draft-ietf-sidrops-https-tal-05.txt   draft-ietf-sidrops-https-tal-06.txt 
Network Working Group G. Huston Network Working Group G. Huston
Internet-Draft APNIC Internet-Draft APNIC
Obsoletes: 7730 (if approved) S. Weiler Obsoletes: 7730 (if approved) S. Weiler
Intended status: Standards Track W3C/MIT Intended status: Standards Track W3C/MIT
Expires: April 14, 2019 G. Michaelson Expires: July 27, 2019 G. Michaelson
APNIC APNIC
S. Kent S. Kent
Unaffiliated Unaffiliated
T. Bruijnzeels T. Bruijnzeels
NLnet Labs NLnet Labs
October 11, 2018 January 23, 2019
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor Locator Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor Locator
draft-ietf-sidrops-https-tal-05 draft-ietf-sidrops-https-tal-06
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) for the Resource This document defines a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) for the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). This document obsoletes RFC 7730 Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). TALs allow Relying Parties in the
by adding support for HTTPS URIs in a TAL. RPKI to download the current Trust Anchor (TA) CA certificate from
one or more locations, and verify that the key of this self-signed
certificate matches the key on the TAL. Thus, Relying Parties can be
configured with TA keys, but allow these TAs to change the content of
their CA certificate. In particular it allows TAs to change the set
of Internet Number Resources included in the RFC3779 extension of
their certificate.
This document obsoletes the previous definition of Trust Anchor
Locators in RFC 7730 by adding support for HTTPS URIs.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 14, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on July 27, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Trust Anchor Locator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Trust Anchor Locator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Trust Anchor Locator Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2.1. Trust Anchor Locator Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. TAL and Trust Anchor Certificate Considerations . . . . . 4 2.2. Trust Anchor Locator File Format . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.3. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3. TAL and Trust Anchor Certificate Considerations . . . . . 4
3. Relying Party Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.4. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. HTTPS Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Relying Party Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. HTTPS Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) for the Resource This document defines a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) for the Resource
skipping to change at page 2, line 46 skipping to change at page 3, line 13
a TAL. a TAL.
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD, The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD,
SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this
document, are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document, are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Trust Anchor Locator 2. Trust Anchor Locator
2.1. Trust Anchor Locator Format 2.1. Trust Anchor Locator Motivation
This document does not propose a new format for trust anchor This document does not propose a new format for trust anchor
material. A trust anchor in the RPKI is represented by a self-signed material. A trust anchor in the RPKI is represented by a self-signed
X.509 Certification Authority (CA) certificate, a format commonly X.509 Certification Authority (CA) certificate, a format commonly
used in PKIs and widely supported by RP software. This document used in PKIs and widely supported by RP software. This document
specifies a format for data used to retrieve and verify the specifies a format for data used to retrieve and verify the
authenticity of a trust anchor in a very simple fashion. That data authenticity of a trust anchor in a very simple fashion. That data
is referred to as the TAL. is referred to as the TAL.
The motivation for defining the TAL is to enable selected data in the The motivation for defining the TAL is to enable selected data in the
skipping to change at page 3, line 31 skipping to change at page 3, line 46
The TAL is analogous to the TrustAnchorInfo data structure specified The TAL is analogous to the TrustAnchorInfo data structure specified
in [RFC5914], which is on the Standards Track. That specification in [RFC5914], which is on the Standards Track. That specification
could be used to represent the TAL, if one defined an rsync or HTTPS could be used to represent the TAL, if one defined an rsync or HTTPS
URI extension for that data structure. However, the TAL format was URI extension for that data structure. However, the TAL format was
adopted by RPKI implementors prior to the PKIX trust anchor work, and adopted by RPKI implementors prior to the PKIX trust anchor work, and
the RPKI implementer community has elected to utilize the TAL format, the RPKI implementer community has elected to utilize the TAL format,
rather than define the requisite extension. The community also rather than define the requisite extension. The community also
prefers the simplicity of the ASCII encoding of the TAL, versus the prefers the simplicity of the ASCII encoding of the TAL, versus the
binary (ASN.1) encoding for TrustAnchorInfo. binary (ASN.1) encoding for TrustAnchorInfo.
2.2. Trust Anchor Locator File Format
In this document we define a Trust Anchor URI as a URI that can be
used to retrieved a current Trust Anchor certificate. This URI MUST
be either an rsync URI [RFC5781], or an HTTPS URI [RFC7230].
The TAL is an ordered sequence of: The TAL is an ordered sequence of:
1. an optional comment section consisting of one or more lines 1. an optional comment section consisting of one or more lines each
starting with the '#' character, containing human readable starting with the '#' character, followed by human readable
informational ASCII text, followed by an empty line using a informational UTF-8 text, and ending with a line break,
"<CRLF>" or "<LF>" line break only.
