draft-ietf-sidrops-bgpsec-algs-rfc8208-bis-05.txt   rfc8608.txt 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Turner Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Turner
Internet-Draft sn3rd Request for Comments: 8608 sn3rd
Obsoletes: 8208 (if approved) O. Borchert Obsoletes: 8208 O. Borchert
Intended status: Standards Track NIST Updates: 7935 NIST
Expires: October 17, 2019 April 15, 2019 Category: Standards Track June 2019
ISSN: 2070-1721
BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, and Signature Formats BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, and Signature Formats
draft-ietf-sidrops-bgpsec-algs-rfc8208-bis-05
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies the algorithms, algorithm parameters, This document specifies the algorithms, algorithm parameters,
asymmetric key formats, asymmetric key sizes, and signature formats asymmetric key formats, asymmetric key sizes, and signature formats
used in BGPsec (Border Gateway Protocol Security). This document used in BGPsec (Border Gateway Protocol Security). This document
obsoletes RFC 8208 ("BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, and Signature updates RFC 7935 ("The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use
Formats") by adding Documentation Algorithm IDs, Experimentation in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure") and obsoletes RFC 8208
Algorithm IDs, correcting the range of unassigned algorithms IDs to ("BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, and Signature Formats") by adding
fill the complete range, and restructured the document for better Documentation and Experimentation Algorithm IDs, correcting the range
reading. of unassigned algorithms IDs to fill the complete range, and
restructuring the document for better reading.
This document also includes example BGPsec UPDATE messages as well as This document also includes example BGPsec UPDATE messages as well as
the private keys used to generate the messages and the certificates the private keys used to generate the messages and the certificates
necessary to validate those signatures. necessary to validate those signatures.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 2, 2018 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8608.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Changes from RFC 8208 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Changes from RFC 8208 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Algorithm ID Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Algorithm ID Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Signature Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.2. Signature Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.1. Algorithm ID 0x01 (1) - (ECDSA-P256) . . . . . . . . . 6 2.2.1. Algorithm ID 0x01 (1) - (ECDSA P-256) . . . . . . . . 6
3. Asymmetric Key Pair Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Asymmetric Key Pair Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Asymmetric Key Pair for Algorithm ID 0x01 (1) - 3.1. Asymmetric Key Pair for Algorithm ID 0x01 (1) - (ECDSA
(ECDSA-P256) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 P-256) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.1. Public Key Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.1. Public Key Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.2. Private Key Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1.2. Private Key Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Signature Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Signature Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Additional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Additional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.1. Topology and Experiment Description . . . . . . . . . . . 13 A.1. Topology and Experiment Description . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.2. Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 A.2. Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.3. BGPsec IPv4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 A.3. BGPsec IPv4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.4. BGPsec IPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 A.4. BGPsec IPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document specifies the following: This document specifies the following:
o the digital signature algorithm and parameters, o the digital signature algorithm and parameters,
o the hash algorithm and parameters, o the hash algorithm and parameters,
o the algorithm identifier assignment and classification, o the algorithm identifier assignment and classification,
skipping to change at page 3, line 36 skipping to change at page 3, line 36
This document updates [RFC7935] to add support for a) a different This document updates [RFC7935] to add support for a) a different
algorithm for BGPsec certificate requests, which are issued only by algorithm for BGPsec certificate requests, which are issued only by
BGPsec speakers; b) a different Subject Public Key Info format for BGPsec speakers; b) a different Subject Public Key Info format for
BGPsec certificates, which is needed for the specified BGPsec BGPsec certificates, which is needed for the specified BGPsec
signature algorithm; and c) different signature formats for BGPsec signature algorithm; and c) different signature formats for BGPsec
signatures, which are needed for the specified BGPsec signature signatures, which are needed for the specified BGPsec signature
algorithm. The BGPsec certificates are differentiated from other algorithm. The BGPsec certificates are differentiated from other
RPKI certificates by the use of the BGPsec Extended Key Usage as RPKI certificates by the use of the BGPsec Extended Key Usage as
defined in [RFC8209]. BGPsec uses a different algorithm [RFC6090] defined in [RFC8209]. BGPsec uses a different algorithm [RFC6090]
[DSS] as compared to the rest of the RPKI that provides similar [DSS] from the rest of the RPKI to provide similar security with
security with smaller keys making the certificates smaller; these smaller keys, making the certificates smaller; these algorithms also
algorithms also result in smaller signatures, which makes the PDUs result in smaller signatures, which make the PDUs smaller.
smaller.
