speaking, require the use of HTTPS or other transport
   security mechanisms.  There may, however, be circumstances in which a
   particular publication operator may prefer HTTPS over HTTP anyway, as
   a matter of (BPKI) CA policy.  Use of HTTP versus HTTPS here is,
   essentially, a private matter between the repository operator and its
   clients.  Note, however, that even if a client/server pair uses HTTPS
   for this protocol, message authentication for this protocol is still
   based on the CMS signatures, not HTTPS.

   Although the hashes used in the <publish/> and <withdraw/> PDUs are
   cryptographically strong, the digest algorithm was selected for
   convenience in comparing these hashes with the hashes that appear in
   RPKI manifests.  The hashes used in the <publish/> and <withdraw/>
   PDUs are not particularly security-sensitive, because these PDUs are
   protected by the CMS signatures.  Because of this, the most likely
   reason for a change to this digest algorithm would be to track a
   corresponding change in the digest algorithm used in RPKI manifests.
   If and when such a change happens, it will require incrementing the
   version number of this publication protocol, but given that the most
   likely implementation of a publication server uses these hashes as
   lookup keys in a database, bumping the protocol version number would
   be a relatively minor portion of the effort of changing the

   Compromise of a publication server, perhaps through mismanagement of
   BPKI private keys, could lead to a denial-of-service attack on the
   RPKI.  An attacker gaining access to BPKI private keys could use this
   protocol to delete (withdraw) RPKI objects, leading to routing
   changes or failures.  Accordingly, as in most PKIs, good key
   management practices are important.


6.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank: Geoff Huston, George Michaelson,
   Oleg Muravskiy, Paul Wouters, Randy Bush, Rob Loomans, Robert
   Kisteleki, Tim Bruijnzeels, Tom Petch, and anybody else who helped
   along the way but whose name(s) the authors have temporarily


7.  References


7.1.  Normative References

   [RelaxNG]  Clark, J., "RELAX NG Compact Syntax", OASIS , November
              2002, <

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997.

   [RFC2616]  Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
              Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", RFC 3986,
              STD 66, January 2005.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
              RFC 5652, STD 70, September 2009.

   [RFC5781]  Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI
              Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010.

   [RFC6492]  Huston, G., Loomans, R., Ellacott, B., and R. Austein, "A
              Protocol for Provisioning Resource Certificates",
              RFC 6492, February 2012.

   [SHS]      National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
              Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-4, March 2012,


   [XML]      Cowan, J., "Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.1", W3C CR
              CR-xml11-20021015, October 2002.

7.2.  Informative References

              Bruijnzeels, T., Muravskiy, O., Weber, B., and R. Austein,
              "RPKI Repository Delta Protocol", draft-ietf-sidr-delta-
              protocol-07 (work in progress), September 2016. February 2017.

              Austein, R., "An Out-Of-Band Setup Protocol For RPKI
              Production Services", draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-oob-setup-05 draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-oob-setup-06
              (work in progress), December 2016.

   [RelaxNG]  Clark, J., "RELAX NG Compact Syntax", OASIS , November
              2002, <
              compact-20021121.html>. January 2017.

   [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.

   [XML]      Cowan, J., "Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.1", W3C CR
              CR-xml11-20021015, October 2002.

Authors' Addresses

   Samuel Weiler
   W3C / MIT


   Anuja Sonalker
   TowerSec Automotive Cyber Security


   Rob Austein
   Dragon Research Labs