draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-01.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-02.txt 
Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) G. Huston Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) G. Huston
Internet-Draft G. Michaelson Internet-Draft G. Michaelson
Intended status: Informational APNIC Intended status: Informational APNIC
Expires: April 9, 2009 October 6, 2008 Expires: February 5, 2010 August 4, 2009
Validation of Route Origination in BGP using the Resource Certificate Validation of Route Origination in BGP using the Resource Certificate
PKI PKI
draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-01.txt draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-02.txt
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Abstract Abstract
This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure to validate the origination of routes advertised in Infrastructure to validate the origination of routes advertised in
the Border Gateway Protocol. The proposed application is intended to the Border Gateway Protocol. The proposed application is intended to
fit within the requirements for adding security to inter-domain fit within the requirements for adding security to inter-domain
routing, including the ability to support incremental and piecemeal routing, including the ability to support incremental and piecemeal
deployment, and does not require any changes to the specification of deployment, and does not require any changes to the specification of
BGP. BGP.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Decoupled Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection . . . . . . 4
2.2. Linked Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Further Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection . . . . . 6 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Validation Outcomes and Rejection of BGP Route Objects . . 9 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Further Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. Changes -01 to -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to validate the origination of routes Infrastructure (RPKI) to validate the origination of routes
advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RFC4271]. advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RFC4271].
The RPKI is based on Resource Certificates. Resource Certificates The RPKI is based on Resource Certificates. Resource Certificates
are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX profile [RFC5280], are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX profile [RFC5280],
and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS identifiers [RFC3779]. and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS identifiers [RFC3779].
skipping to change at page 3, line 27 skipping to change at page 3, line 27
Subject's private key with the public key contained in the Resource Subject's private key with the public key contained in the Resource
Certificate. The PKI is structured such that each current Resource Certificate. The PKI is structured such that each current Resource
Certificate matches a current resource allocation or assignment. Certificate matches a current resource allocation or assignment.
This is described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]. This is described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch].
Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) are digitally signed objects that Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) are digitally signed objects that
bind an address to an AS number, signed by the address holder. A ROA bind an address to an AS number, signed by the address holder. A ROA
provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has
authorized an AS to originate route objects in the inter-domain authorized an AS to originate route objects in the inter-domain
routing environment for that address block. ROAs are described in routing environment for that address block. ROAs are described in
[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]. [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]. ROAs are intended to fit within the
requirements for adding security to inter-domain routing, including
the ability to support incremental and piecemeal deployment.
Bogon Origin Attestations (BOAs) are digitally signed objects that This document describes the semantic interpretation of a valid ROA,
describe a collection of address prefixes and AS numbers that are not with particular reference to application in BGP relating to the
authorised by the right-of-use holder to be advertised in the inter- origination of route objects. The document does not describe any
domain routing system [I-D.ietf-sidr-boa]. application of a ROA to validation of the AS Path.
This document describes how ROA and BOA validation outcomes can be This proposed application does not require any changes to the
used in the BGP route selection process, and how the proposed specification of BGP protocol elements. The application may be used
application of ROAs and BOAs are intended to fit within the as part of BGP's local route selection algorithm [RFC4271].
requirements for adding security to inter-domain routing
[ID.ietf-rpsec-bgpsecrec], including the ability to support
incremental and piecemeal deployment. This proposed application does
not require any changes to the specification of BGP protocol
elements. The application may be used as part of BGP's local route
selection algorithm [RFC4271].
2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object 2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object
A BGP Route Object is an address prefix and a set of attributes. In A BGP "Route Object" is an address prefix and a set of attributes.
terms of ROA and BOA validation the prefix value and the origin AS In terms of validation of the Route Object the prefix value and the
are used in the validation operation. origin AS attribute are used in the validation operation.
If the route object is an aggregate and the AS Path contains an AS If the route object is an aggregate and the AS Path contains an AS
Set, then the origin AS is considered to be the AS described as the Set, then the origin AS is considered to be the AS described as the
AGGREGATOR [RFC4271] of the route object. AGGREGATOR [RFC4271] of the route object.
