draft-ietf-sidrops-https-tal-08.txt   rfc8630.txt 
Network Working Group G. Huston Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) G. Huston
Internet-Draft APNIC Request for Comments: 8630 APNIC
Obsoletes: 7730 (if approved) S. Weiler Obsoletes: 7730 S. Weiler
Intended status: Standards Track W3C/MIT Category: Standards Track W3C/MIT
Expires: November 1, 2019 G. Michaelson ISSN: 2070-1721 G. Michaelson
APNIC APNIC
S. Kent S. Kent
Unaffiliated Unaffiliated
T. Bruijnzeels T. Bruijnzeels
NLnet Labs NLnet Labs
April 30, 2019 August 2019
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor Locator Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor Locator
draft-ietf-sidrops-https-tal-08
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) for the Resource This document defines a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) for the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). TALs allow Relying Parties in the Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). The TAL allows Relying Parties in
RPKI to download the current Trust Anchor (TA) CA certificate from the RPKI to download the current Trust Anchor (TA) Certification
one or more locations, and verify that the key of this self-signed Authority (CA) certificate from one or more locations and verify that
certificate matches the key on the TAL. Thus, Relying Parties can be the key of this self-signed certificate matches the key on the TAL.
configured with TA keys, but allow these TAs to change the content of Thus, Relying Parties can be configured with TA keys but can allow
their CA certificate. In particular it allows TAs to change the set these TAs to change the content of their CA certificate. In
of IP Address Delegations and/or Autonomous System Identifier particular, it allows TAs to change the set of IP Address Delegations
Delegations included in the RFC3779 extension of their certificate. and/or Autonomous System Identifier Delegations included in the
extension(s) (RFC 3779) of their certificate.
This document obsoletes the previous definition of Trust Anchor This document obsoletes the previous definition of the TAL as
Locators in RFC 7730 by adding support for RFC3986 Uniform Resource provided in RFC 7730 by adding support for Uniform Resource
Identifiers (URIs) that use HTTPS as the scheme. Identifiers (URIs) (RFC 3986) that use HTTP over TLS (HTTPS) (RFC
7230) as the scheme.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 1, 2019. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8630.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction ....................................................2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Terminology ................................................3
1.2. Changes from RFC7730 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Changes from RFC 7730 ......................................3
2. Trust Anchor Locator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Trust Anchor Locator ............................................3
2.1. Trust Anchor Locator Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Trust Anchor Locator Motivation ............................3
2.2. Trust Anchor Locator File Format . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Trust Anchor Locator File Format ...........................4
2.3. TAL and Trust Anchor Certificate Considerations . . . . . 4 2.3. TAL and TA Certificate Considerations ......................4
2.4. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.4. Example ....................................................6
3. Relying Party Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Relying Party Use ...............................................6
4. URI Scheme Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. URI Scheme Considerations .......................................7
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. Security Considerations .........................................8
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. IANA Considerations .............................................8
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. References ......................................................8
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.1. Normative References .......................................8
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.2. Informative References ....................................10
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Acknowledgements ..................................................10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Authors' Addresses ................................................11
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) for the Resource This document defines a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) for the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. This format may be used Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. This format may be used
to distribute trust anchor material using a mix of out-of-band and to distribute Trust Anchor (TA) material using a mix of out-of-band
online means. Procedures used by Relying Parties (RPs) to verify and online means. Procedures used by Relying Parties (RPs) to verify
RPKI signed objects SHOULD support this format to facilitate RPKI signed objects SHOULD support this format to facilitate
interoperability between creators of trust anchor material and RPs. interoperability between creators of TA material and RPs. This
This document obsoletes [RFC7730] by adding support for HTTPS URIs document obsoletes [RFC7730] by adding support for Uniform Resource
[RFC7230] in a TAL. Identifiers (URIs) [RFC3986] that use HTTP over TLS (HTTPS) [RFC7230]
as the scheme.
