draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-02.txt		draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-03.txt
	Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) G. Huston		Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) G. Huston
	Internet-Draft G. Michaelson		Internet-Draft G. Michaelson
	Intended status: Informational APNIC		Intended status: Informational APNIC
	Expires: February 5, 2010 August 4, 2009		Expires: February 7, 2010 August 6, 2009
	Validation of Route Origination in BGP using the Resource Certificate		Validation of Route Origination in BGP using the Resource Certificate
	PKI		PKI and ROAs
	draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-02.txt		draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-03.txt
	Status of this Memo		Status of this Memo
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	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
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	Abstract		Abstract
	This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key		This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key
	Infrastructure to validate the origination of routes advertised in		Infrastructure to validate the origination of routes advertised in
	the Border Gateway Protocol. The proposed application is intended to		the Border Gateway Protocol. The proposed application is intended to
	fit within the requirements for adding security to inter-domain		fit within the requirement for adding security to inter-domain
	routing, including the ability to support incremental and piecemeal		routing, including the ability to support incremental and piecemeal
	deployment, and does not require any changes to the specification of		deployment, and does not require any changes to the specification of
	BGP.		BGP.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection . . . . . . 4		3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection . . . . . 4
	4. Further Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4. Further Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		4.1. Partial Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4.2. Disavowal of Routing Origination . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	7. Changes -01 to -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4.3. BGP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
			7. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
			7.1. Changes -02 to -03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
			7.2. Changes -01 to -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
			8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
			8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
			8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
			Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key		This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key
	Infrastructure (RPKI) to validate the origination of routes		Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] to validate the
	advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RFC4271].		origination of routes advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
			[RFC4271].
	The RPKI is based on Resource Certificates. Resource Certificates		The RPKI is based on a hierarchy of Resource Certificates that are
	are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX profile [RFC5280],		aligned to the Internet number resource allocation structure.
	and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS identifiers [RFC3779].		Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX
	A Resource Certificate describes an action by an issuer that binds a		profile [RFC5280], and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS
	list of IP address blocks and Autonomous System (AS) numbers to the		identifiers [RFC3779]. A Resource Certificate describes an action by
	Subject of a certificate, identified by the unique association of the		an issuer that binds a list of IP address blocks and Autonomous
	Subject's private key with the public key contained in the Resource		System (AS) numbers to the Subject of a certificate, identified by
	Certificate. The PKI is structured such that each current Resource		the unique association of the Subject's private key with the public
	Certificate matches a current resource allocation or assignment.		key contained in the Resource Certificate. The RPKI is structured
	This is described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch].		such that each current Resource Certificate matches a current
			resource allocation or assignment. This is further described in
			[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch].
	Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) are digitally signed objects that		Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) are digitally signed objects that
	bind an address to an AS number, signed by the address holder. A ROA		bind an address to an AS number, signed by the address holder. A ROA
	provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has		provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has
	authorized an AS to originate route objects in the inter-domain		authorized an AS to originate route objects in the inter-domain
	routing environment for that address block. ROAs are described in		routing environment for that address block. ROAs are described in
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]. ROAs are intended to fit within the		[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]. ROAs are intended to fit within the
	requirements for adding security to inter-domain routing, including		requirements for adding security to inter-domain routing.
	the ability to support incremental and piecemeal deployment.
	This document describes the semantic interpretation of a valid ROA,		This document describes the semantic interpretation of a valid ROA,
	with particular reference to application in BGP relating to the		with particular reference to application in BGP relating to the
	origination of route objects. The document does not describe any		origination of route objects.
	application of a ROA to validation of the AS Path.
	This proposed application does not require any changes to the		This proposed application of validation of ROAs does not require any
	specification of BGP protocol elements. The application may be used		changes to the specification of BGP protocol elements. The outcomes
	as part of BGP's local route selection algorithm [RFC4271].		of ROA validation may be used as part of BGP's local route selection
			procedure [RFC4271].