ROA validation is described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format], and the ROA validation is described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format], and the
outcome of the validation operation is that the ROA is valid in the outcome of the validation operation is that the ROA is valid in the
context of the RPKI, or validation has failed. context of the RPKI, or validation has failed.
BOA validation is described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-boa], and the outcome It is assumed here that ROAs are managed and distributed
of the validation operation is that the BOA is valid in the context independently of the operation of BGP itself, and a local BGP speaker
of the RPKI, or validation has failed. has access to a local cache of the complete set of ROAs and the RPKI
data set when performing a validation operation.
There appears to be two means of matching a route object to a ROA:
decoupled and linked.
2.1. Decoupled Validation
The decoupled approach is where the ROAs are managed and distributed
independently of the operation of the routing protocol and a local
BGP speaker has access to a local cache of the complete set of ROAs
and the RPKI data set when performing a validation operation.
In this case the BGP route object does not refer to a specific ROA. A BGP route object does not refer to a specific ROA that should be
The relying party to match a route object to one or more candidate used by a Relying Party (RP) to validate the origination information
valid ROAs and BOAs in order to determine the appropriate local contained in the route object, nor does it refer to the set of
certificates that the RP should use to validate the ROA's digital
signature. The RP needs to match a route object to one or more
candidate valid ROAs in order to determine the appropriate local
actions to perform on the route object. actions to perform on the route object.
The relying party selects the set of ROAs where the address prefix in To validate a route object the RP would undertake the following
the route object either exactly matches an ROAIPAddress (matching steps:
both the address prefix value and the prefix length), or where the
route object spans a block of addresses that is included in the span
described by the ROA's address prefix value and length and where the
route object's prefix length is less than the ROA's prefix length and
greater then or equal to the ROA's corresponding maxLength attribute.
The following outcomes are possible using the defined ROA validation
procedure for each ROA in this set:
Exact Match:
A valid ROA exists, where the address prefix in the route object
exactly matches a prefix listed in the ROA, or the ROA contains a
covering aggregate and the prefix length of the route object is
smaller than or equal to the ROA's associated maxLength attribute,
and the origin AS in the route object matches the origin AS listed
in the ROA.
Covering Match:
A valid ROA exists, where an address prefix in the ROA is a
covering aggregate of the prefix in the route object, and the
prefix length of the route object is greater than the ROA's
associated maxLength attribute, and the origin AS in the route
object matches the AS listed in the ROA.
Exact Mismatch:
A valid ROA exists where the address prefix in the route object
exactly matches a prefix listed in the ROA, or the ROA contains a
covering aggregate and the prefix length of the route object is
smaller than or equal to the ROA's associated maxLength attribute,
and the origin AS of the route object does not match the AS listed
in the ROA.
Covering Mismatch:
A valid ROA exists where an address prefix in the ROA is a
covering aggregate of the prefix in the route object, the prefix
length of the route object is greater than the ROA's associated
maxLength attribute, and the origin AS of the route object does
not match the AS listed in the ROA.
No ROA:
There are no Exact Matches, Covering Matches, no Exact Mismatches
or Covering Mismatches in the RPKI repository.
The ROA to be used for the validation function is selected from the
set of ROAs in the order given above. In other words an Exact Match
is preferred over a Covering Match, which, in turn, is preferred over
an Exact Mismatch which is preferred over a Covering Mismatch.
The set of BOAs that are used for the validation function are
composed of the set of valid BOAs where the origin AS of the route
object matches an AS described in a BOA, or where an address prefix
in a valid BOA that is an exact match or a covering aggregate of the
route object. In the case that the validation outcome using ROAs is
one of Exact Mismatch, Covering Mismatch or No ROA, then the
validation outcome of the BOA changes the overall validation result
to "Bogon".