Appendix A (non-normative) contains example BGPsec UPDATE messages as Appendix A (non-normative) contains example BGPsec UPDATE messages as
well as the private keys used to generate the messages and the well as the private keys used to generate the messages and the
certificates necessary to validate the signatures. certificates necessary to validate the signatures.
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
1.2. Changes from RFC 8208 1.2. Changes from RFC 8208
This section describes the significant changes between [RFC8208] and This section describes the significant changes between [RFC8208] and
this document. this document.
o Added Section 2.1 of algorithm ID types. Also, the interpretation o Added Section 2.1 containing Algorithm ID types. Also, the
of these IDs is described. interpretation of these IDs is described.
o Restructured Sections 2 and 3 to align with the corresponding o Restructured Sections 2 and 3 to align with the corresponding
algorithm suite identifier value. algorithm suite identifier value.
o Correction of range for unassigned algorithm suite identifier o Corrected the range for unassigned algorithm suite identifier
values. values.
o Adding of Documentation algorithm suite identifier values. o Added Documentation algorithm suite identifier values.
o Adding of Experimentation algorithm suite identifier values. o Added Experimentation algorithm suite identifier values.
o Changed Next-HOP IP in Appendix A's IPv6 Example to use private o Changed the next-hop IP in Appendix A's IPv6 example to use a
usage IPv6 address. private usage IPv6 address.
2. Algorithms 2. Algorithms
The algorithms used to compute signatures on CA certificates, BGPsec The algorithms used to compute signatures on CA certificates, BGPsec
Router Certificates, and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are as Router Certificates, and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are as
specified in Section 2 of [RFC7935]. This section addresses BGPsec specified in Section 2 of [RFC7935]. This section addresses
algorithms used by BGPsec [RFC8205] [DSS]. For example, these algorithms used by BGPsec [RFC8205] [DSS]. For example, these
algorithms are used by BGPsec routers to sign and verify BGPsec algorithms are used by BGPsec routers to sign and verify BGPsec
UPDATE messages. To identify which algorithm is used, the BGPsec UPDATE messages. To identify which algorithm is used, the BGPsec
UPDATE message contains the corresponding algorithm ID in each UPDATE message contains the corresponding algorithm ID in each
Signature_Block of the BGPsec UPDATE message. Signature_Block of the BGPsec UPDATE message.
2.1. Algorithm ID Types 2.1. Algorithm ID Types
Algorithms in BGPsec UPDATE messages are identified by the Algorithm Algorithms in BGPsec UPDATE messages are identified by the Algorithm
Suite Identifier field (Algorithm ID) within the Signature_Block (see Suite Identifier field (algorithm ID) within the Signature_Block (see
Section 3.2 of [RFC8205]). Section 3.2 of [RFC8205]).
This document specifies five types of algorithm IDs: This document specifies five types of Algorithm IDs:
o Reserved Algorithm ID o Reserved Algorithm ID
Reserved algorithm IDs are the values 0x00 (0) and 0xFF (255). Reserved algorithm IDs are the values 0x00 (0) and 0xFF (255).
These IDs MUST NOT be used in a Signature_Block and if These IDs MUST NOT be used in a Signature_Block, and if
encountered, the router MUST treat BGPsec UPDATE messages as encountered, the router MUST treat BGPsec UPDATE messages as
Malformed [RFC4271]. malformed [RFC4271].
o Signature Algorithm ID o Signature Algorithm ID
Signature algorithms are defined in Section 2.2 of this document. Signature algorithms are defined in Section 2.2 of this document.