	2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object		2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object
	A BGP "Route Object" is an address prefix and a set of attributes.		A BGP "route object" is an address prefix and an associated set of
	In terms of validation of the Route Object the prefix value and the		attributes. In terms of validation of the route object the address
	origin AS attribute are used in the validation operation.		prefix value and the "origin AS" are used in the ROA validation
			operation. The route object's origin AS is the final element of the
	If the route object is an aggregate and the AS Path contains an AS		route object's AS_PATH attribute. If the final AS_PATH element is an
	Set, then the origin AS is considered to be the AS described as the		AS Set, indicating that the route object is an aggregate, then the
	AGGREGATOR [RFC4271] of the route object.		origin AS is taken as the AS component of the AGGREGATOR attribute
			[RFC4271].
	ROA validation is described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format], and the
	outcome of the validation operation is that the ROA is valid in the
	context of the RPKI, or validation has failed.
	It is assumed here that ROAs are managed and distributed
	independently of the operation of BGP itself, and a local BGP speaker
	has access to a local cache of the complete set of ROAs and the RPKI
	data set when performing a validation operation.
	A BGP route object does not refer to a specific ROA that should be		A BGP route object does not refer to a specific ROA that should be
	used by a Relying Party (RP) to validate the origination information		used by a Relying Party (RP) to validate the origination information
	contained in the route object, nor does it refer to the set of		contained in the route object. The RP needs to match a route object
	certificates that the RP should use to validate the ROA's digital		to one or more candidate valid ROAs in order to determine a
	signature. The RP needs to match a route object to one or more		validation outcome, which, in turn, can be used to determine the
	candidate valid ROAs in order to determine the appropriate local		appropriate local actions to perform on the route object. Valid ROAs
	actions to perform on the route object.		are defined as ROAs that are determined to be syntactically correct
			and are signed using a signature that can be verified using the RPKI,
			as described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]. The outcome of this ROA
			validation function is that either the RP has determined that the ROA
			is valid in the context of the RPKI, or the ROA is invalid, in which
			case the ROA is not to be used by the RP.
	To validate a route object the RP would undertake the following		It is assumed here that ROAs are managed and distributed
	steps:		independently of the operation of BGP itself, and that a local BGP
			speaker has access to a local cache of the complete set of valid ROAs
			when performing a route object validation operation.
			Route object validation is defined by the following procedure:
	1. Select all valid ROAs that include a ROAIPAddress value that		1. Select all valid ROAs that include a ROAIPAddress value that
	either matches, or is a covering aggregate of, the address prefix		either matches, or is a covering aggregate of, the address
	in the route object.		prefix in the route object.
	2. If the set of candidate ROAs is empty the validation process
	stops with an outcome of "unknown".		2. If the set of candidate ROAs is empty then the validation
	3. If any ROA has an asID value that matches the originating AS in		procedure stops with an outcome of "unknown".
	the route object, and either the route object's address prefix
	precisely matches an address in the ROA, or the route object's		3. If any ROA has an asID value that matches the origin AS in the
	address prefix is a more specific prefix of the address in the		route object, and either the route object's address prefix
	ROA and the prefix length value is less than or equal to the		precisely matches a ROAIPAddress in the ROA, or the route
	ROAIPAddress's maxLength value, then the validation process stops		object's address prefix is a more specific prefix of a
	with an outcome of "valid".		ROAIPAddress and the route object's prefix length value is
	4. Otherwise, the validation outcome is "invalid".		less than or equal to the ROAIPAddress' maxLength value, then
			the validation procedure stops with an outcome of "valid".
			4. Otherwise, the validation procedure stops with an outcome of
			"invalid".
	3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection		3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection
	Within the framework of the abstract model of BGP operation, a		Within the framework of the abstract model of BGP operation, a
	received prefix announcement from a peer is compared to all		received prefix announcement from a BGP speaking peer is compared to
	announcements for this prefix received from other peers and a route		all announcements for this prefix received from other BGP peers and a
	selection procedure is used to select the "best" route object from		route selection procedure is used to select the "best" route object
	this candidate set, which is then used locally by installing it in		from this candidate set. This route object is then used locally by
	the loc-RIB [RFC4271], and is announced to peers as the local "best"		installing it in the loc-RIB [RFC4271], and is announced to peers as
	route.		the local "best" route.
