draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-02.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-03.txt 
Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) G. Huston Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) G. Huston
Internet-Draft G. Michaelson Internet-Draft G. Michaelson
Intended status: Informational APNIC Intended status: Informational APNIC
Expires: February 5, 2010 August 4, 2009 Expires: February 7, 2010 August 6, 2009
Validation of Route Origination in BGP using the Resource Certificate Validation of Route Origination in BGP using the Resource Certificate
PKI PKI and ROAs
draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-02.txt draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-03.txt
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Abstract Abstract
This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure to validate the origination of routes advertised in Infrastructure to validate the origination of routes advertised in
the Border Gateway Protocol. The proposed application is intended to the Border Gateway Protocol. The proposed application is intended to
fit within the requirements for adding security to inter-domain fit within the requirement for adding security to inter-domain
routing, including the ability to support incremental and piecemeal routing, including the ability to support incremental and piecemeal
deployment, and does not require any changes to the specification of deployment, and does not require any changes to the specification of
BGP. BGP.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection . . . . . . 4 3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection . . . . . 4
4. Further Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Further Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1. Partial Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.2. Disavowal of Routing Origination . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Changes -01 to -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.3. BGP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1. Changes -02 to -03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.2. Changes -01 to -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to validate the origination of routes Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] to validate the
advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RFC4271]. origination of routes advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
[RFC4271].
The RPKI is based on Resource Certificates. Resource Certificates The RPKI is based on a hierarchy of Resource Certificates that are
are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX profile [RFC5280], aligned to the Internet number resource allocation structure.
and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS identifiers [RFC3779]. Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX
A Resource Certificate describes an action by an issuer that binds a profile [RFC5280], and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS
list of IP address blocks and Autonomous System (AS) numbers to the identifiers [RFC3779]. A Resource Certificate describes an action by
Subject of a certificate, identified by the unique association of the an issuer that binds a list of IP address blocks and Autonomous
Subject's private key with the public key contained in the Resource System (AS) numbers to the Subject of a certificate, identified by
Certificate. The PKI is structured such that each current Resource the unique association of the Subject's private key with the public
Certificate matches a current resource allocation or assignment. key contained in the Resource Certificate. The RPKI is structured
This is described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]. such that each current Resource Certificate matches a current
resource allocation or assignment. This is further described in
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch].
Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) are digitally signed objects that Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) are digitally signed objects that
bind an address to an AS number, signed by the address holder. A ROA bind an address to an AS number, signed by the address holder. A ROA
provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has
authorized an AS to originate route objects in the inter-domain authorized an AS to originate route objects in the inter-domain
routing environment for that address block. ROAs are described in routing environment for that address block. ROAs are described in
[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]. ROAs are intended to fit within the [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]. ROAs are intended to fit within the
requirements for adding security to inter-domain routing, including requirements for adding security to inter-domain routing.
the ability to support incremental and piecemeal deployment.
This document describes the semantic interpretation of a valid ROA, This document describes the semantic interpretation of a valid ROA,
with particular reference to application in BGP relating to the with particular reference to application in BGP relating to the
origination of route objects. The document does not describe any origination of route objects.
application of a ROA to validation of the AS Path.
This proposed application does not require any changes to the This proposed application of validation of ROAs does not require any
specification of BGP protocol elements. The application may be used changes to the specification of BGP protocol elements. The outcomes
as part of BGP's local route selection algorithm [RFC4271]. of ROA validation may be used as part of BGP's local route selection
procedure [RFC4271].
2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object 2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object
A BGP "Route Object" is an address prefix and a set of attributes. A BGP "route object" is an address prefix and an associated set of
In terms of validation of the Route Object the prefix value and the attributes. In terms of validation of the route object the address
origin AS attribute are used in the validation operation. prefix value and the "origin AS" are used in the ROA validation
operation. The route object's origin AS is the final element of the
If the route object is an aggregate and the AS Path contains an AS route object's AS_PATH attribute. If the final AS_PATH element is an
Set, then the origin AS is considered to be the AS described as the AS Set, indicating that the route object is an aggregate, then the
AGGREGATOR [RFC4271] of the route object. origin AS is taken as the AS component of the AGGREGATOR attribute
[RFC4271].