Processing of BGPsec UPDATE signing and validation using signature Processing of BGPsec UPDATE signing and validation using signature
algorithms is described in length in Section 4.2 and Section 5.2 algorithms is described at length in Sections 4.2 and 5.2 of
of [RFC8205]. [RFC8205].
o Unassigned Algorithm ID o Unassigned Algorithm ID
This type of algorithm ID is free for future assignments and MUST This type of Algorithm ID is free for future assignments and MUST
NOT be used until an algorithm is officially assigned (see NOT be used until an algorithm is officially assigned (see
Section 7). In case a router encounters an unassigned algorithm Section 7). In case a router encounters an unassigned algorithm
ID in one of the Signature_Blocks of a BGPsec UPDATE message, the ID in one of the Signature_Blocks of a BGPsec UPDATE message, the
router SHOULD process the Signature_Block as router SHOULD process the Signature_Block as an unsupported
"unsupported algorithm" as specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC8205]. algorithm as specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC8205].
o Experimentation Algorithm ID o Experimentation Algorithm ID
Experimentation algorithm IDs span from 0xF7 (247) to 0xFA (250). Experimentation algorithm IDs span from 0xF7 (247) to 0xFA (250).
To allow experimentation to accurately describe deployment To allow experimentation to accurately describe deployment
examples, the use of publicly assigned algorithm IDs is examples, the use of publicly assigned algorithm IDs is
inappropriate, and a reserved block of Experimentation algorithm inappropriate, and a reserved block of Experimentation algorithm
IDs is required. This ensures that experimentation does not clash IDs is required. This ensures that experimentation does not clash
with assigned algorithm IDs in deployed networks, and mitigates with assigned algorithm IDs in deployed networks and mitigates the
the risks to operational integrity of the network through risks to operational integrity of the network through
inappropriate use of experimentation to perform literal inappropriate use of experimentation to perform literal
configuration of routing elements on production systems. A router configuration of routing elements on production systems. A router
that encounters an algorithm ID of this type outside of an that encounters an algorithm ID of this type outside of an
experimental network, SHOULD treat it the same as experimental network SHOULD treat it the same as an unsupported
"unsupported algorithm" as specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC8205]. algorithm as specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC8205].
o Documentation Algorithm ID o Documentation Algorithm ID
Documentation algorithm IDs span from 0xFB (251) to 0xFE (254). Documentation algorithm IDs span from 0xFB (251) to 0xFE (254).
To allow documentation to accurately describe deployment examples, To allow documentation to accurately describe deployment examples,
the use of publicly assigned algorithm IDs is inappropriate, and a the use of publicly assigned algorithm IDs is inappropriate, and a
reserved block of Documentation algorithm IDs is required. This reserved block of Documentation algorithm IDs is required. This
ensures that documentation does not clash with assigned algorithm ensures that documentation does not clash with assigned algorithm
IDs in deployed networks, and mitigates the risks to operational IDs in deployed networks and mitigates the risks to operational
integrity of the network through inappropriate use of integrity of the network through inappropriate use of
documentation to perform literal configuration of routing elements documentation to perform literal configuration of routing elements
on production systems. A router that encounters an algorithm ID on production systems. A router that encounters an algorithm ID
of this type SHOULD treat it the same as "unsupported algorithm" of this type SHOULD treat it the same as an unsupported algorithm
as specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC8205]. as specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC8205].
2.2. Signature Algorithms 2.2. Signature Algorithms
2.2.1. Algorithm ID 0x01 (1) - (ECDSA-P256) 2.2.1. Algorithm ID 0x01 (1) - (ECDSA P-256)
o The signature algorithm used MUST be the Elliptic Curve Digital o The signature algorithm used MUST be the Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with curve P-256 [RFC6090] [DSS]. Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with curve P-256 [RFC6090] [DSS].
o The hash algorithm used MUST be SHA-256 [SHS]. o The hash algorithm used MUST be SHA-256 [SHS].
Hash algorithms are not identified by themselves in certificates or Hash algorithms are not identified by themselves in certificates or
BGPsec UPDATE messages. They are represented by an OID that combines BGPsec UPDATE messages. They are represented by an OID that combines
the hash algorithm with the digital signature algorithm as follows: the hash algorithm with the digital signature algorithm as follows:
skipping to change at page 6, line 35 skipping to change at page 6, line 35
identifier value 0x01 (1) (see Section 7) is included in the identifier value 0x01 (1) (see Section 7) is included in the
Signature_Block List's Algorithm Suite Identifier field. Signature_Block List's Algorithm Suite Identifier field.