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
1.2. Changes from RFC7730 1.2. Changes from RFC 7730
The TAL format defined in this document differs from the definition The TAL format defined in this document differs from the definition
in [RFC7730] in that: in [RFC7730] in that:
o it allows for the use of the HTTPS scheme in URIs [RFC7230]; and o it allows for the use of the HTTPS scheme in URIs [RFC7230], and
o it allows for the inclusion of an optional comment section. o it allows for the inclusion of an optional comment section.
Note that current Relying Parties may not support this new format Note that current RPs may not support this new format yet.
yet. Therefore it is RECOMMENDED that a Trust Anchor operator Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that a TA operator maintain a TAL file
maintains a [RFC7730] TAL file for a time as well until they are as defined in [RFC7730] for a time as well, until they are satisfied
satisfied that RP tooling has been updated. that RP tooling has been updated.
2. Trust Anchor Locator 2. Trust Anchor Locator
2.1. Trust Anchor Locator Motivation 2.1. Trust Anchor Locator Motivation
This document does not propose a new format for trust anchor This document does not propose a new format for TA material. A TA in
material. A trust anchor in the RPKI is represented by a self-signed the RPKI is represented by a self-signed X.509 Certification
X.509 Certification Authority (CA) certificate, a format commonly Authority (CA) certificate, a format commonly used in PKIs and widely
used in PKIs and widely supported by RP software. This document supported by RP software. This document specifies a format for data
specifies a format for data used to retrieve and verify the used to retrieve and verify the authenticity of a TA in a very simple
authenticity of a trust anchor in a very simple fashion. That data fashion. That data is referred to as the TAL.
is referred to as the TAL.
The motivation for defining the TAL is to enable selected data in the The motivation for defining the TAL is to enable selected data in the
trust anchor to change, without needing to redistribute the trust TA to change, without needing to redistribute the TA per se.
anchor per se.
In the RPKI, certificates contain an RFC3779 extension, that can In the RPKI, certificates contain one or more extensions [RFC3779]
contain a set of IP Address Delegations and/or Autonomous System that can contain a set of IP Address Delegations and/or Autonomous
Identifier Delegations. In this document we refer to these System Identifier Delegations. In this document, we refer to these
delegations as the Internet Number Resources (INR) contained in an delegations as the Internet Number Resources (INRs) contained in an
RPKI certificate. RPKI certificate.
The set of INRs associated with an entity acting as a trust anchor is The set of INRs associated with an entity acting as a TA is likely to
likely to change over time. Thus, if one were to use the common PKI change over time. Thus, if one were to use the common PKI convention
convention of distributing a trust anchor to RPs in a secure fashion, of distributing a TA to RPs in a secure fashion, then this procedure
then this procedure would need to be repeated whenever the INR set would need to be repeated whenever the INR set for the entity acting
for the entity acting as a trust anchor changed. By distributing the as a TA changed. By distributing the TAL (in a secure fashion)
TAL (in a secure fashion), instead of distributing the trust anchor, instead of distributing the TA, this problem is avoided, i.e., the
this problem is avoided, i.e., the TAL is constant so long as the TAL is constant so long as the TA's public key and its location do
trust anchor's public key and its location do not change. not change.
The TAL is analogous to the TrustAnchorInfo data structure specified The TAL is analogous to the TrustAnchorInfo data structure specified
in [RFC5914], which is on the Standards Track. That specification in [RFC5914], which is on the Standards Track. That specification
could be used to represent the TAL, if one defined an rsync or HTTPS could be used to represent the TAL, if one defined an rsync or HTTPS
URI extension for that data structure. However, the TAL format was URI extension for that data structure. However, the TAL format was
adopted by RPKI implementors prior to the PKIX trust anchor work, and adopted by RPKI implementors prior to the PKIX TA work, and the RPKI
the RPKI implementer community has elected to utilize the TAL format, implementor community has elected to utilize the TAL format rather
rather than define the requisite extension. The community also than define the requisite extension. The community also prefers the
prefers the simplicity of the ASCII encoding of the TAL, versus the simplicity of the ASCII encoding of the TAL, versus the binary
binary (ASN.1) encoding for TrustAnchorInfo. (ASN.1) encoding for TrustAnchorInfo.