2. a URI section, 2. a URI section, that is comprised of one or more ordered lines,
each containing a Trust Anchor URI, and ending with a line break,
3. a "<CRLF>" or "<LF>" line break, 3. a line break,
4. a subjectPublicKeyInfo [RFC5280] in DER format [X.509], encoded 4. a subjectPublicKeyInfo [RFC5280] in DER format [X.509], encoded
in Base64 (see Section 4 of [RFC4648]). To avoid long lines, in Base64 (see Section 4 of [RFC4648]). To avoid long lines,
"<CRLF>" or "<LF>" line breaks MAY be inserted into the line breaks MAY be inserted into the Base64-encoded string.
Base64-encoded string.
where the URI section is comprised or one of more of the ordered
sequence of:
2.1. either an rsync URI [RFC5781], or an HTTPS URI [RFC7230] Note that line breaks in this file can use either "<CRLF>" or "<LF>".
2.2. a "<CRLF>" or "<LF>" line break.
2.2. TAL and Trust Anchor Certificate Considerations 2.3. TAL and Trust Anchor Certificate Considerations
Each URI in the TAL MUST reference a single object. It MUST NOT Each Trust Anchor URI in the TAL MUST reference a single object. It
reference a directory or any other form of collection of objects. MUST NOT reference a directory or any other form of collection of
objects.
The referenced object MUST be a self-signed CA certificate that The referenced object MUST be a self-signed CA certificate that
conforms to the RPKI certificate profile [RFC6487]. This certificate conforms to the RPKI certificate profile [RFC6487]. This certificate
is the trust anchor in certification path discovery [RFC4158] and is the trust anchor in certification path discovery [RFC4158] and
validation [RFC5280] [RFC3779]. validation [RFC5280] [RFC3779].
The validity interval of this trust anchor SHOULD reflect the The validity interval of this trust anchor SHOULD reflect the
anticipated period of stability of the particular set of INRs that anticipated period of stability of the particular set of INRs that
are associated with the putative trust anchor. are associated with the putative trust anchor.
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Because the trust anchor is a self-signed certificate, there is no Because the trust anchor is a self-signed certificate, there is no
corresponding CRL that can be used to revoke it, nor is there a corresponding CRL that can be used to revoke it, nor is there a
manifest [RFC6486] that lists this certificate. manifest [RFC6486] that lists this certificate.
If an entity wishes to withdraw a self-signed CA certificate as a If an entity wishes to withdraw a self-signed CA certificate as a
putative trust anchor, for any reason, including key rollover, the putative trust anchor, for any reason, including key rollover, the
entity MUST remove the object from the location referenced in the entity MUST remove the object from the location referenced in the
TAL. TAL.
Where the TAL contains two or more URIs, then the same self- signed Where the TAL contains two or more Trust Anchor URIs, then the same
CA certificate MUST be found at each referenced location. In order self-signed CA certificate MUST be found at each referenced location.
to increase operational resilience, it is RECOMMENDED that the domain In order to increase operational resilience, it is RECOMMENDED that
name parts of each of these URIs resolve to distinct IP addresses the domain name parts of each of these URIs resolve to distinct IP
that are used by a diverse set of repository publication points, and addresses that are used by a diverse set of repository publication
these IP addresses be included in distinct Route Origin points, and these IP addresses be included in distinct Route Origin
Authorizations (ROAs) objects signed by different CAs. Authorizations (ROAs) objects signed by different CAs.