	It is proposed here that the ROA validation outcome of "unknown",		The route object validation outcome, described in Section 2, of
	"valid" or "invalid" be used as part of the determination of the		"unknown", "valid" or "invalid" may be used as part of the
	local degree of preference as defined in section 9.1.1 of the BGP		determination of the local degree of preference as defined in section
	specification [RFC4271].		9.1.1 of the BGP specification [RFC4271]. The local degree of
			preference is as follows:
			"valid" is to be preferred over
			"unknown", which itself is to be preferred over
			"invalid".
	The proposed addition to the local degree of preference is "valid" is		This preference ranking is performed prior to the steps described in
	to be preferred over "unknown" over "invalid".		section 9.1.1 of [RFC4271].
	It is a matter of local BGP selection policy in setting whether		It is a matter of local BGP selection policy as to the actions to be
	"invalid" route objects are discarded from further consideration in		undertaken by a BGP instance in processing route objects with
	the route selection process, however the following consideration		"unknown" validation outcomes. Due to considerations of partial use
	should be taken into account in such a situation.		of ROAs in heterogeneous environments, such as in the public
			Internet, it is advised that local policy settings should not result
			in "unknown" validation outcomes being considered as sufficient
			grounds to reject a route object outright from further consideration
			as a local "best" route.
	The consideration here is one of potential circularity of dependence.		It is a matter of local BGP selection policy as to whether "invalid"
	If the authoritative publication point of the repository of ROAs or		route objects are considered to be ineligible for further
	any certificates used in relation to an address prefix is stored at a		consideration in the route selection process. The consideration here
	location that lies within the address prefix described in a ROA, then		is one of potential circularity of dependence. If the authoritative
			publication point of the repository of ROAs, or that of any
			certificate used in relation to an address prefix, is located at an
			address that lies within the address prefix described in a ROA, then
	the repository can only be accessed once a route for the prefix has		the repository can only be accessed once a route for the prefix has
	been accepted by the local routing domain. It is also noted that the		been accepted by the RP's local routing domain. It is also noted
	propagation time of RPKI objects may be different to the propagation		that the propagation time of RPKI objects may be different to the
	time of route objects in BGP, and that route objects may be received		propagation time of route objects in BGP, and that route objects may
	before the relying party's local repository cache picks up the		be received before the RP's local repository cache picks up the
	associated ROAs and recognises them as valid within the RPKI.		associated ROAs and recognises them as valid within the RPKI.
	For these reasons it is advised that local policy settings should not
	result in "unknown" validation outcomes being considered as
	sufficient grounds to reject a route object outright from
	consideration as a local "best" route.
	A local policy setting may be considered such that "invalid"		A local policy setting may be considered such that "invalid"
	validation outcomes would be sufficient grounds to reject the route		validation outcomes would be sufficient grounds to reject the route
	object. However, due to the considerations of circular dependence		object. However, due to these considerations of circular dependence
	and differing propagation times as noted above, a local policy		and differing propagation times of ROAs and route objects, an
	setting may be considered that would involve the use of a local timer		alternate local policy setting may be considered that would involve
	to accept the route as feasible for an interim period of time until		the use of a local timer to accept the route object as feasible for
	there is an acceptable level of assurance that all reasonable efforts		an interim period of time, until there is an acceptable level of
	to obtain a valid ROA for the object have been undertaken.		assurance that all reasonable efforts to obtain a valid ROA for the
			route object have been undertaken.
	4. Further Considerations		4. Further Considerations
	This document provides a description of how ROAs could be used by a		4.1. Partial Deployment Considerations
	BGP speaker.
	It is noted that the proposed procedure requires no changes to the
	operation of BGP. However, there are a number of considerations
	about this approach to origination validation that are relevant to
	the operation of a BGP speaker that are not specified here.
	These considerations include:
	o It is not specified when validation of an advertised prefix should
	be performed by a BGP speaker. It is considered to be a matter of
	local policy whether it is strictly required to perform validation
	at a point prior to loading the object into the Adj-RIB-In
	structure [RFC4271], or once the object has been loaded into Adj-
	RIB-In, or at a later time that is determined by a local
	configuration setting. It is also not specified whether
	origination validation should be performed each time a route
	object is updated by a peer even when the origin AS has not
	altered.
	o The lifetime of a validation outcome is not specified here. This
	specifically refers to the time period during which the original
	validation outcome can be still applied, at the expiration of
	which the routing object should be re-tested for validity. It is
	a matter of local policy setting as to whether a validation
	outcome be regarded as valid until the route object is withdrawn
	or further updated, or whether validation of a route object should
	occur at more frequent intervals.
	o It is a matter of local configuration as to whether ROA validation
	is performed on a per-AS basis rather than a per-BGP speaker, and
	the appropriate mechanisms to support a de-coupled framework of
	validation of ROAs and the loading of outcomes into BGP speakers
	are not considered here.
