draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-10.txt   rfc6483.txt 
Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) G. Huston Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) G. Huston
Internet-Draft G. Michaelson Request for Comments: 6483 G. Michaelson
Intended status: Informational APNIC Category: Informational APNIC
Expires: May 15, 2011 November 11, 2010 ISSN: 2070-1721 February 2012
Validation of Route Origination using the Resource Certificate PKI and Validation of Route Origination Using
ROAs the Resource Certificate Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and
draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-10.txt Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)
Abstract Abstract
This document defines the semantics of a Route Origin Authorization This document defines the semantics of a Route Origin Authorization
(ROA) in terms of the context of an application of the Resource (ROA) in terms of the context of an application of the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure to validate the origination of routes Public Key Infrastructure to validate the origination of routes
advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol. advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol.
Status of this Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
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working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
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approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 15, 2011. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6483.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction ....................................................2
2. ROA Validation Outcomes for a Route . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. ROA Validation Outcomes for a Route .............................3
3. Applying Validation Outcomes to Route Selection . . . . . . . . 6 3. Applying Validation Outcomes to Route Selection .................5
4. Disavowal of Routing Origination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Disavowal of Routing Origination ................................6
5. Route Validation Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Route Validation Lifetime .......................................6
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Security Considerations .........................................7
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Acknowledgements ................................................7
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8. References ......................................................8
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8.1. Normative References .......................................8
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8.2. Informative References .....................................8
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines the semantics of a Route Origin Authorization This document defines the semantics of a Route Origin Authorization
(ROA) in terms of the context of an application of the Resource (ROA) in terms of the context of an application of the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] to validate the Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480] to validate the
origination of routes advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) origination of routes advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
[RFC4271]. [RFC4271].
The RPKI is based on a hierarchy of Resource Certificates that are The RPKI is based on a hierarchy of resource certificates that are
aligned to the Internet number resource allocation structure. aligned to the Internet Number Resource allocation structure.
Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX Resource certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX
profile [RFC5280], and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS profile [RFC5280], and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS
identifiers [RFC3779]. A Resource Certificate describes an action by identifiers [RFC3779]. A resource certificate describes an action by
an issuer that binds a list of IP address blocks and Autonomous an issuer that binds a list of IP address blocks and Autonomous
System (AS) numbers to the Subject of a certificate, identified by System (AS) numbers to the subject of a certificate, identified by
the unique association of the Subject's private key with the public the unique association of the subject's private key with the public
key contained in the Resource Certificate. The RPKI is structured key contained in the resource certificate. The RPKI is structured
such that each current Resource Certificate matches a current such that each current resource certificate matches a current
resource allocation or assignment. This is further described in resource allocation or assignment. This is further described in
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]. [RFC6480].
ROAs are digitally signed objects that bind an address to an AS ROAs are digitally signed objects that bind an address to an AS
number, signed by the address holder. A ROA provides a means of number, and are signed by the address holder. A ROA provides a means
verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized a particular of verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized a
AS to originate routes in the inter-domain routing environment for particular AS to originate routes in the inter-domain routing
that address block. ROAs are described in environment for that address block. ROAs are described in [RFC6482].
[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]. ROAs are intended to fit within the ROAs are intended to fit within the requirements for adding security
requirements for adding security to inter-domain routing. to inter-domain routing.
This document describes the semantic interpretation of a ROA, with This document describes the semantic interpretation of a ROA, with
particular reference to application in inter-domain routing relating particular reference to application in inter-domain routing relating
to the origination of routes, and the intended scope of the authority to the origination of routes, and the intended scope of the authority
that is conveyed in the ROA. that is conveyed in the ROA.
2. ROA Validation Outcomes for a Route 2. ROA Validation Outcomes for a Route
A "route" is unit of information that associates a set of A "route" is unit of information that associates a set of
destinations described by an IP address prefix with a set of destinations described by an IP address prefix with a set of
attributes of a path to those destinations, as defined in section 1.1 attributes of a path to those destinations, as defined in Section 1.1
of [RFC4271]. of [RFC4271].
