draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-03.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-04.txt 
Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) G. Huston Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) G. Huston
Internet-Draft G. Michaelson Internet-Draft G. Michaelson
Intended status: Informational APNIC Intended status: Informational APNIC
Expires: February 7, 2010 August 6, 2009 Expires: September 4, 2010 March 3, 2010
Validation of Route Origination in BGP using the Resource Certificate Validation of Route Origination using the Resource Certificate PKI and
PKI and ROAs ROAs
draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-03.txt draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-04.txt
Abstract
This document defines the semantics of a Route Origin Authorization
in terms of the context of an application of the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure to validate the origination of routes advertised in
the Border Gateway Protocol.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Drafts. Drafts.
skipping to change at page 1, line 33 skipping to change at page 1, line 40
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The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
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This Internet-Draft will expire on February 7, 2010. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 4, 2010.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
Abstract include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key described in the BSD License.
Infrastructure to validate the origination of routes advertised in
the Border Gateway Protocol. The proposed application is intended to
fit within the requirement for adding security to inter-domain
routing, including the ability to support incremental and piecemeal
deployment, and does not require any changes to the specification of
BGP.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. ROA Validation Outcomes for a Route Object . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection . . . . . 4 3. Applying Validation Outcomes to Route Selection . . . . . . . . 5
4. Further Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Disavowal of Routing Origination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Partial Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Route Object Validation Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Disavowal of Routing Origination . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. BGP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1. Changes -02 to -03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.2. Changes -01 to -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key This document defines the semantics of a Route Origin Authorization
Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] to validate the (ROA) in terms of the context of an application of the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] to validate the
origination of routes advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) origination of routes advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
[RFC4271]. [RFC4271].
The RPKI is based on a hierarchy of Resource Certificates that are The RPKI is based on a hierarchy of Resource Certificates that are
aligned to the Internet number resource allocation structure. aligned to the Internet number resource allocation structure.
Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX
profile [RFC5280], and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS profile [RFC5280], and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS
identifiers [RFC3779]. A Resource Certificate describes an action by identifiers [RFC3779]. A Resource Certificate describes an action by
an issuer that binds a list of IP address blocks and Autonomous an issuer that binds a list of IP address blocks and Autonomous
System (AS) numbers to the Subject of a certificate, identified by System (AS) numbers to the Subject of a certificate, identified by
the unique association of the Subject's private key with the public the unique association of the Subject's private key with the public
key contained in the Resource Certificate. The RPKI is structured key contained in the Resource Certificate. The RPKI is structured
such that each current Resource Certificate matches a current such that each current Resource Certificate matches a current
resource allocation or assignment. This is further described in resource allocation or assignment. This is further described in
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]. [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch].
Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) are digitally signed objects that ROAs are digitally signed objects that bind an address to an AS
bind an address to an AS number, signed by the address holder. A ROA number, signed by the address holder. A ROA provides a means of
provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized a particular
authorized an AS to originate route objects in the inter-domain AS to originate route objects in the inter-domain routing environment
routing environment for that address block. ROAs are described in for that address block. ROAs are described in
[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]. ROAs are intended to fit within the [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]. ROAs are intended to fit within the
requirements for adding security to inter-domain routing. requirements for adding security to inter-domain routing.
This document describes the semantic interpretation of a valid ROA, This document describes the semantic interpretation of a ROA, with
with particular reference to application in BGP relating to the particular reference to application in inter-domain routing relating
origination of route objects. to the origination of route objects, and the intended scope of the
authority that is conveyed in the ROA.
This proposed application of validation of ROAs does not require any 2. ROA Validation Outcomes for a Route Object
changes to the specification of BGP protocol elements. The outcomes
of ROA validation may be used as part of BGP's local route selection
procedure [RFC4271].
2. Validation Outcomes of a BGP Route Object A "route object" is an address prefix and an associated set of
routing attributes. In terms of validation of the route object in
the context of BGP [RFC4271]the address prefix value and the "origin
AS" are used in the ROA validation operation. The route object's
origin AS is the final element of the route object's AS_PATH
attribute. If the final AS_PATH element is an AS Set, indicating
that the route object is an aggregate, then the origin AS is taken as
the AS component of the AGGREGATOR attribute [RFC4271].