3. Asymmetric Key Pair Formats 3. Asymmetric Key Pair Formats
The key formats used to compute signatures on CA certificates, BGPsec The key formats used to compute signatures on CA certificates, BGPsec
Router Certificates, and CRLs are as specified in Section 3 of Router Certificates, and CRLs are as specified in Section 3 of
[RFC7935]. This section addresses key formats found in the BGPsec [RFC7935]. This section addresses key formats found in the BGPsec
Router Certificate requests and in BGPsec Router Certificates. Router Certificate requests and in BGPsec Router Certificates.
3.1. Asymmetric Key Pair for Algorithm ID 0x01 (1) - (ECDSA-P256) 3.1. Asymmetric Key Pair for Algorithm ID 0x01 (1) - (ECDSA P-256)
The ECDSA private keys used to compute signatures for certificate The ECDSA private keys used to compute signatures for certificate
requests and BGPsec UPDATE messages MUST be associated with the P-256 requests and BGPsec UPDATE messages MUST be associated with the P-256
curve domain parameters [RFC5480]. The public key pair MUST use the elliptic curve domain parameters [RFC5480]. The public key pair MUST
uncompressed form. use the uncompressed form.
3.1.1. Public Key Format 3.1.1. Public Key Format
The Subject's public key is included in subjectPublicKeyInfo The Subject's public key is included in subjectPublicKeyInfo
[RFC5280]. It has two sub-fields: algorithm and subjectPublicKey. [RFC5280]. It has two sub-fields: algorithm and subjectPublicKey.
The values for the structures and their sub-structures follow: The values for the structures and their sub-structures follow:
o algorithm (an AlgorithmIdentifier type): The id-ecPublicKey OID o algorithm (an AlgorithmIdentifier type): The id-ecPublicKey OID
MUST be used in the algorithm field, as specified in Section 2.1.1 MUST be used in the algorithm field, as specified in Section 2.1.1
of [RFC5480]. The value for the associated parameters MUST be of [RFC5480]. The value for the associated parameters MUST be
skipping to change at page 8, line 8 skipping to change at page 7, line 44
[RFC7935], and [RFC8209] apply to certificates. The security [RFC7935], and [RFC8209] apply to certificates. The security
considerations of [RFC3279], [RFC6090], [RFC7935], and [RFC8209] considerations of [RFC3279], [RFC6090], [RFC7935], and [RFC8209]
apply to certification requests. The security considerations of apply to certification requests. The security considerations of
[RFC3279], [RFC6090], and [RFC8205] apply to BGPsec UPDATE messages. [RFC3279], [RFC6090], and [RFC8205] apply to BGPsec UPDATE messages.
No new security considerations are introduced as a result of this No new security considerations are introduced as a result of this
specification. specification.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) has created the The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) has created the
"BGPsec Algorithm Suite Registry" in the Resource Public Key "BGPsec Algorithm Suites" registry in the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) group. The one-octet "BGPsec Algorithm Suite Infrastructure (RPKI) group. The one-octet algorithm suite
Registry" identifiers assigned by IANA identify the digest algorithm identifiers assigned by IANA identify the digest algorithm and
and signature algorithm used in the BGPsec Signature_Block List's signature algorithm used in the BGPsec Signature_Block List's
Algorithm Suite Identifier field. Algorithm Suite Identifier field.
[RFC8208] directed IANA to register a single algorithm suite Per [RFC8208], IANA registered a single algorithm suite identifier
identifier for the digest algorithm SHA-256 [SHS] and for the for the digest algorithm SHA-256 [SHS] and for the signature
signature algorithm ECDSA on the P-256 curve [RFC6090] [DSS]. This algorithm ECDSA on the P-256 curve [RFC6090] [DSS]. This identifier
identifier is still valid, and IANA has updated registration to refer is still valid, and IANA has updated the registration to refer to
to this document. this document.
IANA is asked to modify the previously registered "Unassigned"
address space.