Bogon:
A valid BOA exists where an address prefix in the BOA is a an
exact match for the prefix in the route object, or is a covering
aggregate of the prefix in the route object, or an AS in the BOA
matches the originating AS in the BOA. In addition, there is no
valid ROA that is an Exact Match or a Covering Match with the
route object.
2.2. Linked Validation
The linked approach requires the route object to reference a ROA
either by inclusion of the ROA as an attribute of the route object,
or inclusion of a identity field in an attribute of the route object
as a means of identifying a particular ROA.
If the ROA can be located is valid within the context of the RPKI
then the route object can be compared against the ROA, as per the
previous section, giving one of five possible results: Exact Match,
Covering Match, Exact Mismatch, Covering Mismatch, and No Match,
which is defined as:
No Match:
The valid ROA does not comtain any address prefix that exactly
matches the address prefix in the route object, or is a covering
aggregate of the address prefix in the route object.
In the case of a Mismatch or a No Match condition, the relying party 1. Select all valid ROAs that include a ROAIPAddress value that
should check for the presence of valid BOAs where the origin AS of either matches, or is a covering aggregate of, the address prefix
the route object matches an AS described in a BOA, or where an in the route object.
address prefix in a valid BOA that is an exact match or a covering 2. If the set of candidate ROAs is empty the validation process
aggregate of the route object. If a valid BOA can be found that stops with an outcome of "unknown".
matches either of these conditions that the overall route object 3. If any ROA has an asID value that matches the originating AS in
validation of a route object with a linked ROA is changed to "Bogon". the route object, and either the route object's address prefix
precisely matches an address in the ROA, or the route object's
address prefix is a more specific prefix of the address in the
ROA and the prefix length value is less than or equal to the
ROAIPAddress's maxLength value, then the validation process stops
with an outcome of "valid".
4. Otherwise, the validation outcome is "invalid".
3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection 3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection
Within the framework of the abstract model of BGP operation, a Within the framework of the abstract model of BGP operation, a
received prefix announcement from a peer is compared to all received prefix announcement from a peer is compared to all
announcements for this prefix received from other peers and a route announcements for this prefix received from other peers and a route
selection procedure is used to select the "best" route object from selection procedure is used to select the "best" route object from
this candidate set which is then used locally by placing it in the this candidate set, which is then used locally by installing it in
loc-RIB, and is announced to peers as the local "best" route. the loc-RIB [RFC4271], and is announced to peers as the local "best"
route.
It is proposed here that the validation outcome be used as part of
the determination of the local degree of preference as defined in
section 9.1.1 of the BGP specification [RFC4271].
In the case of partial deployment of ROAs there are a very limited
set of circumstances where the outcome of ROA validation can be used
as grounds to reject all consideration of the route object as an
invalid advertisement. While the presence of a valid ROA that
matches the advertisement is a strong indication that an
advertisement matches the authority provided by the prefix holder to
advertise the prefix into the routing system, the absence of a ROA or
the invalidity of a covering ROA does not provide a conclusive
indication that the advertisement has been undertaken without the
address holder's permission, unless the object is described in a BOA.
In the case of a partial deployment scenario of RPKI route
attestation objects, where some address prefixes and AS numbers are
described in ROAs or BOAs and others are not, then the relative
ranking of validation outcomes from the highest (most preferred) to
the lowest (least preferred) degree of preference are proposed to be
as specified int he following list. The exact values to apply to a
Local Preference setting are left as a matter of local policy and
local configuration.
1. Exact Match
The prefix has been allocated and is routeable, and that the
prefix right-of-use holder has authorized the originating AS to
originate precisely this announcement.
2. Covering Match
This is slightly less preferred because it is possible that the
address holder of the aggregate has allocated the prefix in
question to a different party. It is also possible that the
originating AS is using more specific advertisements as part of a
traffic engineering scenario.
3. No ROA
In the case of partial deployment of ROAs, the absence of
validation credentials is a neutral outcome, in that there is no
grounds to increase or decrease the relative degree of preference
for the route object.