2.3. Example 2.4. Example
# This TAL is intended for documentation purposes only. # This TAL is intended for documentation purposes only.
# Do not attempt to use this in a production setting. # Do not attempt to use this in a production setting.
rsync://rpki.example.org/rpki/hedgehog/root.cer rsync://rpki.example.org/rpki/hedgehog/root.cer
https://rpki.example.org/rpki/hedgehog/root.cer https://rpki.example.org/rpki/hedgehog/root.cer
MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAovWQL2lh6knDx MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAovWQL2lh6knDx
GUG5hbtCXvvh4AOzjhDkSHlj22gn/1oiM9IeDATIwP44vhQ6L/xvuk7W6 GUG5hbtCXvvh4AOzjhDkSHlj22gn/1oiM9IeDATIwP44vhQ6L/xvuk7W6
Kfa5ygmqQ+xOZOwTWPcrUbqaQyPNxokuivzyvqVZVDecOEqs78q58mSp9 Kfa5ygmqQ+xOZOwTWPcrUbqaQyPNxokuivzyvqVZVDecOEqs78q58mSp9
nbtxmLRW7B67SJCBSzfa5XpVyXYEgYAjkk3fpmefU+AcxtxvvHB5OVPIa nbtxmLRW7B67SJCBSzfa5XpVyXYEgYAjkk3fpmefU+AcxtxvvHB5OVPIa
BfPcs80ICMgHQX+fphvute9XLxjfJKJWkhZqZ0v7pZm2uhkcPx1PMGcrG BfPcs80ICMgHQX+fphvute9XLxjfJKJWkhZqZ0v7pZm2uhkcPx1PMGcrG
ee0WSDC3fr3erLueagpiLsFjwwpX6F+Ms8vqz45H+DKmYKvPSstZjCCq9 ee0WSDC3fr3erLueagpiLsFjwwpX6F+Ms8vqz45H+DKmYKvPSstZjCCq9
aJ0qANT9OtnfSDOS+aLRPjZryCNyvvBHxZXqj5YCGKtwIDAQAB aJ0qANT9OtnfSDOS+aLRPjZryCNyvvBHxZXqj5YCGKtwIDAQAB
skipping to change at page 5, line 43 skipping to change at page 6, line 10
nbtxmLRW7B67SJCBSzfa5XpVyXYEgYAjkk3fpmefU+AcxtxvvHB5OVPIa nbtxmLRW7B67SJCBSzfa5XpVyXYEgYAjkk3fpmefU+AcxtxvvHB5OVPIa
BfPcs80ICMgHQX+fphvute9XLxjfJKJWkhZqZ0v7pZm2uhkcPx1PMGcrG BfPcs80ICMgHQX+fphvute9XLxjfJKJWkhZqZ0v7pZm2uhkcPx1PMGcrG
ee0WSDC3fr3erLueagpiLsFjwwpX6F+Ms8vqz45H+DKmYKvPSstZjCCq9 ee0WSDC3fr3erLueagpiLsFjwwpX6F+Ms8vqz45H+DKmYKvPSstZjCCq9
aJ0qANT9OtnfSDOS+aLRPjZryCNyvvBHxZXqj5YCGKtwIDAQAB aJ0qANT9OtnfSDOS+aLRPjZryCNyvvBHxZXqj5YCGKtwIDAQAB
3. Relying Party Use 3. Relying Party Use
In order to use the TAL to retrieve and validate a (putative) trust In order to use the TAL to retrieve and validate a (putative) trust
anchor, an RP SHOULD: anchor, an RP SHOULD:
1. Retrieve the object referenced by (one of) the URI(s) contained 1. Retrieve the object referenced by (one of) the Trust Anchor
in the TAL. URI(s) contained in the TAL.
2. Confirm that the retrieved object is a current, self-signed RPKI 2. Confirm that the retrieved object is a current, self-signed RPKI
CA certificate that conforms to the profile as specified in CA certificate that conforms to the profile as specified in
[RFC6487]. [RFC6487].
3. Confirm that the public key in the TAL matches the public key in 3. Confirm that the public key in the TAL matches the public key in
the retrieved object. the retrieved object.
4. Perform other checks, as deemed appropriate (locally), to ensure 4. Perform other checks, as deemed appropriate (locally), to ensure
that the RP is willing to accept the entity publishing this self- that the RP is willing to accept the entity publishing this self-
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relating to all resources described in the INR extension of this relating to all resources described in the INR extension of this
certificate. certificate.
An RP SHOULD perform these functions for each instance of TAL that it An RP SHOULD perform these functions for each instance of TAL that it
is holding for this purpose every time the RP performs a is holding for this purpose every time the RP performs a
resynchronization across the local repository cache. In any case, an resynchronization across the local repository cache. In any case, an
RP also SHOULD perform these functions prior to the expiration of the RP also SHOULD perform these functions prior to the expiration of the
locally cached copy of the retrieved trust anchor referenced by the locally cached copy of the retrieved trust anchor referenced by the
TAL. TAL.
In the case where a TAL contains multiple URIs, an RP MAY use a In the case where a TAL contains multiple Trust Anchor URIs, an RP
locally defined preference rule to select the URI to retrieve the MAY use a locally defined preference rule to select the URI to
self-signed RPKI CA certificate that is to be used as a trust anchor. retrieve the self-signed RPKI CA certificate that is to be used as a
Some examples are: trust anchor. Some examples are:
o Using the order provided in the TAL o Using the order provided in the TAL
o Selecting the URI randomly from the available list o Selecting the Trust Anchor URI randomly from the available list
o Creating a prioritized list of URIs based on RP-specific o Creating a prioritized list of URIs based on RP-specific
parameters, such as connection establishment delay parameters, such as connection establishment delay
If the connection to the preferred URI fails, or the retrieved CA If the connection to the preferred URI fails, or the retrieved CA
certificate public key does not match the TAL public key, the RP certificate public key does not match the TAL public key, the RP
SHOULD retrieve the CA certificate from the next URI, according to SHOULD retrieve the CA certificate from the next URI, according to
the local preference ranking of URIs. the local preference ranking of URIs.