2.2. Trust Anchor Locator File Format 2.2. Trust Anchor Locator File Format
In this document we define a Trust Anchor URI as a URI that can be In this document, we define a TA URI as a URI that can be used to
used to retrieved a current Trust Anchor certificate. This URI MUST retrieve a current TA certificate. This URI MUST be either an rsync
be either an rsync URI [RFC5781], or an HTTPS URI [RFC7230]. URI [RFC5781] or an HTTPS URI [RFC7230].
The TAL is an ordered sequence of: The TAL is an ordered sequence of:
1. an optional comment section consisting of one or more lines each 1. an optional comment section consisting of one or more lines each
starting with the '#' character, followed by human readable starting with the "#" character, followed by human-readable
informational UTF-8 text, conforming to the restrictions defined informational UTF-8 text, conforming to the restrictions defined
in section 2 of [RFC5198], and ending with a line break, in Section 2 of [RFC5198], and ending with a line break,
2. a URI section, that is comprised of one or more ordered lines, 2. a URI section that is comprised of one or more ordered lines,
each containing a Trust Anchor URI, and ending with a line break, each containing a TA URI, and ending with a line break,
3. a line break, 3. a line break, and
4. a subjectPublicKeyInfo [RFC5280] in DER format [X.509], encoded 4. a subjectPublicKeyInfo [RFC5280] in DER format [X.509], encoded
in Base64 (see Section 4 of [RFC4648]). To avoid long lines, in base64 (see Section 4 of [RFC4648]). To avoid long lines,
line breaks MAY be inserted into the Base64-encoded string. line breaks MAY be inserted into the base64-encoded string.
Note that line breaks in this file can use either "<CRLF>" or "<LF>". Note that line breaks in this file can use either "<CRLF>" or "<LF>".
2.3. TAL and Trust Anchor Certificate Considerations 2.3. TAL and TA Certificate Considerations
Each Trust Anchor URI in the TAL MUST reference a single object. It Each TA URI in the TAL MUST reference a single object. It MUST NOT
MUST NOT reference a directory or any other form of collection of reference a directory or any other form of collection of objects.
objects. The referenced object MUST be a self-signed CA certificate The referenced object MUST be a self-signed CA certificate that
that conforms to the RPKI certificate profile [RFC6487]. This conforms to the RPKI certificate profile [RFC6487]. This certificate
certificate is the trust anchor in certification path discovery is the TA in certification path discovery [RFC4158] and validation
[RFC4158] and validation [RFC5280] [RFC3779]. [RFC5280] [RFC3779].
The validity interval of this trust anchor is chosen such that the The validity interval of this TA is chosen such that (1) the
"notBefore" time predates the moment that this certificate is "notBefore" time predates the moment that this certificate is
published, and the "notAfter" time is after the planned time of re- published and (2) the "notAfter" time is after the planned time of
issuance of this certificate. reissuance of this certificate.
The INR extension(s) of this trust anchor MUST contain a non-empty The INR extension(s) of this TA MUST contain a non-empty set of
set of number resources. It MUST NOT use the "inherit" form of the number resources. It MUST NOT use the "inherit" form of the INR
INR extension(s). The INR set described in this certificate is the extension(s). The INR set described in this certificate is the set
set of number resources for which the issuing entity is offering of number resources for which the issuing entity is offering itself
itself as a putative trust anchor in the RPKI [RFC6480]. as a putative TA in the RPKI [RFC6480].
The public key used to verify the trust anchor MUST be the same as The public key used to verify the TA MUST be the same as the
the subjectPublicKeyInfo in the CA certificate and in the TAL. subjectPublicKeyInfo in the CA certificate and in the TAL.
