--- 1/draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-02.txt 2009-08-06 09:12:11.000000000 +0200 +++ 2/draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-03.txt 2009-08-06 09:12:11.000000000 +0200 @@ -1,19 +1,19 @@ Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) G. Huston Internet-Draft G. Michaelson Intended status: Informational APNIC -Expires: February 5, 2010 August 4, 2009 +Expires: February 7, 2010 August 6, 2009 Validation of Route Origination in BGP using the Resource Certificate - PKI - draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-02.txt + PKI and ROAs + draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-03.txt Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. @@ -22,292 +22,420 @@ and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. - This Internet-Draft will expire on February 5, 2010. + This Internet-Draft will expire on February 7, 2010. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Abstract This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure to validate the origination of routes advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol. The proposed application is intended to - fit within the requirements for adding security to inter-domain + fit within the requirement for adding security to inter-domain routing, including the ability to support incremental and piecemeal deployment, and does not require any changes to the specification of BGP. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection . . . . . . 4 - 4. Further Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 7. Changes -01 to -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object . . . . . . . . . . 3 + 3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection . . . . . 4 + 4. Further Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 4.1. Partial Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 4.2. Disavowal of Routing Origination . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 4.3. BGP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 7. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 7.1. Changes -02 to -03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 7.2. Changes -01 to -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1. Introduction This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key - Infrastructure (RPKI) to validate the origination of routes - advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RFC4271]. + Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] to validate the + origination of routes advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) + [RFC4271]. - The RPKI is based on Resource Certificates. Resource Certificates - are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX profile [RFC5280], - and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS identifiers [RFC3779]. - A Resource Certificate describes an action by an issuer that binds a - list of IP address blocks and Autonomous System (AS) numbers to the - Subject of a certificate, identified by the unique association of the - Subject's private key with the public key contained in the Resource - Certificate. The PKI is structured such that each current Resource - Certificate matches a current resource allocation or assignment. - This is described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]. + The RPKI is based on a hierarchy of Resource Certificates that are + aligned to the Internet number resource allocation structure. + Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX + profile [RFC5280], and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS + identifiers [RFC3779]. A Resource Certificate describes an action by + an issuer that binds a list of IP address blocks and Autonomous + System (AS) numbers to the Subject of a certificate, identified by + the unique association of the Subject's private key with the public + key contained in the Resource Certificate. The RPKI is structured + such that each current Resource Certificate matches a current + resource allocation or assignment. This is further described in + [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]. Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) are digitally signed objects that bind an address to an AS number, signed by the address holder. A ROA provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized an AS to originate route objects in the inter-domain routing environment for that address block. ROAs are described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]. ROAs are intended to fit within the - requirements for adding security to inter-domain routing, including - the ability to support incremental and piecemeal deployment. + requirements for adding security to inter-domain routing. This document describes the semantic interpretation of a valid ROA, with particular reference to application in BGP relating to the - origination of route objects. The document does not describe any - application of a ROA to validation of the AS Path. + origination of route objects. - This proposed application does not require any changes to the - specification of BGP protocol elements. The application may be used - as part of BGP's local route selection algorithm [RFC4271]. + This proposed application of validation of ROAs does not require any + changes to the specification of BGP protocol elements. The outcomes + of ROA validation may be used as part of BGP's local route selection + procedure [RFC4271]. 