4. Covering Mismatch
A Covering Mismatch is considered to be less preferable than a
neutral position in that the address holder of a covering
aggregate has indicated an originating AS that is not the
originating AS of this announcement. On the other hand it may be
the case that this prefix has been validly allocated to another
party who has not generated a ROA for this prefix even through
the announcement is valid.
5. Exact Mismatch
Here the exact match prefix holder has validly provided an
authority for origination by an AS that is not the AS that is
originating this announcement. This would appear to be a bogus
announcement by inference.
6. No Match
Here the route object has referenced a ROA that is not valid, or
does not include an address prefix that matcehs the route object,
or the referenced ROA could not be located. This could be an
attempt to create a false route object and use an invalid ROA.
7. Bogon
Here the right-of-use holder of the AS or address prefix has
explicitly tagged the address prefix or the AS as a "bogon".
This implies that the announcement has been made without the
appropriate authority, and the local preference of the route
object should be ranked at a level commensurate with rejecting
the route object.
In the case of comprehensive deployment of RPKI route attestion
objects the absence of a specific ROA origination authority for the
route object should render it as an unusable for routing. In this
case the local preference setting for the route object is as follows:
1. Exact Match
The prefix has been allocated and is routeable, and that the
prefix right-of-use holder has authorized the originating AS to
originate precisely this announcement.
2. Covering Match, No ROA, Covering Mismatch, Exact Mismatch, No
Match
The local preference of the route object should be ranked at a
level of least preferred, due to the constraints noted in the
following section.
3. Bogon
Here the right-of-use holder of the AS or address prefix has It is proposed here that the ROA validation outcome of "unknown",
explicitly tagged the address prefix or the AS as a "bogon". "valid" or "invalid" be used as part of the determination of the
This implies that the announcement has been made without the local degree of preference as defined in section 9.1.1 of the BGP
appropriate authority, and the local preference of the route specification [RFC4271].
object should be ranked at a level commensurate with rejecting
the route object.
3.1. Validation Outcomes and Rejection of BGP Route Objects The proposed addition to the local degree of preference is "valid" is
to be preferred over "unknown" over "invalid".
In the case of comprehensive deployment of ROAs, the use of a It is a matter of local BGP selection policy in setting whether
validation outcome other than an Exact Match as sufficient grounds to "invalid" route objects are discarded from further consideration in
reject a route object should be undertaken with care. the route selection process, however the following consideration
should be taken into account in such a situation.
The consideration here is one of potential circularity of dependence. The consideration here is one of potential circularity of dependence.
If the authoritative publication point of the repository of ROAs or If the authoritative publication point of the repository of ROAs or
any certificates used in relation to an address prefix is stored at a any certificates used in relation to an address prefix is stored at a
location that lies within the address prefix described in a ROA, then location that lies within the address prefix described in a ROA, then
the repository can only be accessed once a route for the prefix has the repository can only be accessed once a route for the prefix has
been accepted by the local routing domain. It is also noted that the been accepted by the local routing domain. It is also noted that the
propagation time of RPKI objects may be different to the propagation propagation time of RPKI objects may be different to the propagation
time of route objects in BGP, and that route objects may be received time of route objects in BGP, and that route objects may be received
before the relying party's local repository cache picks up the before the relying party's local repository cache picks up the
associated ROAs and recognises them as valid within the RPKI. associated ROAs and recognises them as valid within the RPKI.
For these reasons it is proposed that, even in the case of For these reasons it is advised that local policy settings should not
comprehensive deployment of ROAs, a missing ROA or a mismatch should result in "unknown" validation outcomes being considered as
not be considered as sufficient grounds to reject a route sufficient grounds to reject a route object outright from
advertisement outright. Alternate approaches may involve the use of consideration as a local "best" route.
a local timer to accept the route for an interim period of time until
A local policy setting may be considered such that "invalid"
validation outcomes would be sufficient grounds to reject the route
object. However, due to the considerations of circular dependence
and differing propagation times as noted above, a local policy
setting may be considered that would involve the use of a local timer
to accept the route as feasible for an interim period of time until
there is an acceptable level of assurance that all reasonable efforts there is an acceptable level of assurance that all reasonable efforts
to local a valid ROA have been undertaken. to obtain a valid ROA for the object have been undertaken.