The trust anchor MUST contain a stable key which does not change when The TA MUST contain a stable key that does not change when the
the certificate is reissued due to changes in the INR extension(s), certificate is reissued due to changes in the INR extension(s), when
when the certificate is renewed prior to expiration. the certificate is renewed prior to expiration.
Because the public key in the TAL and the trust anchor MUST be Because the public key in the TAL and the TA MUST be stable, this
stable, this motivates operation of that CA in an offline mode. In motivates operation of that CA in an offline mode. In that case, a
that case a subordinate CA certificate containing the same INRs, or subordinate CA certificate containing the same INRs, or, in theory,
in theory any sub-set of INRs, can be issued for online operations. any subset of INRs, can be issued for online operations. This allows
This allows the entity that issues the trust anchor to keep the the entity that issues the TA to keep the corresponding private key
corresponding private key of this certificate offline, while issuing of this certificate offline, while issuing all relevant child
all relevant child certificates under the immediate subordinate CA. certificates under the immediate subordinate CA. This measure also
This measure also allows the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) issued allows the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) issued by that entity to
by that entity to be used to revoke the subordinate CA certificate in be used to revoke the subordinate CA certificate in the event of
the event of suspected key compromise of this online operational key suspected key compromise of this online operational key pair that is
pair that is potentially more vulnerable. potentially more vulnerable.
The trust anchor MUST be published at a stable URI. When the trust The TA MUST be published at a stable URI. When the TA is reissued
anchor is reissued for any reason, the replacement CA certificate for any reason, the replacement CA certificate MUST be accessible
MUST be accessible using the same URI. using the same URI.
Because the trust anchor is a self-signed certificate, there is no Because the TA is a self-signed certificate, there is no
corresponding CRL that can be used to revoke it, nor is there a corresponding CRL that can be used to revoke it, nor is there a
manifest [RFC6486] that lists this certificate. manifest [RFC6486] that lists this certificate.
If an entity wishes to withdraw a self-signed CA certificate as a If an entity wishes to withdraw a self-signed CA certificate as a
putative trust anchor, for any reason, including key rollover, the putative TA, for any reason, including key rollover, the entity MUST
entity MUST remove the object from the location referenced in the remove the object from the location referenced in the TAL.
TAL.
Where the TAL contains two or more Trust Anchor URIs, then the same Where the TAL contains two or more TA URIs, the same self-signed
self-signed CA certificate MUST be found at each referenced location. CA certificate MUST be found at each referenced location. In order
In order to increase operational resilience, it is RECOMMENDED that to increase operational resilience, it is RECOMMENDED that
the domain name parts of each of these URIs resolve to distinct IP (1) the domain name parts of each of these URIs resolve to distinct
addresses that are used by a diverse set of repository publication IP addresses that are used by a diverse set of repository publication
points, and these IP addresses be included in distinct Route Origin points and (2) these IP addresses be included in distinct Route
Authorizations (ROAs) objects signed by different CAs. Origin Authorization (ROA) objects signed by different CAs.