Algorithm Digest Signature Specification
Suite Algorithm Algorithm Pointer
Identifier
+------------+---------------+--------------+-----------------------+
| 0x2-0xEF | Unassigned | Unassigned | |
+------------+---------------+--------------+-----------------------+
To be modified to: IANA has modified the range of the "Unassigned" address space from
"0x2-0xEF" to "0x02-0xF6":
Algorithm Digest Signature Specification Algorithm Digest Signature Specification
Suite Algorithm Algorithm Pointer Suite Algorithm Algorithm Pointer
Identifier Identifier
+------------+---------------+--------------+-----------------------+ +------------+---------------+--------------+-----------------------+
| 0x02-0xF6 | Unassigned | Unassigned | | | 0x02-0xF6 | Unassigned | Unassigned | |
+------------+---------------+--------------+-----------------------+ +------------+---------------+--------------+-----------------------+
In addition IANA is asked to register the following address space for In addition, IANA has registered the following address spaces for
"Documentation" and "Experimentation": "Experimentation" and "Documentation":
Algorithm Digest Signature Specification Algorithm Digest Signature Specification
Suite Algorithm Algorithm Pointer Suite Algorithm Algorithm Pointer
Identifier Identifier
+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+ +------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
| 0xF7-0xFA | Experimentation | Experimentation | This Document | | 0xF7-0xFA | Experimentation | Experimentation | This document |
+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+ +------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
| 0xFB-0xFE | Documentation | Documentation | This Document | | 0xFB-0xFE | Documentation | Documentation | This document |
+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+ +------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
After the requested modification, the "BGPsec Algorithm Suite
Registry" in the RPKI group should contain the following values:
BGPsec Algorithm Suite Registry The "BGPsec Algorithm Suites" registry in the RPKI group now contains
the following values:
Algorithm Digest Signature Specification Algorithm Digest Signature Specification
Suite Algorithm Algorithm Pointer Suite Algorithm Algorithm Pointer
Identifier Identifier
+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+ +------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
| 0x00 | Reserved | Reserved | This document | | 0x00 | Reserved | Reserved | This document |
+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+ +------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
| 0x01 | SHA-256 | ECDSA P-256 | [SHS] [DSS] | | 0x01 | SHA-256 | ECDSA P-256 | [SHS] [DSS] |
| | | | [RFC6090] | | | | | [RFC6090] |
| | | | This document | | | | | This document |
+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+ +------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
| 0x02-0xF6 | Unassigned | Unassigned | | | 0x02-0xF6 | Unassigned | Unassigned | |
+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+ +------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
| 0xF7-0xFA | Experimentation | Experimentation | This Document | | 0xF7-0xFA | Experimentation | Experimentation | This document |
+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+ +------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
| 0xFB-0xFE | Documentation | Documentation | This Document | | 0xFB-0xFE | Documentation | Documentation | This document |
+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+ +------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
| 0xFF | Reserved | Reserved | This document | | 0xFF | Reserved | Reserved | This document |
+------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+ +------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
Future assignments are to be made using the Standards Action process Future assignments are to be made using the Standards Action process
defined in [RFC8126]. Assignments consist of the one-octet algorithm defined in [RFC8126]. Assignments consist of the one-octet algorithm
suite identifier value and the associated digest algorithm name and suite identifier value and the associated digest algorithm name and
signature algorithm name. signature algorithm name.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
skipping to change at page 10, line 10 skipping to change at page 9, line 14
Future assignments are to be made using the Standards Action process Future assignments are to be made using the Standards Action process
defined in [RFC8126]. Assignments consist of the one-octet algorithm defined in [RFC8126]. Assignments consist of the one-octet algorithm
suite identifier value and the associated digest algorithm name and suite identifier value and the associated digest algorithm name and
signature algorithm name. signature algorithm name.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, DOI Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
editor.org/info/rfc2986>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and [RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>. 2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, DOI Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
editor.org/info/rfc4211>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, DOI Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
editor.org/info/rfc4271>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk, [RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009, Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.
[RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic [RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090, DOI Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090,
10.17487/RFC6090, February 2011, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC6090, February 2011,
editor.org/info/rfc6090>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6090>.
[RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility [RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility
Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, DOI 10.17487/RFC6916, April (RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, DOI 10.17487/RFC6916, April
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6916>. 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6916>.
[RFC7935] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, Ed., "The Profile for [RFC7935] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, Ed., "The Profile for
Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public
Key Infrastructure", RFC 7935, DOI 10.17487/RFC7935, Key Infrastructure", RFC 7935, DOI 10.17487/RFC7935,
August 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7935>. August 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7935>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc- May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed., and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol [RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>. 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.
[RFC8208] Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key [RFC8208] Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key
Formats, and Signature Formats", RFC 8208, DOI Formats, and Signature Formats", RFC 8208,
10.17487/RFC8208, September 2017, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC8208, September 2017,
editor.org/info/rfc8208>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8208>.