4. Further Considerations 4. Further Considerations
This document provides a description of how ROAs and BOAs could be This document provides a description of how ROAs could be used by a
used by a BGP speaker. BGP speaker.
It is noted that the proposed procedure requires no changes to the It is noted that the proposed procedure requires no changes to the
operation of BGP. operation of BGP. However, there are a number of considerations
about this approach to origination validation that are relevant to
It is also noted that the decoupled and linked approach are not the operation of a BGP speaker that are not specified here.
mutually exclusive, and the same procedure can be applied to route
objects that contain an explicit pointer to the associated ROA and
route objects where the local BGP speaker has to create a set of
candidate ROAs that could be applied to a route object. However,
there are a number of considerations about this approach to
origination validation that are not specified here.
These considerations include: These considerations include:
o It is not specified when validation of an advertised prefix should o It is not specified when validation of an advertised prefix should
be performed by a BGP speaker. Is is considered to be a matter of be performed by a BGP speaker. It is considered to be a matter of
local policy whether it is considered to be strictly necessary to local policy whether it is strictly required to perform validation
perform validation at a point prior to loading the object into the at a point prior to loading the object into the Adj-RIB-In
Adj-RIB-In structure, or once the object has been loaded into Adj- structure [RFC4271], or once the object has been loaded into Adj-
RIB-In, or at a later time that is determined by a local RIB-In, or at a later time that is determined by a local
configuration setting. It is also not specified whether configuration setting. It is also not specified whether
origination validation should be performed each time a route origination validation should be performed each time a route
object is updated by a peer even when the origin AS has not object is updated by a peer even when the origin AS has not
altered. altered.
o The lifetime of a validation outcome is not specified here. This o The lifetime of a validation outcome is not specified here. This
specifically refers to the time period during which the original specifically refers to the time period during which the original
validation outcome can be still applied, and the time when the validation outcome can be still applied, at the expiration of
routing object be revalidated. It is a matter of local policy which the routing object should be re-tested for validity. It is
setting as to whether a validation outcome be regarded as valid a matter of local policy setting as to whether a validation
until the route object is withdrawn or further updated, or whether outcome be regarded as valid until the route object is withdrawn
validation of a route object should occur at more frequent or further updated, or whether validation of a route object should
intervals? occur at more frequent intervals.
o It is a matter of local policy as to whther there are
circumstances that would allow a route object to be removed from
further consideration in route selection upon a validation
failure, similar to the actions of Route Flap Damping.
o It is a matter of local configuration as to whther ROA validation o It is a matter of local configuration as to whether ROA validation
is performed on a per-AS basis rather than a per-BGP speaker, and is performed on a per-AS basis rather than a per-BGP speaker, and
the appropriate BGP mechanisms to support such a per-AS iBGP route the appropriate mechanisms to support a de-coupled framework of
validation service are not considered here. validation of ROAs and the loading of outcomes into BGP speakers
are not considered here.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
This approach to orgination validation does not allow for This approach to origination validation uses a model of positive
'deterministic' validation in terms of the ability of a BGP speker to security, where information that cannot be validated within the RPKI
accept or reject an advertised route object outright, given that framework is intended to interpreted by a RP as invalid.
there remains some issues of potential circularity of dependence and
time lags between the propagation of information in the routing
system and propagation of information in the RPKI.
There are also issues of the most appropirate interpretation of However, the considerations of accommodating environments of partial
outcomes where validation of the authenticity of the route object has adoption, where only a subset of valid route objects have associated
not been possible in the context of partial adoption of the RPKI, ROAs within the structure of the RPKI imply some modification to the
where the absense of validation information does not necessarily model of positive security. Here it is assumed that once an address
constitute sufficient grounds to interpret the route object as an prefix is described in a ROA, then this ROA "protects" all address
invalidly originated object. prefixes that are more specific than that described in the ROA.