2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object - A BGP "Route Object" is an address prefix and a set of attributes. - In terms of validation of the Route Object the prefix value and the - origin AS attribute are used in the validation operation. - - If the route object is an aggregate and the AS Path contains an AS - Set, then the origin AS is considered to be the AS described as the - AGGREGATOR [RFC4271] of the route object. - - ROA validation is described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format], and the - outcome of the validation operation is that the ROA is valid in the - context of the RPKI, or validation has failed. - - It is assumed here that ROAs are managed and distributed - independently of the operation of BGP itself, and a local BGP speaker - has access to a local cache of the complete set of ROAs and the RPKI - data set when performing a validation operation. + A BGP "route object" is an address prefix and an associated set of + attributes. In terms of validation of the route object the address + prefix value and the "origin AS" are used in the ROA validation + operation. The route object's origin AS is the final element of the + route object's AS_PATH attribute. If the final AS_PATH element is an + AS Set, indicating that the route object is an aggregate, then the + origin AS is taken as the AS component of the AGGREGATOR attribute + [RFC4271]. A BGP route object does not refer to a specific ROA that should be used by a Relying Party (RP) to validate the origination information - contained in the route object, nor does it refer to the set of - certificates that the RP should use to validate the ROA's digital - signature. The RP needs to match a route object to one or more - candidate valid ROAs in order to determine the appropriate local - actions to perform on the route object. + contained in the route object. The RP needs to match a route object + to one or more candidate valid ROAs in order to determine a + validation outcome, which, in turn, can be used to determine the + appropriate local actions to perform on the route object. Valid ROAs + are defined as ROAs that are determined to be syntactically correct + and are signed using a signature that can be verified using the RPKI, + as described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]. The outcome of this ROA + validation function is that either the RP has determined that the ROA + is valid in the context of the RPKI, or the ROA is invalid, in which + case the ROA is not to be used by the RP. - To validate a route object the RP would undertake the following - steps: + It is assumed here that ROAs are managed and distributed + independently of the operation of BGP itself, and that a local BGP + speaker has access to a local cache of the complete set of valid ROAs + when performing a route object validation operation. + + Route object validation is defined by the following procedure: 1. Select all valid ROAs that include a ROAIPAddress value that - either matches, or is a covering aggregate of, the address prefix - in the route object. - 2. If the set of candidate ROAs is empty the validation process - stops with an outcome of "unknown". - 3. If any ROA has an asID value that matches the originating AS in - the route object, and either the route object's address prefix - precisely matches an address in the ROA, or the route object's - address prefix is a more specific prefix of the address in the - ROA and the prefix length value is less than or equal to the - ROAIPAddress's maxLength value, then the validation process stops - with an outcome of "valid". - 4. Otherwise, the validation outcome is "invalid". + either matches, or is a covering aggregate of, the address + prefix in the route object. + + 2. If the set of candidate ROAs is empty then the validation + procedure stops with an outcome of "unknown". + + 3. If any ROA has an asID value that matches the origin AS in the + route object, and either the route object's address prefix + precisely matches a ROAIPAddress in the ROA, or the route + object's address prefix is a more specific prefix of a + ROAIPAddress and the route object's prefix length value is + less than or equal to the ROAIPAddress' maxLength value, then + the validation procedure stops with an outcome of "valid". + + 4. Otherwise, the validation procedure stops with an outcome of + "invalid". 3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection Within the framework of the abstract model of BGP operation, a - received prefix announcement from a peer is compared to all - announcements for this prefix received from other peers and a route - selection procedure is used to select the "best" route object from - this candidate set, which is then used locally by installing it in - the loc-RIB [RFC4271], and is announced to peers as the local "best" - route. + received prefix announcement from a BGP speaking peer is compared to + all announcements for this prefix received from other BGP peers and a + route selection procedure is used to select the "best" route object + from this candidate set. This route object is then used locally by + installing it in the loc-RIB [RFC4271], and is announced to peers as + the local "best" route. - It is proposed here that the ROA validation outcome of "unknown", - "valid" or "invalid" be used as part of the determination of the - local degree of preference as defined in section 9.1.1 of the BGP - specification [RFC4271]. + The route object validation outcome, described in Section 2, of + "unknown", "valid" or "invalid" may be used as part of the + determination of the local degree of preference as defined in section + 9.1.1 of the BGP specification [RFC4271]. The local degree of + preference is as follows: + "valid" is to be preferred over + "unknown", which