A BGP "route object" is an address prefix and an associated set of It is assumed here that a Relying Party (RP) has access to a local
attributes. In terms of validation of the route object the address cache of the complete set of valid ROAs when performing validation of
prefix value and the "origin AS" are used in the ROA validation a route object. (Valid ROAs are defined as ROAs that are determined
operation. The route object's origin AS is the final element of the to be syntactically correct and are signed using a signature that can
route object's AS_PATH attribute. If the final AS_PATH element is an be verified using the RPKI, as described in
AS Set, indicating that the route object is an aggregate, then the [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format].) The RP needs to match a route object to
origin AS is taken as the AS component of the AGGREGATOR attribute one or more candidate valid ROAs in order to determine a validation
[RFC4271]. outcome, which, in turn, can be used to determine the appropriate
local actions to perform on the route object.
A BGP route object does not refer to a specific ROA that should be This approach to route object origination validation uses a model of
used by a Relying Party (RP) to validate the origination information "positive" attestations, where route objects that cannot be validated
contained in the route object. The RP needs to match a route object within the RPKI framework would conventionally be treated by a RP as
to one or more candidate valid ROAs in order to determine a "invalid". However, the considerations of accommodating environments
validation outcome, which, in turn, can be used to determine the of partial adoption of the use of ROAs, where only a subset of
appropriate local actions to perform on the route object. Valid ROAs validly advertised address prefixes have associated published ROAs
are defined as ROAs that are determined to be syntactically correct within the structure of the RPKI, imply some modification to this
and are signed using a signature that can be verified using the RPKI, model of positive attestation. In the context of route object
as described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]. The outcome of this ROA validation it is assumed that once an address prefix is described in
validation function is that either the RP has determined that the ROA a ROA, then this ROA speifically encompasses all address prefixes
is valid in the context of the RPKI, or the ROA is invalid, in which that are more specific than that described in the ROA. Thus, any
case the ROA is not to be used by the RP. route object for more specific address prefix than that described by
any valid ROA that does not itself have a matching valid ROA is
considered to be "invalid". However, routes objects for address
prefixes that are not fully described by any single ROA, i.e., those
route objects whose address prefixes may be an aggregate of address
prefixes described in a valid ROA, or have address prefixes where
there is no intersection with any ROA, and are not matched by any ROA
and are not a more specific of any ROA cannot be reliably classified
as "invalid" in a partial deployment scenario. Such route objects
have a validation outcome of "unknown".
It is assumed here that ROAs are managed and distributed The validation condition of a route object with a prefix and an
independently of the operation of BGP itself, and that a local BGP origin AS when using single ROA for validation is summarized in the
speaker has access to a local cache of the complete set of valid ROAs following table:
when performing a route object validation operation.
Prefix matching non-matching
AS AS
+---------+-------------+
Covering | unknown | unknown |
Aggregate | | |
+---------+-------------+
match ROA | valid | invalid |
prefix | | |
+---------+-------------+
More | invalid | invalid |
Specific | | |
than ROA | | |
+---------+-------------+
In an environment of a collection of ROAs, a route object is
considered to be "valid" if any ROA provides a "valid" outcome. It
is considered to be "invalid" if one (or more) ROAs provide an
"invalid" outcome and no ROAs provide a "valid" outcome. It is
considered to be "unknown" when no ROA produces either a "valid" or
an "invalid" outcome.
Route object validation is defined by the following procedure: Route object validation is defined by the following procedure:
1. Select all valid ROAs that include a ROAIPAddress value that 1. Select all valid ROAs that include a ROAIPAddress value that
either matches, or is a covering aggregate of, the address either matches, or is a covering aggregate of, the address
prefix in the route object. prefix in the route object.
2. If the set of candidate ROAs is empty then the validation 2. If the set of candidate ROAs is empty then the validation
procedure stops with an outcome of "unknown". procedure stops with an outcome of "unknown".