ROA validation is described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format], and the
outcome of the validation operation is that the ROA is valid in the
context of the RPKI, or validation has failed.
It is assumed here that ROAs are managed and distributed
independently of the operation of BGP itself, and a local BGP speaker
has access to a local cache of the complete set of ROAs and the RPKI
data set when performing a validation operation.
A BGP route object does not refer to a specific ROA that should be A BGP route object does not refer to a specific ROA that should be
used by a Relying Party (RP) to validate the origination information used by a Relying Party (RP) to validate the origination information
contained in the route object, nor does it refer to the set of contained in the route object. The RP needs to match a route object
certificates that the RP should use to validate the ROA's digital to one or more candidate valid ROAs in order to determine a
signature. The RP needs to match a route object to one or more validation outcome, which, in turn, can be used to determine the
candidate valid ROAs in order to determine the appropriate local appropriate local actions to perform on the route object. Valid ROAs
actions to perform on the route object. are defined as ROAs that are determined to be syntactically correct
and are signed using a signature that can be verified using the RPKI,
as described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]. The outcome of this ROA
validation function is that either the RP has determined that the ROA
is valid in the context of the RPKI, or the ROA is invalid, in which
case the ROA is not to be used by the RP.
To validate a route object the RP would undertake the following It is assumed here that ROAs are managed and distributed
steps: independently of the operation of BGP itself, and that a local BGP
speaker has access to a local cache of the complete set of valid ROAs
when performing a route object validation operation.
Route object validation is defined by the following procedure:
1. Select all valid ROAs that include a ROAIPAddress value that 1. Select all valid ROAs that include a ROAIPAddress value that
either matches, or is a covering aggregate of, the address prefix either matches, or is a covering aggregate of, the address
in the route object. prefix in the route object.
2. If the set of candidate ROAs is empty the validation process
stops with an outcome of "unknown". 2. If the set of candidate ROAs is empty then the validation
3. If any ROA has an asID value that matches the originating AS in procedure stops with an outcome of "unknown".
the route object, and either the route object's address prefix
precisely matches an address in the ROA, or the route object's 3. If any ROA has an asID value that matches the origin AS in the
address prefix is a more specific prefix of the address in the route object, and either the route object's address prefix
ROA and the prefix length value is less than or equal to the precisely matches a ROAIPAddress in the ROA, or the route
ROAIPAddress's maxLength value, then the validation process stops object's address prefix is a more specific prefix of a
with an outcome of "valid". ROAIPAddress and the route object's prefix length value is
4. Otherwise, the validation outcome is "invalid". less than or equal to the ROAIPAddress' maxLength value, then
the validation procedure stops with an outcome of "valid".
4. Otherwise, the validation procedure stops with an outcome of
"invalid".
3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection 3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection
Within the framework of the abstract model of BGP operation, a Within the framework of the abstract model of BGP operation, a
received prefix announcement from a peer is compared to all received prefix announcement from a BGP speaking peer is compared to
announcements for this prefix received from other peers and a route all announcements for this prefix received from other BGP peers and a
selection procedure is used to select the "best" route object from route selection procedure is used to select the "best" route object
this candidate set, which is then used locally by installing it in from this candidate set. This route object is then used locally by
the loc-RIB [RFC4271], and is announced to peers as the local "best" installing it in the loc-RIB [RFC4271], and is announced to peers as
route. the local "best" route.