	5. Security Considerations
	This approach to origination validation uses a model of positive		This approach to route object origination validation uses a model of
	security, where information that cannot be validated within the RPKI		"positive security" attestations, where information that cannot be
	framework is intended to interpreted by a RP as invalid.		validated within the RPKI framework is intended to interpreted by a
			RP as invalid information.
	However, the considerations of accommodating environments of partial		However, the considerations of accommodating environments of partial
	adoption, where only a subset of valid route objects have associated		adoption, where only a subset of valid route objects have associated
	ROAs within the structure of the RPKI imply some modification to the		ROAs within the structure of the RPKI, imply some modification to
	model of positive security. Here it is assumed that once an address		this model of positive security. Here it is assumed that once an
	prefix is described in a ROA, then this ROA "protects" all address		address prefix is described in a ROA, then this ROA encompasses all
	prefixes that are more specific than that described in the ROA.		address prefixes that are more specific than that described in the
	Thus, any more specific address prefix and originating AS combination		ROA. Thus, any more specific address prefix and originating AS
	of a valid ROA, that does not have a matching valid ROA is considered		combination of a valid ROA, that does not have a matching valid ROA
	to be "invalid".		is considered to be "invalid".
			Routes objects that describe address prefixes that are not fully
			described by any single ROA, i.e., those address prefixes that may be
			an aggregate of a ROA, or have no intersection with any ROA, and are
			not matched by any ROA and are not a more specific of any ROA cannot
			be reliably classified as "invalid" in a partial deployment scenario,
			and are therefore described as "unknown".
	The match condition of a route object against a single ROA is		The match condition of a route object against a single ROA is
	summarized in the following table:		summarized in the following table:
	Prefix match AS mismatch AS		Prefix matching non-matching
			AS AS
	+---------+-------------+		+---------+-------------+
	Covering | unknown | unknown |		Covering | unknown | unknown |
	Aggregate | | |		Aggregate | | |
	+---------+-------------+		+---------+-------------+
	match ROA | valid | invalid |		match ROA | valid | invalid |
	prefix | | |		prefix | | |
	+---------+-------------+		+---------+-------------+
	More | invalid | invalid |		More | invalid | invalid |
	Specific | | |		Specific | | |
	than ROA +---------+-------------+		than ROA | | |
			+---------+-------------+
	In an environment of a collection of ROAs, a route object is		In an environment of a collection of ROAs, a route object is
	considered "valid" if any ROA provides a "valid" outcome, and		considered to be "valid" if any ROA provides a "valid" outcome, and
	"invalid" if one or more ROAs provide an "invalid" outcome and no		"invalid" if one or more ROAs provide an "invalid" outcome and no
	ROAs provide a "valid" outcome. The "unknown" outcome occurs when no		ROAs provide a "valid" outcome. The "unknown" outcome occurs when no
	ROA produces a "valid" or an "invalid" outcome.		ROA produces either a "valid" or an "invalid" outcome.
			4.2. Disavowal of Routing Origination
			A ROA is a positive attestation that a prefix holder has authorized
			an AS to originate a route for this prefix into the inter-domain
			routing system. It is possible for a prefix holder to attest that no
			AS has been granted any such authority by using a ROA where the ROA'S
			subject AS is one that will not be used in a routing context.
			Specifically, AS 0 is reserved by the IANA such that it "may be use
			[sic] to identify non-routed networks" [IANA.AS-Registry].
			A ROA with a subject of AS 0 is an attestation by the holder of a
			prefix that the prefix described in the ROA, and any more specific
			prefix, should not be used in a routing context.