A route's "origin AS" is defined as follows: If the final path A route's "origin AS" is defined as follows: If the final path
segment of the AS_PATH is of type AS_SEQUENCE, the "origin AS" is the segment of the AS_PATH is of type AS_SEQUENCE, the origin AS is the
first element of the sequence (i.e. the AS in the rightmost position first element of the sequence (i.e., the AS in the rightmost position
with respect to the position of octets in the protocol message). If with respect to the position of octets in the protocol message). If
the AS_PATH contains a path segment of type AS_SET, indicating that the AS_PATH contains a path segment of type AS_SET, indicating that
the route is an aggregate, then the "origin AS" cannot be determined. the route is an aggregate, then the origin AS cannot be determined.
In terms of validation of a route in the context of a routing In terms of validation of a route in the context of a routing
environment, the address prefix value and the origin AS are used in environment, the address prefix value and the origin AS are used in
the ROA validation operation. the ROA validation operation.
It is assumed here that a Relying Party (RP) has access to a local It is assumed here that a relying party (RP) has access to a local
cache of the complete set of valid ROAs when performing validation of cache of the complete set of valid ROAs when performing validation of
a route. (Valid ROAs are defined as ROAs that are determined to be a route. (Valid ROAs are defined as ROAs that are determined to be
syntactically correct and are signed using a signature that can be syntactically correct and are signed using a signature that can be
verified using the RPKI, as described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format].) verified using the RPKI, as described in [RFC6482].) The RP needs to
The RP needs to match a route to one or more candidate valid ROAs in match a route to one or more valid candidate ROAs in order to
order to determine a validation outcome, which, in turn, can be used determine a validation outcome, which, in turn, can be used to
to determine the appropriate local actions to perform on the route. determine the appropriate local actions to perform on the route.
This approach to route origination validation uses a generic model of This approach to route origination validation uses a generic model of
"positive" attestation that has an associated inference that routes "positive" attestation that has an associated inference that routes
that cannot be validated within the RPKI framework would that cannot be validated within the RPKI framework would
conventionally be interpreted by an RP as "invalid". However, the conventionally be interpreted by an RP as "invalid". However, the
considerations of accommodating environments of partial adoption of considerations of accommodating environments of partial adoption of
the use of ROAs, where only a subset of validly advertised address the use of ROAs, where only a subset of validly advertised address
prefixes have associated published ROAs within the structure of the prefixes have associated published ROAs within the structure of the
RPKI, imply some modification to this model of positive attestation. RPKI, imply some modification to this model of positive attestation.
In the context of route validation it is assumed that once an address In the context of route validation, it is assumed that once an
prefix is described in a ROA, then this ROA specifically encompasses address prefix is described in a ROA, then this ROA specifically
all address prefixes that are more specific than that described in encompasses all address prefixes that are more specific than that
the ROA. Thus, any route for a more specific address prefix than described in the ROA. Thus, any route for a more specific address
that described by any valid ROA that does not itself have a matching prefix than that described by any valid ROA that does not itself have
valid ROA can be considered to be "invalid". However, routes objects a matching valid ROA can be considered "invalid". However, routes
for address prefixes that are not fully described by any single ROA, for address prefixes that are not fully described by any single ROA
i.e., those route objects whose address prefixes may be an aggregate (i.e., those routes whose address prefixes may be an aggregate of
of address prefixes described in a valid ROA, or have address address prefixes described in a valid ROA, or have address prefixes
prefixes where there is no intersection with any ROA, and are not where there is no intersection with any valid ROA), and are not
matched by any ROA and are not a more specific of any ROA, cannot be matched by any valid ROA and do not have an address prefix that is a
more specific address prefix described in any valid ROA, cannot be
reliably classified as "invalid" in a partial deployment scenario. reliably classified as "invalid" in a partial deployment scenario.
Such routes have a validation outcome of "unknown". Such routes have a validation outcome of "unknown".
