draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-00.txt   draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-01.txt 
Network Working Group A. Azimov Network Working Group A. Azimov
Internet-Draft Yandex Internet-Draft Yandex
Intended status: Standards Track E. Uskov Intended status: Standards Track E. Uskov
Expires: November 18, 2019 Qrator Labs Expires: May 7, 2020 Qrator Labs
R. Bush R. Bush
Internet Initiative Japan Internet Initiative Japan
K. Patel K. Patel
Arrcus Arrcus
J. Snijders J. Snijders
NTT NTT
R. Housley R. Housley
Vigil Security Vigil Security
May 17, 2019 November 4, 2019
A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization
draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-00 draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-01
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for Autonomous System This document defines a standard profile for Autonomous System
Provider Authorization in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure. An Provider Authorization in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure. An
Autonomous System Provider Authorization is a digitally signed object Autonomous System Provider Authorization is a digitally signed object
that provides a means of verifying that a Customer Autonomous System that provides a means of verifying that a Customer Autonomous System
holder has authorized a Provider Autonomous System to be its upstream holder has authorized members of Provider set to be its upstream
provider and for the Provider to send prefixes received from the providers and for the Providers to send prefixes received from the
Customer Autonomous System in all directions including providers and Customer Autonomous System in all directions including providers and
peers. peers.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
skipping to change at page 2, line 10 skipping to change at page 2, line 10
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 18, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on May 7, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 35 skipping to change at page 2, line 35
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. The ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. The ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. The ASPA eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. The ASPA eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. AFI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. AFI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. customerASID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.3. customerASID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.4. providerASID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.4. providerASSET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. ASPA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. ASPA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. ASN.1 Module for the ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. ASN.1 Module for the ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
is to improve routing security. (See [RFC6480] for more is to improve routing security. (See [RFC6480] for more
information.) As part of this infrastructure, a mechanism is needed information.) As part of this infrastructure, a mechanism is needed
to verify that a Provider AS (PAS) has permission from a Customer AS to verify that a AS has permission from a Customer AS (CAS) holder to
(CAS) holder to send routes in all directions. The digitally signed send routes in all directions. The digitally signed Autonomous
Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object provides this System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object provides this
verification mechanism. verification mechanism.
The ASPA uses the template for RPKI digitally signed objects The ASPA uses the template for RPKI digitally signed objects
[RFC6488], which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC6488], which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
[RFC5652] wrapper for the ASPA content as well as a generic [RFC5652] wrapper for the ASPA content as well as a generic
validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. As ASPAs need to be validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. As ASPAs need to be
validated with RPKI certificates issued by the current validated with RPKI certificates issued by the current
infrastructure, we assume the mandatory-to-implement algorithms in infrastructure, we assume the mandatory-to-implement algorithms in
[RFC6485], or its successor. [RFC6485], or its successor.
skipping to change at page 3, line 41 skipping to change at page 3, line 41
The content-type for an ASPA is defined as id-cct-ASPA, which has the The content-type for an ASPA is defined as id-cct-ASPA, which has the
numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.TBD. This OID MUST appear numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.TBD. This OID MUST appear
both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo structure as both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo structure as
well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo
structure (see [RFC6488]). structure (see [RFC6488]).
3. The ASPA eContent 3. The ASPA eContent
The content of an ASPA identifies the Customer AS (CAS) as well as The content of an ASPA identifies the Customer AS (CAS) as well as
the Provider AS (PAS) that is authorized to further propagate the Set of Provider ASes (SPAS) that are authorized to further
announcements received from the customer. If customer has multiple propagate announcements received from the customer. If customer has
providers, it issues multiple ASPAs, one for each provider AS. An multiple providers they SHOULD be registered in a single ASPA object.
ASPA is formally defined as: An ASPA is formally defined as:
ct-ASPA CONTENT-TYPE ::= ct-ASPA CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ ASProviderAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASPA } { ASProviderAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASPA }
id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct TBD } id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct TBD }
ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE { ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] ASPAVersion DEFAULT v0, version [0] ASPAVersion DEFAULT v0,
AFI AddressFamilyIdentifier, AFI AddressFamilyIdentifier,
customerASID ASID, customerASID ASID,
providerASID ASID } providerASSET SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ASID }
ASPAVersion ::= INTEGER { v0(0) } ASPAVersion ::= INTEGER { v0(0) }
AddressFamilyIdentifier ::= INTEGER AddressFamilyIdentifier ::= INTEGER
ASID ::= INTEGER ASID ::= INTEGER
Note that this content appears as the eContent within the Note that this content appears as the eContent within the
encapContentInfo as specified in [RFC6488]. encapContentInfo as specified in [RFC6488].
skipping to change at page 4, line 39 skipping to change at page 4, line 39
3.2. AFI 3.2. AFI
The AFI field contains Address Family Identifier for which the The AFI field contains Address Family Identifier for which the
relation between customer and provider ASes is authorized. Presently relation between customer and provider ASes is authorized. Presently
defined values for the Address Family Identifier field are specified defined values for the Address Family Identifier field are specified
in the IANA's Address Family Numbers registry [IANA-AF]. in the IANA's Address Family Numbers registry [IANA-AF].
3.3. customerASID 3.3. customerASID
The customerASID field contains the AS number of the Autonomous The customerASID field contains the AS number of the Autonomous
System that authorizes an upstream provider (listed in the System that authorizes an upstream providers (listed in the
providerASId) to propagate prefixes in the specified address family providerASSET) to propagate prefixes in the specified address family
other ASes. other ASes.
3.4. providerASID 3.4. providerASSET
The providerASID contains the AS number that is authorized to further The providerASSET contains the sequence (set) of AS numbers that are
propagate announcements in the specified address family received from authorized to further propagate announcements in the specified
the customer. address family received from the customer.
4. ASPA Validation 4. ASPA Validation
Before a relying party can use an ASPA to validate a routing Before a relying party can use an ASPA to validate a routing
announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ASPA object announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ASPA object
itself. To validate an ASPA, the relying party MUST perform all the itself. To validate an ASPA, the relying party MUST perform all the
validation checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following validation checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following
additional ASPA-specific validation step. additional ASPA-specific validation step.
o The autonomous system identifier delegation extension [RFC3779] is o The autonomous system identifier delegation extension [RFC3779] is
skipping to change at page 6, line 36 skipping to change at page 6, line 36
id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct TBD } id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct TBD }
ct-ASPA CONTENT-TYPE ::= ct-ASPA CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ TYPE ASProviderAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASPA } { TYPE ASProviderAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASPA }
ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE { ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] ASPAVersion DEFAULT v0, version [0] ASPAVersion DEFAULT v0,
AFI AddressFamilyIdentifier, AFI AddressFamilyIdentifier,
customerASID ASID, customerASID ASID,
providerASID ASID } providerASSET SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ASID }
ASPAVersion ::= INTEGER { v0(0) } ASPAVersion ::= INTEGER { v0(0) }
AddressFamilyIdentifier ::= INTEGER AddressFamilyIdentifier ::= INTEGER
ASID ::= INTEGER ASID ::= INTEGER
END END
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
 End of changes. 13 change blocks. 
22 lines changed or deleted 22 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.47. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/