			The route object validation procedure, described in Section 2, will
			provide a "valid" outcome if any ROA matches the address prefix and
			origin AS, even if other valid ROAs would provide an "invalid"
			validation outcome if used in isolation. Consequently, an AS0 ROA
			has a lower preference than any other ROA that has a routeable AS as
			its subject. This allows a prefix holder to use an AS0 ROA to
			declare a default condition that any route object that is equal to,
			or more specific than the prefix to be considered to be invalid,
			while also allowing other concurrently issued ROAs to describe valid
			origination authorizations for more specific prefixes.
			For example, the holder of prefix 203.0.113.0/24 may wish to
			authorise the origination of a route object of 203.0.113.196/26 by
			64496, and explicitly declare that all other use of prefixes from
			this block should be considered invalid. This could be achieved
			through the issuing of a ROA for Address=203.0.113.0/24,
			maxLength=32, AS = 0 and a second ROA for Address=203.0.113.196/26,
			maxLength=26, AS=64496.
			By convention, an AS 0 ROA should have a maxLength value of 32 for
			IPv4 addresses and 128 for IPv6 addresses, although in terms of route
			object validation the same outcome would be achieved with any valid
			maxLength value, or even if the maxLength element were to be omitted
			from the ROA. Also by convention, an AS 0 ROA should be the only ROA
			issued for a given address prefix, although again this is not a
			strict requirement. An AS 0 ROA can coexist with ROAs that have
			different subject AS values, although in such cases the presence of
			the AS 0 ROA does not alter the route object validation outcome in
			any way.
			4.3. BGP Considerations
			This document provides a description of how ROAs could be used by a
			BGP speaker.
			It is noted that the proposed procedure requires no changes to the
			operation of BGP. However, there are a number of considerations
			about this approach to origination validation that are relevant to
			the operation of a BGP speaker that are not specified here.
			These considerations include:
			* It is not specified when validation of an advertised prefix
			should be performed by a BGP speaker. It is considered to be a
			matter of local policy whether it is strictly required to
			perform validation at a point prior to loading the object into
			the Adj-RIB-In structure [RFC4271], or once the object has been
			loaded into Adj-RIB-In, or at a later time that is determined
			by a local configuration setting. It is also not specified
			whether origination validation should be performed each time a
			route object is updated by a peer even when the origin AS has
			not altered.
			* The lifetime of a validation outcome is not specified here.
			This specifically refers to the time period during which the
			original validation outcome can be still applied, at the
			expiration of which the routing object should be re-tested for
			validity. It is a matter of local policy setting as to whether
			a validation outcome be regarded as valid until the route
			object is withdrawn or further updated, or whether validation
			of a route object should occur at more frequent intervals.
			* It is a matter of local configuration as to whether ROA
			validation is performed on a per-AS basis rather than a per-BGP
			speaker, and the appropriate mechanisms to support a de-coupled
			framework of validation of ROAs and the loading of outcomes
			into BGP speakers are not considered here.
			5. Security Considerations
			ROA issuers should be aware of the validation implication in issuing
			a ROA, in that a ROA will implicitly invalidate all route objects for
			more specific prefixes with a prefix length greater than maxLength,
			and all originating AS's other than the AS listed in the collection
			of ROAs.
			A conservative operational practice would be to ensure the issuing of
			ROAs for all more specific prefixes with distinct origination AS's
			prior to the issuing of ROAs for larger encompassing address blocks,
			in order to avoid inadvertent invalidation of valid route objects
			during ROA generation.
			ROA issuers should also be aware that if they generate a ROA for one
			origin AS, then if the prefix is authorised by multiple AS's then
			ROAs should be generated for all such authorized AS's.
	6. IANA Considerations		6. IANA Considerations
	[There are no IANA considerations in this document.]		Dear IANA,
	7. Changes -01 to -02		The AS number registry [IANA.AS-Registry] contains the following
			annotation against AS 0: "may be use to identify non-routed
			networks." Could you please add a 'd' as appropriate to this text?
			Thank you,
			the authors.
			7. Change Log
			Note: This section is NOT to be included in final version of this
			document.
			7.1. Changes -02 to -03
			Further Considerations section now has a subsection describing the
			assumptions that ROA validation is making about the precise nature of
			partial deployment, noting that a ROA has an implicit scope of
			application for all prefixes that are equal to or more specific than
			the prefix listed in the ROA
			Moved the table of validation outcomes from the Security
			Considerations section to the section on Further Considerations.