2.4. Example 2.4. Example
# This TAL is intended for documentation purposes only. # This TAL is intended for documentation purposes only.
# Do not attempt to use this in a production setting. # Do not attempt to use this in a production setting.
rsync://rpki.example.org/rpki/hedgehog/root.cer rsync://rpki.example.org/rpki/hedgehog/root.cer
https://rpki.example.org/rpki/hedgehog/root.cer https://rpki.example.org/rpki/hedgehog/root.cer
MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAovWQL2lh6knDx MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAovWQL2lh6knDx
GUG5hbtCXvvh4AOzjhDkSHlj22gn/1oiM9IeDATIwP44vhQ6L/xvuk7W6 GUG5hbtCXvvh4AOzjhDkSHlj22gn/1oiM9IeDATIwP44vhQ6L/xvuk7W6
Kfa5ygmqQ+xOZOwTWPcrUbqaQyPNxokuivzyvqVZVDecOEqs78q58mSp9 Kfa5ygmqQ+xOZOwTWPcrUbqaQyPNxokuivzyvqVZVDecOEqs78q58mSp9
nbtxmLRW7B67SJCBSzfa5XpVyXYEgYAjkk3fpmefU+AcxtxvvHB5OVPIa nbtxmLRW7B67SJCBSzfa5XpVyXYEgYAjkk3fpmefU+AcxtxvvHB5OVPIa
BfPcs80ICMgHQX+fphvute9XLxjfJKJWkhZqZ0v7pZm2uhkcPx1PMGcrG BfPcs80ICMgHQX+fphvute9XLxjfJKJWkhZqZ0v7pZm2uhkcPx1PMGcrG
ee0WSDC3fr3erLueagpiLsFjwwpX6F+Ms8vqz45H+DKmYKvPSstZjCCq9 ee0WSDC3fr3erLueagpiLsFjwwpX6F+Ms8vqz45H+DKmYKvPSstZjCCq9
aJ0qANT9OtnfSDOS+aLRPjZryCNyvvBHxZXqj5YCGKtwIDAQAB aJ0qANT9OtnfSDOS+aLRPjZryCNyvvBHxZXqj5YCGKtwIDAQAB
3. Relying Party Use 3. Relying Party Use
In order to use the TAL to retrieve and validate a (putative) trust In order to use the TAL to retrieve and validate a (putative) TA, an
anchor, an RP SHOULD: RP SHOULD:
1. Retrieve the object referenced by (one of) the Trust Anchor 1. Retrieve the object referenced by (one of) the TA URI(s)
URI(s) contained in the TAL. contained in the TAL.
2. Confirm that the retrieved object is a current, self-signed RPKI 2. Confirm that the retrieved object is a current, self-signed RPKI
CA certificate that conforms to the profile as specified in CA certificate that conforms to the profile as specified in
[RFC6487]. [RFC6487].
3. Confirm that the public key in the TAL matches the public key in 3. Confirm that the public key in the TAL matches the public key in
the retrieved object. the retrieved object.
4. Perform other checks, as deemed appropriate (locally), to ensure 4. Perform other checks, as deemed appropriate (locally), to ensure
that the RP is willing to accept the entity publishing this self- that the RP is willing to accept the entity publishing this
signed CA certificate to be a trust anchor. These tests apply to self-signed CA certificate to be a TA. These tests apply to the
the validity of attestations made in the context of the RPKI validity of attestations made in the context of the RPKI relating
relating to all resources described in the INR extension of this to all resources described in the INR extension(s) of this
certificate. certificate.
An RP SHOULD perform these functions for each instance of TAL that it An RP SHOULD perform these functions for each instance of a TAL that
is holding for this purpose every time the RP performs a it is holding for this purpose every time the RP performs a
resynchronization across the local repository cache. In any case, an resynchronization across the local repository cache. In any case, an
RP also SHOULD perform these functions prior to the expiration of the RP also SHOULD perform these functions prior to the expiration of the
locally cached copy of the retrieved trust anchor referenced by the locally cached copy of the retrieved TA referenced by the TAL.
TAL.
In the case where a TAL contains multiple Trust Anchor URIs, an RP In the case where a TAL contains multiple TA URIs, an RP MAY use a
MAY use a locally defined preference rule to select the URI to locally defined preference rule to select the URI to retrieve the
retrieve the self-signed RPKI CA certificate that is to be used as a self-signed RPKI CA certificate that is to be used as a TA. Some
trust anchor. Some examples are: examples are:
o Using the order provided in the TAL o Using the order provided in the TAL
o Selecting the Trust Anchor URI randomly from the available list o Selecting the TA URI randomly from the available list
o Creating a prioritized list of URIs based on RP-specific o Creating a prioritized list of URIs based on RP-specific
parameters, such as connection establishment delay parameters, such as connection establishment delay
If the connection to the preferred URI fails, or the retrieved CA If the connection to the preferred URI fails or the retrieved CA
certificate public key does not match the TAL public key, the RP certificate public key does not match the TAL public key, the RP
SHOULD retrieve the CA certificate from the next URI, according to SHOULD retrieve the CA certificate from the next URI, according to
the local preference ranking of URIs. the local preference ranking of URIs.