It is proposed here that the ROA validation outcome of "unknown", The route object validation outcome, described in Section 2, of
"valid" or "invalid" be used as part of the determination of the "unknown", "valid" or "invalid" may be used as part of the
local degree of preference as defined in section 9.1.1 of the BGP determination of the local degree of preference as defined in section
specification [RFC4271]. 9.1.1 of the BGP specification [RFC4271]. The local degree of
preference is as follows:
"valid" is to be preferred over
"unknown", which itself is to be preferred over
"invalid".
The proposed addition to the local degree of preference is "valid" is This preference ranking is performed prior to the steps described in
to be preferred over "unknown" over "invalid". section 9.1.1 of [RFC4271].
It is a matter of local BGP selection policy in setting whether It is a matter of local BGP selection policy as to the actions to be
"invalid" route objects are discarded from further consideration in undertaken by a BGP instance in processing route objects with
the route selection process, however the following consideration "unknown" validation outcomes. Due to considerations of partial use
should be taken into account in such a situation. of ROAs in heterogeneous environments, such as in the public
Internet, it is advised that local policy settings should not result
in "unknown" validation outcomes being considered as sufficient
grounds to reject a route object outright from further consideration
as a local "best" route.
The consideration here is one of potential circularity of dependence. It is a matter of local BGP selection policy as to whether "invalid"
If the authoritative publication point of the repository of ROAs or route objects are considered to be ineligible for further
any certificates used in relation to an address prefix is stored at a consideration in the route selection process. The consideration here
location that lies within the address prefix described in a ROA, then is one of potential circularity of dependence. If the authoritative
publication point of the repository of ROAs, or that of any
certificate used in relation to an address prefix, is located at an
address that lies within the address prefix described in a ROA, then
the repository can only be accessed once a route for the prefix has the repository can only be accessed once a route for the prefix has
been accepted by the local routing domain. It is also noted that the been accepted by the RP's local routing domain. It is also noted
propagation time of RPKI objects may be different to the propagation that the propagation time of RPKI objects may be different to the
time of route objects in BGP, and that route objects may be received propagation time of route objects in BGP, and that route objects may
before the relying party's local repository cache picks up the be received before the RP's local repository cache picks up the
associated ROAs and recognises them as valid within the RPKI. associated ROAs and recognises them as valid within the RPKI.
For these reasons it is advised that local policy settings should not
result in "unknown" validation outcomes being considered as
sufficient grounds to reject a route object outright from
consideration as a local "best" route.
A local policy setting may be considered such that "invalid" A local policy setting may be considered such that "invalid"
validation outcomes would be sufficient grounds to reject the route validation outcomes would be sufficient grounds to reject the route
object. However, due to the considerations of circular dependence object. However, due to these considerations of circular dependence
and differing propagation times as noted above, a local policy and differing propagation times of ROAs and route objects, an
setting may be considered that would involve the use of a local timer alternate local policy setting may be considered that would involve
to accept the route as feasible for an interim period of time until the use of a local timer to accept the route object as feasible for
there is an acceptable level of assurance that all reasonable efforts an interim period of time, until there is an acceptable level of
to obtain a valid ROA for the object have been undertaken. assurance that all reasonable efforts to obtain a valid ROA for the
route object have been undertaken.
4. Further Considerations 4. Further Considerations
This document provides a description of how ROAs could be used by a 4.1. Partial Deployment Considerations
BGP speaker.
It is noted that the proposed procedure requires no changes to the
operation of BGP. However, there are a number of considerations
about this approach to origination validation that are relevant to
the operation of a BGP speaker that are not specified here.
These considerations include:
o It is not specified when validation of an advertised prefix should
be performed by a BGP speaker. It is considered to be a matter of
local policy whether it is strictly required to perform validation
at a point prior to loading the object into the Adj-RIB-In
structure [RFC4271], or once the object has been loaded into Adj-
RIB-In, or at a later time that is determined by a local
configuration setting. It is also not specified whether
origination validation should be performed each time a route
object is updated by a peer even when the origin AS has not
altered.
o The lifetime of a validation outcome is not specified here. This
specifically refers to the time period during which the original
validation outcome can be still applied, at the expiration of
which the routing object should be re-tested for validity. It is
a matter of local policy setting as to whether a validation
outcome be regarded as valid until the route object is withdrawn
or further updated, or whether validation of a route object should
occur at more frequent intervals.
o It is a matter of local configuration as to whether ROA validation
is performed on a per-AS basis rather than a per-BGP speaker, and
the appropriate mechanisms to support a de-coupled framework of
validation of ROAs and the loading of outcomes into BGP speakers
are not considered here.