[RFC8209] Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for [RFC8209] Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
and Certification Requests", RFC 8209, DOI and Certification Requests", RFC 8209,
10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017,
editor.org/info/rfc8209>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8209>.
[DSS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital [DSS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)", NIST FIPS Publication 186-4, Signature Standard (DSS)", NIST FIPS Publication 186-4,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4, July 2013, DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4, July 2013,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/ <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf>. NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf>.
[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure [SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard (SHS)", NIST FIPS Publication 180-4, Hash Standard (SHS)", NIST FIPS Publication 180-4,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4, August 2015, DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4, August 2015,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/ <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf>. NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf>.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[RFC5398] Huston, G., "Autonomous System (AS) Number Reservation for [RFC5398] Huston, G., "Autonomous System (AS) Number Reservation for
Documentation Use", RFC 5398, DOI 10.17487/RFC5398, Documentation Use", RFC 5398, DOI 10.17487/RFC5398,
December 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5398>. December 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5398>.
[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature [RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
skipping to change at page 13, line 15 skipping to change at page 12, line 15
Appendix A. Examples Appendix A. Examples
A.1. Topology and Experiment Description A.1. Topology and Experiment Description
Topology: Topology:
AS(64496)----AS(65536)----AS(65537) AS(64496)----AS(65536)----AS(65537)
Prefix Announcement: AS(64496), 192.0.2.0/24, 2001:db8::/32 Prefix Announcement: AS(64496), 192.0.2.0/24, 2001:db8::/32
The signature algorithm used in this example is ECDSA P-256 using the The signature algorithm used in this example is ECDSA P-256, using
algorithm suite identifier ID 0x01 (1) as specified in Section 7 of the algorithm suite identifier ID 0x01 (1) as specified in Section 7
this document. of this document.
A.2. Keys A.2. Keys
For this example, the ECDSA algorithm was provided with a static k to For this example, the ECDSA algorithm was provided with a static k to
make the result deterministic. make the result deterministic.
The k used for all signature operations was taken from [RFC6979], The k used for all signature operations was taken from [RFC6979],
Appendix A.2.5, "Signatures With SHA-256, message = 'sample'". Appendix A.2.5, "Signatures With SHA-256, message = 'sample'".
Note: Even though the certificates below are expired, the are still Note: Even though the certificates below are expired, they are still
useful within the constraint of this document. useful within the constraint of this document.
k = A6E3C57DD01ABE90086538398355DD4C k = A6E3C57DD01ABE90086538398355DD4C
3B17AA873382B0F24D6129493D8AAD60 3B17AA873382B0F24D6129493D8AAD60
Keys of AS64496: Keys of AS64496:
================ ================
ski: AB4D910F55CAE71A215EF3CAFE3ACC45B5EEC154 ski: AB4D910F55CAE71A215EF3CAFE3ACC45B5EEC154
private key: private key:
skipping to change at page 23, line 13 skipping to change at page 21, line 13
55058E8053F4ACD3 55058E8053F4ACD3
Acknowledgements Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Geoff Huston and George Michaelson for The authors wish to thank Geoff Huston and George Michaelson for
producing [RFC7935], which this document is entirely based on. The producing [RFC7935], which this document is entirely based on. The
authors would also like to thank Roque Gagliano, David Mandelberg, authors would also like to thank Roque Gagliano, David Mandelberg,
Tom Petch, Sam Weiler, and Stephen Kent for their reviews and Tom Petch, Sam Weiler, and Stephen Kent for their reviews and
comments. Mehmet Adalier, Kotikalapudi Sriram, and Doug Montgomery comments. Mehmet Adalier, Kotikalapudi Sriram, and Doug Montgomery
were instrumental in developing the test vectors found in Appendix A. were instrumental in developing the test vectors found in Appendix A.
Additionally we want to thank Geoff Huston, author of [RFC5398] from Additionally, we want to thank Geoff Huston, author of [RFC5398] from
where we borrowed wording for Section 2.1 of this document. which we borrowed wording for Section 2.1 of this document.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Sean Turner Sean Turner
sn3rd sn3rd
Email: sean@sn3rd.com Email: sean@sn3rd.com
Oliver Borchert Oliver Borchert
NIST NIST
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