4. URI Scheme Considerations 4. URI Scheme Considerations
Please note that the RSYNC protocol provides neither transport Please note that the RSYNC protocol provides neither transport
security nor any means by which the Relying Party can validate that security nor any means by which the RP can validate that they are
they are connected to the proper host. There it is RECOMMENDED that connected to the proper host. Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that
HTTPS is used as the preferred scheme. HTTPS be used as the preferred scheme.
Note that, although a Man in the Middle (MITM) cannot produce a CA Note that, although a Man in the Middle (MITM) cannot produce a CA
certificate that would be considered valid according to the process certificate that would be considered valid according to the process
described in Section 3, this attack can prevent that the Relying described in Section 3, this type of attack can prevent the RP from
Party learns about an updated CA certificate. learning about an updated CA certificate.
Relying Parties MUST do TLS certificate and host name validation when RPs MUST do TLS certificate and host name validation when they fetch
they fetch a CA certificate using an HTTPS URI on a TAL. RPs SHOULD a CA certificate using an HTTPS URI on a TAL. RPs SHOULD log any TLS
log any TLS certificate or host name validation issues found, so that certificate or host name validation issues found so that an operator
an operator can investigate the cause. can investigate the cause.
It is RECOMMENDED that Relying Parties and Repository Servers follow It is RECOMMENDED that RPs and Repository Servers follow the Best
the Best Current Practices outlined in [RFC7525] on the use of HTTP Current Practices outlined in [RFC7525] on the use of HTTPS
over TLS (HTTPS) [RFC7230]. Relying Parties SHOULD do TLS [RFC7230]. RPs SHOULD do TLS certificate and host name validation
certificate and host name validation using subjectAltName dNSName using subjectAltName dNSName identities as described in [RFC6125].
identities as described in [RFC6125]. The rules and guidelines The rules and guidelines defined in [RFC6125] apply here, with the
defined in [RFC6125] apply here, with the following considerations: following considerations:
o Relying Parties and Repository Servers SHOULD support the DNS-ID o RPs and Repository Servers SHOULD support the DNS-ID identifier
identifier type. The DNS-ID identifier type SHOULD be present in type. The DNS-ID identifier type SHOULD be present in Repository
Repository Server certificates. Server certificates.
o DNS names in Repository Server certificates SHOULD NOT contain the o DNS names in Repository Server certificates SHOULD NOT contain the
wildcard character "*". wildcard character "*".
o A Common Name (CN) field may be present in a Repository Server
certificate's subject name but SHOULD NOT be used for
authentication within the rules described in [RFC6125].
o This protocol does not require the use of SRV-IDs. o This protocol does not require the use of SRV-IDs.
o This protocol does not require the use of URI-IDs. o This protocol does not require the use of URI-IDs.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
Compromise of a trust anchor private key permits unauthorized parties Compromise of a TA private key permits unauthorized parties to
to masquerade as a trust anchor, with potentially severe masquerade as a TA, with potentially severe consequences. Reliance
consequences. Reliance on an inappropriate or incorrect trust anchor on an inappropriate or incorrect TA has similar potentially severe
has similar potentially severe consequences. consequences.
