--- 1/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-00.txt 2019-11-04 12:13:29.723098271 -0800 +++ 2/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-01.txt 2019-11-04 12:13:29.743098779 -0800 @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ Network Working Group A. Azimov Internet-Draft Yandex Intended status: Standards Track E. Uskov -Expires: November 18, 2019 Qrator Labs +Expires: May 7, 2020 Qrator Labs R. Bush Internet Initiative Japan K. Patel Arrcus J. Snijders NTT R. Housley Vigil Security - May 17, 2019 + November 4, 2019 A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization - draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-00 + draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-01 Abstract This document defines a standard profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure. An Autonomous System Provider Authorization is a digitally signed object that provides a means of verifying that a Customer Autonomous System - holder has authorized a Provider Autonomous System to be its upstream - provider and for the Provider to send prefixes received from the + holder has authorized members of Provider set to be its upstream + providers and for the Providers to send prefixes received from the Customer Autonomous System in all directions including providers and peers. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. @@ -43,21 +43,21 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on November 18, 2019. + This Internet-Draft will expire on May 7, 2020. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents @@ -68,39 +68,39 @@ described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. The ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. The ASPA eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.1. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. AFI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.3. customerASID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 3.4. providerASID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 3.4. providerASSET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. ASPA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. ASN.1 Module for the ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1. Introduction The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is to improve routing security. (See [RFC6480] for more information.) As part of this infrastructure, a mechanism is needed - to verify that a Provider AS (PAS) has permission from a Customer AS - (CAS) holder to send routes in all directions. The digitally signed - Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object provides this + to verify that a AS has permission from a Customer AS (CAS) holder to + send routes in all directions. The digitally signed Autonomous + System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object provides this verification mechanism. The ASPA uses the template for RPKI digitally signed objects [RFC6488], which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] wrapper for the ASPA content as well as a generic validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. As ASPAs need to be validated with RPKI certificates issued by the current infrastructure, we assume the mandatory-to-implement algorithms in [RFC6485], or its successor. @@ -123,35 +123,35 @@ The content-type for an ASPA is defined as id-cct-ASPA, which has the numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.TBD. This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo structure as well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo structure (see [RFC6488]). 3. The ASPA eContent The content of an ASPA identifies the Customer AS (CAS) as well as - the Provider AS (PAS) that is authorized to further propagate - announcements received from the customer. If customer has multiple - providers, it issues multiple ASPAs, one for each provider AS. An - ASPA is formally defined as: + the Set of Provider ASes (SPAS) that are authorized to further + propagate announcements received from the customer. If customer has + multiple providers they SHOULD be registered in a single ASPA object. + An ASPA is formally defined as: ct-ASPA CONTENT-TYPE ::= { ASProviderAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASPA } id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct TBD } ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE { version [0] ASPAVersion DEFAULT v0, AFI AddressFamilyIdentifier, customerASID ASID, - providerASID ASID } + providerASSET SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ASID } ASPAVersion ::= INTEGER { v0(0) } AddressFamilyIdentifier ::= INTEGER ASID ::= INTEGER Note that this content appears as the eContent within the encapContentInfo as specified in [RFC6488]. @@ -162,29 +162,29 @@ 3.2. AFI The AFI field contains Address Family Identifier for which the relation between customer and provider ASes is authorized. Presently defined values for the Address Family Identifier field are specified in the IANA's Address Family Numbers registry [IANA-AF]. 3.3. customerASID The customerASID field contains the AS number of the Autonomous - System that authorizes an upstream provider (listed in the - providerASId) to propagate prefixes in the specified address family + System that authorizes an upstream providers (listed in the + providerASSET) to propagate prefixes in the specified address family other ASes. -3.4. providerASID +3.4. providerASSET - The providerASID contains the AS number that is authorized to further - propagate announcements in the specified address family received from - the customer. + The providerASSET contains the sequence (set) of AS numbers that are + authorized to further propagate announcements in the specified + address family received from the customer. 4. ASPA Validation Before a relying party can use an ASPA to validate a routing announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ASPA object itself. To validate an ASPA, the relying party MUST perform all the validation checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following additional ASPA-specific validation step. o The autonomous system identifier delegation extension [RFC3779] is @@ -219,21 +219,21 @@ id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct TBD } ct-ASPA CONTENT-TYPE ::= { TYPE ASProviderAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASPA } ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE { version [0] ASPAVersion DEFAULT v0, AFI AddressFamilyIdentifier, customerASID ASID, - providerASID ASID } + providerASSET SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ASID } ASPAVersion ::= INTEGER { v0(0) } AddressFamilyIdentifier ::= INTEGER ASID ::= INTEGER END 6. IANA Considerations