3. If any ROA has an asID value that matches the origin AS in the 3. If any of the selected ROAs has an asID value that matches the
route object, and either the route object's address prefix origin AS in the route object, and either the route object's
precisely matches a ROAIPAddress in the ROA, or the route address prefix precisely matches a ROAIPAddress in the ROA, or
object's address prefix is a more specific prefix of a the route object's address prefix is a more specific prefix of
ROAIPAddress and the route object's prefix length value is a ROAIPAddress, and the route object's prefix length value is
less than or equal to the ROAIPAddress' maxLength value, then less than or equal to the ROAIPAddress' maxLength value, then
the validation procedure stops with an outcome of "valid". the validation procedure stops with an outcome of "valid".
4. Otherwise, the validation procedure stops with an outcome of 4. Otherwise, the validation procedure stops with an outcome of
"invalid". "invalid".
3. Applying Validation Outcomes to BGP Route Selection 3. Applying Validation Outcomes to Route Selection
Within the framework of the abstract model of BGP operation, a Within the framework of the abstract model of the operation of inter-
received prefix announcement from a BGP speaking peer is compared to domain routing using BGP [RFC4271], a received prefix announcement
all announcements for this prefix received from other BGP peers and a from a routing peer is compared to all announcements for this prefix
route selection procedure is used to select the "best" route object received from other routing peers and a route selection procedure is
from this candidate set. This route object is then used locally by used to select the "best" route object from this candidate set.
installing it in the loc-RIB [RFC4271], and is announced to peers as
the local "best" route.
The route object validation outcome, described in Section 2, of The route object validation outcome, described in Section 2, of
"unknown", "valid" or "invalid" may be used as part of the "unknown", "valid" or "invalid" may be used as part of the
determination of the local degree of preference as defined in section determination of the local degree of preference, in which case the
9.1.1 of the BGP specification [RFC4271]. The local degree of local order of preference is as follows:
preference is as follows:
"valid" is to be preferred over "valid" is to be preferred over
"unknown", which itself is to be preferred over "unknown", which itself is to be preferred over
"invalid". "invalid".
This preference ranking is performed prior to the steps described in It is a matter of local routing policy as to the actions to be
section 9.1.1 of [RFC4271]. undertaken by a routing entity in processing route objects with
It is a matter of local BGP selection policy as to the actions to be
undertaken by a BGP instance in processing route objects with
"unknown" validation outcomes. Due to considerations of partial use "unknown" validation outcomes. Due to considerations of partial use
of ROAs in heterogeneous environments, such as in the public of ROAs in heterogeneous environments, such as in the public
Internet, it is advised that local policy settings should not result Internet, it is advised that local policy settings should not result
in "unknown" validation outcomes being considered as sufficient in "unknown" validation outcomes being considered as sufficient
grounds to reject a route object outright from further consideration grounds to reject a route object outright from further consideration
as a local "best" route. as a local "best" route.
It is a matter of local BGP selection policy as to whether "invalid" It is a matter of local routing policy as to whether "invalid" route
route objects are considered to be ineligible for further objects are considered to be ineligible for further consideration in
consideration in the route selection process. The consideration here a route selection process. A possible consideration here is one of
is one of potential circularity of dependence. If the authoritative potential circularity of dependence. If the authoritative
publication point of the repository of ROAs, or that of any publication point of the repository of ROAs, or that of any
certificate used in relation to an address prefix, is located at an certificate used in relation to an address prefix, is located at an
address that lies within the address prefix described in a ROA, then address that lies within the address prefix described in a ROA, then
the repository can only be accessed once a route for the prefix has the repository can only be accessed by the RP once a route for the
been accepted by the RP's local routing domain. It is also noted prefix has been accepted by the RP's local routing domain. It is
that the propagation time of RPKI objects may be different to the also noted that the propagation time of RPKI objects may be different
propagation time of route objects in BGP, and that route objects may to the propagation time of route objects, and that route objects may
be received before the RP's local repository cache picks up the be received before the RP's local repository cache picks up the
associated ROAs and recognises them as valid within the RPKI. associated ROAs and recognises them as valid within the RPKI.