5. Security Considerations
This approach to origination validation uses a model of positive This approach to route object origination validation uses a model of
security, where information that cannot be validated within the RPKI "positive security" attestations, where information that cannot be
framework is intended to interpreted by a RP as invalid. validated within the RPKI framework is intended to interpreted by a
RP as invalid information.
However, the considerations of accommodating environments of partial However, the considerations of accommodating environments of partial
adoption, where only a subset of valid route objects have associated adoption, where only a subset of valid route objects have associated
ROAs within the structure of the RPKI imply some modification to the ROAs within the structure of the RPKI, imply some modification to
model of positive security. Here it is assumed that once an address this model of positive security. Here it is assumed that once an
prefix is described in a ROA, then this ROA "protects" all address address prefix is described in a ROA, then this ROA encompasses all
prefixes that are more specific than that described in the ROA. address prefixes that are more specific than that described in the
Thus, any more specific address prefix and originating AS combination ROA. Thus, any more specific address prefix and originating AS
of a valid ROA, that does not have a matching valid ROA is considered combination of a valid ROA, that does not have a matching valid ROA
to be "invalid". is considered to be "invalid".
Routes objects that describe address prefixes that are not fully
described by any single ROA, i.e., those address prefixes that may be
an aggregate of a ROA, or have no intersection with any ROA, and are
not matched by any ROA and are not a more specific of any ROA cannot
be reliably classified as "invalid" in a partial deployment scenario,
and are therefore described as "unknown".
The match condition of a route object against a single ROA is The match condition of a route object against a single ROA is
summarized in the following table: summarized in the following table:
Prefix match AS mismatch AS Prefix matching non-matching
AS AS
+---------+-------------+ +---------+-------------+
Covering | unknown | unknown | Covering | unknown | unknown |
Aggregate | | | Aggregate | | |
+---------+-------------+ +---------+-------------+
match ROA | valid | invalid | match ROA | valid | invalid |
prefix | | | prefix | | |
+---------+-------------+ +---------+-------------+
More | invalid | invalid | More | invalid | invalid |
Specific | | | Specific | | |
than ROA +---------+-------------+ than ROA | | |
+---------+-------------+
In an environment of a collection of ROAs, a route object is In an environment of a collection of ROAs, a route object is
considered "valid" if any ROA provides a "valid" outcome, and considered to be "valid" if any ROA provides a "valid" outcome, and
"invalid" if one or more ROAs provide an "invalid" outcome and no "invalid" if one or more ROAs provide an "invalid" outcome and no
ROAs provide a "valid" outcome. The "unknown" outcome occurs when no ROAs provide a "valid" outcome. The "unknown" outcome occurs when no
ROA produces a "valid" or an "invalid" outcome. ROA produces either a "valid" or an "invalid" outcome.
4.2. Disavowal of Routing Origination
A ROA is a positive attestation that a prefix holder has authorized
an AS to originate a route for this prefix into the inter-domain
routing system. It is possible for a prefix holder to attest that no
AS has been granted any such authority by using a ROA where the ROA'S
subject AS is one that will not be used in a routing context.
Specifically, AS 0 is reserved by the IANA such that it "may be use
[sic] to identify non-routed networks" [IANA.AS-Registry].
A ROA with a subject of AS 0 is an attestation by the holder of a
prefix that the prefix described in the ROA, and any more specific
prefix, should not be used in a routing context.