itself is to be preferred over + "invalid". - The proposed addition to the local degree of preference is "valid" is - to be preferred over "unknown" over "invalid". + This preference ranking is performed prior to the steps described in + section 9.1.1 of [RFC4271]. - It is a matter of local BGP selection policy in setting whether - "invalid" route objects are discarded from further consideration in - the route selection process, however the following consideration - should be taken into account in such a situation. + It is a matter of local BGP selection policy as to the actions to be + undertaken by a BGP instance in processing route objects with + "unknown" validation outcomes. Due to considerations of partial use + of ROAs in heterogeneous environments, such as in the public + Internet, it is advised that local policy settings should not result + in "unknown" validation outcomes being considered as sufficient + grounds to reject a route object outright from further consideration + as a local "best" route. - The consideration here is one of potential circularity of dependence. - If the authoritative publication point of the repository of ROAs or - any certificates used in relation to an address prefix is stored at a - location that lies within the address prefix described in a ROA, then + It is a matter of local BGP selection policy as to whether "invalid" + route objects are considered to be ineligible for further + consideration in the route selection process. The consideration here + is one of potential circularity of dependence. If the authoritative + publication point of the repository of ROAs, or that of any + certificate used in relation to an address prefix, is located at an + address that lies within the address prefix described in a ROA, then the repository can only be accessed once a route for the prefix has - been accepted by the local routing domain. It is also noted that the - propagation time of RPKI objects may be different to the propagation - time of route objects in BGP, and that route objects may be received - before the relying party's local repository cache picks up the + been accepted by the RP's local routing domain. It is also noted + that the propagation time of RPKI objects may be different to the + propagation time of route objects in BGP, and that route objects may + be received before the RP's local repository cache picks up the associated ROAs and recognises them as valid within the RPKI. - For these reasons it is advised that local policy settings should not - result in "unknown" validation outcomes being considered as - sufficient grounds to reject a route object outright from - consideration as a local "best" route. - A local policy setting may be considered such that "invalid" validation outcomes would be sufficient grounds to reject the route - object. However, due to the considerations of circular dependence - and differing propagation times as noted above, a local policy - setting may be considered that would involve the use of a local timer - to accept the route as feasible for an interim period of time until - there is an acceptable level of assurance that all reasonable efforts - to obtain a valid ROA for the object have been undertaken. + object. However, due to these considerations of circular dependence + and differing propagation times of ROAs and route objects, an + alternate local policy setting may be considered that would involve + the use of a local timer to accept the route object as feasible for + an interim period of time, until there is an acceptable level of + assurance that all reasonable efforts to obtain a valid ROA for the + route object have been undertaken. 4. Further Considerations - This document provides a description of how ROAs could be used by a - BGP speaker. - - It is noted that the proposed procedure requires no changes to the - operation of BGP. However, there are a number of considerations - about this approach to origination validation that are relevant to - the operation of a BGP speaker that are not specified here. - - These considerations include: - - o It is not specified when validation of an advertised prefix should - be performed by a BGP speaker. It is considered to be a matter of - local policy whether it is strictly required to perform validation - at a point prior to loading the object into the Adj-RIB-In - structure [RFC4271], or once the object has been loaded into Adj- - RIB-In, or at a later time that is determined by a local - configuration setting. It is also not specified whether - origination validation should be performed each time a route - object is updated by a peer even when the origin AS has not - altered. - - o The lifetime of a validation outcome is not specified here. This - specifically refers to the time period during which the original - validation outcome can be still applied, at the expiration of - which the routing object should be re-tested for validity. It is - a matter of local policy setting as to whether a validation - outcome be regarded as valid until the route object is withdrawn - or further updated, or whether validation of a route object should - occur at more frequent intervals. - - o It is a matter of local configuration as to whether ROA validation - is performed on a per-AS basis rather than a per-BGP speaker, and - the appropriate mechanisms to support a de-coupled framework of - validation of ROAs and the loading of outcomes into BGP speakers - are not considered here. - -5. Security Considerations +4.1. Partial Deployment Considerations - This approach to origination validation uses a model of positive - security, where