A local policy setting may be considered such that "invalid" 4. Disavowal of Routing Origination
validation outcomes would be sufficient grounds to reject the route
object. However, due to these considerations of circular dependence
and differing propagation times of ROAs and route objects, an
alternate local policy setting may be considered that would involve
the use of a local timer to accept the route object as feasible for
an interim period of time, until there is an acceptable level of
assurance that all reasonable efforts to obtain a valid ROA for the
route object have been undertaken.
4. Further Considerations
4.1. Partial Deployment Considerations
This approach to route object origination validation uses a model of
"positive security" attestations, where information that cannot be
validated within the RPKI framework is intended to interpreted by a
RP as invalid information.
However, the considerations of accommodating environments of partial
adoption, where only a subset of valid route objects have associated
ROAs within the structure of the RPKI, imply some modification to
this model of positive security. Here it is assumed that once an
address prefix is described in a ROA, then this ROA encompasses all
address prefixes that are more specific than that described in the
ROA. Thus, any more specific address prefix and originating AS
combination of a valid ROA, that does not have a matching valid ROA
is considered to be "invalid".
Routes objects that describe address prefixes that are not fully
described by any single ROA, i.e., those address prefixes that may be
an aggregate of a ROA, or have no intersection with any ROA, and are
not matched by any ROA and are not a more specific of any ROA cannot
be reliably classified as "invalid" in a partial deployment scenario,
and are therefore described as "unknown".
The match condition of a route object against a single ROA is
summarized in the following table:
Prefix matching non-matching
AS AS
+---------+-------------+
Covering | unknown | unknown |
Aggregate | | |
+---------+-------------+
match ROA | valid | invalid |
prefix | | |
+---------+-------------+
More | invalid | invalid |
Specific | | |
than ROA | | |
+---------+-------------+
In an environment of a collection of ROAs, a route object is
considered to be "valid" if any ROA provides a "valid" outcome, and
"invalid" if one or more ROAs provide an "invalid" outcome and no
ROAs provide a "valid" outcome. The "unknown" outcome occurs when no
ROA produces either a "valid" or an "invalid" outcome.
4.2. Disavowal of Routing Origination
A ROA is a positive attestation that a prefix holder has authorized A ROA is a positive attestation that a prefix holder has authorized
an AS to originate a route for this prefix into the inter-domain an AS to originate a route for this prefix into the inter-domain
routing system. It is possible for a prefix holder to attest that no routing system. It is possible for a prefix holder to construct an
AS has been granted any such authority by using a ROA where the ROA'S authorization where no valid AS has been granted any such authority
subject AS is one that will not be used in a routing context. to originate a route object for an address prefix. This is acheived
Specifically, AS 0 is reserved by the IANA such that it "may be use by using a ROA where the ROA's subject AS is one that must never be
[sic] to identify non-routed networks" [IANA.AS-Registry]. used in any routing context. Specifically, AS 0 is reserved by the
IANA such that it "may be use [sic] to identify non-routed networks"
[IANA.AS-Registry].
A ROA with a subject of AS 0 is an attestation by the holder of a A ROA with a subject of AS 0 is an attestation by the holder of a
prefix that the prefix described in the ROA, and any more specific prefix that the prefix described in the ROA, and any more specific
prefix, should not be used in a routing context. prefix, SHOULD NOT be used in a routing context.
The route object validation procedure, described in Section 2, will The route object validation procedure, described in Section 2, will
provide a "valid" outcome if any ROA matches the address prefix and provide a "valid" outcome if any ROA matches the address prefix and
origin AS, even if other valid ROAs would provide an "invalid" origin AS, even if other valid ROAs would provide an "invalid"
validation outcome if used in isolation. Consequently, an AS0 ROA validation outcome if used in isolation. Consequently, an AS 0 ROA
has a lower preference than any other ROA that has a routeable AS as has a lower preference than any other ROA that has a routeable AS as
its subject. This allows a prefix holder to use an AS0 ROA to its subject. This allows a prefix holder to use an AS 0 ROA to
declare a default condition that any route object that is equal to, declare a default condition that any route object that is equal to,
or more specific than the prefix to be considered to be invalid, or more specific than the prefix to be considered to be invalid,
while also allowing other concurrently issued ROAs to describe valid while also allowing other concurrently issued ROAs to describe valid
origination authorizations for more specific prefixes. origination authorizations for more specific prefixes.