The route object validation procedure, described in Section 2, will
provide a "valid" outcome if any ROA matches the address prefix and
origin AS, even if other valid ROAs would provide an "invalid"
validation outcome if used in isolation. Consequently, an AS0 ROA
has a lower preference than any other ROA that has a routeable AS as
its subject. This allows a prefix holder to use an AS0 ROA to
declare a default condition that any route object that is equal to,
or more specific than the prefix to be considered to be invalid,
while also allowing other concurrently issued ROAs to describe valid
origination authorizations for more specific prefixes.
For example, the holder of prefix 203.0.113.0/24 may wish to
authorise the origination of a route object of 203.0.113.196/26 by
64496, and explicitly declare that all other use of prefixes from
this block should be considered invalid. This could be achieved
through the issuing of a ROA for Address=203.0.113.0/24,
maxLength=32, AS = 0 and a second ROA for Address=203.0.113.196/26,
maxLength=26, AS=64496.
By convention, an AS 0 ROA should have a maxLength value of 32 for
IPv4 addresses and 128 for IPv6 addresses, although in terms of route
object validation the same outcome would be achieved with any valid
maxLength value, or even if the maxLength element were to be omitted
from the ROA. Also by convention, an AS 0 ROA should be the only ROA
issued for a given address prefix, although again this is not a
strict requirement. An AS 0 ROA can coexist with ROAs that have
different subject AS values, although in such cases the presence of
the AS 0 ROA does not alter the route object validation outcome in
any way.
4.3. BGP Considerations
This document provides a description of how ROAs could be used by a
BGP speaker.
It is noted that the proposed procedure requires no changes to the
operation of BGP. However, there are a number of considerations
about this approach to origination validation that are relevant to
the operation of a BGP speaker that are not specified here.
These considerations include:
* It is not specified when validation of an advertised prefix
should be performed by a BGP speaker. It is considered to be a
matter of local policy whether it is strictly required to
perform validation at a point prior to loading the object into
the Adj-RIB-In structure [RFC4271], or once the object has been
loaded into Adj-RIB-In, or at a later time that is determined
by a local configuration setting. It is also not specified
whether origination validation should be performed each time a
route object is updated by a peer even when the origin AS has
not altered.
* The lifetime of a validation outcome is not specified here.
This specifically refers to the time period during which the
original validation outcome can be still applied, at the
expiration of which the routing object should be re-tested for
validity. It is a matter of local policy setting as to whether
a validation outcome be regarded as valid until the route
object is withdrawn or further updated, or whether validation
of a route object should occur at more frequent intervals.
* It is a matter of local configuration as to whether ROA
validation is performed on a per-AS basis rather than a per-BGP
speaker, and the appropriate mechanisms to support a de-coupled
framework of validation of ROAs and the loading of outcomes
into BGP speakers are not considered here.
5. Security Considerations
ROA issuers should be aware of the validation implication in issuing
a ROA, in that a ROA will implicitly invalidate all route objects for
more specific prefixes with a prefix length greater than maxLength,
and all originating AS's other than the AS listed in the collection
of ROAs.
A conservative operational practice would be to ensure the issuing of
ROAs for all more specific prefixes with distinct origination AS's
prior to the issuing of ROAs for larger encompassing address blocks,
in order to avoid inadvertent invalidation of valid route objects
during ROA generation.
ROA issuers should also be aware that if they generate a ROA for one
origin AS, then if the prefix is authorised by multiple AS's then
ROAs should be generated for all such authorized AS's.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
[There are no IANA considerations in this document.] Dear IANA,
7. Changes -01 to -02 The AS number registry [IANA.AS-Registry] contains the following
annotation against AS 0: "may be use to identify non-routed
networks." Could you please add a 'd' as appropriate to this text?
Thank you,
the authors.
7. Change Log
Note: This section is NOT to be included in final version of this
document.
