draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-clarify-03.txt   draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-clarify-04.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Updates: 6811 (if approved) July 25, 2018 Updates: 6811 (if approved) August 10, 2018
Intended status: Standards Track Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: January 26, 2019 Expires: February 11, 2019
Origin Validation Clarifications BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation Clarifications
draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-clarify-03 draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-clarify-04
Abstract Abstract
Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation is hampered by, among Deployment of Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) based BGP
other things, vendor mis-implementations in two critical areas: which origin validation is hampered by, among other things, vendor mis-
routes are validated and whether policy is applied when not specified implementations in two critical areas: which routes are validated and
by configuration. This document is meant to clarify possible whether policy is applied when not specified by configuration. This
misunderstandings causing those mis-implementations; and thus updates document is meant to clarify possible misunderstandings causing those
RFC6811 by clarifying that all prefixes should be marked, and that mis-implementations; and thus updates RFC6811 by clarifying that all
policy must not be applied without operator configuration" prefixes should have their validation state set, and that policy must
not be applied without operator configuration.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
be interpreted as described in [RFC8174] only when they appear in all be interpreted as described in [RFC8174] only when they appear in all
upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English
words, without normative meaning. words, without normative meaning.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 26, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on February 11, 2019.
Internet-DrafBGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation Clarifications August 2018
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation is hampered by, among Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation is hampered by, among
other things, vendor mis-implementations in two critical areas, which other things, vendor mis-implementations in two critical areas, which
routes are validated and whether policy is applied when not specified routes are validated and whether policy is applied when not specified
by configuration. This document is meant to clarify possible by configuration. This document is meant to clarify possible
misunderstandings causing those mis-implementations. misunderstandings causing those mis-implementations.
When a route is distributed into BGP, origin validation marks the When a route is distributed into BGP, the origin validation state of
announcement as NotFound, Valid, or Invalid per [RFC6811]. the is set to as NotFound, Valid, or Invalid per [RFC6811].
Operational testing has shown that the specifications of that RFC Operational testing has shown that the specifications of that RFC
were not sufficient to avoid divergent implementations. This were not sufficient to avoid divergent implementations. This
document attempts to clarify two areas seeming to cause confusion. document attempts to clarify two areas seeming to cause confusion.
The implementation issues seem not to be about how to validate, i.e., The implementation issues seem not to be about how to validate, i.e.,
how to decide if a route is NotFound, Valid, or Invalid. The issues how to decide if a route is NotFound, Valid, or Invalid. The issues
seem to be which routes to mark and whether to apply policy without seem to be which routes to evaluate and set their evaluation state,
operator configuration. and whether to apply policy without operator configuration.
2. Suggested Reading 2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI,
[RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), [RFC6482], and RPKI- [RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), [RFC6482], and RPKI-
based Prefix Validation, [RFC6811]. based Prefix Validation, [RFC6811].
3. Mark ALL Prefixes 3. Evaluate ALL Prefixes
Significant Clarification: A router MUST mark all routes in BGP Significant Clarification: A router MUST evaluate and set the
coming from any source (eBGP, iBGP, or redistribution from static, validation state of all routes in BGP coming from any source (eBGP,
connected, etc.), unless specifically configured otherwise by the iBGP, or redistribution from static, connected, etc.), unless
operator. Else the operator does not have the ability to drop specifically configured otherwise by the operator. Else the operator
Invalid routes coming from every potential source; and is therefore does not have the ability to drop Invalid routes coming from every
liable to complaints from neighbors about propagation of Invalid potential source; and is therefore liable to complaints from
routes. For this reason, [RFC6811] says
Internet-DrafBGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation Clarifications August 2018
neighbors about propagation of Invalid routes. For this reason,
[RFC6811] says
"When a BGP speaker receives an UPDATE from a neighbor, it SHOULD "When a BGP speaker receives an UPDATE from a neighbor, it SHOULD
perform a lookup as described above for each of the Routes in the perform a lookup as described above for each of the Routes in the
UPDATE message. The lookup SHOULD also be applied to routes that are UPDATE message. The lookup SHOULD also be applied to routes that are
redistributed into BGP from another source, such as another protocol redistributed into BGP from another source, such as another protocol
or a locally defined static route." or a locally defined static route."
[RFC6811] goes on to say "An implementation MAY provide configuration [RFC6811] goes on to say "An implementation MAY provide configuration
options to control which routes the lookup is applied to." options to control which routes the lookup is applied to."
When redistributing into BGP from connected, static, IGP, iBGP, etc., When redistributing into BGP from connected, static, IGP, iBGP, etc.,
there is no AS_PATH in the input to allow RPKI validation of the there is no AS_PATH in the input to allow RPKI validation of the
originating AS. In such cases, the router SHOULD use the AS of the originating AS. In such cases, the router SHOULD use the AS of the
router's BGP configuration. If that is ambiguous because of router's BGP configuration. If that is ambiguous because of
confederation, AS migration, or other multi-AS configuration, then confederation, AS migration, or other multi-AS configuration, then
the router configuration MUST provide a means of specifying the AS to the router configuration MUST provide a means of specifying the AS to
be used on the redistribution, either per redistribution or globally. be used on the redistribution, either per redistribution or globally.
4. Marking not Acting 4. Set State, Don't Act
Significant Clarification: Once routes are marked, the operator Significant Clarification: Once routes are evaluated and have their
should be in complete control of any policy applied based on the state set, the operator should be in complete control of any policy
markings. Absent specific operator configuration, policy MUST NOT be applied based on the evaluation state. Absent specific operator
applied. configuration, policy MUST NOT be applied.
Automatic origin validation policy actions such as those described in Automatic origin validation policy actions such as those described in
[RFC8097], BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community, [RFC8097], BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community,
MUST NOT be carried out or otherwise applied unless specifically MUST NOT be carried out or otherwise applied unless specifically
configured by the operator. configured by the operator.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
This document does not create security considerations beyond those of This document does not create security considerations beyond those of
[RFC6811]. [RFC6811].
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This document has no IANA Considerations. This document has no IANA Considerations.
7. Acknowledgments 7. Acknowledgments
Many thanks to John Scudder who had the patience to give constructive Many thanks to John Scudder who had the patience to give constructive
review multiple times, and to Keyur Patel who noted that the AS might review multiple times, and to Keyur Patel who noted that the AS might
have to be specified. George Michaelson, Jay Borkenhagen, John have to be specified. George Michaelson, Jay Borkenhagen, John
Heasley, and Matthias Waehlisch kindly helped clean up loose wording. Heasley, and Matthias Waehlisch kindly helped clean up loose wording.
Internet-DrafBGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation Clarifications August 2018
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
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