For example, the holder of prefix 203.0.113.0/24 may wish to By convention, an AS 0 ROA SHOULD have a maxLength value of 32 for
authorise the origination of a route object of 203.0.113.196/26 by
64496, and explicitly declare that all other use of prefixes from
this block should be considered invalid. This could be achieved
through the issuing of a ROA for Address=203.0.113.0/24,
maxLength=32, AS = 0 and a second ROA for Address=203.0.113.196/26,
maxLength=26, AS=64496.
By convention, an AS 0 ROA should have a maxLength value of 32 for
IPv4 addresses and 128 for IPv6 addresses, although in terms of route IPv4 addresses and 128 for IPv6 addresses, although in terms of route
object validation the same outcome would be achieved with any valid object validation the same outcome would be achieved with any valid
maxLength value, or even if the maxLength element were to be omitted maxLength value, or even if the maxLength element were to be omitted
from the ROA. Also by convention, an AS 0 ROA should be the only ROA from the ROA.
issued for a given address prefix, although again this is not a
strict requirement. An AS 0 ROA can coexist with ROAs that have
different subject AS values, although in such cases the presence of
the AS 0 ROA does not alter the route object validation outcome in
any way.
4.3. BGP Considerations
This document provides a description of how ROAs could be used by a
BGP speaker.
It is noted that the proposed procedure requires no changes to the
operation of BGP. However, there are a number of considerations
about this approach to origination validation that are relevant to
the operation of a BGP speaker that are not specified here.
These considerations include: Also by convention, an AS 0 ROA SHOULD be the only ROA issued for a
given address prefix, although again this is not a strict
requirement. An AS 0 ROA can coexist with ROAs that have different
subject AS values, although in such cases the presence of the AS 0
ROA does not alter the route object validation outcome in any way.
* It is not specified when validation of an advertised prefix 5. Route Object Validation Lifetime
should be performed by a BGP speaker. It is considered to be a
matter of local policy whether it is strictly required to
perform validation at a point prior to loading the object into
the Adj-RIB-In structure [RFC4271], or once the object has been
loaded into Adj-RIB-In, or at a later time that is determined
by a local configuration setting. It is also not specified
whether origination validation should be performed each time a
route object is updated by a peer even when the origin AS has
not altered.
* The lifetime of a validation outcome is not specified here. The "lifetime" of a validation outcome refers to the time period
This specifically refers to the time period during which the during which the original validation outcome can be still applied.
original validation outcome can be still applied, at the The implicit assumption here is that when the validation lifetime
expiration of which the routing object should be re-tested for expires the routing object SHOULD be re-tested for validity.
validity. It is a matter of local policy setting as to whether
a validation outcome be regarded as valid until the route
object is withdrawn or further updated, or whether validation
of a route object should occur at more frequent intervals.
* It is a matter of local configuration as to whether ROA The validation lifetime for a ROA is controlled by the Valid times
validation is performed on a per-AS basis rather than a per-BGP specified in the End Entity (EE) Certificate used to sign the ROA,
speaker, and the appropriate mechanisms to support a de-coupled and the valid times of those certificates in the certification path
framework of validation of ROAs and the loading of outcomes used to validate the EE Certificate. A ROA validation "expires" at
into BGP speakers are not considered here. the Validity To field of the signing EE certificate, or at such a
time when there is no certification path that can validate the ROA.
A ROA issuer may prematurely invalidate a ROA by revoking the EE
certificate that was used to sign the ROA.
5. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
ROA issuers should be aware of the validation implication in issuing ROA issuers should be aware of the validation implication in issuing
a ROA, in that a ROA will implicitly invalidate all route objects for a ROA, in that a ROA implicitly invalidates all route objects that
more specific prefixes with a prefix length greater than maxLength, have more specific prefixes with a prefix length greater than
and all originating AS's other than the AS listed in the collection maxLength, and all originating AS's other than the AS listed in the
of ROAs. collection of ROAs for this prefix.