4. HTTPS Considerations 4. HTTPS Considerations
Note that a Man in the Middle (MITM) cannot produce a CA certificate Note that a Man in the Middle (MITM) cannot produce a CA certificate
that would be considered valid according to the process described in that would be considered valid according to the process described in
Section 3. However, a MITM attack can be performed to prevent the Section 3. However, a MITM attack can be performed to prevent the
Relying Party from learning about an updated CA certificate. Because Relying Party from learning about an updated CA certificate. Because
of this, Relying Parties SHOULD do TLS certificate and host name of this, Relying Parties MUST do TLS certificate and host name
validation when they fetch a CA certificate using an HTTPS URI on a validation when they fetch a CA certificate using an HTTPS URI on a
TAL. TAL.
Relying Party tools SHOULD log any TLS certificate or host name Relying Party tools SHOULD log any TLS certificate or host name
validation issues found, so that an operator can investigate the validation issues found, so that an operator can investigate the
cause. However, such validation issues are often due to cause.
configuration errors or a lack of a common TLS trust anchor. In
these cases, it is better if the Relying Party retrieves the CA
certificate regardless and performs validation on it. Therefore, the
Relying Party MUST continue to retrieve the data in case of errors.
It is RECOMMENDED that Relying Parties and Repository Servers follow It is RECOMMENDED that Relying Parties and Repository Servers follow
the Best Current Practices outlined in [RFC7525] on the use of HTTP the Best Current Practices outlined in [RFC7525] on the use of HTTP
over TLS (HTTPS) [RFC7230]. Relying Parties SHOULD do TLS over TLS (HTTPS) [RFC7230]. Relying Parties SHOULD do TLS
certificate and host name validation using subjectAltName dNSName certificate and host name validation using subjectAltName dNSName
identities as described in [RFC6125]. The rules and guidelines identities as described in [RFC6125]. The rules and guidelines
defined in [RFC6125] apply here, with the following considerations: defined in [RFC6125] apply here, with the following considerations:
o Relying Parties and Repository Servers SHOULD support the DNS-ID o Relying Parties and Repository Servers SHOULD support the DNS-ID
identifier type. The DNS-ID identifier type SHOULD be present in identifier type. The DNS-ID identifier type SHOULD be present in
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wildcard character "*". wildcard character "*".
o A Common Name (CN) field may be present in a Repository Server o A Common Name (CN) field may be present in a Repository Server
certificate's subject name but SHOULD NOT be used for certificate's subject name but SHOULD NOT be used for
authentication within the rules described in [RFC6125]. authentication within the rules described in [RFC6125].
o This protocol does not require the use of SRV-IDs. o This protocol does not require the use of SRV-IDs.
o This protocol does not require the use of URI-IDs. o This protocol does not require the use of URI-IDs.
Note, however, that this validation is done on a best-effort basis
and serves to highlight potential issues, but CA certificate
validation in relation to a TAL as described in Section 3 does not
depend on this. Therefore, Relying Parties MAY deviate from the
validation steps listed above.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
Compromise of a trust anchor private key permits unauthorized parties Compromise of a trust anchor private key permits unauthorized parties
to masquerade as a trust anchor, with potentially severe to masquerade as a trust anchor, with potentially severe
consequences. Reliance on an inappropriate or incorrect trust anchor consequences. Reliance on an inappropriate or incorrect trust anchor
has similar potentially severe consequences. has similar potentially severe consequences.
This TAL does not directly provide a list of resources covered by the This TAL does not directly provide a list of resources covered by the
referenced self-signed CA certificate. Instead, the RP is referred referenced self-signed CA certificate. Instead, the RP is referred
to the trust anchor itself and the INR extension(s) within this to the trust anchor itself and the INR extension(s) within this
skipping to change at page 8, line 14 skipping to change at page 8, line 19
6. Acknowledgements 6. Acknowledgements
This approach to trust anchor material was originally described by This approach to trust anchor material was originally described by
Robert Kisteleki. Robert Kisteleki.
The authors acknowledge the contributions of Rob Austein and Randy The authors acknowledge the contributions of Rob Austein and Randy
Bush, who assisted with drafting this document and with helpful Bush, who assisted with drafting this document and with helpful
review comments. review comments.
The authors acknowledge with work of Roque Gagliano, Terry Manderson, The authors acknowledge work of Roque Gagliano, Terry Manderson, and
and Carlos Martinez Cagnazzo in developing the ideas behind the Carlos Martinez Cagnazzo in developing the ideas behind the inclusion
inclusion of multiple URIs in the TAL. of multiple URIs in the TAL.
The authors acknowledge Job Snijders for suggesting the inclusion of
comments at the start of the TAL.
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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