draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-clarify-01.txt   draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-clarify-02.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: Standards Track April 19, 2018 Intended status: Standards Track April 26, 2018
Expires: October 21, 2018 Expires: October 28, 2018
Origin Validation Clarifications Origin Validation Clarifications
draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-clarify-01 draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-clarify-02
Abstract Abstract
Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation is hampered by, among Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation is hampered by, among
other things, vendor mis-implementations in two critical areas, which other things, vendor mis-implementations in two critical areas, which
routes are validated and whether policy is applied when not specified routes are validated and whether policy is applied when not specified
by configuration. This document is meant to clarify possible by configuration. This document is meant to clarify possible
misunderstandings causing those mis-implementations. misunderstandings causing those mis-implementations.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 21, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 28, 2018.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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operator configuration. operator configuration.
2. Suggested Reading 2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI,
[RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), [RFC6482], and RPKI- [RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), [RFC6482], and RPKI-
based Prefix Validation, [RFC6811]. based Prefix Validation, [RFC6811].
3. Mark ALL Prefixes 3. Mark ALL Prefixes
A router SHOULD validate and mark all routes in its BGP, no matter Significant Clarification: A router MUST mark all routes in BGP
how received. Otherwise the operator does not have the ability to coming from any source (eBGP, iBGP, or redistribution from static),
drop Invalid routes; and is therefore liable to complaints from unless specifically configured otherwise by the operator. Else the
neighbors about propagation of invalid routes. For this reason, operator does not have the ability to drop Invalid routes coming from
every potential source; and is therefore liable to complaints from
neighbors about propagation of Invalid routes. For this reason,
[RFC6811] says [RFC6811] says
"When a BGP speaker receives an UPDATE from a neighbor, it SHOULD "When a BGP speaker receives an UPDATE from a neighbor, it SHOULD
perform a lookup as described above for each of the Routes in the perform a lookup as described above for each of the Routes in the
UPDATE message. The lookup SHOULD also be applied to routes that are UPDATE message. The lookup SHOULD also be applied to routes that are
redistributed into BGP from another source, such as another protocol redistributed into BGP from another source, such as another protocol
or a locally defined static route." or a locally defined static route."
[RFC6811] goes on to say "An implementation MAY provide configuration [RFC6811] goes on to say "An implementation MAY provide configuration
options to control which routes the lookup is applied to." options to control which routes the lookup is applied to."
Significant Clarification: In the absence of the operator applying
such policy, ALL routes in BGP MUST be marked.
This means that, on a router, all routes in BGP, absent operator
configuration otherwise, MUST have been marked because they were
either received via BGP (whether eBGP or iBGP), redistributed from an
IGP, static, or directly connected, or any other distribution into
BGP.
When redistributing into BGP from connected, static, IGP, iBGP, etc., When redistributing into BGP from connected, static, IGP, iBGP, etc.,
there is no AS_PATH in the input to allow RPKI validation of the there is no AS_PATH in the input to allow RPKI validation of the
originating AS. In such cases, the router SHOULD use the AS of the originating AS. In such cases, the router SHOULD use the AS of the
router's BGP configuration. If that is ambiguous because of router's BGP configuration. If that is ambiguous because of
confederation, AS migration, or other multi-AS configuration, then confederation, AS migration, or other multi-AS configuration, then
the router configuration MUST provide a means of specifying the AS to the router configuration MUST provide a means of specifying the AS to
be used on the redistribution, either per redistribution or globally. be used on the redistribution, either per redistribution or globally.
4. Marking not Acting 4. Marking not Acting
Significant Clarification: Once routes are marked, the operator Significant Clarification: Once routes are marked, the operator
should be in complete control of any policy applied based the should be in complete control of any policy applied based the
markings. Absent operator configuration, policy MUST NOT be applied. markings. Absent specific operator configuration, policy MUST NOT be
applied.
Automatic origin validation policy actions such as those described in Automatic origin validation policy actions such as those described in
[RFC8097], BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community, [RFC8097], BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community,
MUST NOT be carried out or otherwise applied unless specifically MUST NOT be carried out or otherwise applied unless specifically
configured by the operator. configured by the operator.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
This document does not create security considerations beyond those of This document does not create security considerations beyond those of
[RFC6811]. [RFC6811].
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