A conservative operational practice would be to ensure the issuing of A conservative operational practice would be to ensure the issuing of
ROAs for all more specific prefixes with distinct origination AS's ROAs for all more specific prefixes with distinct origination AS's
prior to the issuing of ROAs for larger encompassing address blocks, prior to the issuing of ROAs for larger encompassing address blocks,
in order to avoid inadvertent invalidation of valid route objects in order to avoid inadvertent invalidation of valid route objects
during ROA generation. during ROA generation.
ROA issuers should also be aware that if they generate a ROA for one ROA issuers should also be aware that if they generate a ROA for one
origin AS, then if the prefix is authorised by multiple AS's then origin AS, then if the prefix holder authorises multiple AS's to
ROAs should be generated for all such authorized AS's. originate route objects it is necessary for a ROA be generated for
every such authorized AS.
6. IANA Considerations
Dear IANA,
The AS number registry [IANA.AS-Registry] contains the following
annotation against AS 0: "may be use to identify non-routed
networks." Could you please add a 'd' as appropriate to this text?
Thank you,
the authors.
7. Change Log
Note: This section is NOT to be included in final version of this
document.
7.1. Changes -02 to -03
Further Considerations section now has a subsection describing the
assumptions that ROA validation is making about the precise nature of
partial deployment, noting that a ROA has an implicit scope of
application for all prefixes that are equal to or more specific than
the prefix listed in the ROA
Moved the table of validation outcomes from the Security
Considerations section to the section on Further Considerations.
Added consideration about disavowal and the use of an AS 0 ROA and
its interpretation in the context of validation of route objects, and
proposed conventions of use of an AS 0 ROA.
Noted hierarchical dependence of ROA issuance in the Security
Considerations section.
7.2. Changes -01 to -02
Following WG review of the means of specification of denial in 7. IANA Considerations
routing authorizations in the context of the RPKI at IETF 74 and IETF
75, it appears that there is no general WG support for the use of an
explicit denial object (termed a 'BOA'). The alternative approach,
explored in previous iterations of this draft, used a more restricted
interpretation of a ROA that yielded only "valid" or "unknown"
outcomes (by using "unknown" where "invalid" is used in this revision
of the document). To allow for "invalid" outcomes the draft used the
BOA to undertake the role of a 'disavow' constraint, where a route
object was considered to be "invalid" if it was the subject of a
valid BOA and was not considered to be "valid" by any valid ROA. The
reasons advanced to support the dropping of the BOA was the increased
complexity of RP systems through the use of a second object in route
validation, a potentially confusing mismatch in the interpretation
scope between the ROA and the BOA, where the ROAs scope was limited
to set of prefixes described in the ROA, while the BOA's scope
included all possible more specifics of the prefixes listed in the
BOA, and the ability to reconstruct the semantic equivalent of a BOA
through the use of a ROA that used a restricted-use AS as its asID.
Accordingly, this draft has been revised to remove all references to
the use of an explicit denial object and uses the implicit semantics
of denial in a ROA object.
There appears to be no WG interest in consideration of validation in [There are no IANA Considerations.]
a "linked" model, where a ROA is bound to the route object that it is
intended to validate. Accordingly this section of the text has also
been dropped from this version.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch (work in Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch (work in
progress), July 2009. progress), October 2009.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format] [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]
Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "An Infrastructure to Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "An Infrastructure to
Support Secure Internet Routing", Support Secure Internet Routing",
draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format (work in progress), July 2009. draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format (work in progress),
October 2009.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[IANA.AS-Registry] [IANA.AS-Registry]
IANA, "IANA Autonomous System Number Registry", IANA, "IANA Autonomous System Number Registry",
August 2009. March 2010.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Geoff Huston Geoff Huston
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email: gih@apnic.net Email: gih@apnic.net
George Michaelson George Michaelson
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email: ggm@apnic.net Email: ggm@apnic.net
 End of changes. 41 change blocks. 
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