information that cannot be validated within the RPKI - framework is intended to interpreted by a RP as invalid. + This approach to route object origination validation uses a model of + "positive security" attestations, where information that cannot be + validated within the RPKI framework is intended to interpreted by a + RP as invalid information. However, the considerations of accommodating environments of partial adoption, where only a subset of valid route objects have associated - ROAs within the structure of the RPKI imply some modification to the - model of positive security. Here it is assumed that once an address - prefix is described in a ROA, then this ROA "protects" all address - prefixes that are more specific than that described in the ROA. - Thus, any more specific address prefix and originating AS combination - of a valid ROA, that does not have a matching valid ROA is considered - to be "invalid". + ROAs within the structure of the RPKI, imply some modification to + this model of positive security. Here it is assumed that once an + address prefix is described in a ROA, then this ROA encompasses all + address prefixes that are more specific than that described in the + ROA. Thus, any more specific address prefix and originating AS + combination of a valid ROA, that does not have a matching valid ROA + is considered to be "invalid". + + Routes objects that describe address prefixes that are not fully + described by any single ROA, i.e., those address prefixes that may be + an aggregate of a ROA, or have no intersection with any ROA, and are + not matched by any ROA and are not a more specific of any ROA cannot + be reliably classified as "invalid" in a partial deployment scenario, + and are therefore described as "unknown". The match condition of a route object against a single ROA is summarized in the following table: - Prefix match AS mismatch AS + Prefix matching non-matching + AS AS +---------+-------------+ Covering | unknown | unknown | Aggregate | | | +---------+-------------+ match ROA | valid | invalid | prefix | | | +---------+-------------+ More | invalid | invalid | Specific | | | - than ROA +---------+-------------+ + than ROA | | | + +---------+-------------+ In an environment of a collection of ROAs, a route object is - considered "valid" if any ROA provides a "valid" outcome, and + considered to be "valid" if any ROA provides a "valid" outcome, and "invalid" if one or more ROAs provide an "invalid" outcome and no ROAs provide a "valid" outcome. The "unknown" outcome occurs when no - ROA produces a "valid" or an "invalid" outcome. + ROA produces either a "valid" or an "invalid" outcome. + +4.2. Disavowal of Routing Origination + + A ROA is a positive attestation that a prefix holder has authorized + an AS to originate a route for this prefix into the inter-domain + routing system. It is possible for a prefix holder to attest that no + AS has been granted any such authority by using a ROA where the ROA'S + subject AS is one that will not be used in a routing context. + Specifically, AS 0 is reserved by the IANA such that it "may be use + [sic] to identify non-routed networks" [IANA.AS-Registry]. + + A ROA with a subject of AS 0 is an attestation by the holder of a + prefix that the prefix described in the ROA, and any more specific + prefix, should not be used in a routing context. + + The route object validation procedure, described in Section 2, will + provide a "valid" outcome if any ROA matches the address prefix and + origin AS, even if other valid ROAs would provide an "invalid" + validation outcome if used in isolation. Consequently, an AS0 ROA + has a lower preference than any other ROA that has a routeable AS as + its subject. This allows a prefix holder to use an AS0 ROA to + declare a default condition that any route object that is equal to, + or more specific than the prefix to be considered to be invalid, + while also allowing other concurrently issued ROAs to describe valid + origination authorizations for more specific prefixes. + + For example, the holder of prefix 203.0.113.0/24 may wish to + authorise the origination of a route object of 203.0.113.196/26 by + 64496, and explicitly declare that all other use of prefixes from + this block should be considered invalid. This could be achieved + through the issuing of a ROA for Address=203.0.113.0/24, + maxLength=32, AS = 0 and a second ROA for Address=203.0.113.196/26, + maxLength=26, AS=64496. + + By convention, an AS 0 ROA should have a maxLength value of 32 for + IPv4 addresses and 128 for IPv6 addresses, although in terms of route + object validation the same outcome would be achieved with any valid + maxLength value, or even if the maxLength element were to be omitted + from the ROA. Also by convention, an AS 0 ROA should be the only ROA + issued for a given address prefix, although again this is not a + strict requirement. An AS 0 ROA can coexist with ROAs that have + different subject AS values, although in such cases the presence of + the AS 0 ROA does not alter the route object validation outcome in + any way. + +4.3. BGP Considerations + + This document provides a description of how ROAs could be used by a + BGP speaker. + + It is noted that the proposed procedure requires no changes to the + operation of BGP. However, there are a number of considerations + about this approach to origination validation that are relevant to + the operation of a BGP speaker that are not specified here. + + These considerations include: + + * It is not specified when validation of an advertised prefix + should be performed by a BGP speaker. It is considered to be a + matter