An abstract attribute of a route can be determined as the outcome of An abstract attribute of a route can be determined as the outcome of
this validation procedure, namely a "validity state" this validation procedure, namely a "validity state" [BGP-PFX]. The
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. The "validity state" of a route, with validity state of a route, with a prefix and an origin AS as defined
a prefix and an origin AS as defined above, when using single ROA for above, when using single ROA for determining this validity state, is
determining this validity state is summarized in the following table: summarized in the following table:
Route matching non-matching Route matching non-matching
Prefix AS-> AS AS Prefix AS-> AS AS
V +---------+---------+ V +---------+---------+
Non- | unknown | unknown | Non- | unknown | unknown |
Intersecting | | | Intersecting | | |
+---------+---------+ +---------+---------+
Covering | unknown | unknown | Covering | unknown | unknown |
Aggregate | | | Aggregate | | |
+---------+---------+ +---------+---------+
match ROA | valid | invalid | match ROA | valid | invalid |
prefix | | | prefix | | |
+---------+---------+ +---------+---------+
More | | | More | | |
Specific | invalid | invalid | Specific | invalid | invalid |
than ROA | | | than ROA | | |
+---------+---------+ +---------+---------+
Route's Validity State Route's Validity State
In an environment of a collection of valid ROAs, a route's validity In an environment of a collection of valid ROAs, a route's validity
state is considered to be "valid" if any ROA provides a "valid" state is considered to be "valid" if any ROA provides a "valid"
outcome. It's validity state is considered to be "invalid" if one outcome. It's validity state is considered to be "invalid" if one
(or more) ROAs provide an "invalid" outcome and no ROAs provide a (or more) ROAs provide an "invalid" outcome and no ROAs provide a
"valid" outcome. Its validity state is considered to be "unknown" "valid" outcome. Its validity state is considered to be "unknown"
(or, synonymously, "not found" [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] when no (or, synonymously, "not found" [BGP-PFX]) when no valid ROA can
valid ROA can produce either a "valid" or an "invalid" validity state produce either a "valid" or an "invalid" validity state outcome.
outcome.
A route validity state is defined by the following procedure: A route validity state is defined by the following procedure:
1. Select all valid ROAs that include a ROAIPAddress value that 1. Select all valid ROAs that include a ROAIPAddress value that
either matches, or is a covering aggregate of, the address either matches, or is a covering aggregate of, the address
prefix in the route. This selection forms the set of prefix in the route. This selection forms the set of
"candidate ROAs." "candidate ROAs".
2. If the set of candidate ROAs is empty, then the procedure 2. If the set of candidate ROAs is empty, then the procedure stops
stops with an outcome of "unknown" (or, synonymously, "not with an outcome of "unknown" (or, synonymously, "not found", as
found", as used in [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]). used in [BGP-PFX]).
3. If the route's origin AS can be determined and any of the set 3. If the route's origin AS can be determined and any of the set
of candidate ROAs has an asID value that matches the origin AS of candidate ROAs has an asID value that matches the origin AS
in the route, and the route's address prefix matches a in the route, and the route's address prefix matches a
ROAIPAddress in the ROA (where "match" is defined as where the ROAIPAddress in the ROA (where "match" is defined as where the
route's address precisely matches the ROAIPAddress, or where route's address precisely matches the ROAIPAddress, or where
the ROAIPAddress includes a maxLength element, and the route's the ROAIPAddress includes a maxLength element, and the route's
address prefix is a more specific prefix of the ROAIPAddress, address prefix is a more specific prefix of the ROAIPAddress,
and the route's address prefix length value is less than or and the route's address prefix length value is less than or
equal to the ROAIPAddress maxLength value) then the procedure equal to the ROAIPAddress maxLength value), then the procedure
halts with an outcome of "valid". halts with an outcome of "valid".
4. Otherwise, the procedure halts with an outcome of "invalid". 4. Otherwise, the procedure halts with an outcome of "invalid".
3. Applying Validation Outcomes to Route Selection 3. Applying Validation Outcomes to Route Selection
Within the framework of the abstract model of the operation of inter- Within the framework of the abstract model of the operation of inter-
domain routing using BGP [RFC4271], a received prefix announcement domain routing using BGP [RFC4271], a received prefix announcement
from a routing peer is compared to all announcements for this prefix from a routing peer is compared to all announcements for this prefix
received from other routing peers and a route selection procedure is received from other routing peers, and a route selection procedure is
used to select the "best" route from this candidate set. used to select the "best" route from this candidate set.
