draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-algs-01.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-algs-02.txt 
SIDR G. Huston SIDR G. Huston
Internet-Draft APNIC Internet-Draft APNIC
Intended status: Informational May 16, 2010 Intended status: Standards Track October 8, 2010
Expires: November 17, 2010 Expires: April 11, 2011
A Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for use in the Resource Public A Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for use in the Resource Public
Key Infrastructure Key Infrastructure
draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-algs-01.txt draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-algs-02.txt
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a profile for the algorithm and key size to be This document defines a profile for the algorithm and key size to be
used for signatures applied to certificates, Certificate Revocation used for signatures applied to certificates, Certificate Revocation
Lists, and signed objects in the context of the Resource Public Key Lists, and signed objects in the context of the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure. Infrastructure.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 17, 2010. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 11, 2011.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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Lists (CRLs), and signed objects in the context of the Resource Lists (CRLs), and signed objects in the context of the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]. Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch].
This section of the profile is specified in a distinct profile This section of the profile is specified in a distinct profile
document, referenced by the RPKI Certificate Policy (CP) document, referenced by the RPKI Certificate Policy (CP)
[I-D.ietf-sidr-cp] and the RPKI Certificate Profile [I-D.ietf-sidr-cp] and the RPKI Certificate Profile
[I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs], in order to allow for a degree of [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs], in order to allow for a degree of
algorithm and key agility in the RPKI, while permitting some longer algorithm and key agility in the RPKI, while permitting some longer
term stability in the CP and Certificate Profile specifications. term stability in the CP and Certificate Profile specifications.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
2. Algorithm and Key Size 2. Algorithm and Key Size
This profile specifies the use of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 [RFC3447] with This profile specifies the use of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 [RFC3447] with
the SHA-256 hash algorithm to compute the signature of certificates, the SHA-256 hash algorithm to compute the signature of certificates,
CRLs, and signed objects in the context of the RPKI. Accordingly, CRLs, and signed objects in the context of the RPKI. Accordingly,
the OID value in the RPKI for such signatures MUST be the OID value in the RPKI for such signatures MUST be
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3. Future Upates 3. Future Upates
It is anticipated that the RPKI will require the adoption of updated It is anticipated that the RPKI will require the adoption of updated
key sizes and a different set of signature and hash algorithms over key sizes and a different set of signature and hash algorithms over
time, in order to maintain an acceptable level of cryptographic time, in order to maintain an acceptable level of cryptographic
security to protect the integrity of signed products in the RPKI. security to protect the integrity of signed products in the RPKI.
This profile should be updated to specify such future requirements, This profile should be updated to specify such future requirements,
as and when appropriate. as and when appropriate.
CAs and RPs should be capable of supporting a transition to allow for CAs and RPs SHOULD be capable of supporting a transition to allow for
the phased introduction of additional encryption algorithms and key the phased introduction of additional encryption algorithms and key
specifications, and also accomodate the orderly deprecation of specifications, and also accomodate the orderly deprecation of
previously specified algorithms and keys. Accordingly, CAs and RPs previously specified algorithms and keys. Accordingly, CAs and RPs
SHOULD be capable of supporting multiple RPKI algorithm and key SHOULD be capable of supporting multiple RPKI algorithm and key
profiles simultaneously within the scope of such anticipated profiles simultaneously within the scope of such anticipated
transitions. transitions. The recommended procedures to implement such a
transition of key sizes and algorithms is not specified in this
Note: This document specifies the current algorithm requirements for document.
the RPKI. The document acknowledges a requirement for algorithm
agility, both in terms of larger key sizes in conjunction with the
current algorithms, and transition to other algorithms. It is noted
that the SIDR architecture is one where each CA is required to
generate signed material that may be validated by the entire
collection of Relying Parties. This architectural requirement
precludes the use of any negotiation between a CA and a RP as to the
algorithm to use for signed products in the RPKI. This constraint
implies that any transition of key size or algorithm will require a
phased approach with the concurrent support of both old and new
algorithms until such time as it is deemed that all RPs can support
the new algorithm. Given that there is no accommodation for multiple
signature algorithms in the current collection of RPKI
specifications, either the colelction of RPKI specifications will
require subsequent revision to support the use of multiple signature
algorithms within the specifications of signed objects in the RPKI,
which itself poses a transition issue, or all such form of algorithm
transition will require the construction and operation of a parallel
RPKI structure that is entirely distinct from the "current" RPKI
structure by virtue of its exclusive use of a "new" algorithm for
signature generation. The latter option, that of the concurrent
operation of parallel RPKI structures, poses some complex issues in
terms of synchronisation of actions across the set of RPKI CAs, as
well as issues of consistency and coherency in the operation of
multiple parallel RPKI frameworks, as well as the uncertainties
associated with a global determination of when any such transition
can be considered "complete". The alternate approach, of allowing
multiple signature algorithms in the RPKI certificate profile, and in
the specification of CMS signatures as used in manifests, ROAS, other
signed objects, and in the provisioning protocol, allows for
algorithm transition to occur within a single RPKI framework, and
allows for individual CAs to commence use of multiple algorithms in a
piecemeal fashion without reliance on the algorithm transition of the
immediate superior CA and without a forced synchronisation of
algorithm transition with subordinate CAs. In the light of this
consideration, this document recommends the comprehensive revision of
the existing RPKI specification and architecture documents to include
provision for multiple signatures with multiple algorithms in order
to support an orderly transition to longer key sizes and to other
signature algorithms in the RPKI.
4. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
The Security Considerations of [RFC3779], [RFC5280], and [RFC4055] The Security Considerations of [RFC3779], [RFC5280], and [RFC4055]
apply to signatures as defined by this profile, and their use. apply to signatures as defined by this profile, and their use.
Algorithm transition poses some particular security issues, relating
to potential vulnerabilities in the parallel operation of an RPKI
framework where a potentially compromised algorithm remains in use
beyond a reasonable time for retirement. These issues should be
considered in detail in a future version of this document.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
[There are no IANA considerations in this document.] [There are no IANA considerations in this document.]
6. Acknowledgments 6. Acknowledgments
The author acknowledges the re-use in this draft of material The author acknowledges the re-use in this draft of material
originally contained in working drafts the RPKI Certificate Policy originally contained in working drafts the RPKI Certificate Policy
and Resource Certificate profile documents. The co-authors of these and Resource Certificate profile documents. The co-authors of these
two documents, namely Stephen Kent, Derrick Kong, Karen Seo, Ronald two documents, namely Stephen Kent, Derrick Kong, Karen Seo, Ronald
Watro, George Michaelson and Robert Loomans, are acknowledged with Watro, George Michaelson and Robert Loomans, are acknowledged, with
thanks. The constraint on key size noted in this profile is the thanks. The constraint on key size noted in this profile is the
outcome of comments from Stephen Kent and review comments from David outcome of comments from Stephen Kent and review comments from David
Cooper. Cooper.
7. Normative References 7. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch (work in Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch (work in
progress), July 2009. progress), July 2009.
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June 2005. June 2005.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
Author's Address Author's Address
Geoff Huston Geoff Huston
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre APNIC
Email: gih@apnic.net Email: gih@apnic.net
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