7.1. Changes -02 to -03
Further Considerations section now has a subsection describing the
assumptions that ROA validation is making about the precise nature of
partial deployment, noting that a ROA has an implicit scope of
application for all prefixes that are equal to or more specific than
the prefix listed in the ROA
Moved the table of validation outcomes from the Security
Considerations section to the section on Further Considerations.
Added consideration about disavowal and the use of an AS 0 ROA and
its interpretation in the context of validation of route objects, and
proposed conventions of use of an AS 0 ROA.
Noted hierarchical dependence of ROA issuance in the Security
Considerations section.
7.2. Changes -01 to -02
Following WG review of the means of specification of denial in Following WG review of the means of specification of denial in
routing authorizations in the context of the RPKI at IETF 74 and IETF routing authorizations in the context of the RPKI at IETF 74 and IETF
75, it appears that there is no general WG support for the use of an 75, it appears that there is no general WG support for the use of an
explicit denial object (termed a 'BOA'). The alternative approach, explicit denial object (termed a 'BOA'). The alternative approach,
explored in previous iterations of this draft, used a more restricted explored in previous iterations of this draft, used a more restricted
interpretation of a ROA that yielded only "valid" or "unknown" interpretation of a ROA that yielded only "valid" or "unknown"
outcomes (by using "unknown" where "invalid" is used in this revision outcomes (by using "unknown" where "invalid" is used in this revision
of the document). To allow for "invalid" outcomes the draft used the of the document). To allow for "invalid" outcomes the draft used the
BOA to undertake the role of a 'disavow' constraint, where a route BOA to undertake the role of a 'disavow' constraint, where a route
object was considered to be "invalid" if it was the subject of a object was considered to be "invalid" if it was the subject of a
valid BOA and was not considered to be "valid" by any valid ROA. The valid BOA and was not considered to be "valid" by any valid ROA. The
reasons advanced to support the dropping of the BOA was the increased reasons advanced to support the dropping of the BOA was the increased
complexity of RP systems through the use of a second object in route complexity of RP systems through the use of a second object in route
validation, a potentially confusing mismatch in the interpretation validation, a potentially confusing mismatch in the interpretation
scope between the ROA and the BOA, where the ROA's scope was limited scope between the ROA and the BOA, where the ROAs scope was limited
to set of prefixes described in the ROA, while the BOA's scope to set of prefixes described in the ROA, while the BOA's scope
included all possible more specifics of the prefixes listed in the included all possible more specifics of the prefixes listed in the
BOA, and the ability to reconstruct the semantic equivalent of a BOA BOA, and the ability to reconstruct the semantic equivalent of a BOA
through the use of a ROA that used a restricted-use AS as its asID. through the use of a ROA that used a restricted-use AS as its asID.
Accordingly, this draft has been revised to remove all references to Accordingly, this draft has been revised to remove all references to
the use of an explicit denial object and uses the implicit semantics the use of an explicit denial object and uses the implicit semantics
of denial in a ROA object. of denial in a ROA object.
There appears to be no WG interest in consideration of validation in There appears to be no WG interest in consideration of validation in
a "linked" model, where a ROA is bound to the route object that it is a "linked" model, where a ROA is bound to the route object that it is
intended to validate. Accordingly this section of the text has also intended to validate. Accordingly this section of the text has also
been dropped from this version. been dropped from this version.
8. Normative References 8. References
8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch (work in Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch (work in
progress), July 2009. progress), July 2009.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format] [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]
Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "An Infrastructure to Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "An Infrastructure to
Support Secure Internet Routing", Support Secure Internet Routing",
draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format (work in progress), July 2009. draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format (work in progress), July 2009.
skipping to change at page 8, line 33 skipping to change at page 11, line 13
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
8.2. Informative References
[IANA.AS-Registry]
IANA, "IANA Autonomous System Number Registry",
August 2009.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Geoff Huston Geoff Huston
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email: gih@apnic.net Email: gih@apnic.net
George Michaelson George Michaelson
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
 End of changes. 34 change blocks. 
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