of local policy whether it is strictly required to + perform validation at a point prior to loading the object into + the Adj-RIB-In structure [RFC4271], or once the object has been + loaded into Adj-RIB-In, or at a later time that is determined + by a local configuration setting. It is also not specified + whether origination validation should be performed each time a + route object is updated by a peer even when the origin AS has + not altered. + + * The lifetime of a validation outcome is not specified here. + This specifically refers to the time period during which the + original validation outcome can be still applied, at the + expiration of which the routing object should be re-tested for + validity. It is a matter of local policy setting as to whether + a validation outcome be regarded as valid until the route + object is withdrawn or further updated, or whether validation + of a route object should occur at more frequent intervals. + + * It is a matter of local configuration as to whether ROA + validation is performed on a per-AS basis rather than a per-BGP + speaker, and the appropriate mechanisms to support a de-coupled + framework of validation of ROAs and the loading of outcomes + into BGP speakers are not considered here. + +5. Security Considerations + + ROA issuers should be aware of the validation implication in issuing + a ROA, in that a ROA will implicitly invalidate all route objects for + more specific prefixes with a prefix length greater than maxLength, + and all originating AS's other than the AS listed in the collection + of ROAs. + + A conservative operational practice would be to ensure the issuing of + ROAs for all more specific prefixes with distinct origination AS's + prior to the issuing of ROAs for larger encompassing address blocks, + in order to avoid inadvertent invalidation of valid route objects + during ROA generation. + + ROA issuers should also be aware that if they generate a ROA for one + origin AS, then if the prefix is authorised by multiple AS's then + ROAs should be generated for all such authorized AS's. 6. IANA Considerations - [There are no IANA considerations in this document.] + Dear IANA, -7. Changes -01 to -02 + The AS number registry [IANA.AS-Registry] contains the following + annotation against AS 0: "may be use to identify non-routed + networks." Could you please add a 'd' as appropriate to this text? + + Thank you, + + the authors. + +7. Change Log + + Note: This section is NOT to be included in final version of this + document. + +7.1. Changes -02 to -03 + + Further Considerations section now has a subsection describing the + assumptions that ROA validation is making about the precise nature of + partial deployment, noting that a ROA has an implicit scope of + application for all prefixes that are equal to or more specific than + the prefix listed in the ROA + + Moved the table of validation outcomes from the Security + Considerations section to the section on Further Considerations. + + Added consideration about disavowal and the use of an AS 0 ROA and + its interpretation in the context of validation of route objects, and + proposed conventions of use of an AS 0 ROA. + + Noted hierarchical dependence of ROA issuance in the Security + Considerations section. + +7.2. Changes -01 to -02 Following WG review of the means of specification of denial in routing authorizations in the context of the RPKI at IETF 74 and IETF 75, it appears that there is no general WG support for the use of an explicit denial object (termed a 'BOA'). The alternative approach, explored in previous iterations of this draft, used a more restricted interpretation of a ROA that yielded only "valid" or "unknown" outcomes (by using "unknown" where "invalid" is used in this revision of the document). To allow for "invalid" outcomes the draft used the BOA to undertake the role of a 'disavow' constraint, where a route object was considered to be "invalid" if it was the subject of a valid BOA and was not considered to be "valid" by any valid ROA. The reasons advanced to support the dropping of the BOA was the increased complexity of RP systems through the use of a second object in route validation, a potentially confusing mismatch in the interpretation - scope between the ROA and the BOA, where the ROA's scope was limited + scope between the ROA and the BOA, where the ROAs scope was limited to set of prefixes described in the ROA, while the BOA's scope included all possible more specifics of the prefixes listed in the BOA, and the ability to reconstruct the semantic equivalent of a BOA through the use of a ROA that used a restricted-use AS as its asID. Accordingly, this draft has been revised to remove all references to the use of an explicit denial object and uses the implicit semantics of denial in a ROA object. There appears to be no WG interest in consideration of validation in a "linked" model, where a ROA is bound to the route object that it is intended to validate. Accordingly this section of the text has also been dropped from this version. -8. Normative References +8. References + +8.1. Normative References [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch (work in progress), July 2009. [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format (work in progress), July 2009. @@ -316,20 +444,26 @@ Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. +8.2. Informative References + + [IANA.AS-Registry] + IANA, "IANA Autonomous System Number Registry", + August 2009. + Authors' Addresses Geoff Huston Asia Pacific Network Information Centre Email: gih@apnic.net George Michaelson Asia Pacific Network Information Centre