The route's validity state, described in Section 2, of "valid", The route's validity state, described in Section 2, of "valid",
"invalid" or "unknown" may be used as part of the determination of "invalid", or "unknown" may be used as part of the determination of
the local degree of preference, in which case the local order of the local degree of preference, in which case the local order of
preference is as follows: preference is as follows:
"valid" is to be preferred over "valid" is to be preferred over
"unknown", which is to be preferred over "unknown", which is to be preferred over
"invalid". "invalid".
It is a matter of local routing policy as to the actions to be It is a matter of local routing policy as to the actions to be
undertaken by a routing entity in processing those routes with undertaken by a routing entity in processing those routes with
"unknown" validity states. Due to considerations of partial use of "unknown" validity states. Due to considerations of partial use of
ROAs in heterogeneous environments, such as in the public Internet, ROAs in heterogeneous environments, such as in the public Internet,
it is advised that local policy settings should not result in it is advised that local policy settings should not result in
"unknown" validity state outcomes being considered as sufficient "unknown" validity state outcomes being considered as sufficient
skipping to change at page 6, line 32 skipping to change at page 5, line 37
"unknown", which is to be preferred over "unknown", which is to be preferred over
"invalid". "invalid".
It is a matter of local routing policy as to the actions to be It is a matter of local routing policy as to the actions to be
undertaken by a routing entity in processing those routes with undertaken by a routing entity in processing those routes with
"unknown" validity states. Due to considerations of partial use of "unknown" validity states. Due to considerations of partial use of
ROAs in heterogeneous environments, such as in the public Internet, ROAs in heterogeneous environments, such as in the public Internet,
it is advised that local policy settings should not result in it is advised that local policy settings should not result in
"unknown" validity state outcomes being considered as sufficient "unknown" validity state outcomes being considered as sufficient
grounds to reject a route outright from further consideration as a grounds to reject a route outright from further consideration as a
local "best" route. local best route.
It is a matter of local routing policy as to whether routes with an It is a matter of local routing policy as to whether routes with an
"invalid" validity state are considered to be ineligible for further "invalid" validity state are considered to be ineligible for further
consideration in a route selection process. A possible consideration consideration in a route selection process. Potential circular
here is one of potential circularity of dependence: If the dependence is a consideration here: if the authoritative publication
authoritative publication point of the repository of ROAs, or that of point of the repository of ROAs, or that of any certificate used in
any certificate used in relation to an address prefix, is located at relation to an address prefix, is located at an address that lies
an address that lies within the address prefix described in a ROA, within the address prefix described in a ROA, then the repository can
then the repository can only be accessed by the RP once a route for only be accessed by the RP once a route for the prefix has been
the prefix has been accepted by the RP's local routing domain. It is accepted by the RP's local routing domain. It is also noted that the
also noted that the propagation time of RPKI objects may be different propagation time of RPKI objects may be different to the propagation
to the propagation time of routes, and that routes may be learned by time of routes, and that routes may be learned by an RP's routing
an RP's routing system before the RP's local RPKI repository cache system before the RP's local RPKI repository cache picks up the
picks up the associated ROAs and recognises them as having a validity associated ROAs and recognizes them as having a validity state of
state of "valid" within the RPKI. "valid" within the RPKI.
4. Disavowal of Routing Origination 4. Disavowal of Routing Origination
A ROA is a positive attestation that a prefix holder has authorized A ROA is a positive attestation that a prefix holder has authorized
an AS to originate a route for this prefix into the inter-domain an AS to originate a route for this prefix into the inter-domain
routing system. It is possible for a prefix holder to construct an routing system. It is possible for a prefix holder to construct an
authorization where no valid AS has been granted any such authority authorization where no valid AS has been granted any such authority
to originate a route for an address prefix. This is achieved by to originate a route for an address prefix. This is achieved by
using a ROA where the ROA's subject AS is one that must not be used using a ROA where the ROA's subject AS is one that must not be used
in any routing context. Specifically, AS 0 is reserved by the IANA in any routing context. Specifically, AS 0 is reserved by the IANA
such that it may be used to identify non-routed networks such that it may be used to identify non-routed networks [IANA-AS].