This TAL does not directly provide a list of resources covered by the This TAL does not directly provide a list of resources covered by the
referenced self-signed CA certificate. Instead, the RP is referred referenced self-signed CA certificate. Instead, the RP is referred
to the trust anchor itself and the INR extension(s) within this to the TA itself and the INR extension(s) within this certificate.
certificate. This provides necessary operational flexibility, but it This provides necessary operational flexibility, but it also allows
also allows the certificate issuer to claim to be authoritative for the certificate issuer to claim to be authoritative for any resource.
any resource. Relying parties should either have great confidence in RPs should either (1) have great confidence in the issuers of such
the issuers of such certificates that they are configuring as trust certificates that they are configuring as TAs or (2) issue their own
anchors, or they should issue their own self-signed certificate as a self-signed certificate as a TA and, in doing so, impose constraints
trust anchor and, in doing so, impose constraints on the subordinate on the subordinate certificates.
certificates.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA. This document has no IANA actions.
7. Acknowledgements
This approach to trust anchor material was originally described by
Robert Kisteleki.
The authors acknowledge the contributions of Rob Austein and Randy
Bush, who assisted with drafting this document and with helpful
review comments.
The authors acknowledge work of Roque Gagliano, Terry Manderson, and
Carlos Martinez Cagnazzo in developing the ideas behind the inclusion
of multiple URIs in the TAL.
The authors acknowledge Job Snijders for suggesting the inclusion of
comments at the start of the TAL.
8. References 7. References
8.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004, DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5198] Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for Network [RFC5198] Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for Network
Interchange", RFC 5198, DOI 10.17487/RFC5198, March 2008, Interchange", RFC 5198, DOI 10.17487/RFC5198, March 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5198>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5198>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
skipping to change at page 9, line 41 skipping to change at page 9, line 23
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI [RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI
Scheme", RFC 5781, DOI 10.17487/RFC5781, February 2010, Scheme", RFC 5781, DOI 10.17487/RFC5781, February 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5781>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5781>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125,
2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>. March 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>. February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer [RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing", Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014, RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525,
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>. May 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[RFC7730] Huston, G., Weiler, S., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent, [RFC7730] Huston, G., Weiler, S., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent,
"Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor "Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor
Locator", RFC 7730, DOI 10.17487/RFC7730, January 2016, Locator", RFC 7730, DOI 10.17487/RFC7730, January 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7730>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7730>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[X.509] ITU-T, "The Directory: Public-key and attribute [X.509] ITU-T, "Information technology - Open Systems
certificate frameworks", October 2012. Interconnection - The Directory: Public-key and attribute
certificate frameworks", ITU-T Recommendation X.509,
October 2016, <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509>.
8.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[RFC4158] Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R. [RFC4158] Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R.
Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
Certification Path Building", RFC 4158, Certification Path Building", RFC 4158,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4158, September 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4158, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4158>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4158>.
[RFC5914] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor [RFC5914] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor
Format", RFC 5914, DOI 10.17487/RFC5914, June 2010, Format", RFC 5914, DOI 10.17487/RFC5914, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5914>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5914>.
[RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, [RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
"Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012, (RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.
Acknowledgements
This approach to TA material was originally described by Robert
Kisteleki.
The authors acknowledge the contributions of Rob Austein and Randy
Bush, who assisted with drafting this document and with helpful
review comments.
The authors acknowledge the work of Roque Gagliano, Terry Manderson,
and Carlos Martinez-Cagnazzo in developing the ideas behind the
inclusion of multiple URIs in the TAL.
The authors acknowledge Job Snijders for suggesting the inclusion of
comments at the start of the TAL.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Geoff Huston Geoff Huston
APNIC APNIC
Email: gih@apnic.net Email: gih@apnic.net
URI: https://www.apnic.net URI: https://www.apnic.net
Samuel Weiler Samuel Weiler
W3C/MIT W3C/MIT
Email: weiler@csail.mit.edu Email: weiler@csail.mit.edu
George Michaelson George Michaelson
APNIC APNIC
Email: ggm@apnic.net Email: ggm@apnic.net
URI: https://www.apnic.net URI: https://www.apnic.net
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