			Added consideration about disavowal and the use of an AS 0 ROA and
			its interpretation in the context of validation of route objects, and
			proposed conventions of use of an AS 0 ROA.
			Noted hierarchical dependence of ROA issuance in the Security
			Considerations section.
			7.2. Changes -01 to -02
	Following WG review of the means of specification of denial in		Following WG review of the means of specification of denial in
	routing authorizations in the context of the RPKI at IETF 74 and IETF		routing authorizations in the context of the RPKI at IETF 74 and IETF
	75, it appears that there is no general WG support for the use of an		75, it appears that there is no general WG support for the use of an
	explicit denial object (termed a 'BOA'). The alternative approach,		explicit denial object (termed a 'BOA'). The alternative approach,
	explored in previous iterations of this draft, used a more restricted		explored in previous iterations of this draft, used a more restricted
	interpretation of a ROA that yielded only "valid" or "unknown"		interpretation of a ROA that yielded only "valid" or "unknown"
	outcomes (by using "unknown" where "invalid" is used in this revision		outcomes (by using "unknown" where "invalid" is used in this revision
	of the document). To allow for "invalid" outcomes the draft used the		of the document). To allow for "invalid" outcomes the draft used the
	BOA to undertake the role of a 'disavow' constraint, where a route		BOA to undertake the role of a 'disavow' constraint, where a route
	object was considered to be "invalid" if it was the subject of a		object was considered to be "invalid" if it was the subject of a
	valid BOA and was not considered to be "valid" by any valid ROA. The		valid BOA and was not considered to be "valid" by any valid ROA. The
	reasons advanced to support the dropping of the BOA was the increased		reasons advanced to support the dropping of the BOA was the increased
	complexity of RP systems through the use of a second object in route		complexity of RP systems through the use of a second object in route
	validation, a potentially confusing mismatch in the interpretation		validation, a potentially confusing mismatch in the interpretation
	scope between the ROA and the BOA, where the ROA's scope was limited		scope between the ROA and the BOA, where the ROAs scope was limited
	to set of prefixes described in the ROA, while the BOA's scope		to set of prefixes described in the ROA, while the BOA's scope
	included all possible more specifics of the prefixes listed in the		included all possible more specifics of the prefixes listed in the
	BOA, and the ability to reconstruct the semantic equivalent of a BOA		BOA, and the ability to reconstruct the semantic equivalent of a BOA
	through the use of a ROA that used a restricted-use AS as its asID.		through the use of a ROA that used a restricted-use AS as its asID.
	Accordingly, this draft has been revised to remove all references to		Accordingly, this draft has been revised to remove all references to
	the use of an explicit denial object and uses the implicit semantics		the use of an explicit denial object and uses the implicit semantics
	of denial in a ROA object.		of denial in a ROA object.
	There appears to be no WG interest in consideration of validation in		There appears to be no WG interest in consideration of validation in
	a "linked" model, where a ROA is bound to the route object that it is		a "linked" model, where a ROA is bound to the route object that it is
	intended to validate. Accordingly this section of the text has also		intended to validate. Accordingly this section of the text has also
	been dropped from this version.		been dropped from this version.
	8. Normative References		8. References
			8.1. Normative References
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]		[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
	Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support		Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
	Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch (work in		Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch (work in
	progress), July 2009.		progress), July 2009.
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]		[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]
	Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "An Infrastructure to		Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "An Infrastructure to
	Support Secure Internet Routing",		Support Secure Internet Routing",
	draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format (work in progress), July 2009.		draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format (work in progress), July 2009.
	skipping to change at page 8, line 33		skipping to change at page 11, line 13
	Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.		Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
	[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway		[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
	Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.		Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
	[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,		[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
	Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key		Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List		Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
	(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.		(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
			8.2. Informative References
			[IANA.AS-Registry]
			IANA, "IANA Autonomous System Number Registry",
			August 2009.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Geoff Huston		Geoff Huston
	Asia Pacific Network Information Centre		Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
	Email: gih@apnic.net		Email: gih@apnic.net
	George Michaelson		George Michaelson
	Asia Pacific Network Information Centre		Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
End of changes. 34 change blocks.
	157 lines changed or deleted		291 lines changed or added
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