[IANA.AS-Registry].
A ROA with a subject of AS 0 (AS0-ROA) is an attestation by the A ROA with a subject of AS 0 (AS 0 ROA) is an attestation by the
holder of a prefix that the prefix described in the ROA, and any more holder of a prefix that the prefix described in the ROA, and any more
specific prefix, should not be used in a routing context. specific prefix, should not be used in a routing context.
The route validation procedure, described in Section 2, will provide The route validation procedure, described in Section 2, will provide
a "valid" outcome if any ROA matches the address prefix and origin a "valid" outcome if any ROA matches the address prefix and origin
AS, even if other valid ROAs would provide an "invalid" validation AS, even if other valid ROAs would provide an "invalid" validation
outcome if used in isolation. Consequently, an AS0-ROA has a lower outcome if used in isolation. Consequently, an AS 0 ROA has a lower
relative preference than any other ROA that has a routable AS as its relative preference than any other ROA that has a routable AS as its
subject. This allows a prefix holder to use an AS0-ROA to declare a subject. This allows a prefix holder to use an AS 0 ROA to declare a
default condition that any route that is equal to, or more specific default condition that any route that is equal to or more specific
than the prefix to be considered to be invalid, while also allowing than the prefix to be considered "invalid", while also allowing other
other concurrently issued ROAs to describe valid origination concurrently issued ROAs to describe valid origination authorizations
authorizations for more specific prefixes. for more specific prefixes.
By convention, an AS0-ROA should have a maxLength value of 32 for By convention, an AS 0 ROA should have a maxLength value of 32 for
IPv4 addresses and a maxlength value of 128 for IPv6 addresses, IPv4 addresses and a maxlength value of 128 for IPv6 addresses;
although in terms of route validation the same outcome would be although, in terms of route validation, the same outcome would be
achieved with any valid maxLength value, or even if the maxLength achieved with any valid maxLength value, or even if the maxLength
element were to be omitted from the ROA. element were to be omitted from the ROA.
Also by convention, an AS0-ROA should be the only ROA issued for a Also by convention, an AS 0 ROA should be the only ROA issued for a
given address prefix, although again this is not a strict given address prefix; although again, this is not a strict
requirement. An AS0-ROA MAY coexist with ROAs that have different requirement. An AS 0 ROA may coexist with ROAs that have different
subject AS values, although in such cases the presence or otherwise subject AS values; although in such cases, the presence or lack of
of the AS0-ROA does not alter the route's validity state in any way. presence of the AS 0 ROA does not alter the route's validity state in
any way.
5. Route Validation Lifetime 5. Route Validation Lifetime
The "lifetime" of a validation outcome refers to the time period The "lifetime" of a validation outcome refers to the time period
during which the original validation outcome can be still applied. during which the original validation outcome can be still applied.
The implicit assumption here is that when the validation lifetime The implicit assumption here is that when the validation lifetime
expires the routing object should be re-tested for validity. "expires", the route should be re-tested for validity.
The validation lifetime for a ROA is controlled by the Valid times The validation lifetime for a ROA is controlled by the Valid times
specified in the End Entity (EE) Certificate used to sign the ROA, specified in the end-entity (EE) certificate used to sign the ROA,
and the valid times of those certificates in the certification path and the valid times of those certificates in the certification path
used to validate the EE Certificate. A ROA validation "expires" at used to validate the EE certificate. A ROA validation expires at the
the Validity To field of the signing EE certificate, or at such a notAfter field of the signing EE certificate, or at such a time when
time when there is no certification path that can validate the ROA. there is no certification path that can validate the ROA. A ROA
A ROA issuer may elect to prematurely invalidate a ROA by revoking issuer may elect to prematurely invalidate a ROA by revoking the EE
the EE certificate that was used to sign the ROA. certificate that was used to sign the ROA.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
ROA issuers should be aware of the validation implication in issuing ROA issuers should be aware of the validation implication in issuing
a ROA, in that a ROA implicitly invalidates all routes that have more a ROA, in that a ROA implicitly invalidates all routes that have more
specific prefixes with a prefix length greater than maxLength, and specific prefixes with a prefix length greater than maxLength, and
all originating AS's other than the AS listed in the collection of all originating AS's other than the AS listed in the collection of
ROAs for this prefix. ROAs for this prefix.