Thus, any more specific address prefix and originating AS combination
of a valid ROA, that does not have a matching valid ROA is considered
to be "invalid".
The consequence of these considerations is that while the use of ROAs The match condition of a route object against a single ROA is
can increase the confidence in the validity of origination of route summarized in the following table:
objects that match a valid ROA, ROAs cannot perform the opposite,
namely the rejection of route objects that cannot be validated by Prefix match AS mismatch AS
ROAs. To assist in the case of rejecting some forms of route objects +---------+-------------+
that cannot be explicitly validated, the BOA has been used as a means Covering | unknown | unknown |
of explicit rejection of certain classes route objects. The Aggregate | | |
implication is that publishers in the RPKI should publish both ROAs +---------+-------------+
and BOAs in order to provide the greatest level of information that match ROA | valid | invalid |
will allow relying parties to make appropriate choices in terms of prefix | | |
route preference selection. +---------+-------------+
More | invalid | invalid |
Specific | | |
than ROA +---------+-------------+
In an environment of a collection of ROAs, a route object is
considered "valid" if any ROA provides a "valid" outcome, and
"invalid" if one or more ROAs provide an "invalid" outcome and no
ROAs provide a "valid" outcome. The "unknown" outcome occurs when no
ROA produces a "valid" or an "invalid" outcome.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
[There are no IANA considerations in this document.] [There are no IANA considerations in this document.]
7. Normative References 7. Changes -01 to -02
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] Following WG review of the means of specification of denial in
Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and R. Barnes, "An Infrastructure routing authorizations in the context of the RPKI at IETF 74 and IETF
to Support Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch 75, it appears that there is no general WG support for the use of an
(work in progress), February 2008. explicit denial object (termed a 'BOA'). The alternative approach,
explored in previous iterations of this draft, used a more restricted
interpretation of a ROA that yielded only "valid" or "unknown"
outcomes (by using "unknown" where "invalid" is used in this revision
of the document). To allow for "invalid" outcomes the draft used the
BOA to undertake the role of a 'disavow' constraint, where a route
object was considered to be "invalid" if it was the subject of a
valid BOA and was not considered to be "valid" by any valid ROA. The
reasons advanced to support the dropping of the BOA was the increased
complexity of RP systems through the use of a second object in route
validation, a potentially confusing mismatch in the interpretation
scope between the ROA and the BOA, where the ROA's scope was limited
to set of prefixes described in the ROA, while the BOA's scope
included all possible more specifics of the prefixes listed in the
BOA, and the ability to reconstruct the semantic equivalent of a BOA
through the use of a ROA that used a restricted-use AS as its asID.
Accordingly, this draft has been revised to remove all references to
the use of an explicit denial object and uses the implicit semantics
of denial in a ROA object.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-boa] There appears to be no WG interest in consideration of validation in
Huston, G., Manderson, T., and G. Michaelson, "Profile for a "linked" model, where a ROA is bound to the route object that it is
Bogon Origin Attestations (BOAs)", draft-ietf-sidr-bogons intended to validate. Accordingly this section of the text has also
(work in progress), August 2008. been dropped from this version.
8. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch (work in
progress), July 2009.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format] [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]
Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "An Infrastructure to Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "An Infrastructure to
Support Secure Internet Routing", Support Secure Internet Routing",
draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format (work in progress), July 2008. draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format (work in progress), July 2009.
[ID.ietf-rpsec-bgpsecrec]
Christian, B. and T. Tauber, "BGP Security Requirements",
draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format (work in progress),
November 2007.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
skipping to change at page 13, line 4 skipping to change at line 337
Geoff Huston Geoff Huston
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email: gih@apnic.net Email: gih@apnic.net
George Michaelson George Michaelson
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email: ggm@apnic.net Email: ggm@apnic.net
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