A conservative operational practice would be to ensure the issuing of A conservative operational practice would be to ensure the issuing of
ROAs for all more specific prefixes with distinct origination AS's ROAs for all more specific prefixes with distinct origination ASes
prior to the issuing of ROAs for larger encompassing address blocks, prior to the issuing of ROAs for larger encompassing address blocks,
in order to avoid inadvertent invalidation of valid routes during ROA in order to avoid inadvertent invalidation of valid routes during ROA
generation. generation.
ROA issuers should also be aware that if they generate a ROA for one ROA issuers should also be aware that if they generate a ROA for one
origin AS, then if the address prefix holder authorises multiple AS's origin AS, then if the address prefix holder authorizes multiple ASes
to originate routes for a given address prefix, then is necessary for to originate routes for a given address prefix, then is necessary for
a ROA be generated for every such authorized AS. a ROA be generated for every such authorized AS.
7. IANA Considerations 7. Acknowledgements
[There are no IANA Considerations.]
8. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful contributions of The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful contributions of
John Scudder and Stephen Kent in preparing this document, and also John Scudder and Stephen Kent in preparing this document, and also
the contributions of many members of the SIDR Working Group in the contributions of many members of the SIDR working group in
response to presentations of this material in SIDR WG sessions. The response to presentations of this material in SIDR WG sessions. The
authors also acknowledge prior work undertaken by Tony Bates, Randy authors also acknowledge prior work undertaken by Tony Bates, Randy
Bush, Tony Li, and Yakov Rekhter as the validation outcomes described Bush, Tony Li, and Yakov Rekhter as the validation outcomes described
here reflect the authentication outcomes and semantics of origin AS here reflect the authentication outcomes and semantics of origin AS
verification described in [exI-D.bates]. A number of validation verification described in [NLRI-ORIG]. A number of validation
concepts relating to a route's "validity state" presented in concepts relating to a route's validity state presented in [BGP-PFX],
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate], edited by Pradosh Mohapatra et al, have edited by Pradosh Mohapatra, et al., have be used in this document.
be used in this document.
9. References 8. References
9.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch (work in
progress), October 2009.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format] [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "An Infrastructure to Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January
Support Secure Internet Routing", 2006.
draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format (work in progress),
October 2009.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
9.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] [BGP-PFX] Mohapatra, P., Ed., Scudder, J., Ed., Ward, D., Ed.,
Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. Bush, R., Ed., and R. Austein, Ed., "BGP Prefix Origin
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", Validation", Work in Progress, October 2011.
draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-00 (work in progress),
July 2010.
[IANA.AS-Registry] [IANA-AS] IANA, "Autonomous System (AS) Numbers",
IANA, "IANA Autonomous System Number Registry", http://http://www.iana.org/assignments/as-numbers
March 2010.
[exI-D.bates] [NLRI-ORIG] Bates, T., Bush, R., Li, T., and Y. Rekhter, "DNS-based
Bates, T., Bush, R., Li, T., and Y. Rekhter, "DNS-based NLRI origin AS verification in BGP", Work in Progress,
NLRI origin AS verification in BGP", January 1998.
draft-bates-bgp4-nlri-orig-verif-00.txt (work in
progress), January 1998.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Geoff Huston Geoff Huston
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre APNIC
Email: gih@apnic.net EMail: gih@apnic.net
George Michaelson George Michaelson
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre APNIC
Email: ggm@apnic.net EMail: ggm@apnic.net
 End of changes. 62 change blocks. 
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